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The Politics of Diversity in Nineteenth-Century Britain 
 
Abstract 
 
 This dissertation places the problem of social and ideological diversity at the center of 
nineteenth-century British political thought. Given our contemporary preoccupation with the 
diversity of beliefs, perspectives, and identities, it is tempting to assume that this diversity has always 
been regarded as a central political issue. Surprisingly, however, I contend that ideological diversity 
was identified as a political problem in a recognizably modern sense only in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution. A novel conception of ideological diversity emerged in nineteenth-century 
Britain, generating theoretical advancements above all in two areas: toleration and freedom of 
expression, and representation. 
 My examination of the first subject starts with the reconstruction of an important and 
neglected set of arguments from the 1810s-40s about the impact that the liberty of discussion and 
the press had in securing social peace and stability. I then move on to explore the extraordinary but 
little-known burst of theorizing about freedom of discussion that took place in the last third of the 
century. Contrary to what most political theorists today would expect, I show that the thought of 
John Stuart Mill was not considered to be representative of the theory of free expression – in part 
because Victorians, who were committed to a consequentialist and historicist account of the value of 
toleration, saw him as illicitly importing ahistorical principles of natural right into his work; and in 
part because he was thought to have expanded his theory beyond a proper notion of toleration to 
embrace a cluster of beliefs and attitudes (such as the neutrality of the state or the refusal to judge 
the quality of different opinions) which were unjustified and harmful. 
Part two demonstrates how central the concern for diversity was to the era’s famous debates 
about parliamentary reform and political representation. It depicts three leading institutional 
paradigms for the relationship between representation and diversity. The first is what I call the 
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variety-of-suffrages school. These authors put forward plans for electoral reform that deliberately varied 
the suffrage across constituencies in order to ensure seats in the House of Commons for different 
classes, interest groups, and ideological movements. Adherents to this school subscribed to an ideal 
of descriptive representation – they held that Parliament should “mirror” the diverse society for which it 
made laws. In contrast to this ideal, a uniform suffrage entailed bestowing an illiberal hegemony on 
only one part of the body politic: if the property requirement for the vote were restrictive, only the 
opinions of the upper classes would be included; conversely, if the property requirement were 
abolished, the working classes, by virtue of their vast numbers, would consistently outvote or 
“swamp” the other groups in society and lead to their exclusion from the assembly. Beyond simply 
being unfair to those excluded, such uniform suffrages would impair parliamentary deliberation by 
diminishing the range of ideas heard and rendering debate “partial.” These defects would in turn 
lead to ill-judged legislation and political instability. 
Victorian democratic theory, the second paradigm that I identify, developed two main 
counterarguments to the variety-of-suffrages tradition. The first was to affirm that the working class 
was characterized by a diversity of opinions, and thus that a democratic suffrage would not eliminate 
the contestation among viewpoints that gave the assembly its deliberative character. The second 
response was that anxiety about social-ideological diversity had no place in the evaluation of 
electoral structures. For these more radical democrats, descriptive representation and democracy 
were opposed and irreconcilable. The final vision of the relationship between diversity and 
representation was the theory of proportional representation. The motivation for the scheme of the 
single transferable vote which Thomas Hare and JS Mill championed, and the stunning range of 
benefits predicted from its implementation, cannot be understood in isolation from the anxious 
search for a reform which would expand the electorate without causing the Commons to become 
unrepresentative and undeliberative. PR was supposed to square this circle and deliver democratic 
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representativeness – to provide an electoral system which could, even under universal suffrage, produce 
an assembly that was a mirror of society in its diversity. While PR was arguably the most 
consequential political innovation to emerge from the Victorian era, it was unable to convince the 
British public of its superiority to these alternative paradigms of representation, and it combined 
elements from the other two schools of representation in ways that were not always internally 
coherent or mutually reinforcing. 
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Introduction: The Past, Present, and Future of This Dissertation 
 This dissertation in its present form is a compromise between its past and its future. 
 I set out to rewrite the history of nineteenth-century political thought by placing the problem 
of ideological diversity at its center. Given our contemporary preoccupation with the diversity of 
beliefs, perspectives, and identities, it is tempting to assume that this diversity has always been 
regarded as a central political issue. Surprisingly, however, I was going to contend that ideological 
diversity was identified as a political problem in a recognizably modern sense only in the aftermath 
of the French Revolution. While the multiplicity of religious beliefs had been among the paramount 
phenomena of early-modern English politics, it was not, I would go on to say, until the nineteenth 
century that a wider notion of ideological diversity came into focus as a major topic of political 
theory. My plan was to document this new peak of interest in diversity, especially in the early- and 
mid-Victorian era, with respect both to what we might call its social-scientific or proto-social-
scientific dimensions (the psychological and sociological causes and effects of diversity), and to its 
impact on normative political theory and institutional design. In particular, I would show, the novel 
conception of ideological diversity that emerged in nineteenth-century Britain generated theoretical 
advancements above all in two areas: toleration and freedom of expression, and representation. 
 This is a story which, in outline at least, I still endorse. One might say quite truthfully that it 
was in the era under consideration here that the issue took on the proportions it more or less has 
today. We often hear the nineteenth century spoken of as an “age of public opinion,” but too 
seldom do we recognize that this public opinion was understood to be a divided, polyphonic entity. 
Similarly, scholars tend not to appreciate how great a gulf exists between (a) the diversity that the 
nineteenth century took to characterize the “public mind” and (b) the phenomenon of “diversity of 
opinions” as, say, Hume would have grasped it in an earlier period, when it denoted squabbles 
between Protestant sects or the split of a narrow stratum of elites into “Court” and “Country” 
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factions. 
 While I have not abandoned this story, it is also the case that I have not exactly written it, 
although important elements of it are still present. If anything, continuities with earlier periods are 
stressed as much as discontinuities (above all in the first chapter of each part); and there is no 
concerted effort to prove the unprecedentedness of the nineteenth century’s understanding of the 
diversity of opinion, which according to my initial notions was slated to be one of the dissertation’s 
major tasks.  
Even more damningly for my original vision, it is not simply that the argument about novelty 
has been downgraded in favor of pursuing other themes, but also that the diversity of opinion, at least as 
originally conceptualized, no longer holds the manuscript as a whole together. I have wound up with 
two distinct inquiries – one on toleration, the other on representation – which would probably be 
better treated separately. This is not to deny that the two halves have a great deal in common. Not 
only are many of the dramatis personae shared, but a number of common topics appear in both: the 
process by which the exchange of ideas conduces to truth; the relationship between the inclusion of 
perspectives and the stability of the polity; the concept of public opinion; the historicization of 
liberal principles; the exceptionalism of British political experience; the perception of modern society 
as a split and multi-faceted entity; the aversion to natural rights; the influence of “economic” ideas 
on political argument; the benefits of deliberation; the threat of majority tyranny; the opposition 
between diversity and stagnation – and many more could be listed. Beyond this thematic overlap, the 
parts are united by two convictions of mine. The first is that nineteenth-century Britain was marked 
by an extraordinary richness of thought about politics which has been underserved by political 
theorists, in part out of a too-exclusive focus on John Stuart Mill. The second is that the period 
offers a kind of ideal point for taking up questions that still perplex us as citizens of liberal-
democratic societies today. Its usefulness as a laboratory for arguments and institutions derives from 
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the fact that in it a belief in many of the values to which we are still pledged – deliberation, freedom 
of thought, inclusivity, representation, and so on – was combined with a different sense of how 
these values interacted with one another and with what institutions were necessary to instantiate 
them; to give a particularly fertile example, the relationship between these “liberal” values and 
democracy was more uncertain and hotly contested than it tends to be in contemporary political 
theory. Sharing much with and yet departing interestingly from twenty-first-century politics and 
philosophy, nineteenth-century Britain is the right kind of mirror to hold up to contemporary 
political theory. 
 Despite these commonalities, the two halves of the dissertation have come quite far apart 
substantively. The first part explores justifications for toleration and expressive freedom. The 
second, by contrast, explores the theory and institutions underlying the endeavor to achieve the 
descriptive representation or mirroring of the nation in the Commons. Reflection on diversity factors into 
both of these areas of research, but it does so in importantly different ways, and I now think it is 
best to treat each on its own terms rather than try to press them into a single narrative. My hope at 
this point, therefore, is to release them as independent volumes. Let me conclude by indicating the 
final form which I now see this material taking. 
To begin with the future of part one: under the title Beyond On Liberty: The Theory of Freedom 
of Thought and Expression in Nineteenth-Century Britain, I foresee a monograph in four chapters: 1) 
Liberty before Mill: The Pacific Theory of Free Expression; 2) Liberty after Mill, I: 
Consequentialism, Historicism, and Free Expression; 3) Liberty after Mill, II: The Belated Rise of a 
Democratic Account of Freedom of Discussion; 4) The French Theory of Toleration under the 
Second Empire and Third Republic. What is the relationship between the book sketched above and 
the dissertation?  
Chapter one will remain more or less as it stands here. Chapter two of the dissertation can 
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serve as a placeholder for the prospective second and third chapters of the finished product, since 
Stephen addressed many of the most significant arguments about religious-intellectual freedom in 
this time. Nevertheless I will seek to expand the scope in terms both of the authors analyzed and the 
lines of argument reconstructed.1 Finally, chapter four of the future version will contrast this 
Victorian outlook on toleration with the natural rights-based set of theories that developed 
concomitantly in France and will show how the fight against the prosecution of the press during the 
Second Empire shaped a body of thought on the open society that, while Anglophilic in some 
respects, was distinctive in its preoccupations. 
 Part two on representation is closer to completion as its own work. The dissertation’s four 
chapters are to be supplemented by two more which are not yet fully written. The first of the new 
chapters (which would be the fifth of the volume) will conclude my account of PR. In the 
dissertation I discuss PR with respect to its core conceptual and institutional components and its 
relationship to the other theories of representation that I cover. The fifth chapter will add to this an 
account of the vigorous debate surrounding the “moral” – broadly construed to include political, 
cultural, ethical, and intellectual – effects of PR. It will start with an examination of the benefits 
which proponents claimed for PR, especially those which were thought to originate in the greater 
freedom it bestowed on the elector. This will be followed by taking in turn four lines of criticism 
from PR’s opponents: (a) that PR would in fact stymy the vital contestation of ideas by suppressing 
the local electoral fight and fostering a “cliquish” or “crotchety” political culture, thereby leading to 
                                                 
1 To give an inkling of what this expanded survey would entail, let me mention three themes that will occupy more space 
in the final version than they have received here. (A) The Victorian age witnessed a great number of histories of toleration 
and the free press, which offered conflicting explanations of their rise; I will give an account of these differences in 
historical outlook and their political implications. (B) Democracy had been thought of as a regime that was especially 
inhospitable to intellectual liberty, and this view lasted well beyond Tocqueville, with famous espousers of it like Henry 
Maine in the 1880s and on. And yet, beginning with the Idealist movement, in the final decades of the century freedom 
of thought and discussion began to be reinterpreted as having its grounding in democratic norms. Describing how this 
uneasy and not entirely successful shift occurred will be a major goal. (C) In the dissertation I attend to the genealogy of 
the image of the marketplace of ideas. Famous as it is, it was eclipsed in the second half of the century by two other 
façons de penser. One, taken from biology, was that of the evolution or natural selection of ideas; the other, taken from sport, 
was that of fair play between contending doctrines. I will reconstruct the development of these other two archetypes. 
These and other lines of inquiry will fill out the second and third chapters of the independent volume. 
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political-intellectual stagnation; (b) that its animus toward parties was misplaced, and that what was 
desired was an electoral system built on recognition of the positive value of parties in structuring 
public deliberation and organizing a mass electorate; (c) that it fetishized parliamentary deliberation 
instead of acknowledging that parliament was no longer, in the age of a fully developed press and 
democratized political culture, a privileged deliberative forum; and (d) that the referendum or the 
strengthening of the Lords, rather than PR, was the proper corrective to the decline of 
parliamentarism. Finally, the last chapter will examine John Stuart Mill’s thinking about 
representation in light of the broad array of Victorian traditions of representation that I have 
depicted. My heavily contextualized Mill will be a messy one – a figure, for instance, whose 
commitment to mirroring was uncertain; whose democratic credentials were dubious; who was 
highly elitist, even judged by the standards of his own time; and whose views, like those of many 
Victorian authors on representation, were rife with difficulties regarding the interaction between the 
different values which representative government was meant to serve. For this volume I envision 
some such title as Representation in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Political Theory and Institutional Design in a 
Liberal Age. 
Because of the distance still to be travelled before bringing this two-pronged project to 
fruition, the dissertation resembles more a collection of linked essays than the single seamless 
argument I had once envisaged. Nevertheless, my hope is that it retains enough coherence to be 
worth engaging as a whole even in this transitional phase. 
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PART ONE 
Toleration and Freedom of Expression 
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Chapter One 
 
What’s Not in On Liberty: 
A Neglected Nineteenth-Century Defense of Freedom of Discussion 
 
The combination of two important characteristics of nineteenth-century Britain makes On 
Liberty, for historians of political thought, something of a dangerous book. The first is the 
intellectual ascendancy of John Stuart Mill, and the preeminence of On Liberty in his oeuvre. His 
peers and succeeding generations of Victorians recognized his singular stature and influence in the 
period,2 and the inclination to treat his as the mind most representative of his time has probably 
gotten stronger, rather than weaker, with the passage of time.3 While Mill’s reputation during his 
lifetime was well established on many fronts, On Liberty stood out as a work of unique significance 
both to admirers and critics; it was “the gospel of the nineteenth century.”4 
 The second characteristic is that the nineteenth century – more specifically, the span of Mill’s 
life (1806-1873) – saw the consolidation of the freedoms of discussion and of the press in Britain.5 
At the dawn of the century, in the wake of the French Revolution, the freedoms of speech and 
publication were under siege.6 Several of Mill’s earliest forays into journalism as a teenager were 
                                                 
2 He was by far “Victorian liberalism’s most authoritative and important philosophical exponent”; H.S. Jones, Victorian 
Political Thought (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 95. On the assumption that Mill is representative of the whole of 
Victorian liberalism (or of liberalism simpliciter), see John C. Rees, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1985), 78-9; C.L. Ten, “Mill’s Place in Liberalism,” The Political Science Reviewer 24 (Fall 1995), 179-204, at 179-80. 
Of course, Mill’s preeminence was not unanimously conceded, even among self-identified liberals. For a 
particularly intemperate rebellion against Mill’s stature, see the pamphlet by “A Liberal,” with the majestic title 
(abbreviated here) A Review of Mr. J.S. Mill’s Essay ‘On Liberty,’ and an Investigation of His Claim to Be Considered the Leading 
Philosopher and Thinker of the Age (London: Watson and Gardner, 1867). 
 
3 On the process of Mill’s canonization as a political thinker, see Stefan Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and 
Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 8. If anything, this tendency to take 
Mill’s exemplary status for granted has only gotten stronger with the passage of time; it is well exemplified by his typical 
position in survey courses on the history of political thought as the lone British thinker from the nineteenth century, and 
often the lone British thinker after Locke. 
 
4 Leslie Stephen, “Social Macadamisation,” Fraser’s Magazine, vol. 16, no. 32 (Aug 1872): 150-68, 150. 
 
5 In this dissertation I will follow nineteenth-century usage in treating the “liberty of discussion” and the “liberty of the 
press” as synonymous and interchangeable. 
 
6 William Wickwar’s Struggle for the Freedom of the Press, 1819-1832 (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1928), and Arthur 
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articles in defense of the journalist Richard Carlile, who had been imprisoned for atheistic 
publications, and Mill was himself imprisoned for a short stretch in 1823 for distributing pamphlets 
on birth control written by Carlile.7 A central plank of the platform of the philosophic radicals 
among whom Mill was raised was the liberty of the press, precisely because they judged it a liberty 
that the British people were still yet to win.8 
The intellectual and political climate into which On Liberty was released in 1859, however, 
was markedly different. Describing the mindset of Lord Eldon – the Tory Lord Chancellor at the 
head of the reactionary effort of the nineteenth century’s first three decades who boasted that he 
had “prosecuted more libels” than any attorney-general in British history9 – Walter Bagehot could 
already marvel in 1855 (just seventeen years after Eldon’s death) that “as for Lord Eldon, it is the 
most difficult thing in the world to believe that there ever was such a man.”10 Indeed, it was a source 
of bemusement among the first wave of readers that Mill should devote the longest and most 
famous chapter of his book to championing a fait accompli; as one commentator remarked, “he has 
expended nearly half his little treatise in vindicating the ‘Liberty of Thought and Discussion,’ which 
                                                                                                                                                             
Aspinall’s Politics and the Press, 1780-1850 (London: Home & Van Thal Ltd, 1949) are thorough and still helpful accounts 
of the condition of the press in this period. Alexander Bain’s reflections at two-generations remove on the early-
nineteenth-century crackdown on the press are still illuminating, as well; see Bain, James Mill: A Biography (London: 
Longmans, Green, & Co., 1882). See also Kevin Gilmartin, Print Politics: The Press and Radical Opposition in Early Nineteenth-
Century England (Cambridge, 1996); Donald Thomas, A Long Time Burning: A History of Literary Censorship in England (New 
York, 1969); Joel H. Wiener, Radicalism and Freethought in Nineteenth-Century Britain: The Life of Richard Carlile (Westport, CT, 
1983). 
 
7 See Mill’s “Letters on Free Discussion” of Jan-Feb 1823 and his article on the “Petition of Mary Anne Carlile” of May 
1823 in CW, vol. 22, 9-18, 21-4. On Mill’s arrest, see Richard Reeves, John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2007), 1-2. 
 
8 For a concise account of the importance to the Benthamites of overturning the “very wide-ranging laws of libel [used] 
to silence all kinds of critics of the established order,” see Stefan Collini’s “Introduction” to Mill, CW, vol. 21, xl-xli. 
 
9 Quoted in Horace Twiss, The Public and Private Lives of Lord Eldon, second edition, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1844), 
vol. 2, 166. 
 
10 Bagehot, “First Edinburgh Reviewers,” in CW, vol. 1, 313. 
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we had vainly imagined was pretty well understood and enjoyed among us.”11 In the space of a few 
decades the subject of the book’s second chapter, “The Liberty of Thought and Discussion,” had 
gone from a matter of heated controversy to an article of faith in British political culture. 
What sort of danger does the combination of these two truths produce? In a word, the 
danger is that On Liberty will be uncritically accepted as the full statement of the theory of freedom 
of discussion from this period. Mill embraced so much of what was typical of his milieu – and he so 
self-consciously sought to digest all the prominent currents of thought which he encountered12 – 
that it has proven difficult to resist the impulse to treat him as a proxy for or distillation of the 
intellectual movement of his lifetime, at least on its liberal side. 
And yet, even on a theme as closely associated with Mill as liberty of discussion, it would be 
a mistake to assume that he had encompassed the full range of reasons for supporting his position. 
The goal of this chapter is to uncover and examine an alternate mode of justification for this liberty, 
one about which Mill and subsequent historians and political theorists have had little to say. This 
effort at broadening our understanding of nineteenth-century theories of an unrestricted press and 
unfettered circulation of opinion is an endeavor of not merely antiquarian interest. It hopefully goes 
some way towards stimulating an interrogation of a set of freedoms the value of which is too easily 
taken for granted. In Mill’s terms, there is some risk that our support of the freedoms of speech and 
the press will become a “dead dogma.”13 Recovering an important but now largely forgotten outlook 
on them is thus a project of true Millian spirit, helping to prevent our belief in free thought and 
                                                 
11 Anonymous review of On Liberty from the British Quarterly Review in Liberty: Contemporary Responses to John Stuart Mill, ed. 
Andrew Pyle (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 1994), 185. 
 
12 On Mills “practical eclecticism,” see Joseph Hamburger, Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic Radicals 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), e.g. 77, 105. 
 
13 Mill, On Liberty, in CW, vol. 18, 243. 
 
 12 
 
discussion from becoming “but one superstition the more.”14 
I begin, in section one, with a review of the scope and grounds of On Liberty’s case for the 
liberties of discussion and the press. Section two reconstructs an argument for these liberties which 
Mill left out of his celebrated tract and demonstrates its historical and theoretical importance. In the 
third section I return to Mill in order to explain why he showed so little interest in this line of 
thought – a line of thought which, as we will see, he might have been expected to embrace. Finally, I 
conclude with reflections on the way in which the analysis of the pacific theory of free expression 
alters our understanding of nineteenth-century liberalism more broadly. 
 
1) On Liberty’s Argument for Freedom of Discussion 
 Perhaps out of an excess of enthusiasm, the historian Henry Thomas Buckle made a curious 
error in characterizing On Liberty. In his review of the work he hailed Mill for the “comprehensive 
spirit” that enabled him to “concentrate in a single treatise all the arguments” in support of liberty.15 
Yet it ought to have been apparent to any contemporary reader of On Liberty that its second chapter 
on the “liberty of thought and discussion” had no claims to comprehensiveness. Contrary to 
Buckle’s assessment, it would be much truer to say that Mill explicitly renounced any aspiration to 
encompass the broad range of arguments salient in Victorian society. 
Reconstructing the argument of the second chapter of On Liberty is one of the easier 
interpretive tasks in the history of political thought, for at the end of the chapter Mill summarizes 
with admirable clarity the “four distinct grounds” on which he had proceeded. They were: 
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly 
know, be true… 
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may…contain a portion of truth; 
and…it is only by the collision of adverse opinions, that the remainder of the truth has any 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 244. 
 
15 Buckle, “Mill on Liberty,” in Liberty: Contemporary Responses to John Stuart Mill, 63-4. Originally published in Fraser’s 
Magazine, 1859. 
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chance of being supplied. 
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is 
suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those 
who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of 
its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will 
be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and 
conduct…16 
 
Human fallibility, the indispensability of partial truths to intellectual progress, the degradation of 
once-living truths into prejudices, and the further degradation of these still-true prejudices into 
empty, meaningless slogans – these were the grounds on which Mill defended “freedom of opinion, 
and freedom of the expression of opinion.”17 These four reasons were, in turn, best understood as 
pieces of a single overarching argument, namely, that the liberty of forming and publishing opinions 
was necessary “to the mental well-being of mankind” over the longue durée.18 His case was, Mill was 
clear, restricted to these considerations. 
Contra Buckle, then, it would be more accurate to see chapter two of On Liberty as 
deliberately selective rather than as striving for comprehensiveness. Many kinds of argument simply 
had no place in Mill’s framework. Two such exclusions are obvious. First, it precluded any 
invocation of religious or theological grounds. Second, justifications based on even a secular “idea of 
abstract right” were equally unwelcome.19 With this rejection of a priori or natural rights theory Mill 
not only remained true to his convictions about the philosophical untenability and moral 
deleteriousness of all forms of intuitionism, but also expressed the spirit of his milieu. Nineteenth-
century English liberalism was singularly inhospitable to any recourse to natural rights. Though Mill 
high-mindedly announced that he was prepared to “forego any advantage” derivable from an appeal 
                                                 
16 Mill, On Liberty, 258. 
 
17 Ibid., 257-8. 
 
18 Ibid., 257. 
 
19 Ibid., 224. 
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to natural rights, it is unlikely that the omission of such an appeal cost him much rhetorically20; as we 
will see in chapter two, consequentialism was resoundingly the order of the day. 
Even within the domain of utilitarian arguments for the liberties of the press and of 
discussion, however, On Liberty hardly spanned the full range. Indeed, the book eschewed what was 
probably the most famous of all lines of justification for these freedoms: to wit, that they were 
necessary for keeping governors accountable to the governed, for rooting out corruption, and for 
preventing the rise of despotism.21 This argument, a staple of radical advocacy for a free press, is so 
familiar as hardly to require elaboration here, and received as much ink from Mill’s pen as from any 
other, especially during his 1820s agitation to end prosecutions for blasphemous and seditious libel.22 
While Mill did not incorporate this viewpoint into chapter two’s official list of proofs of the 
utility of unfettered discussion, he nevertheless attended to it in the “Introductory.” In the opening 
pages of On Liberty Mill explained his rationale for leaving out such a valuable strand of thought. 
This was, in brief, that the argument was a good one, had already won over English hearts and 
minds, and needed no longer to be pressed into service: “the time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, 
when any defence would be necessary of the ‘liberty of the press’ as one of the securities against 
corrupt or tyrannical government.”23 This sort of argument was most appropriate to an earlier set of 
struggles when “patriots” sought to “set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 224. 
 
21 For our purposes, we can let the words of Mill’s father stand in summation of this line of reasoning: “the freedom of 
the press…is, in all civilized countries, among all but the advocates of misgovernment, regarded as an indispensable 
security, and the greatest safeguard of the interest of mankind”; “it is doubtful whether a power of the people in 
choosing their rulers, without the liberty of the press, would be an advantage”; James Mill, “The Liberty of the Press,” in 
Political Writings, ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 116, 117. 
 
22 For Mill’s retelling of his activity during this period, see Autobiography, in CW, vol. 1, 89-93. For a particularly clear 
enunciation of this view by the young Mill, see the essay “Periodical Literature: Edinburgh Review” in CW, vol. 1, esp. 
297-300, written when Mill was seventeen. K.C. O’Rourke analyzes the declining weight which Mill placed on this 
argument from political accountability over the course of his career in John Stuart Mill and Freedom of Expression: The 
Genesis of a Theory (London: Routledge, 2001), e.g. 42, 58. 
 
23 Mill, On Liberty, 228. 
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exercise over the community” through “a recognition of certain immunities” such as rights of free 
speech. 24 It belonged to an epoch in which the ruled many were locked in struggle with the ruling 
few. But, Mill judged in On Liberty, times had changed; the conditions which necessitated the 
forceful articulation of this argument in Bentham’s and James Mill’s generations had been 
superseded. 25 In 1859 the more compelling concern was to protect the dissident or nonconforming 
or unpopular few from the powerful and homogenous many. The largely social phenomenon of 
“the tyranny of the majority” – “society collectively [tyrannizing] over the separate individuals who 
compose it” by means which “are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its 
political functionaries”26 – was the true object of anxiety for the analyst of modern society.27 
This is not to say that Mill imagined the old claims for liberty of discussion and the press to 
be irrelevant once representative institutions had been established. But it is nonetheless the case that 
in On Liberty he was unwilling to invoke the argument that was so dear to his father and his younger 
self. After all, was such an argument not liable to the rejoinder, which his father had felt the need to 
ward off almost four decades prior, that “if the people…really chose the members of the House of 
Commons, and renewed their choice so frequently, as to have the power of removal after a short 
                                                 
24 Mill, On Liberty, 217-8. John Burrow confirms Mill on this point; by the mid-century the vision of a free press as the 
“watch-dog” protecting the people “against abuses” had lost steam as the “grosser abuses” diminished; Burrow, Whigs 
and Liberals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 75-6. 
 
25 Without anticipating too much the subject matter of part two, it is important to note that Mill should have felt so 
strongly about this point even though, in the year of On Liberty’s appearance, still only one in five adult males possessed 
the franchise; see T.A. Jenkins, Parliament, Party, and Politics in Victorian Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1996), 90. 
 
26 Mill, On Liberty, 219-20. 
 
27 Mill’s French translator, Charles Dupont-White, writing during the Second French Empire which had been established 
upon the collapse of republican representative institutions and which placed severe restrictions on the press, chided Mill 
for too blithely presuming that the travails of his father’s era were behind (as Mill put it in On Liberty’s opening 
paragraph) “the more civilized portion of the species.” For this and other reasons Dupont-White believed that On Liberty 
was less a philosophical treatment of liberty than a highly localized tract about English politics; see Dupont-White, 
“Préface” to La liberté par M. John Stuart Mill (Paris: Guillaumin, 1860), vi, l. 
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experience of misconduct, the freedom of the press would be unnecessary”?28 The thought that 
genuine representative government complete with mechanisms of accountability was sufficient to 
ensure the harmony of interests between governed and governors without subjecting the country to 
the “licence of the press” was not one which Mill wanted On Liberty to have to fend off. For the Mill 
of the 1850s, refighting such battles would have distracted from the central concern. The 
“intolerance” of the “sentiment of the majority” was a more haunting specter than the bigotry and 
selfishness of governing cliques, and so On Liberty could dispense with this older and more familiar 
argument for the unlimited right of opinion and publication.29 
The selectivity of On Liberty ought, then, already to be becoming apparent. In addition to 
eschewing any assistance from religious or natural-right modes of argumentation, Mill’s desire to 
achieve a broader vindication of “moral, social, & intellectual liberty, asserted against the despotism 
of society whether exercised by governments or public opinion” led him to sideline the argument 
from political accountability, popular control, and good governance formulated during the legal-
political struggle to end government prosecution and harassment of writers that had raged during 
the first three decades of the 1800s.30 But in moving toward a higher plane from which he could give 
his “different and more fundamental treatment” of the issue,31 Mill took stock of this earlier line of 
reasoning, acknowledging its essential truth as well as the good service it had performed for the 
liberal cause. Another argument, however, one similar in its pedigree and historical importance – 
flourishing in the first third of the nineteenth century, persisting though dwindling in impact as the 
Victorian era wore on – was not so fortunate as to receive such a glance of recognition in Mill’s 
                                                 
28 James Mill, “The Liberty of the Press,” 117. 
 
29 Mill, On Liberty, 222. 
 
30 Mill, Letter to Theodor Gomperz, 4 Dec. 1858, in CW, vol. 15, 581. 
 
31 Mill, On Liberty, 217. 
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“small volume.”32 Despite being advanced with varying degrees of sophistication by a host of 
authors both celebrated and obscure, historians and political theorists today have largely lost sight of 
this significant strand of liberal thinking about the value of liberty of discussion – perhaps due in 
part to Mill’s disregard of it. What was this line of thought? It is the task of the next section to give 
this argument some long overdue exposure. 
 
2) The Pacific Argument for Freedom of Discussion 
a) Samuel Bailey 
 In an 1829 article for the Westminster Review, the official journal of “Benthamite” or 
“philosophic radical” principles with which both Mills and many other radical thinkers were 
involved, Thomas Perronet Thompson described a book “so finished in its parts and so perfect in 
their union” that “like one of the great statues of antiquity, it might have been broken into 
fragments, and each separated limb would have pointed to the existence of some interesting whole, 
of which the value might be surmised from the beauty of the specimen.”33 The object of this bizarre 
hyperbole was, Thompson did not hesitate to say, the second most important of all “comparatively 
modern books,” surpassed only by The Wealth of Nations.34 Such exorbitant praise was, surely, 
intended for a volume of one of the giants of the Enlightenment, a Hume or Voltaire, or perhaps 
for one of the seminal philosophic-radical productions such as Bentham’s Rationale of Judicial Evidence 
or James Mill’s History of British India. 
 In fact, Thompson’s accolades were directed at a work called Essays on the Formation and 
Publication of Opinions, first published in 1821 by the utilitarian philosopher, polymath, and failed 
                                                 
32 Mill, Letter to Theodor Gomperz, 4 Dec. 1858, 581. 
 
33 Thompson, “Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, &c.,” Westminster Review, vol. 11, no. 22 (1829): 477-89, 478. Thompson, a 
former governor of Sierra Leone who would eventually attain the rank of general, provided funds for the founding of 
the Westminster Review and wrote prolifically, especially on economic subjects. 
 
34 Ibid., 477. 
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parliamentary candidate Samuel Bailey.35 Yet despite these and other testimonials of its influence,36 
this text and its author have vanished from the history of political thought.37 This absence has been 
of scholarly detriment above all in the study of John Stuart Mill and On Liberty.38 For Bailey’s 
advocacy of an unfettered press and unrestricted public discussion was not merely “in the air,” just 
one of many texts about which Mill might have encountered in passing as an intellectually active 
young man. Instead, Mill knew Bailey’s corpus from top to bottom,39 and it is likely that he had an 
especially close acquaintance with the Formation and Publication. Mill’s father had written approvingly 
about the book when its second edition was released in 1826,40 and after James Mill’s death his son 
republished this review essay, accompanied by excerpts from Bailey’s original text, a volume entitled 
The Principles of Toleration.41 Forgotten though he is today, Bailey was a notable figure in the 
intellectual world of the Mills. 
                                                 
35 Bailey (1791-1870) was born almost exactly midway between James and John Stuart Mill, and so he straddles the two 
generations of philosophic radicals. This in-betweenness is reflected in his thought, which combines ideas often 
considered to be exclusive either to Mill the father or to Mill the son. 
 
36 See e.g. Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians, 3 vols. (London: Duckworth & Co., 1900), vol. 2, 339; Alexander Bain, 
John Stuart Mill, A Criticism with Personal Recollections (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1882), 47. 
 
37 The extent to which Bailey has been forgotten is well attested by his complete exclusion from such comprehensive 
works as The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, eds. Gareth Stedman-Jones and Gregory Claeys 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) and the Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, ed. James Crimmins (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
 
38 Both K.C. O’Rourke and John C. Rees have offered reconstructions of the background to and development of Mill’s 
views on the liberty of discussion in which Bailey plays no part; see O’Rourke, Mill and Expression; Rees, John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty. What little awareness of his relationship to JS Mill there is has been unduly limited to economic questions; 
see e.g. Richard Reeves, John Stuart Mill, 38. 
 
39 He discussed Bailey’s economics as part of his youthful reading group, wrote a review of Bailey’s Rationale of Political 
Representation, entered into a dispute with Bailey about (of all things) the theory of vision, listed him as an ally in the fight 
for women’s suffrage, and engaged with him on foundational epistemological matters in the Logic. 
 See Mill, Autobiography, 123; “Rationale of Representation,” in CW, vol. 18, 15-46; “Bailey on Berkeley’s Theory 
of Vision,” in CW, vol. 11, 245-70; Letter to Samuel Bailey, 21 Jan 1863, in CW, vol. 15, 824-5; Considerations on 
Representative Government, in CW, vol. 19, 481; System of Logic, bk. IV, in CW, vol. 8, 649. The confrontation over the theory 
of vision led Mill to offer some harsh assessments of Bailey’s abilities in correspondence with Alexander Bain; for an 
evaluation of this quarrel about vision, see F.E. Sparshott, “Introduction,” to Mill, in CW, vol. 11, xlv-lvii. 
 
40 James Mill, “Formation of Opinions,” Westminster Review 6, no. 11 (July 1826): 1-22. 
 
41 James Mill, The principles of toleration (London, 1837). The editorship of the Principles was anonymous, but Keith Quincy 
has made a persuasive case that J. S. Mill was the editor; Keith Quincy, “Samuel Bailey and Mill’s Defence of Freedom 
of Discussion,” The Mill Newsletter 21, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 4-18, at 7-9. 
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 These facts are important because Bailey’s Formation and Publication is the closest 
approximation to On Liberty’s second chapter before On Liberty itself. For one thing, range of 
grounds on which Mill would base his proof of the indispensability of free discussion to “mental 
well-being” is present in Bailey’s text.42 Even more remarkably, Bailey fretted about such extralegal 
forms of constraint on opinion as the social tyranny of the majority, “the persecution of private 
antipathy and public odium” which ostracized those who would “deviat[e] from established 
opinions” as “a species of criminals.”43 It should be recalled that Bailey was voicing these worries 
about social intolerance without the benefit of Tocqueville’s insights – the insights from which Mill’s 
own concerns about the matter would originate.44 
What is of interest from our perspective, however, are not the many commonalities between 
On Liberty and Formation and Publication, but rather a discrepancy between them. For in addition to the 
lines of thought that would make their way into On Liberty, Bailey offered an argument which would 
have no counterpart in Mill’s treatise. This was that the liberty of discussion and the press was 
necessary for the achievement of civic peace and social stability. 
Bailey’s pacific or stabilizing argument for unrestricted discussion began with two proofs of 
the “ultimate inefficacy of restraints on the publication of opinions.”45 The first was what we might 
call “theodical” in character. Though not quite “whatever is, is right,” Bailey was nonetheless putting 
forth something reminiscent of this notorious Leibnitzian claim, for he argued that whatever the 
distribution of opinions in a society was, was what it ought to be, and was, moreover, unalterable by 
                                                 
42 Quincy offers a detailed, point-by-point comparison of the main lines of Bailey’s and Mill’s texts, concluding that “the 
similarity…seems too close to qualify as mere coincidence,” though “Mill made better use of Bailey’s arguments than did 
Bailey himself” (“Bailey and Mill,” 16). 
 
43 Bailey, Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions, and on Other Subjects, third edition, revised and enlarged 
(London: John Green, 1837), 87. Though I will make use of this edition throughout because it is the final one, I have 
verified that the passages cited were present from the first edition of 1821. 
 
44 Tocqueville, who would have been fifteen when the Formation and Publication appeared, would not visit the United State 
for another decade after its publication. 
 
45 Ibid., 149. 
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such blunt methods as the coercive intervention of the state.46 The views current in a society 
necessarily and unavoidably reflected an underlying matrix of social and intellectual conditions 
against which the weapons of authority were futile. “The interference of power cannot obviate this 
necessity [for the “regular process” of the contestation of views to take place], nor can it prevent the 
operation of those general causes, which are constantly at work on the understandings of men, and 
produce certain opinions in certain states of society and stages of civilization.”47 “The various 
branches of knowledge,” Bailey contended, were “so intimately connected” that it would be as 
absurd to try to stifle only that small subset of opinions which society deemed harmful as it would 
be to try to suddenly overturn the entire worldview of a people through the mechanisms of 
legislation and coercion.48 In short, Bailey believed that once the profound, quasi-providential 
imperturbability of this “natural progress” of opinions was grasped, it would become clear that all 
“authority can do, is to retard the action of these general causes.”49 The laws that governed the 
movement of opinions were deeper, stronger, and juster than society’s efforts to stall or direct this 
movement could ever be. 
Bailey’s second proof of ineffectuality contained less metaphysics and philosophy of history 
and more psychology. It consisted of the familiar and longstanding observation – one which even 
such hardened proponents of coercive measures of intolerance as Locke’s antagonist Jonas Proast 
had felt compelled to concede50 – that efforts to silence an opinion frequently backfired and caused 
                                                 
46 In the mid- and late-Victorian periods the defense of toleration would assimilate itself to the trends in evolutionary 
theory fashionable at the time. In my opinion, however, this evolutionary approach to toleration basically just translated 
Bailey’s theodical stance into a more “scientific” idiom. For an example of this Darwinian toleration, see Leslie Stephen’s 
two papers from 1883, published in The Nineteenth Century, titled “The Suppression of Poisonous Opinions.” 
 
47 Bailey, Formation and Publication, 150-1. 
 
48 Ibid., 149. 
 
49 Ibid., 151. 
 
50 “And as to the Spectatours…they will be much tempted likewise, not onely to entertain the same opinion of such a 
Religion [whose adherents had endured persecution], but withall to judge more favourably of that of the Sufferers; who, 
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the targeted opinion to be regarded more favorably than it had been before: 
The mere attempt to suppress a doctrine has often been found to disseminate it more 
widely….The curiosity roused by their being prohibited, a repugnance to oppression, an 
undefined suspicion, or tacit inference, that what requires the arm of power to suppress it 
must have some strong claims to credence, and various other circumstances, draw the 
attention of numbers, in whose eyes the matter in controversy, had it been freely discussed, 
would have been totally destitute of interest.51 
 
In short, repressive measures tended to disseminate “the obnoxious doctrine far more rapidly than it 
would have diffused itself had it been left unmolested.”52 
 After having established by these two routes the inefficacy and counterproductivity of 
policies of suppression,53 Bailey proceeded to deepen his charge against repressive policies. The fact 
that such measures did not realize their intended result of eradicating immoral or pernicious beliefs 
was far from their worst consequence. If all that these policies did was to decelerate the operation of 
the natural causes by which opinions were shaped and modified, or to give a temporary injection of 
sympathy to the persecuted beliefs, then repression and intolerance were certainly unwise and 
perhaps also unethical – but by the same token it would be foolish to harbor much concern about 
them.54 Unfortunately, however, attempts at suppression were not merely inefficacious but were, in 
fact, productive of “positive evils.”55 These positive evils were the decline of domestic tranquility 
and the risk of civil war.  
                                                                                                                                                             
they will be apt to think, would not expose themselves to such Extremities, which they might avoid by compliance, were 
they not thoroughly satisfied of the Justice of their Cause”; Proast, The argument of the Letter concerning toleration, briefly 
consider'd and answer'd, (London : Printed at the Theatre for George West and Henry Clements..., 1690), 14. 
 
51 Bailey, Formation and Publication, 151. 
 
52 Ibid., 152. 
 
53 Perhaps because he did not have a clear analytical separation of them in his own mind, Bailey does not appear to have 
posed to himself the question of the consistency of his theodical and his psychological explanations for the instrumental 
irrationality of restrictions on the expression of opinions. Where he could consistently adhere to them both is, I think, 
dubious. 
 
54 “In proportion to the inefficacy of restraints on the publication of opinions, the objections, which we have brought 
against them, would, of course, be weakened or removed”; ibid., 152. 
 
55 Ibid., 152. 
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 Countries which permitted the free circulation of opinions were, Bailey judged, very likely to 
prove stable and orderly. This stability derived from an important aspect of the “regular process” by 
which systems of belief succeeded one another – that it was slow and gradual. “In a country, or 
community, where no such restraints existed, it is obvious that no changes of opinion could well be 
sudden. Truth, at the best, makes but slow advances.”56 In this Bailey’s progressive-theodical 
rationalism nevertheless diverged decisively from the almost unfathomably optimistic and utopian 
rationalism that had flourished three decades earlier in the philosophy of William Godwin, who 
predicted that, if only his compatriots would overcome the “cowardice” that inhibited them from 
speaking their minds sincerely, then “three years hence there would be scarcely a falshood of any 
magnitude remaining in the civilized world.”57 Contra Godwin, Bailey believed that when the human 
mind encountered new ideas a kind of friction or inertia was involved which imposed a salutary 
delay on the embrace of novel beliefs and ensured that the succession of opinions would be 
characterized by continuity rather than by the precipitous overthrow of established modes of 
thought: 
The reluctance of the human mind to receive ideas contrary to its usual habits of thinking 
would be a sufficient security from violent transitions, did we not already possess another in 
the slowness with which the understanding makes its discoveries. Arguments, by which 
prescriptive error is overturned, however plain and forcible they may be, are found out with 
difficulty, and in the first instance can be entered into only by enlarged and liberal minds, by 
whom they are subsequently familiarized and disseminated by others.58 
 
What threatened civic peace and social cohesion were not changes of opinion tout court, but too rapid 
and too abrupt changes.59 Fortunately, the operation of free discussion, paradoxically aided by the 
limits of the understanding and the pertinacity of human prejudice – “by the fact, that our affections 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 152. 
 
57 Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 2 vols. (London: G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1793), vol. 1, 241-2. 
 
58 Bailey, Formation and Publication, 152-3. 
 
59 There is an analogy between Bailey’s thinking here and the findings in comparative politics about the importance of 
the pace of industrialization and economic modernization to a country’s political stability. 
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attach themselves to a doctrine as well as to any external object”60 – was certain of itself to keep the 
advance of intellect “so insensibly progressive, that we can hardly mark the change but by 
comparing two distant periods.”61 
If the continuity and gradualness of the evolution of beliefs protected free societies against 
violent upheaval, this mechanism was not, as the reader might imagine, dependent upon the power 
of majorities to suppress dissent. Bailey anticipated many themes that we have come to associate 
with the younger Mill, including the alarm at such extralegal forms of constraint on opinion as the 
social tyranny of the majority.62 For Bailey, the gradualism that marked the distribution of beliefs over 
time was due to the piece-by-piece manner in which new truths were ascertained and promulgated, 
and to people’s reluctance to abandon their traditional views.63 Indeed, Bailey judged that the social 
intolerance against which John Stuart Mill would later inveigh was productive of discord and 
violence in the same way that legal, state-sponsored persecution and censorship were. Similarly, 
James Mill did not endorse majority tyranny, whether in social or political form,64 and neither did the 
Whigs. 
 Inefficacious from the perspective of eliminating undesired beliefs or even of thwarting their 
transmission, restrictions on the press were therefore only capable of disturbing the naturally 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 286. In the words of Leslie Stephen, there was “an uncomfortable sense of friction and distortion which is 
always produced by the intrusion of a new set of ideas” – a discomfort that was certainly not without social and 
psychological benefits; see Stephen, “Darwinism and Divinity,” in Essays on Freethinking and Plainspeaking (London: 
Longmans, Green, & Co., 1873), 86. Stephen knew Bailey’s oeuvre very well, citing him in multiple works and even 
writing an entry on him for the second volume of the Dictionary of National Biography after Bailey’s name had faded. In 
conjunction with the similarities discussed in note 46 as well as his remarks quoted in ch. 2, note 220, it is likely that 
Stephen was strongly marked by Bailey. 
 
61 Bailey, Formation and Publication, 153. 
 
62 Ibid., 87. 
 
63 Ibid., 152-53. 
 
64 See Ursula Henriques, Religious Toleration in England, 1787–1833 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 254. 
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peaceful succession of opinions and thereby “producing irritation and violence.”65 It is important to 
stress that Bailey was arguing nothing less than that the most probable outcome of incursions on 
free discussion was precisely the opposite of their intended result; under English law in the period all 
prosecutions for libel were officially undertaken in order to punish “breaches of the peace.”66 Thus, 
though a restrictive press regime was conceived of and justified as a guarantor of order,67 it was in 
reality a chief source of destabilization: 
Now all restraints on the free examination of any subject are an interference with the natural 
and regular process here described, and produce mischievous irregularities….Under a system 
of restraint and coercion, we see apparently sudden revolutions in public sentiment. 
Opinions are cherished and spread, in the secrecy of fear, till the ardor with which they are 
entertained can no longer be repressed, and bursts forth into outrage and disorder. The 
passions become exasperated; the natural sense of injustice, which men will deeply feel as 
long as the world lasts at the proscription or persecution of opinions, is roused into action, 
and a zeal is kindled for the propagation of doctrines, endeared to the heart by obloquy and 
suffering. 
Such ebullitions are to be feared only where the natural operation of inquiry has been 
obstructed. As in the physical so in the moral world, it is repression which produces 
violence. Public opinion resembles the vapour, which in the open air is as harmless as the 
breeze, but which may be compressed into an element of tremendous power. When novel 
doctrines are kept down by force, they naturally resort to force to free themselves from 
restraints. Their advocates would seldom pursue violent measures, if such measures had not 
been first directed against them.68 
 
Sophisticated and subtle as this picture was – combining earthbound psychological analysis of the 
perspective of the victim of persecution on his ordeal with elaborate analogies to the physical 
sciences in order to clarify his more abstract vision of the progress of opinions – Bailey did not stop 
here. There was a further way in which he saw “proscription or persecution” as compromising 
                                                 
65 Bailey, Formation and Publication, 149. 
 
66 Wickwar, Struggle for the Freedom of the Press, 18-27. Prosecutions for libel were the primary way, in addition to the 
imposition of taxes on certain kinds of periodicals, of constraining expression. There had been no prior censorship in 
England since the expiration of the Licensing Act in 1695. 
 
67 For a characteristic statement of the traditionalist fear of the disintegrating impact of a free press, see the collection of 
Tory Poet Laureate Robert Southey’s political writings, Essays, Moral and Political, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1832). 
 
68 Bailey, Formation and Publication, 153-4. 
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societal tranquility.69 This was that they eroded citizens’ moral fiber: 
What partly contributes to this violence [with which holders of targeted beliefs “burst forth” 
against their oppressors] is the effect produced by restraint on the moral qualities of men's 
minds. Compulsory silence…has a tendency to make men morose and hypocritical, 
discontented and designing, and ready to risk much in order to rid themselves of their 
trammels; while the liberty of uttering opinions, without obloquy and punishment, promotes 
satisfaction of mind and sincerity of conduct.70 
 
In a word, Bailey thought that a wide array of factors – moral, psychological, metaphysical-
providential, historical – combined to make restraints on the circulation of opinions a potent recipe 
for social instability. 
 Bailey’s pacific or stabilizing argument for liberty of discussion, of course, did not emerge 
out of nowhere. Indeed, it is of interest not only as one member of the large family of arguments for 
the removal of restraints on the press, but also as a point of convergence for other important 
strands of political theory. In particular, it was closely linked to two robust traditions of British 
political thought. 
 The first tradition to influence Bailey’s theory of discussion was political economy. Over the 
course of his career Bailey would write more voluminously on economic issues than on issues of any 
other sort, and even for an era of burgeoning commitment to laissez-faire he was unusually clear and 
forceful in articulating the parallels he saw between the beneficent operation of the economic 
marketplace and the “natural progress of ideas.”71 Notice the language in which Bailey couched the 
central promise of his book; he would prove 
that the extrication of mankind from error will be most readily and effectually accomplished 
by perfect freedom of discussion; that to check inquiry and attempt to regulate the progress 
and direction of opinions, by proscriptions and penalties, is to disturb the order of nature, 
and is analogous, in its mischievous tendency, to the system of forcing the capital and 
industry of the community into channels, which they would never spontaneously seek, 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 92. 
 
70 Ibid., 154-5. 
 
71 Quincy goes so far as to claim that “Bailey was the only Benthamite utilitarian openly to have suggested the analogy”; 
Quincy, “Bailey and Mill,” 15-6. 
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instead of suffering private interest to direct them to their most profitable employment.72 
 
Opinions, no less certainly than prices, must “find [their] level.”73 Interference with the distributive 
and competitive mechanisms in the intellectual as in the economic domain was futile at best and 
harmful at worst.  
While Bailey’s psychology of opinion differed widely from that of his utilitarian predecessor, 
he was nevertheless returning to a Godwinian façon de penser in envisaging the destructive impact of 
authoritarian approaches to the press through the model of a protectionist trade policy. The analogy 
between free trade and free discussion was probably more central to Godwin’s Political Justice than to 
any other work of political philosophy before Bailey’s time. Godwin believed that he was living at a 
moment of simultaneous economic and intellectual emancipation, and that the same “mistake” 
regarding the benefits of the “positive interference of society in its corporate capacity” had been 
“now universally exploded” in the cases both of “commerce” and of “speculative inquiry.”74 Neither 
particular branches of industry nor particular dogmas should “be nursed and patronised by the hand 
of power.”75 “Nothing,” he summed up the parallel pithily, “can be at once so unreasonable and 
hopeless, as to attempt by positive regulations to disarm the unalterable laws of the universe.”76 In 
the later words of Buckle, the “protective spirit” was the common enemy of modern civilization on 
the fronts both of the economic market and of the marketplace of ideas.77 For what was the 
penalization of certain beliefs but an endeavor to insulate other, more favored beliefs from the 
natural forces of competition? 
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 The similarities between Godwin and Bailey went further than simply their application of the 
framework of political economy to the domain of opinions. For Godwin, without the aid of the 
more sophisticated psychology with which Bailey was working, nevertheless also moved from the 
analogy between trade in goods and the circulation of opinions to the warning that encroachments 
on the latter could disrupt the civil order: 
Such institutions [intended to give permanence to certain systems and opinions] are two 
ways pernicious; first, which is most material, because they render all the future advances of 
mind infinitely tedious and operose; secondly, because by violently confining the stream of 
reflexion, and holding it for a time in an unnatural state, they compel it at last to rush 
forward with impetuosity, and thus occasion calamities, which, were it free from restraint, 
would be found extremely foreign to its nature.78 
 
To meddle with the natural laws which governed the progress of opinion was not merely to slow the 
march of mind, but also to threaten the fabric of society with violent and sudden disruptions, as the 
new inquiries in economics could help us to see. 
 The second ideological source from which Bailey drew in his depiction of the peaceable 
character of free discussion was the (by his time) venerable instrumental or politique justification of 
religious toleration. The principal authority for this justification (as for virtually all justifications of 
toleration) in early-nineteenth-century Britain remained Locke, who was indisputably the preeminent 
“philosopher of toleration” in the period.79 Among the array of arguments for toleration which 
Locke had marshaled was the claim that the true threat to social harmony was not the plurality of 
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religious sects and beliefs. Instead, the danger lay in the magistrate’s attempts to eradicate this 
plurality: “It is not the Diversity of Opinions, (which cannot be avoided) but the Refusal of 
Toleration to those that are of different Opinions, (which might have been granted) that has 
produced all the Bustles and Wars that have been in the Christian World, upon account of 
Religion.”80 Naturally enough for an early Enlightenment text, Locke’s defense of the peacemaking 
quality of toleration lacked the progressive, philosophy-of-history apparatus which entered into 
Bailey’s view of free discussion. Locke’s view of the counterproductivity of persecution was, 
however, founded on observations concerning the psychology of victimization very similar to those 
of which Bailey would make use. For example, Locke denied that there was anything particularly 
intransigent or rebellious about religious belief that led adherents of those sects which received harsh 
treatment at the government’s hands to become rebellious subjects; if “those who have black Hair 
(for example) or gray Eyes” were singled out as objects of coercion and disadvantage by society, 
then “these Persons, thus distinguished from others by the Colour of their Hair and Eyes, and 
united together by one common Persecution, would be as dangerous to the Magistrate, as any others 
that had associated themselves meerly upon the account of Religion.”81 It was the response of 
victims to the ordeal of being targeted for their beliefs, rather than the content or character of those 
beliefs, which posed a danger to civil society. Bailey followed this reasoning exactly; indeed, the 
absence of an examination of the content of beliefs as a determining factor in whether and when 
opinions might present a threat to social order was even more complete in the Formation and 
Publication than it had been in the Letter Concerning Toleration, since Locke had allowed that there were 
systems of belief (atheism and Roman Catholicism) the content of which was sufficient to mark 
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them off as a civil peril.82 Bailey, on the contrary, was unwilling to designate any opinions as by their 
very nature inconsistent with the requisites of civil society and therefore beyond the pale of 
legitimate discussion. 
 This instrumental defense of toleration was one of the most potent in Europe throughout 
the eighteenth century.83 It received perhaps its finest expression in Hume, who deemed it the 
“paradoxical” refutation of religious intolerance – “paradoxical” because “in all former 
ages…religious sects and heresies and schisms, had been esteemed dangerous, if not pernicious to 
civil government….The magistrate, therefore, applied himself directly to the cure of this evil as of 
every other; and very naturally attempted, by penal statutes, to suppress those separate communities, 
and punish the obstinate innovators.”84 Long years of “fatal experience” had been necessary to 
convince statesmen that – however counterintuitive it seemed that permitting the multiplication of 
rival sects would advance the cause of peace – “the evil [of sectarian contention] was of a peculiar 
nature, and was both enflamed by violent remedies, and diffused itself more rapidly throughout the 
whole society.”85 This view of toleration as a “paradoxical principle and salutary practice” retained its 
vigor through the great religious controversies of the opening decades of the nineteenth century,86 
with such important pro-toleration voices such as the historian Henry Hallam and the Anglican 
cleric Sydney Smith featuring it in their work.87 As the foremost exponent of Whiggism, Thomas 
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Macaulay, put it, the Toleration Act of 1688 had done more than any “single law” in English history 
to bring “gladness, peace, and a sense of security.”88 
In asserting the peacemaking power of the liberty of discussion, then, Bailey was drawing 
upon and broadening an argument for religious toleration that was of both contemporary relevance 
and imposing lineage. What Bailey did was to extend the thesis criminalizing opinion prompted civil 
strife beyond the religious domain to encompass opinions of all sorts. Bailey was fascinated by the 
amount of ideological diversity in nineteenth-century England – by the “numerous diversities of 
opinion in society,” by the division of the country “into so great a variety of sects and parties, many 
of them of the most dissimilar and opposite modes of thinking” on not only religious, but also on 
political, philosophical, economic, and ethical questions.89 The claim that persecution, not diversity, 
jeopardized domestic tranquility had originally been seized upon in order to provide a theoretical 
vindication for the explosion of Protestant sects that had come to seem an entrenched and 
unchangeable fact about English culture by the time of Voltaire,90 and it had later received an 
expansion by Whigs and the Whiggish-minded into a more comprehensive attack on the disabilities 
and restrictions imposed on non-Protestant religious groups. Believing that he was witnessing an 
unprecedented phenomenon of widespread public disagreement on a seemingly limitless range of 
issues, Bailey took this “paradoxical” logic on toleration a step further – he developed it beyond an 
argument for the protection of various forms of religious worship and belief, into a guarantee of the 
right to express any opinion on any subject. 
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b) James Mill and the Whigs 
It was noted at the start of this section that James Mill greeted the Formation and Publication 
with remarkable enthusiasm. While in his review of the book he focused on Bailey’s proofs of the 
involuntariness of belief, Mill the elder could only have looked favorably on Bailey’s pacific defense 
of freedom of the press. Indeed, a decade before either Bailey’s book or his own celebrated 1823 
entry on the “Liberty of the Press” for the Encyclopædia Britannica, Mill had laid out the pacific 
argument in a series of articles for the Edinburgh Review and had explicitly highlighted its provenance 
in politique thinking about religious toleration: before embarking on “any attempts to crush the liberty 
of the press,” Mill warned, statesmen ought to recall “one or two observations of Locke,” after 
which he inserted a lengthy quotation from the Letter Concerning Toleration beginning with the lines 
(cited above) on the peacefulness of non-persecuting, religiously diverse societies.91 
Mill’s argument that “the countries in which the liberty of the press has, in any tolerable 
degree been ever enjoyed…are the countries in which the evils of agitation have been least felt” had 
much in common with Bailey’s later version.92 There are, however, some notable differences 
between the two. Despite being a founder of classical liberal economics, Mill’s rendition did not 
utilize the lessons of political economy to clarify the natural laws governing the distribution of 
opinions. It also lacked the more providential, metahistorical aspects that Bailey would develop. In 
contrast to Bailey, the center of gravity for Mill’s case for the pacific qualities of a free press lay in 
three areas. 
The first, which we have seen uniting Bailey with Locke and many others, was psychological. 
It consisted of an assessment of the effect on hearts and minds of being victimized for one’s beliefs: 
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to favor state intolerance was to commit to the perplexing proposition that “when men are ill used, 
they will be quiet subjects and cordial allies; when well used, active and dangerous enemies.”93 
Relative to the toleration arguments of his predecessors, Mill broke no new ground on this front. 
The second area of concern for Mill was historical. Against the caricature of Mill (and of the 
utilitarians in general) that grew up in the wake of Macaulay’s scathing attack on his ahistorical and 
deductive method,94 Mill was preoccupied with showing that the historical record bore out his 
depiction of free discussion as an instrument of peace. This preoccupation was natural, for looming 
over all radical activism in this era was the specter of the French Revolution. The cataclysm across 
the Channel was a constant feature of arguments for a restrictive press policy;95 as Mill’s 
contemporary John George, in his own lengthy examination of the theory of public discussion, 
lamented, “arbitrarily-disposed persons have notably made use of the French Revolution to inveigh” 
against the liberty of the press, as “against every species of reform.”96 For Mill’s pacific claim to 
stand as an empirically true statement in the science of politics, this seeming counterexample would 
have to be explained away – either as a genuine exception that nevertheless did not disprove the 
rule, or as an event which, despite appearances, did not in fact run counter to the general 
proposition of the innocuousness of a free press at all. 
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The former course was eminently available to Mill père; it was the route which George, for 
instance, would take in his almost exactly contemporaneous tract on the press.97 To George’s mind, 
the admission that there was a chance that “the right of political discussion,” if “abused,” could lead 
to “anarchy” or “despotism” did not undermine his stance on loosening the restraints on 
expression.98 Nor was he wrong to think this. Assuming that peace and stability were the ends in 
view, it was not required for the demonstration that restrictions on opinion were instrumentally 
irrational that there be no possibility of the freedom of the press eventuating in disorder; it was 
enough that a free press be shown to be a more reliable means of achieving these ends than a 
restricted one. And George was confident that the probabilities supported a freer press: “it will be 
my business to make it be seen, that the evils to be apprehended from the exercise of political 
discussion, bear no sort of comparison with the good to be expected.”99 The younger Mill would 
have been perfectly content with such a handling of the difficulty posed by the Revolution, for he 
believed that in the moral and political sciences “a general proposition may be of the greatest 
practical moment, although not absolutely true without a single exception;” the best that politicians 
and political scientists could do was to attend to the “general course of things.”100 Despite the black 
mark of the French Revolution, in which a press run amok had caused immense social and political 
harm, George was convinced that the normal run of events told in favor of a wide liberty of 
discussion. 
 But this more moderate, probabilistic route did not appeal to James Mill. Pace George, Mill 
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elected the more ambitious course of denying that any frightful lessons about the result of giving 
free rein to the publication of opinions could be drawn from the example of the Revolution. 
Instead, he turned on its head the Tory, conservative invocation of the French Revolution as a 
model for the chaos that would follow any expansion of the rights of discussion. To those who were 
not too “agitate[d]” by the horror stories told about the Terror to “render themselves in any 
tolerable degree acquainted with the facts,” the “extraordinary event” pointed the opposite of the 
Tory moral: “It was not the abuse of a free press which was witnessed during the French Revolution; 
it was the abuse of an enslaved press”; “so far from the freedom of the press being the cause of the 
French revolution, had a free press existed in France, the French revolution never would have taken 
place.”101 Mill was merciless towards those who let their good sense be so “subdued by the excesses 
of the times of terror” that they could imagine that the “popular frenzy” of that period was 
produced by “the liberty, and not by the slavery, of the press – slavery more complete than under any 
other circumstances it can possibly be made to endure.”102 The true lesson to be taken from France’s 
great “public disorders” was that the safest route open to European societies was to leave the press 
unfettered.103  
Mill delivered the coup de grâce to the reactionaries whose “understandings” had been 
“paralyzed” by the Revolution in his interpretation of that most renowned hater of the Revolution, 
“Mr Burke.” 104 According to Mill, Burke had been skeptical that freedom of the press could ever be 
a cause of insurrection and instability. Even Burke, “though his lights were not very steady,” had had 
insight enough to recognize that what appear to be “abuses of the right of discussion” or “the 
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license of the press” were in truth epiphenomenal, mere symptoms of the deeper social and political 
afflictions that actually jeopardized the stability and integrity of a society.105 
 Why was Mill so certain that the press had not only not been a factor in sparking Revolution 
atrocities, but that in fact it was the constraints on the press which had been responsible for many of 
the worst features of the Revolution? Though he did not parse them into neat categories, he in 
effect identified two distinct causal paths by which the absence of freedom of discussion in ancien 
régime France had contributed to the calamity of the Revolution. The first, which was noted above in 
Bailey, was what we might call the channeling problem of restricting discussion. The proponents of a 
doctrine or viewpoint, if hindered from championing it through the peaceable mechanisms of 
debate and deliberation, would eventually have recourse to the only means left them: arms. “Had 
real freedom of the press been enjoyed, then the honest men whom France contained [would have] 
been left a channel by which to lay their sentiments before the public” – that is, they would not have 
had cause to pursue their goals by any other route than appeal to the minds of their countrymen.106 
As a summation of the point that, where all could participate in the bloodless contest of discussion 
and debate, all would abstain from violent conflict, Mill quoted approvingly a French work on the 
press: it was only by “extending the privilege inherent to man of stating his thought, that, in ceasing 
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to be exclusive, it [the privilege of pronouncing one’s opinions] ceases to be harmful.”107 
 The second way in which Mill perceived the “slavery of the press” to have contributed to the 
collapse of French society brought the pacific argument into closer connection with the more 
familiar argument about the epistemic and intellectual gains which free discussion would produce.  
On this line of analysis, the outrages and acts of violence that afflicted France post-1789 were made 
possible by the population’s lack of education and enlightenment. Yet these intellectual deficiencies 
of French life were themselves the product of government policy meant to keep public discussion to 
a minimum: “had a means been secured of instructing the people…the enormities of the revolution 
would have been confined within a narrow compass, and its termination would have been very 
different.”108 An ignorant people was more likely to commit atrocities, to be misled by demagogues, 
and to misunderstand the basic principles of good governance and social order than an enlightened 
one. Fortunately, Mill informed his readers, there was an easy remedy for this unenlightened 
condition: “if the people are ignorant, we have only to give them the inestimable advantage of 
discussion, equally free on both sides, and they will be ignorant no longer”; only when “free 
discussion has place” will the “people receive the best possible education.”109 Nor was this a solely 
intellectual education, an amelioration of subjects’ ideas and mental capacities alone. It also had a 
moral dimension, and one that might surprise us given that Mill and the philosophic radicals are 
often characterized as extreme ideologists. This was that free discussion trained the popular mind in 
the value of moderation. “Where a press has been previously free, there are means for making the 
people hear both sides,” and “a people who have been habituated to hear both sides” would be duly 
suspicious of the fanaticism of a “Robespierre” and less liable to grasp at “the designs of the 
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wicked.”110 Rather than rushing impatiently after every quack scheme or giving themselves over to 
the caprices of extremists and enthusiasts, a people edified by discussion would distrust “authors of 
mischief” and remain committed to the slow and unglamorous process of arriving at consensus 
through argument and persuasion.111 
Neither of these diagnoses of the instability- and violence-producing character of the ancien 
régime press policy were peculiar to James Mill’s “philosophic radical” ideology. Quite the contrary, 
Whigs who prided themselves on moderation and prudence were as comfortable articulating them as 
Mill was. The channeling dimension was, for instance, the central idea of Macaulay’s support for a free 
press:  
when the flames are pent up in the mountain, then it is that they have reason to fear; then it 
is that the earth sinks and the sea swells; then cities are swallowed up; and their place 
knoweth them no more. So it is in politics: where the people is most closely restrained, there 
it gives the greatest shocks to peace and order; therefore would I say to all kings, let your 
demagogues lead crowds, lest they lead armies; let them bluster, lest they massacre.112 
 
To include a view in the public discussion was to guarantee that it would have no noxious effects. If 
the view were unsound, it would, after a brief heyday of being loudly trumpeted by some ambitious 
individual or disgruntled group, lose out to more strongly reasoned opinions; if sound, it would not 
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need to employ violent or insurrectionary means to secure its triumph, but instead would triumph 
peaceably and rationally. Macaulay summed up the finding in a handy aphorism: “the danger of 
states is to be estimated, not by what breaks out of the public mind, but by what stays in it.”113 This 
self-equilibrating nature of free discussion was just one particular instance of the rule that liberty in 
general was self-correcting: “the only cure” for the temporal “evils” that intermittently arise in 
conditions of freedom was “freedom” itself.114 The anonymous writer of an 1820s tract on the 
influence of the press saw the matter in the same light: the “liberal” method was “to let the press 
correct the press, and to permit scurrility and abuse to be rendered nerveless and poisonless” by the 
counterassault from writers of opposing views.115 As James Mill put it, “the freedom of the press 
affords a complete remedy for its own diseases.”116 
 The second explanation which Mill supplied for how the absence of free discussion in 
France had prepared the way for chaos and disaster – the one which invoked the educative, 
instructive power of discussion – was equally agreeable to the Whig mindset. The great Whig 
politician and eventual Lord Chancellor Henry Brougham scolded those who “fe[lt] alarmed” at the 
nascent march of mind they were witnessing: “real knowledge never promoted turbulence or 
unbelief,” but “a people kept in the dark, are sure to be easily disquieted; every breath makes them 
start; all objects appear in false shapes; anxiety and alarm spread rapidly without a cause.”117 Thus “a 
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just and lawful government may safely, and even advantageously, encourage the freest discussion.”118 
Macaulay applied to the English Civil War of the 1640s the same two-step logic of (1) an illiberal 
public sphere rendering popular enlightenment impossible and (2) the resulting benightedness 
manifesting in unruliness and discord: “The government had prohibited free discussion….Their 
retribution was just and natural. If our rulers suffered from popular ignorance, it was because they 
had themselves taken away the key of knowledge.”119 From the Whig perspective, all societies were 
instable which had as their base a populace untutored by free discussion. 
 We have now seen two of the three major strands of James Mill’s version of the pacific-
stabilizing defense: the psychological insight into the counterproductiveness of penalizing opinions 
and the nuanced, multi-faceted historical analysis elaborated in order to discredit the use of the 
French Revolution as an example of the dangers of a free press. The third strand consisted of an 
assessment of a free press as a mediator between rulers and subjects. It was a commonplace of his 
son’s generation (and remains one in modern scholarship) that James Mill’s lifetime coincided with 
the rise of a new and powerful political force: public opinion.120 Interest in and convictions about 
politics had spread beyond a narrow, aristocratic ruling class, and this politicization of a wider 
section of society had to be taken account of by governments – to pay no heed to the verdicts of 
this amorphous but engaged body of citizens was to risk being toppled by a disaffected public 
opinion. A free press, and only a free press, Mill argued was capable of bridging the gap between the 
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two distinct but coequal political forces of government and public opinion and of thereby assuring 
the stability of society: “It is the natural, nay, we may confidently say, the necessary effect of a press, 
so to harmonize together the tone of the government and the sentiments of the people, that no 
jarring opposition between them can ever arise.”121 Mill drove home the point with characteristic 
energy and clarity: 
By the free circulation of opinions, the government is always fully apprised, which, by no 
other means it ever can be, of the sentiments of the people….It is at pains to instruct, to 
persuade, and to conciliate….In a word, the government and the people are under a moral 
necessity of acting together; a free press compels them to bend to one another; and any 
contrariety of views and purposes liable to arise, can never come to such a head as to 
threaten convulsions. We may safely affirm, that more freedom of the press granted to our 
own country, would have the salutary effect of harmonizing, to a much greater degree, the 
tone of government and the sentiments of the people, and of rendering all violent 
opposition between them still more improbable than even at present it is.122 
 
In countries in which a genuine public opinion had developed, suppression of discussion was a 
harmful strategic misstep, for it closed off a vital source of information, stopped up an outlet for 
making grievances known, and disabled the healthy interplay between government and the beliefs in 
society at-large. Through a system of free discussion government and public opinion, instead of 
standing in antagonism to one another, were brought into fruitful and steady connection.  
 On this front, as in his identification of the destabilizing consequences of the lack of press 
freedom in eighteenth-century France, Mill was once again in alignment with the Whigs whom he 
would come so openly to despise in the 1820s-30s.123 Indeed, as Joseph Hamburger noted, this 
argument about the press harmonizing government and public opinion124 – was at the very center of 
the Whig tradition. For the Whigs, politics was essentially an arena for prudent adjustment; the duty 
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of the statesman was to reform laws and institutions in order to keep pace with a society in motion. 
From this perspective, an intermediary between governing circles and citizens’ beliefs and desires 
was indispensable, for the latter were the most important data of which the former needed to take 
account; to veer too far from the dictates of public opinion was to undermine the goal of stability 
and good governance through responsive reform that defined the Whig creed. “Where there is a free 
press, the government must live in constant awe of the opinions of the governed”125 – which, 
unappetizing as it must have sounded to proponents of more paternalistic governance, was a far 
more secure position for governors to occupy than that of executing their offices and implementing 
policy in ignorance of the beliefs of the ruled. Only through a free press could subjects’ degree of 
satisfaction with government be accurately ascertained; much of the value of a free press, to the 
Whig, was that it “reveals discontents, which can then be dealt with by timely concessions.”126 In 
order for the government to “harmonise one part with another, and adapt itself to the state of 
knowledge in the nation,” Russell wrote, it had to “submit to hear noisy orators without shrinking”; 
much as “our gentlemen” might wish for some other way to discover what “disease…menaces” the 
body politic at a given moment, only this untidy process of contest in the press could fulfill the 
epistemic function requisite for keeping government and public opinion playing in tune.127 Since 
informed governments were the only ones which could achieve stability, a free press was a necessity. 
A further refinement on this functional or mediating view was possible, based on the claim 
that the liberty of the press had itself been ratified by public opinion, that a principled commitment 
to it had emerged among the British people. On this view, encroachments on the rights of 
discussion not only opened up the probability of a rift developing between government and public 
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opinion by preventing the former from accurately ascertaining and responding to the latter, but were 
ipso facto rifts of just this sort. Violations of the liberty of the press did not simply lead to conflicts 
between rulers and the public downstream, but were in themselves dangerous and destabilizing 
because they placed the government in opposition to the considered conviction of the citizenry that 
discussion should be unfettered. Both James Mill and his Whig counterparts agreed that such a state 
of substantial public support for the liberty of discussion was, or was fast becoming, a feature of 
modern British life. In 1813 Brougham bemoaned a “total discrepancy between the laws and 
manners of the country” on this issue, the laws remaining restrictive of the press while the manners, 
the “public feelings,” had evolved to embrace wide and open discussion.128 Hence prosecutions of 
writers and publishers had come to be “universally regarded as mere party proceedings, in which the 
law is made a handle to assist the views of the junto that happens to prevail for the time.”129 Mill was 
no less confident than Brougham that “liberal sentiments” were taking root “in Great Britain, 
beyond any other country,”130 and that as a result the time was near when even the most reactionary 
government would not dare to risk the sizable public backlash that a crackdown on the press would 
provoke; Tory “Judges” and “Ministers,” “restrained by their respect for public opinion; by the 
knowledge which exists in the nation; and the danger which, at a certain point, would attend national 
disapprobation,” were already exhibiting a new “forbearance” in criminalizing expression.131 The 
Whig historian Henry Hallam felt so assured of the decisive triumph of the freedom of discussion 
that he projected it a century backwards in English history, finding the unstoppable “torrent of a 
free press” in early instances of juries refusing to convict in cases of political libel and thereby 
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frustrating the government’s assertion of its right to curtail the “licentiousness of the press.”132 The 
desire for a free press, both Whigs and radicals of the first decades of the nineteenth century 
proclaimed (probably more from hopefulness than from certainty) was now a fact of English culture. 
To act in denial of this truth was, they warned, to risk (at best) the durability of the offending 
government and (at worst) the peace and prosperity of the nation. 
A century after Samuel Bailey’s plea for an unfettered press, the historian D.C. Somervell, 
reflecting on English politics in the previous century, concluded confidently that “the development 
of free discussion” had been a major factor in “promot[ing] an immense amount of indisputable 
legislative improvement.”133 Whether he would also have attributed – and whether we should 
attribute – a prominent role to the liberty of discussion in ensuring the peace and stability of Britain 
in the nineteenth century is less certain. But at the least it should be clear by now that many 
advocates of a free press in the first decades of the century expected it to play precisely such a role. 
 
c) French Admirers 
Before turning to the reaction of Mill fils to the pacific theories elaborated here, it is worth 
taking a brief detour across the Channel. For the family of approaches to the intellectual-expressive 
liberties examined here was an important but little noted aspect of the Anglophic trend of French 
thought that has been the object of much comment by historians. 
One of France’s foremost admirers of England, Benjamin Constant, writing in the aftermath 
of Napoleon’s fall, channeled, among other British themes, the vision of the liberty of the press as 
fulfilling a stabilizing function in his depiction of a liberal, constitutional path for French politics.134 
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Constant was especially persuaded by the role ascribed to the press as a harmonizer of society and 
government. In a way that resembled the Whig emphasis on the need for policy and political action 
to coincide with the desires of the population – “any amelioration, any reform, the abolition of any 
abuse, all these are beneficial only when they second the wish of the nation” – he warned that 
governments who misread “public opinion” and consequently did not “march in step with it” risked 
tearing the social fabric apart and bringing about their own demise.135 Fortunately, the liberty of the 
press provided a reliable remedy against the hazard of falling-out-of-sync with the national mind: “if 
you allow public opinion free expression you will have no difficulty in knowing its feelings.”136 The 
disposition of rulers to meddle with the beliefs and opinions of their citizens was powerful one, but 
if it could be tamed then the stability of modern liberal societies would be achieved: 
But if authority will only remain silent, the individuals will speak up, the clash of ideas will 
generate enlightenment, and it will soon be impossible to mistake the general feeling. You 
have here an infallible as well as easy means [to the end of stability], freedom of the press; 
that freedom to which we must always return; that freedom which is as necessary to 
governments as to the people; that freedom, the violation of which, in this respect, is a crime 
against the state.137 
 
The stabilizing impact of a free press was an important part of the overarching lesson that Constant 
wanted to teach France: “No despotic state, with all its might, has ever lasted as long as English 
liberty.”138 The complementarity of liberty and stability was, Constant told his French audience, a 
truth of which British politics and political thinkers had provided ample proof. 
In the endeavor to import into France the pacific logic of support for a free press Constant 
would be followed, two decades later, by the French thinker who would exert the strongest 
influence on Victorian Britain, Alexis de Tocqueville. A central aim of his chapter on “The Freedom 
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of the Press in the United States” in volume one of Democracy in America was to soothe French fears 
of the destabilizing effects of an unbound, licentious press. For our purposes, it is enough to note 
two features of Tocqueville’s idiosyncratic variation on the pacific argument. As will be seen, 
Tocqueville’s reasoning stands somewhat apart from the renditions we have previously examined. 
First, Tocqueville accepted that the press had exercised a destructive impact in France, but 
he elucidated this impact as the result of particular, locally French factors such as the concentration 
of power in the hands of a small number of writers and editors in Paris; the French press was 
rendered reckless and overly potent by the “general law of nature” that “the effective force of any 
power is increased as control is centralized.”139 This pernicious centralization of the press was in part 
the unfortunate but natural consequence of the ascendancy of Paris in the French universe. But it 
was “also a result of the law,” which restricted individuals’ ability to found a journal and enter the 
public debate and hence kept the entire public voice fixed in “a few powerful organs” which could 
consequently exert “a central direction over [citizens’] thinking.”140 In America, on the other hand, 
the political and social decentralization of the nation combined with an absolutely free press to 
produce an “incredible dispersion of [the] forces” of “enlightenment,” a situation in which the 
“beams of human intelligence do not all emanate from a common center but crisscross in every 
direction.”141 Due to the “extreme independence” of the press and the multiplicity of newspapers 
and publications that resulted, Americans were not susceptible to being suddenly mobilized for 
revolutionary ends by the “violent but lofty” rhetoric of a few journalists: “It is an axiom of political 
science in the United States that the only way to neutralize the influence of newspapers is to multiply 
their number. I cannot imagine why such an obvious truth has yet to become a commonplace in 
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France.”142  
While Tocqueville did not cite Adam Smith explicitly, his belief that the proliferation of 
newspapers conduced to civil peace tracked very closely a similar axiom in the Wealth of Nations 
regarding the proliferation of religious sects. Only when “but one sect [is] tolerated in the society, or 
where the whole society is divided into two or three great sects” would religious zeal prove 
“dangerous and troublesome.”143 Religious zeal was “innocent,” however, in countries which were 
“divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into as many thousand small sects, of which no one 
could be considerable enough to disturb the publick tranquillity.”144 On issues that appealed as 
intensely to the passions as religion and politics, the “public tranquility” was best served not by 
“discipline and unity of action” but by diversity, by the multi-vocal symphony of dissent.145 Unlike 
Constant, who stressed the gains to security of harmonizing the government and a more or less 
monolithic public opinion, Tocqueville praised the American establishment of a free press for 
ensuring that political discourse always contained a sound minimum of disagreement. Note also that 
the relationship between Tocqueville and Smith paralleled that which we saw in section one between 
Bailey and Locke: the extension of an argument about the civic effects of religious difference to a 
wider domain of opinion. 
The second way in which a free press was of benefit to peace and order was psychological. 
Here Tocqueville resembles more closely the mainstream of the British pacific argument than in his 
foregoing line of analysis. Like James Mill extolling the moderating moral-intellectual influence of 
the process of free discussion, Tocqueville asserted that the liberty of discussion indisposed citizens 
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to revolt. The multiplicity of programs and beliefs yielded by an unconstrained press regime 
encouraged in citizens a moderate skepticism, a doubting temperament, which was antithetical to the 
“fervor” which sparked revolutions.146 Where free discussion prevailed, individuals were disinclined 
both to be carried away by the bold pronouncement of a new ideology and to attach themselves 
ardently even to the ideas to which they already subscribed. “Since all social theories are criticized 
and combated one after another, anyone who adheres to one of them holds on to it not so much 
because he is sure that it is good as because he is not sure that anything is better.”147 The final 
outcome of the moral-psychological formation provided by free discussion was that a tumultuous 
discourse of “opinions” gave way to a more stable and “permanent” (though inglorious and morally 
deficient) focus on “material interest.”148 While the freedom of the press was, Tocqueville avowed, 
not a panacea for the many ills of a democratic age, the incitement of destabilization and turmoil was 
not among its faults. 
 Because of the large amount of scholarly interest in Tocqueville’s account of the mental life 
of democracies and revolutions, it is worthwhile to prolong our return to British soil a moment 
longer for the sake of noting a further aspect of the first thread of his pacific argument: namely, his 
counterintuitive approach to the question of the ideological basis of political stability. Although it 
has gone wholly unrecognized, this view of the salutary fragmentation which attended the 
liberalization of the press colored the reading of the French Revolution he would elaborate two 
decades later. The large part which Tocqueville assigned to intellectuals and writers in the 
Revolutionary drama has provoked ample comment. But what has not been sufficiently considered 
is Tocqueville’s portrayal of the ideological unanimity of the intelligentsia on the eve of the 
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Revolution. 
 The natural expectation in encountering conflict and innovation of such a magnitude is that 
dissension is responsible. A general agreement or understanding which bound subjects to one 
another and to their rulers and which justified the social order crumbles, and a competition of ideas 
emerges where before there was none. And Tocqueville occasionally describes the Revolution in this 
way, as in his likening of it to the Reformation in his uncompleted sequel to The Ancien Regime on the 
Napoleonic era.149 The Reformation was the perfect paradigm of this conventional way of thinking 
about revolution: the turmoil the Reformation generated is due to the increase it caused in the range 
of religious options on offer in Europe. From unanimity there came diversity, and this diversity 
sparked violence between the newly-divided groups. 
But this is not how the French Revolution appears in L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution, or in the 
bulk of the notes and drafts for the second volume. Instead, its defining feature is precisely the 
opposite. Rather than a vortex of chaotic disagreement,150 what brought on the revolution, and what 
characterized its early stages, was agreement: 
However divided they [the French intelligentsia] are in the rest of their thinking, they all start 
from this same point: they all think that it would be good to substitute basic and simple principles, 
derived from reason and natural law, for the complicated and traditional customs which 
ruled the society of their times. In closely examining this, we shall see that what may 
properly be called the political philosophy of the eighteenth century consisted of this single 
idea. 
 
This situation, so new to history, in which the entire political education of a great nation was 
completely shaped by men of letters, was perhaps what contributed most to giving the 
French Revolution its particular spirit, and made it lead to what we see today. 
 
Like its adversaries, in fact, the aristocracy freely believed that the most perfect society would 
be one where natural equality was best approximated; where merit alone, and not birth and 
fortune, would classify men; to the aristocracy the most legitimate government seemed to be 
the general will expressed by numerical majority. If interests differed, ideas were the same, and 
everyone knew about politics only what they had read in books, the same books. 
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What is surprising is that I see absolutely no one argue about the principles of this 
question….The ideas of Rousseau are a flood which has momentarily submerged this whole 
part of the human mind and the human sciences. 
 
[Speaking of the cahiers of the third estate] Almost complete identity of general ideas about 
social questions with the general ideas proposed by the first two orders, above all by the 
nobility, and even, in fact, in specific ideas, at least as long as it is not a question of particular 
privileges relating to one of these orders, in which case the commoners go farther than that 
order on that particular point. In summary, it is absolutely the same mind, and the only difference is in 
the greater or lesser logic applied to drawing conclusions from principles.151 
 
Certainly there were hold-outs and reactionaries of many sorts, and certainly the picture 
painted in the passages above is a stylized one, but Tocqueville is too insistent on this point not to 
treat it as his serious verdict as an historian. However many parties and systems would clash as it 
dragged on, the French Revolution at its onset was not the fruition of a process of ideological 
fragmentation, but rather the breaking forth of an already settled unanimity – a unified mass that 
had grown up in the shadows of a deadened public sphere and an unfree press only to “burst forth” 
from its confinement, as Bailey or the Whigs would write, once the shackles were loosened enough. 
The sudden and near universal embrace of one worldview – and a radically new one at that – by a 
civilized nation could never have been the consequence of a free politics. If there had been freedom 
under the ancien régime, a simplistic Rousseauianism could not have held such an unchallenged reign 
over the French intellect. Liberty can never result in such perverse unanimity. In the French 
Revolution Tocqueville found further confirmation of the counterproductiveness of attempts by the 
state to control the minds and pens of its citizens, for these attempts did not have the effect of 
directing thought into the paths desired by the state so much as it generated artificially powerful 
conglomerations of opinion, uniting into a few hostile camps what would have been a broad set of 
small and interlocking clusters of belief. 
 Tocqueville is known as a theorist of the tyranny of the majority. This concept had several 
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facets, but insofar as it meant the constraining power of popular majorities over the intellect, it 
denoted a form of pernicious consensus. It represented the fear that, in egalitarian social-political 
conditions, legal guarantees would not be sufficient to secure genuine freedom of discussion, and 
thus that (to use the terms of a Victorian disciple of Tocqueville) “nominal assent” would replace 
“rational decision” as the ground of societal consensus.152 What was depicted in the Ancien Régime, 
and what loomed as the revers de la médaille of his happy description of the ideological fragmentation 
accompanying press freedom, was another species of pernicious consensus, one in which legal 
restrictions on the written word and the absence of meaningful political contest brought about a 
concurrence of view which was equally unreflective of genuine deliberation but which also had the 
consequence of sparking insurrection and unrest. A degree of diversity in opinions was a good for 
Tocqueville, not only in that it was a sign that “independence of mind” had survived the threat 
constituted by the power of “the majority over thought,” but also, and paradoxically, as an aid to 
democratic stability in its own right.153 
 To be sure, it is not easy to determine what Tocqueville concretely had in mind as instances 
of this positive, pacific diversity.154 But even if this was not the most limpid piece of his outlook, it 
was one which resonated during the long French struggle for a free press. While the afterlife of these 
ideas belongs more properly to the following chapter, we can conclude this jaunt into French 
territory by mentioning that the great French liberal politician, polymath, and opponent of 
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Napoleon III Edouard de Laboulaye placed Tocqueville’s Smithian logic of a free press’s 
contribution to stability through the multiplication of voices at the center of the theory of 
intellectual liberty which he developed as an alternative to Imperial control of the press.155 It was a 
lesson which he credited jointly to the author of Democracy in America and to the example of 
“England, where the press is entirely free.”156 
 
3) JS Mill’s Complicated Relationship to the Pacific Argument 
 As the last section showed, the argument for the liberty of discussion from considerations of 
peace and stability was a rich and well-developed one, especially in the period of John Stuart Mill’s 
youth and early adulthood. Moreover, this approach was well-positioned, given who some of its 
major voices were, to have made a strong impression on the younger Mill. Not only such an 
estimable pillar of liberal views in his beloved France as Constant; not only his interlocutor and 
fellow economist, logician, and philosophical radical Samuel Bailey; not only Tocqueville, the author 
who had done more than any other to bring Mill’s political philosophy into its mature form157; but 
even his own father, the greatest spokesman of radicalism in English history.158 And yet, as we have 
seen, Mill was curiously silent about this defense of one of his most treasured causes. His silence 
regarding the argument is particularly deafening in On Liberty, but in fact his marginalization of it 
extends beyond his famous treatise and through a half-century of prolific authorship. 
 This is not to say that nothing resembling the pacific argument ever found its way into his 
writing. However, appearances of such ideas in his corpus are few and far between. One of these 
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rare instances came in a Westminster Review article which Mill wrote at the tender age of eighteen on 
the “Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press.” Unsurprisingly, given his youth at the time of 
composition, it was little more than a summary of his father’s ideas on the subject.159 Among the 
themes rehashed was the pacific argument, couched in phrases nearly identical to James Mill’s: “no 
people which had ever enjoyed a free press, could have been guilty of the excesses of the French 
Revolution,” the young JS Mill wrote; only where discussion was absent or constricted would society 
be threatened by “ignorant and ferocious” outbreaks.160 From the perspective of stability, a free 
press could only be a boon, for “discussion…has a necessary tendency to remedy its own evils.”161 
James Mill could not have said it better himself. 
 Echoes of this teenage production recur later, though very rarely. A frequent topic of his 
journalism on French politics was his outrage at the restrictive press regime of the July Monarchy, 
and he opined on a few occasions that the crackdown on the press was contributing to, rather than 
reducing, the turmoil and instability by which French society was plagued.162 When even the nascent 
Second Republic on which he had pinned great hopes enacted in 1848 “one of the most monstrous 
outrages on the idea of freedom of discussion ever committed by the legislature of a country 
pretending to be free,” Mill wrote an impassioned denunciation of the new law that revived the 
channeling strand of the pacific argument.163 A government, he declared, 
deserves the severest blame if to prevent insurrection it prevents the promulgation of 
opinion. If it does so, it actually justifies insurrection in those to whom it denies the use of 
peaceful means to make their opinions prevail…by what right can the Assembly now 
reprobate any future attempt, either by Monarchists or Socialists, to rise in arms against the 
Government? It denies them free discussion. It says they shall not be suffered to bring their 
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opinions to the touchstone of the public reason and conscience. It refuses them the chance 
which every sincere opinion can justly claim, of triumphing in a fair field….It tells them that 
they must prevail by violence before they shall be allowed to contend by argument. Who can 
blame persons who are deeply convinced of the truth and importance of their opinions, for 
asserting them by force, when that is the only means left them of obtaining even a hearing? 
When their mouths are gagged, can they be reproached for using their arms?164 
 
Yet even these aspersions on what he took to the despotic action of the National Assembly were 
quite different from the standard construction of the pacific defense which we have been 
investigating. That version began from the (usually unstated) presumption that stability and peace 
were moral goods, and then proceeded to show that, because censorship and persecution were likely 
to engender violence and unrest, freedom of discussion was instrumentally necessary for stability 
and therefore morally required. Though a radical like James Mill had no qualms about 
countenancing revolution in certain circumstances, the pacific argument en soi was neutral with 
respect to, and analytically distinct from, any view about the legitimacy or rightness of taking violent 
action in furtherance of beliefs whose expression was proscribed. Hence the argument was equally 
available to a good Whig like Brougham who had little stomach for revolution.165 In his stirring 
indictment of the Assembly’s illiberalism, Mill, while employing certain elements of the pacific logic, 
was more interested in proving the blamelessness or even righteousness of the recourse to violence 
by Frenchmen whose beliefs were denied “fair play” by the “tyrannical” legislation.166 This 
normative justification of rebellion was a far cry from the more purely instrumental or functional 
character of the classic versions of the pacific argument. 
 The closest that the mature Mill would come to giving an orthodox statement of this 
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position was in his reaction to the 1867 Hyde Park riots.167 The Tory government had tried to bar 
the Reform League from gathering in Hyde Park for a demonstration on behalf of a further 
installment of parliamentary reform. In five speeches delivered in the following few weeks, Mill 
castigated the Tories for endangering the tranquility of the country by their attempted exclusion of 
the protesters from the park. Their repressive efforts were, Mill asserted, nothing but foolish 
miscalculation. In England, which possessed well-established traditions of nonviolent political 
discourse and mobilization, even demonstrations which advocated wrongheaded causes or used 
“threatening language” posed no danger to public order.168 On the contrary, the peaceful political 
process was only imperiled when “arbitrary restrictions” curtailing “the freedom of public speaking” 
were put in force, for it was then that “the discontent, which cannot exhale itself in public meetings, 
bursts forth in insurrections, which, whether successful or repressed, always leave behind them a 
long train of calamitous consequences.”169 The best course of action for maintaining England’s 
cherished status as the land of reform rather than revolution was to respect absolutely the right of 
“political meetings.”170 In this speech, Mill applied the argument from stability directly to a subset of 
those rights (here, the rights of public assembly) which fell under the umbrella of liberty of 
discussion. The potential crisis which Britain faced in the summer of 1867 was explicable as a 
particular case of the general theory of the counterproductiveness of restrictions on expression 
which Bailey, James Mill, et al had elaborated (though Mill alluded to none of them in this oration). 
 But this was it. In the thousands of pages which John Stuart Mill would publish on social 
and political questions, he never gave a general exposition of any version of the pacific justification 
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of the freedom of discussion. Despite his astonishing prolificacy, the argument was missing from all 
his major political writings. How is this curious fact to be explained? One possible explanation is 
that Mill simply judged that the argument had lost its topicality. In the years since his father’s death 
fears of the “volatility, unpredictability, and excess” of public opinion and the press had declined171; 
in Mill’s own optimistic words in the Autobiography, “freedom of discussion…seems to be now” in 
mid-Victorian England, “a conceded point.”172 Given that the operation of a (mostly) free press was 
becoming a more familiar and salient part of British political culture, perhaps the persuasive impact 
of returning to the proofs of liberty of discussion’s contributions to peace and stability simply 
looked too minimal to Mill. 
 This hypothesis probably contains some truth. There is no doubt that Mill the younger, his 
frequent animadversions upon the social tyranny of the yoke of public opinion notwithstanding, felt 
far less than his father a necessity “to be always ready to argue and reargue for the liberty of 
expressing” his “obnoxious opinions.”173 But it is certainly far from the whole truth. For, despite 
recent advances, Mill suffered from a keen anxiety about the precariousness of public commitment 
to this (all things considered) relatively new tenet of liberalism. In the late 1840s Mill was still 
lamenting that the English “law of political libel, as laid down in the books, is as inconsistent with 
free discussion as the laws of Russia. There is no censure of any established institution or 
constituted authority which is not an offence by law.”174 The maintenance of a free press was 
“entirely an affair of opinion and custom, not of law”175 – and this opinion and custom was hardly a 
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surety in which one could have confidence: 
this apparent liberality and tolerance has acquired so little of the authority of a principle, that 
it is always ready to give way to the dread or horror inspired by some particular sort of 
opinions. Within the last fifteen or twenty years several individuals have suffered 
imprisonment, for the public profession, sometimes in a very temperate manner, of disbelief 
in religion; and it is probable that both the public and the government, at the first panic 
which arises on the subject of Chartism or Communism, will fly to similar means for 
checking the propagation of democratic or antiproperty doctrines.176 
 
If the liberty of discussion stood on shaky ground in England, it was nonexistent in the adopted 
country of his later years. Residing as he did for long stretches of the last two decades of his life in 
Avignon, Mill had firsthand experience of life under a regime of effective press censorship.177 It is 
not a sufficient explanation of his reticence on the subject of free discussion’s role in realizing a 
stable society, then, that such foundational defenses of the political liberties of expression and 
publication had ceased to be relevant due to the widespread and fixed commitment to these liberties. 
For Mill, as we have seen, denied that the principle of free discussion had taken root firmly. 
 Mill’s avoidance of the pacific-stabilizing defense rested on another basis than the 
impression that it had run its course or that modern, advanced societies like mid-Victorian England 
had progressed beyond the stage at which they needed to be relearn such elementary lessons. 
Instead, I believe, this avoidance had other, deeper causes. In truth, the mature Mill would have seen 
the pacific argument less as out-of-sync with the times than as out-of-sync with his own views. 
Given his own beliefs Mill could only have seen the theory of Bailey and his father as an 
unsatisfactory one, and this for two reasons. 
 The first is that Mill had a great deal of ambivalence about whether the empirical claim that 
freedom of expression and publication helped the cause of civil peace and political stability was 
accurate. On the one hand, though he was not shy about stating where he saw his own views as 
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diverging from those of the men who educated him, he never explicitly renounced this particular 
piece of his ideological inheritance, and, as shown above, he believed that particular cases could arise 
(France in the 1830s-40s, England in the run-up to the Second Reform Act) in which a complete 
liberalization of discussion would be advantageous to the prospects of avoiding violence or 
revolution. On the other hand, as a more general theoretical proposition he held a view that, while 
not logically inconsistent with endorsing the pacific argument, was certainly difficult to reconcile at 
the level of actual political life. 
 The difficulty derives from his subscription to the “Germano-Coleridgean doctrine” on the 
“condition[s] of stability in political society.”178 Mill, influenced here as much by Comte and 
Tocqueville as by Coleridge, averred that “general agreement” was indispensable to stability.179 Mill 
espoused a strongly consensus-based theory of stability. Because the “more powerful propensities” 
of human nature (the “purely selfish ones, and those of a sympathetic character which partake most 
of selfishness”) “evidently tend in themselves to disunite mankind,” “a common system of 
opinions” was required to bind men together and to tame these formidable centrifugal forces.180 The 
“fixed point,” the “something which is settled…and not to be called into question,” the “something 
which men agreed in holding sacred” – these were essential ingredients of a durable and healthy 
body politic.181 So important was this cohesive role of shared values and sentiments that, well after 
the period of Mill’s maximal attraction to “organicist” or “conservative” thought had passed, he still 
rejected the feasibility of representative democracy in multicultural societies on the ground that these 
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societies were incapable of forming a “united public opinion.”182 “When the questioning of these 
fundamental principles is (not the occasional disease, or salutary medicine, but) the habitual 
condition of the body politic,” Mill presaged darkly, “and when all the violent animosities are called 
forth, which spring naturally from such a situation, the State is virtually in a position of civil war; and 
can never long remain free from it in act and fact.”183 
 As an empirical matter, then, a situation of near-complete consensus on a small but crucial 
set of values was a prerequisite of stability. Now, this emphasis on consensus never led Mill to 
abandon the principle of freedom of discussion.184 But it did prevent him from seeing this liberty as 
a pacifying or stabilizing factor. For while there had been, and would likely be again, epochs in 
which the liberty of discussion would be consistent with maintaining this indispensable consensus – 
circumstances in which, while it would be “lawful to contest in theory” the meaning and purpose of 
society’s central institutions and practices, the importance of these institutions would nonetheless be 
“in the common estimation placed beyond discussion”185 – no such harmony was possible in “ages 
of transition” such as Mill believed his own lifetime to be.186 In this state of affairs “to discuss, and 
to question established opinions, are merely two phases of the same thing.”187 Nor did Mill regret 
this intrepid critical temper of his age. Indeed, he perceived it as being still deficient relative to the 
level of scrutiny which he wished to characterize public debate. He wanted every doubt about social 
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and political norms to be searched to its roots even if it meant turning up a bevy of wrongheaded 
views along the way.188 The order of the day was universal interrogation and disagreement.  A new 
consensus sufficiently well-founded to exist “beyond discussion” stood at “an incalculable distance” 
from the present moment when the processes of deliberation and agitation were doing more to 
“throw[] aside” old “errors” than to propagate new verities, and consequently the debates carried on 
through the freedom of the press were bound for the foreseeable future to be agents of 
disintegration and diversity rather than of cohesion and consensus. 189 
 Despite his standing as Western political theory’s most famous apologist for freedom of 
discussion, Mill’s honesty prevented him from claiming for his most cherished principle attributes 
which he did not believe it to possess. Mill embraced the liberty of discussion not because he 
thought it was without risks, but because he thought the risks were worth running. He didn’t blanch 
from admitting that French governments had collapsed not only when the press was unfree but also 
when, as in 1830, “France had enjoyed a practically free press” for “sixteen years prior.”190 And he 
never feigned assurance that a free press was any kind of remedy for the instability which he 
expected to beset Victorian England as it would any society “in transition.” Freedom of discussion 
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in these conditions could lead even a nation with as much political continuity as Britain into disorder 
and revolution – and Mill was willing to accept this potential cost.191 Any increase in instability or the 
likelihood of revolt was more than offset by free discussion’s role in defeating the true “evil”: 
“stagnation.”192 Intellectual and expressive freedom was a good that far outweighed any fears of 
unrest or instability, and this freedom was to be accepted and promoted not out of blindness to the 
attendant perils but because those perils were recognized, assessed, and determined to be of lesser 
consequence than an infringement on the rights of discussion. Once the true magnitude of the social 
and intellectual benefits provided by liberty of discussion was well understood, concerns about peace 
and stability, though real, would be seen to pale in comparison. 
 This last thought brings us to the second cause for Mill to have been dissatisfied with the 
pacific argument. This was that, even if this argument had been true (and it retained, as we have 
seen, some plausibility in Mill’s eyes), it would still have been the wrong kind of reason on which to 
ground one’s support for freedom of discussion. The problem with the pacific argument was that it 
seemed to have a special appeal for thinkers who, while accepting the liberty of discussion, accepted 
it in the wrong manner. 
We saw in section two that the justification from peace and stability was agreeable to Whigs 
such as Brougham. To the young Mill, this ability of the argument to appeal beyond the radicals to 
the Whig mainstream was no recommendation for it, since Mill had nothing but contempt for the 
Whig “coterie,” the “set…who commanded a certain number of seats in Parliament” despite lacking 
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any principles of their own.193 The pacific argument was a perfect rhetorical tool for “Trimmer[s]” 
who understood politics as a means of guaranteeing peace through compromise rather than as a 
domain in which to “achieve a moral purpose.”194 Those who provided a temporizing or narrowly 
instrumental account of liberty of expression could not be trusted to stand by this liberty when its 
instrumental value appeared to decrease; unsurprisingly, Mill showered scorn on Brougham’s 
defense of the free press for what he took to be its tepid and qualified character.195 Whigs were not 
reliable allies on the question of the freedom of the press, and the pacific argument as deployed by 
such unprincipled powerbrokers could only been a mealy-mouthed bid to switch from the 
“aristocratic” to the “popular side of [the] question” when the latter side’s tide looked to be rising.196 
On Mill’s reckoning, the Whigs upheld freedom of discussion because they felt that they had to. This 
attitude, Mill was emphatic, merited condemnation. 
 As Mill would have known well from the confidence with which the likes of his father and 
Samuel Bailey asserted the pacific justification, nothing about this justification precluded it from 
forming part of a profound moral commitment to the liberty of the press. On its own, however, the 
argument could be deployed by thinkers whose understanding of the value of freedom of discussion 
was, to Mill, paltry and inadequate. Let us take two examples. First, Archibald Alison – a Scottish 
Tory writer whom Mill’s “fingers itched to be at” and who was prominent in the first three decades 
of the nineteenth century.197 On the one hand, Alison wished that the government would undertake 
                                                 
193 Mill, “Walsh’s Contemporary History,” in CW, vol. 6, 342. 
 
194 Joseph Hamburger, “The Whig Conscience,” 28. On the young Mill’s, and the philosophic radicals’ in general, 
contempt for the Whigs, see Hamburger, Intellectuals in Politics, 65-7. And see note 123 above. 
 
195 Mill, “Periodical Literature: Edinburgh Review,” 298-300. 
 
196 Ibid., 294. The Whigs’ record on liberalization of discussion during the 1820s and early 1830s was, from the radical 
perspective, deficient: Wickwar, Struggle for Press, e.g. 146, 152, 292, 301; W.J. Linton, James Watson: A Memoir 
(Manchester: Abel Heywood and Son, 1880), 42-3. Hamburger, however, emphasizes that the Whigs generally 
maintained the liberty of the press and public meetings throughout the Reform crisis; Hamburger, Mill and Revolution, 43. 
 
197 Mill, Letter to Macvey Napier, 15 Oct. 1842, in CW, vol. 13, 551. 
 62 
 
a project of considerable financial support to establish a permanent, state-endowed conservative 
press corps in order to defeat the “pleaders on the side of democracy”; on the other, he forswore 
any scheme to reduce the press to “slavery” as it had been in France “under Napoleon.”198 Given 
the extreme skepticism with which he regarded the ability of free public discussion to generate (what 
he believed to be) the correct answers on political and economic questions, he might have been 
expected to toss any liberal, open press policy overboard and to advocate the reinstatement of a 
censorship regime. But he explicitly disavowed any “brutal remedies,” any “talk of coercing the press 
by fetters or prosecutions,” and advocated fighting the pen of falsehood with only the (state-
subsidized) pen of truth in great part because repressive efforts “would be the prolific parent of 
never-failing discord.”199 Had Alison lived to read On Liberty, he would not have felt much sympathy 
with its optimistic rationalism. And yet he was an enemy of all persecution, because he did not want 
his country to be plunged into disorder and disharmony. 
More distressing to Mill than Alison’s illiberalism would have been the fact that Tocqueville, 
for all his beautiful paeans to liberty and haunting expressions of the degrading effects of the tyranny 
of the majority, was closer to the Scottish Tory on this issue than to Mill. As we saw in section two, 
Tocqueville offered his own idiosyncratic version of the pacific argument. This pacific argument 
was, Tocqueville was clear, meant as a piece of a larger deflationary account of the value of the 
liberty of discussion: “I confess that I do not feel toward the freedom of the press that complete and 
instantaneous love that one grants to things that by their very nature are supremely good. I love it 
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out of consideration for the evils that it prevents far more than for the good that it does.”200 In 
democratic ages the liberty of the press was a useful tool for preserving the “public tranquility” 
without falling under the “despot’s heel.201 Despite the “universal…applause and assent” with which 
Tocqueville’s views were greeted in England,202 this was decidedly not the stuff of which the famous 
second chapter of On Liberty was to be made. From Mill’s point-of-view, Democracy’s evaluation of 
the press was closer to unreliable and unscrupulous Whiggery than to his own recognition of the 
liberty of discussion as a crucial component of human flourishing. And indeed, during his brief stint 
as a Cabinet minister in 1849 Tocqueville turned against this liberty, encouraging the National 
Assembly to “suppress the vagaries of the press with even more energy than had been used under 
the [July] Monarchy.”203 When push came to shove, the pacific argument did not prevent 
Tocqueville from penalizing the press even more harshly than the preceding regime had done – a 
regime which Mill condemned for betraying the principles of free discussion. 
It should be apparent how foreign this mindset of Alison and Stephen was to Mill. Mill 
wanted the freedom of the press to be valued as a good in its own right. To be sure, Mill’s official 
word was that the liberty of discussion, like any liberty, had no freestanding, a priori normative status. 
Its official justification was consequentialist, namely, that it promoted “the permanent interests of 
man as a progressive being.”204 Mill, true to his Benthamite-utilitarian heritage, refused to declare 
that the liberty of discussion was an “inherent moral truth” or a “natural right” of any kind, and 
instead insisted that this liberty, like all facets of social and political life, had to be justified on the 
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basis of the benefits which it produced. As his father and Samuel Bailey demonstrate, to emphasize 
peace and stability was perfectly consistent with this philosophy, for these were goods which would 
count on the positive side of the ledger when one set the costs and benefits of liberty against one 
another. 
Yet this formal utilitarian framework had only a loose connection with John Stuart Mill’s 
support of the freedom of thought and discussion – loose enough, in fact, that many fellow 
Victorians came to see Mill’s politics as a hybrid of utilitarianism and natural rights, as we will 
investigate in the next chapter. For on the ground of actual politics and public discourse Mill had no 
desire for the liberty of thought and discussion to be subject to a calculus in which it would be 
weighed as one of potentially many factors felt to be of present political import. This calculative or 
instrumental mode of reasoning would have been a hindrance to the emergence of the only proper 
foundation for the liberty of discussion: the “conscientious sense of the importance to mankind of 
the equal freedom of all opinions.”205 He wanted the liberty of discussion to be affirmed as a dictate 
of justice and a vital element of social and intellectual well-being, not simply acquiesced in as a modus 
vivendi by an assortment of groups who would have preferred to impose their “sympathies and 
antipathies” on society as a whole.206 “A clear insight, indeed, into this necessity [of “antagonist 
modes of thought”] is the only rational or enduring basis of philosophical tolerance; the only 
condition under which liberality in matters of opinion can be anything better than a polite synonym 
for indifference between one opinion and another”207 – or, he might have continued, than a 
synonym for the prudent but morally discreditable subordination of one’s persecutory preferences 
simply for the sake of keeping the peace. 
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Thus even if it had held absolutely as an empirical law of politics, Mill would still have felt a 
sense of failure if the pacific argument had kept On Liberty’s proofs of liberty of opinion’s 
contributions to humanity’s intellectual and moral progress from attaining their rightful place at the 
center of British liberalism. The pacific argument, in Mill’s eyes, encouraged a view of liberty of 
discussion as a concession, an accommodation to an unfortunate but intransigent reality—exactly 
the mindset that he found least conducive to a genuine appreciation of intellectual and expressive 
freedom. Perhaps, then, it was not much of a tragedy to Mill that, to use his terminology, the pacific 
argument was only a “partial truth” anyway.208 
 
4) Conclusion 
This chapter’s recovery of the pacific argument modifies our understanding of nineteenth-
century liberalism in important ways that have broader ramifications for the history of British 
political thought. To start with, despite the work of the late John Burrow and a few others, there is a 
strong perception of a firm division between the outlooks of Whigs and radicals-utilitarians.209 In 
fact, on the crucial political and theoretical controversy about the nature of the press and its 
freedom, these groups were united at the start of the century and in the period of Reform in their 
vision of a free press as an instrument not only of enlightenment but also of stability. Indeed, in this 
sense both Whigs and early radicals emerge as theorists of the union of order and progress that is 
usually ascribed to French movements like Comtism and doctrinairism and to those English figures 
(like the younger Mill) who were influenced by them.210 
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Similarly, the character of the pacific defenses of the press charted here challenges the 
standard notion of a sharp boundary between Enlightenment and nineteenth-century political 
thought. Excepting certain revisionist accounts, the political thought of the latter period is still often 
read as decisively breaking with the former, with Romanticism replacing Reason, history displacing 
nature, utility ending the enthusiasm for the Rights of Man. The authors surveyed in this chapter, on 
the contrary, display continuity with earlier traditions of thought. Complicating the verdict that there 
was a move away from Locke in nineteenth-century liberalism,211 philosophic radicals like James Mill 
incorporated Lockean themes into their case for liberalizing the press; their view of free discussion 
drew from and broadened the Enlightenment vision of religious toleration as an instrument for 
achieving peace in conditions of religious diversity. Likewise, the “free trade” in ideas was an image 
that functioned in much the same way in the late-Enlightenment revolutionary philosophy of 
William Godwin as it did in the work of Bailey, a thinker typical of the Age of Reform. In calling 
upon the resources of political economy and religious toleration, nineteenth-century theorists of the 
relationship between stability and expressive freedom were working in grooves well worn by their 
predecessors. 
Furthermore, reconstruction of the pacific strand of free press argumentation deepens our 
understanding of two other concepts that frequently appear in studies of nineteenth-century 
liberalism, but often without the necessary precision. The first is the aforementioned one of the 
marketplace of ideas. Perhaps due to Justice Holmes’s popularization of the marketplace of ideas as 
the “best test of truth,”212 the analogy of freedom of opinion with the competition of goods in the 
market is usually thought of as a way of explaining intellectual progress, the triumph of truths over 
                                                                                                                                                             
Numbers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978). 
 
211 E.g. Duncan Bell, “What Is Liberalism?,” Political Theory 42, no. 6 (December 2014), 682-715. 
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University of Chicago Press 1992), 316-20. 
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falsehoods.213 But this is only part of what it meant at its origins, when it also served as a way of 
expressing the faith that the contest of ideas could occur peacefully. To be sure, the marketplace of 
ideas expressed a mechanism whereby true ideas would eventually defeat false ones; but it expressed 
as well the hope that, with the end of “monopolies” for favored beliefs and “protections” against ill-
regarded ones, differing ideas would be able to circulate without sparking violence and disorder. 
The second concept that is enriched by the analysis of the pacific theory undertaken here is 
that of public opinion. As noted above, the political thought of the first half of the nineteenth 
century was deeply concerned with the nature and significance of public opinion. Yet this 
sociological observation is seldom related, in modern scholarship, to the theoretical question of how 
to justify the freedom of the press faced by liberals of the time. Nevertheless, insofar as liberal-
minded thinkers strove to portray the liberty of discussion as an instrument of stability as well as a 
precondition for the discovery of truth, they developed the argument that, once public opinion had 
emerged as a political force, abridgments of the expressive freedoms could only have a destabilizing 
impact. The political sociology of opinion that liberals of the era were elaborating thus fed back into 
foundational normative arguments about the meaning and value of freedom of expression in ways 
hitherto insufficiently explored. 
Finally, seen against the intellectual backdrop that I have sketched here, John Stuart Mill’s 
avoidance of the pacific argument looks less like a mere oversight than a meaningful choice of one 
strand of liberalism over another, privileging a more moralistic liberalism which he believed was less 
tainted by instrumentalism. This turn away from the pacific school of thought links the younger Mill 
more closely to modern political theory; when contemporary political theory takes up the subjects of 
toleration and intellectual freedom, it likewise tends to ignore the problem of the conditions of 
                                                 
213 See A. I. Goldman and J. C. Cox, “Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas,” Legal Theory vol. 2, no. 1 (1996): 1-
32; Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 54. 
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social peace and order. Consequently, beyond their historical significance, the nineteenth-century 
pacific theorists hold another title to our consideration, a theoretical one. For better or worse, they 
represent arguably the last sustained effort of British liberalism to address the question of how a 
society can be at once stable and intellectually free – a question which, in the face of concerns about 
the resurgence of extremism in various forms and doubts about the viability of traditional models of 
liberal pluralism and multiculturalism, is likely once again to become central to political theory and 
social science. 
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Chapter Two 
James Fitzjames Stephen, John Stuart Mill, and the Victorian Theory of Toleration 
 In 1913, the last of the great Victorian historians, J.B. Bury, published A History of Freedom of 
Thought, a tour through the many fates of intellectual liberty from Antiquity to the dawn of the 
twentieth century.214 Its rousing final chapter featured two heroes. One was, predictably, John Stuart 
Mill, who was a natural touchstone for a progressivist-rationalist of Bury’s ilk. The other was James 
Fitzjames Stephen.215 
 The inclusion of Stephen doubtless looks surprising to scholars today. How could Mill’s 
greatest critic be seen as the co-protagonist of the late nineteenth century’s contribution to the 
timeless struggle for free thought? Because he is best known as John Stuart Mill’s adversary, and 
because Mill is often assumed to be representative of the liberalism of his era, Stephen has come to 
have a firm reputation as an illiberal and reactionary. He is depicted as urging “the necessity for 
authoritarian measures such as censorship,” as fighting for the “enforcement” of “religious belief,” 
as promoting “authority rather than freedom.”216 If Mill is the exemplary champion of freedom, 
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 Stephen would have been dismayed to find himself thus yoked to Proast; his verdict on his now-frequent 
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Fitzjames Stephen, “Locke on Toleration,” in Horae Sabbaticae, Reprint of Articles from the Saturday Review, 3 vols. (London, 
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Stephen is, we presume, emblematic of reaction. 
 This modern picture of Stephen is understandable. Judged from the perspective of twenty-
first-century democratic egalitarianism, Stephen was in several respects a reactionary. He was 
skeptical of democracy and had little patience for any invocations of the value of equality that went 
beyond a minimalist legal notion.217 More notoriously still, he was a bitter opponent of the women’s 
rights movement.218 On these fronts and others219 he was in decisive practical disagreement with 
Mill, the latter being by any measure the more “liberal” of the two. 
 On the subject with which Bury was concerned, however, the author of the History of Freedom 
of Thought was nearer the truth than more recent scholars have been. On this issue – toleration and 
the liberty of thought and expression220 – the picture of an illiberal, authoritarian Stephen is 
misleading. Far from an advocate of censorship, persecution, or state enforcement of religious 
orthodoxy, Stephen had robust credentials as a liberalizer with regard to restraints on discussion, the 
press, and religious worship. He promoted “complete liberty of opinion” on religious matters; he 
was “most earnestly of opinion” that all vestiges of the “theory of persecution” should be banished 
from English law.221 Even in his famous critique of Mill, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, he was careful to 
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note that he and Mill were on the same side of the contest between persecution and toleration. He 
bookended the chapter “On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion” by “emphatically” clarifying 
that in practice he was very close to Mill and the liberalism for which Mill stood.222 
In addition to the endorsements of toleration throughout his voluminous writings, Stephen 
took action on behalf of the cause. Among other activities, he served as defense counsel in the trial 
for heresy of a clergyman who had contributed to a controversial collection of broad-church 
essays223; he pushed for and drafted a bill for the repeal of the blasphemy laws;224 and he agitated for 
an end to the religious tests that kept non-Anglicans from being eligible for appointments at Oxford 
and Cambridge.225 Stephen was a vocal proponent of reform to purge the English law of those 
statutes that were grounded in “the principle of persecution,” and he was incensed at the 
insouciance of his compatriots in allowing such laws to remain on the books.226 So when his brother 
Leslie Stephen wrote that Fitzjames “agreed with Mill, as he admits, in regard to every actual 
question of the day,” he was not simply trying to protect Fitzjames’s legacy as a liberal; he was also 
giving voice to an important truth about his brother’s life and thought.227  
 The goal of this chapter is to revive this “tolerant” Stephen, the one whom Bury and Leslie 
would have recognized but whom we have forgotten today.228 While, as we will see, his support for 
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toleration and expressive liberty was not without limitations and qualifications, Stephen advanced a 
nuanced, multifaceted account of the benefits that modern societies derived from following these 
liberal principles. To present this account, I draw on a much wider range of texts than is customary 
in scholarship on Stephen, going beyond Liberty, Equality, Fraternity to consider (among others) his 
legal and jurisprudential compositions; his favorable early reviews of On Liberty; his journalism about 
contemporary problems of toleration; and his writings on the history of political thought. The 
elaboration of Stephen’s constructive case for toleration and freedom of the press is the subject of 
section one of this chapter. 
 Stephen’s support for toleration did not mean that he was merely a reproduction of Mill, 
however. True, at the level of practice and policy, the chasms between the two of them were much 
larger on other issues. Yet Stephen was hostile to Mill’s “theory” of liberty of discussion in various 
ways. We must therefore explain why a thinker so committed to the cause objected to many aspects 
of the most famous contemporary rendition of the philosophy of toleration, and how he could have 
done so without undercutting his own positive case for toleration. Section two provides such an 
explanation. This section shows that Stephen’s critical writings on contending theories of toleration 
were not intended – or understood in his time – as articulations of a reactionary or illiberal position. 
Instead, they were devoted to countering what Stephen regarded as two corruptions of a true theory 
of toleration: the intrusion of principles of abstract right, and the expansion of the theory to include 
a cluster of problematic philosophical and policy positions. 
 This chapter, therefore, offers the first comprehensive reconstruction of Stephen’s thought 
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about toleration and intellectual freedom. This reconstruction is significant for two reasons. First, 
given that Stephen is often pressed into service as an exemplar of intellectual-religious illiberalism, it 
behooves us to correct this misconception and replace it with a more accurate picture, especially 
since doing so reveals a sophisticated and serious attempt to theorize the value and scope of 
toleration. Second, contrary to what many scholars assume, On Liberty was not the Victorian era’s 
last word on the intellectual-expressive liberties, and Stephen’s oeuvre offers an excellent point-of-
entry into the extraordinary but little-known burst of theorizing about freedom of discussion that 
took place in second half of the nineteenth century in Britain. The mid-century period saw the 
consolidation of the freedoms of discussion and of the press in Britain, and so we should not be 
surprised to find a massive effort among mid- and late-Victorian authors to explain the causes, 
consequences, and meaning of the then still-novel triumph of toleration. Stephen, as we will see, has 
every bit as strong a claim to be considered representative of this intellectual climate as Mill does. By 
combining an analysis of the theoretical bases of Stephen’s support for toleration with glimpses into 
the shape of Victorian thought more broadly, this chapter breaks new ground both conceptually and 
contextually.  
 
1) Stephen on the Grounds of Toleration 
 Although much of it is unknown today, Stephen produced a stunning output in political 
theory as in other domains of thought.229 As a result, even his defense of toleration, which has been 
presumed not to have existed at all, occupied a considerable mass of pages and was spread across 
many works. This section, therefore, should be understood as a map of the major points of his 
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positive case for toleration, rather than as an exhaustive account of his views. 
 While Stephen downplayed the systematicity of his thought,230 four broad lines of argument 
for toleration emerge from his oeuvre. 
 
a) Peace and the Counterproductiveness of Persecution 
 The first was what I have called the pacific theory of toleration and freedom of discussion. A 
principal component of Stephen’s backing for intellectual freedom was the moral he had learned 
from the authors in chapter one. “A perfectly free press is one of the greatest safeguards of peace 
and order,” he affirmed; persecution of opinions was “quite out of the question” because its 
implementation would either be ineffectual or “absolutely destructive and paralysing.”231 In direct 
opposition to a standard Tory talking-point, which was that the excesses of the French Revolution 
proved the dangers posed by an unshackled press, Stephen agreed with radical and Whig writers 
who blamed the restrictions on public discussion in ancien régime France for the revolutionary chaos.232 
The French Revolution was a lesson in the dangers not of a free but of an unfree press: in the 
eighteenth century “arbitrary power” had misdirected the “French intellect” away from its natural 
“channel[s]” and thereby brought society to the brink of upheaval.233 Sharply rebuking the paternalist 
Toryism that charged the liberties of thought and discussion with undermining the foundations of 
society, Stephen found it evident that the rise of liberalism, including its central norm of free 
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discussion, had bolstered the cause of order and stability.234 The old nightmare of demagogues using 
the press to dupe the multitude into orgies of destruction had been, in Stephen’s eyes, discredited. It 
was more accurate to see the organs of the press as the “servants of the public” by which the 
necessary debate and discourse of the nation was carried out.235 As W.E.H. Lecky, the Anglo-Irish 
historian and philosopher who was ideologically and personally close to Stephen, put it, “it is a deep-
seated conviction of English political life” that opinions “are never so dangerous…as when their 
free expression is suppressed.”236 Stephen, whose pride in all things English could border on 
bellicosity,237 was not likely to repudiate this central plank of British political identity. 
 Not only did restrictions on expression compromise domestic peace; worse still, they 
increased the risk of instability without any gain for the beliefs on behalf of which these restrictions 
and penalties were imposed. Reviewing the history of the criminalization of religious belief and 
expression, Stephen judged that a “strong” argument against “prosecutions” for heterodoxy was 
supplied by the “obvious” fact “that they did not check the open growth of skepticism, or preserve 
the institutions which they were intended to defend.”238 “Civil war, legal persecution, the Inquisition, 
with all their train of horrors,” were not efficacious means for changing hearts and minds.239 The 
normal armaments of intolerance, wrote Frederick Pollock, the great jurist, historian, and admirer of 
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Stephen, “do not work”; rather, “the inutility of legal persecution” was a manifest truth.240 To 
Stephen and likeminded analysts of Britain’s new culture of free religious expression, it was largely 
due to this experience of their ineffectiveness that persecutory laws had fallen into “hopeless and 
direct opposition to the general current of principle and opinion in the present day.”241 
 Befitting an age obsessed with the themes of evolution, progress, and the “historical 
method” in the social sciences,242 observations about the destabilizing and inefficacious character of 
measures of intolerance tended to be understood not as universal laws but rather as empirical 
regularities specific to modern societies. The bulk of Victorian liberals – including, of course, JS 
Mill243 – presented the “age of discussion” in which they lived as the outcome of a long historical 
trajectory by which members of “progressive” (as opposed to “stationary”) societies developed the 
intellectual and moral qualities that made it possible for them to tolerate difference peacefully and 
profit from public debate. “The strongest advocates both of liberty and toleration may consistently 
hold that there were unhappy ages before either became possible,” asserted Walter Bagehot, the 
great political writer and editor of the Economist. 244 Fitzjames’s brother likewise gave a paradigmatic 
statement of this Victorian orthodoxy: “toleration presupposes a certain stage of development, 
moral and intellectual. In the ruder social order, toleration is out of the question for familiar 
                                                 
240 Pollock, “The Theory of Persecution,” in Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (London, 1882), 166. Pollock was one of the 
most influential legal and political thinkers of the generation after Stephen. 
 
241 Stephen, “Laws of England,” 467. See also his closing remarks as defense counsel in the heresy trial of an Anglican 
clergyman: “Consider, my lord, the stupendous folly and cowardice of such legislation. You can indeed shut the mouths 
of the clergy, but can you shut the mouths of the laity? In this age and nation are we to expect that either Christianity or 
the Bible will be free from criticism? You can silence divines, but can you silence literature? Can you silence history? Can 
you silence science?...You cannot arrest discussion”; Stephen, Defence of the Rev. Rowland Williams, D.D., in the Arches’ Court 
of Canterbury (London, 1862), 324. 
 
242 See e.g. Jones, Victorian Political Thought, chs. 2-3; J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society (Cambridge, 1966); Jeffrey Paul von 
Arx, Progress and Pessimism (Cambridge, MA, 1985). 
 
243 Mill, On Liberty, 224. 
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reasons.”245 Once this stage has been reached, however, “toleration becomes an essential condition” 
and “persecution” of all sorts is then an “anachronism,” at once “impolitic” and “ineffectual.”246 The 
historical inflection of the theses about persecution’s irrationality and unconduciveness to peace and 
stability made them prime elements for the growth of an overlapping consensus in favor of 
toleration, for the historical character of the assessment of the fitness of societies for intellectual 
freedom made it easier on committed believers of once-persecuting faiths (especially the Catholic 
Church) to accept the recent consensus on toleration without having to rebuke their churches for 
past misdeeds.247 
 In keeping with the wide purchase of this historical turn of mind, similar ideas found their 
way into Fitzjames Stephen’s thinking on toleration. “In this country and in this generation the time 
for prosecuting political libels has passed, and does not seem likely to return within any definable 
period”; “what can and ought to be said, with as much emphasis as may from time to time be 
required, in favour of toleration in our own age of the world, is that the religious questions which agitate 
Western Europe are perfectly capable of being discussed without violence.”248 In “a rich and 
intelligent country” such as modern England the claims that persecution on the grounds of belief 
served the cause of stability or aided in the propagation of true beliefs were no longer plausible.249 
 This historicized explanation for the pacific properties of free discussion and the 
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ineffectiveness of persecution permitted Stephen to give his endorsement to a latitudinarian 
conception of the scope of free political, religious, and moral discussion for current practice while 
circumscribing his claims at the theoretical level; this pacific view did not, for instance, require him 
to invoke a notion of pre-political or natural rights or deny that it was within the state’s rightful 
power to regulate speech in order to preserve the peace. The importance of this theoretical 
circumscription will become clear later, when we turn to Stephen’s hostility to systems of natural 
right and his self-conscious desire to remain within the Erastian tradition. For now, what is 
significant is that Stephen believed that, as a matter of practice, in the advanced nations (by which he 
seems to have meant England, the United States, and France250) the government’s task of preserving 
order did not require that it actively control opinion; in these societies tranquility could be trusted to 
the course of discussion.251 This was in contrast to both long-ago and far-away places: hence it was 
through the historical example of the onset of Christianity in Rome and the colonial example of the 
clashes which a “great religious reformer” in India might incite that Stephen illustrated the 
justifiability of the state repressing certain forms of expression in situations of emergency.252 It was, 
of course, possible that such crises would reappear in England, and if they did then abridgments of 
the right of expression might, Stephen held, prove necessary. But, given the range of factors that 
pointed to free discussion’s reinforcement of civil peace in the here and now, repression would, as a 
rule, be unwise and unwarranted.253 In countries like England, where infringements on the press 
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were more likely to produce disturbances than accepting its freedom, it was best that rulers resist the 
impulse to persecute the “thought that they hated.”254 
 Apart from these issue of peace and inefficacy, there were other grounds for rejecting the 
devices of persecution and censorship. Even if a modern government were somehow able to 
maintain social order despite foregoing the pacific advantages of a free press, the damage inflicted 
on other areas of human life was too great.255 While Stephen disclaimed the need to elaborate on the 
nature of these damages because they were “well known” and “established beyond the reach of 
controversy,” he did in fact write at length about other justifications for freedom of expression.256 
 Two of these justifications correspond to the two clauses at the end of a crucial sentence 
from the article on Locke which will be the subject of section 2(a): “the use of violence [to resolve 
religious disputes] would do unmixed harm, [1] not only to the cause of truth, but also [2] to the 
development and improvement of the whole character of mankind.”257  
 
b) Truth 
Let us take the first clause first. The epistemic defense of the liberties of thought and 
                                                                                                                                                             
intolerance, persecuting no doctrines but those which “disturbed, or were supposed to be likely to disturb, the public 
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257 Stephen, “Locke on Toleration,” 172. The numbering is my own. 
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discussion is most familiar from On Liberty, but Mill’s presentation of it was far from idiosyncratic.258 
Though it may come as a surprise to those who have encountered only the standard reading of him, 
Stephen subscribed to the “Liberal” piety that “the concession of a legal right of private judgment to 
all mankind is highly beneficial to the interests of truth.”259 In a quintessentially Victorian manner, 
Stephen envisioned a regime of free public discussion as the engine for “the most immense progress 
in every form of civilization” because it was the sole form of social ordering in which the various 
kinds of evidence and argument could be marshaled and tested.260 
While Stephen’s objections to Mill will be dealt with in section 2(b), this is an opportune 
moment to emphasize one feature of those criticisms: they were not anti-rationalist, that is, they 
were not founded on the denial that human beings were capable of reaching the truth through the 
exercise of reason. To see this, we need only compare Stephen’s avowal of the epistemic value of 
public discussion with the assault on Mill of a genuine anti-rationalist, the well-named clergyman 
R.W. Church. Church believed that the claims of On Liberty about the alliance between freedom and 
truth were fundamentally inaccurate.261 For Church, it was simply wishful thinking to posit any link 
between truth and the outcome of argument or deliberation, for the determinants of the latter were 
unrelated to the perception of truth. Those who boasted of the “intrinsic power” of true beliefs to 
triumph in a fair field neglected the fact that “being able to argue and refute is, at any given time, a 
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matter seemingly of chance.”262 These profoundly skeptical sentiments no more belonged to Stephen 
than they did to Mill or the conventional liberal who trusted that “arguments always tell for truth as 
such, and against error as such.”263 
The contrast with Church brings out another sense in which Stephen’s epistemic optimism 
aligned him with Mill. Not only did it help to underwrite his support for freedom of discussion; it 
was also, as Stephen himself was always willing to admit, grounded in a foundational Millianism 
learned from the System of Logic, which was at the zenith of its influence during Stephen’s young 
adulthood.264 The Logic taught Stephen to reject “metaphysical” and “intuitionist” ways of thinking – 
that is, theories which alleged that, via some kind of “moral sense” or body of “innate ideas,” human 
beings possessed a special faculty for the perception of truth that was independent of experience.265 
For Stephen, the true Mill would always be this Mill, the Mill of the 1840s who had established 
empiricist epistemology; proved the illegitimacy of all a priori truth-claims; and demonstrated the 
need to disavow beliefs based on a source of authority which was not susceptible to rational, 
evidence-based scrutiny. 
 Chief among the objects which Mill’s empiricism was meant to attack was Christian 
theology, especially insofar as it was enunciated by clergymen who asserted that their dogmas were 
immune to critical examination.266 Stephen joined in this attack. Taking his corpus in its totality, 
Stephen’s bitterest enemies were not Mill or any other of the more eager and optimistic species of 
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liberalism, but those who would reassert traditional (usually clerical) forms of authority over speech 
and belief.267 Against the proponents of religious authority whose dogmatic certainty led them to 
dismiss the principle of free inquiry and who relied on an “intuitionist” epistemology for the sake, as 
he saw it, of skirting the demand that they provide evidence for their views, Stephen countered that 
the truth could only be arrived at through the provision of “good evidence” within the “pale of 
discussion.”268 In this shared hostility to the various non-evidential intellectual systems of his day 
and their authoritarian implications, Mill and Stephen were, and understood themselves to be, allies 
in Victorian England’s most basic intellectual conflict. They were both apologists for the “age of 
discussion,” and they both anchored their support in empiricism, wariness of the imposition of 
religious dogma, and confidence in the human capacity to attain truth through observation and 
critical reasoning. 
 The Victorian conviction about the truth-revealing property of free discussion was closely 
allied with another claim, which could be epistemological, psychological, or ethical (or all together) 
depending on the context of its use. This was the claim that toleration and a free press were 
necessary conditions for confidence in one’s beliefs.269 As Mill put it: “Complete liberty of 
contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its 
truth for purposes of action.”270 Leslie Stephen, in an article which Fitzjames singled out as 
                                                 
267 See e.g. Stephen, “Necessary Truth,” Contemporary Review, vol. 25 (Dec. 1874): 44-73. 
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representing his own views, gave a hearty assent to Mill’s statement, declaring it a hallmark of 
“genuine Liberalism” to recognize “that a willingness to hear every side of every question is the 
condition and the consequence of vigorous faith.”271 Fitzjames similarly endorsed this tenet of liberal 
social epistemology: on any issue of importance “it is essentially necessary to know what was said on 
both sides. So long as one side only can be heard, you can never be quite sure that you fully 
understand the case at issue.”272 It was a “principle of the utmost importance and of universal 
application…that free inquiry is the great, and indeed almost the only possible guarantee for the 
truth of any doctrines whatever. Persecution destroys this guarantee, and is therefore unfavourable 
to any intelligent and real belief in the truth of any creed whatever.”273 Only the fullest toleration 
could supply the legal-social framework requisite for overcoming the problems of one-sidedness in 
one’s thinking and of unjustified confidence in one’s beliefs. 
 Stephen, like many liberals in the period, was not content merely to point to benefits at the 
societal level; he sought to connect the question of the appropriate national policy on the regulation 
of opinion to a prescription for the ethical individual. Thus he went on to specify that an 
epistemically robust regime of free discussion called for certain moral dispositions among citizens. 
Chief among these was what we might call a fallibility-recognizing state of conviction.274 This was 
certainly not a position of deep philosophical skepticism (Hume was quite unpopular among 
Victorians).275 Nor was it an unprincipled indifference toward public affairs or great questions; the 
imploring of grand convictions makes a ceaseless din through the social thought of the second half 
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of the nineteenth century, to which Stephen was not averse to contributing.276 It was, rather, an 
attitude of studied awareness of one’s own intellectual limitations, and of the close intermixture of 
truth and error in human affairs, which was to be maintained in conjunction with an earnest 
espousal of one’s beliefs. Much of On Liberty is a jeremiad against the arrogant “assumption of 
infallibility,”277 and Stephen similarly preached a gospel of epistemic modesty. He put the point in 
colorful fashion: 
…every assertion which we make should be coupled either expressly or tacitly with some 
such qualification as this: – ‘As at present advised, subject to further and better instructions, 
and upon the assumptions heretofore stated, I am of opinion ---.’ The opinion should 
further be dated, both in time and place, so as to show that a variation on these matters 
might affect its truth.278  
 
Stephen named this desired mindset “moderation,” and he judged that citizens’ realization of this 
moral psychology was a precondition for a society’s achievement of the liberties of speech and 
opinion.279 As with other elements of his support for toleration, the thought that “moderation” was 
the necessary correlate at the personal level to a political-legal system of toleration would become 
almost a platitude of the Victorian era, with thinkers like Lecky, Pollock, and the influential Scottish 
philosopher D.G. Ritchie arguing in terms similar to Stephen’s that the spread of a “degree of 
skepticism” about one’s own possession of the truth was an indispensable ingredient in a lasting 
order of toleration.280  
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 Stephen’s blunt assertion in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity that “skeptical arguments in favour of 
moderation about religion are the only conclusive ones” for toleration needs to be read in light of 
the foregoing.281 As this section shows, Stephen assuredly did not believe that there were no other 
arguments on behalf of toleration: he believed that there were a series of justifications for toleration, 
that a policy of toleration was normatively overdetermined in his day and age. While Stephen was 
critical of others for confusing normative and descriptive claims, his writing is fraught with these 
confusions, and this sentence is, I submit, an instance of this confusion.282 His meaning here is that 
without a certain critical distance on one’s beliefs and a corresponding appreciation of the limits of 
the human intellect even the most liberal legal code could be only a dead letter.283 This reading fits 
well with Stephen’s belief that the decline of traditional religious belief was insufficient on its own 
for the realization of toleration; he feared that a “practical majority” of “unbelievers” lacking in the 
virtue of moderation would “legislate against believers in a way hardly distinguishable from 
persecution.”284 For Stephen, there could be no religiously and intellectually free society without the 
prevalence of the proper moral-intellectual disposition, a disposition that did not coincide with any 
specific content of beliefs but which instead dictated an appropriate manner of holding or 
interacting with one’s beliefs, whatever they were. 
 Stephen’s ideas on the moral psychology that accompanied toleration did not stop here. If 
the success of tolerant legislation was dependent on the just-described moral qualities obtaining, 
toleration qua political system contributed in its turn to the moral betterment of those who lived 
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under it. This glimpse at the psychological basis of a working liberal legal order thus brings us to 
another set of benefits glimpsed in the above-quoted sentence from the essay on Locke: toleration 
furthered not only the cause of truth but the development and improvement of character. 
  
c) Morality 
In addition to their epistemic costs, persecutory policies inflicted moral damages. The 
second half of the nineteenth century witnessed an outpouring of concern for the virtues of sincerity 
and truthfulness, and the literature on toleration reflected this concern. One of the chief charges 
levelled against state intolerance was that it weakened the moral fiber of society by attacking these 
values. Far from the insouciance about these virtues evinced by an older strain of Tory Anglicanism 
exemplified by an author like Robert Southey,285 Victorians who felt the burdens of judgment 
weighing heavily on them in an age of uncertainty came to place the forthright disclosure of one’s 
convictions in the front rank of moral obligations.286 For Leslie Stephen, truthfulness was the 
preeminent modern form of moral excellence – “the virtue of philosophic truthfulness is only now 
obtaining recognition” – and the newfound consensus “that persecution is a blunder” was to be 
understood as the “external” manifestation of society’s still not yet “adequate perception” of the 
“internal rule” of “truthfulness in the highest sense.”287 Policies of toleration and intellectual 
freedom were, to Leslie, the political side of a larger project for ingraining ideals of earnestness and 
honesty in English society: “It is not only wrong to burn a man on account of his creed, but it is 
right to encourage the open avowal and defence of every opinion sincerely maintained. Every man 
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who says frankly and fully what he thinks is so far doing a public service.”288 “Toleration,” he 
summed up, “is a necessary correlative to a respect for truthfulness.”289 The great liberal intellectual 
and politician John Morley gave a vivid articulation of this sentiment in his depiction of insincerity 
as self-persecution, and a kindred spirit animated Sidgwick’s writings on the ethics of religious 
expression and church membership.290 
 These ideas about the foundational value of sincerity to ethical life resonated with 
Fitzjames.291 Membership in the Cambridge Apostles, an exclusive intellectual secret society among 
whose other mid-Victorian members Sidgwick and Pollock were numbered, placed him at the social-
institutional epicenter of the Victorian cult of sincerity. Stephen was inaugurated as an 
undergraduate, and he remained loyal to the group throughout his life.292 The society was a bedrock 
of the “academic liberal” movement of morally earnest and reform-minded young professionals and 
scholars which was to have a great influence on both university and national politics throughout the 
second half of the nineteenth century.293 Apostolic culture was founded on the ideal of friends 
pursuing the truth together in an un-hierarchical, questioning spirit; in their eyes, an absolute 
commitment to candor and truthfulness among one another was required for such Socratic pursuits 
to be fruitful.294 The “liberal man” extolled by the Apostles was not the adherent of a specific 
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doctrine but the man of earnestness and sincerity, and they self-consciously sought out an 
ideologically diverse membership in the belief that a group characterized by diverse opinions could 
coalesce around a common devotion to sincerity.295 
Fittingly for an Apostle, Stephen’s work evinces the tight connection between toleration at 
the policy level and truthfulness at the personal level.296 For instance, Stephen was troubled by the 
distressing tendency for policies of persecution or exclusion on grounds of opinion to afflict 
precisely those citizens who best embodied important moral qualities. If (as many Victorians 
believed, this being an age that feared the groupthink of the “tyranny of the majority”) the average 
person tended to acquiesce and conform to the views dominant in his milieu,297 then it was likely 
that the vocal dissenter in religion or politics possessed a greater quotient of integrity and 
independence of mind than his more conformist contemporaries.298 Most people, Stephen lamented, 
did not bother to “clearly understand[]” or take “responsibility” for their “own opinions”; the 
“conscience” of the “great mass of men” amounted to no more than a “reflection of the current 
maxims and principles of the[ir] time and country.”299 In light of these discouraging facts the 
criminalization of conscientious dissent looked especially harmful, for society could not afford to 
misuse what little candor and honesty it possessed. 
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Consequently, Stephen was eager to praise the “true courage” required to stand up for “the 
unpopular side” of a question.300 One of the most stirring moments of the History of the Criminal Law 
is his re-creation of the defense’s argument, in the 1792 trial of Thomas Paine for seditious libel, that 
restrictions on expression entailed the moral loss of turning the law against many citizens of upright 
intention and public spirit: “however erroneous his opinions may be,” Stephen concluded in the 
voice of the counsel for Paine, it was wrong to punish a “man who publishes what he really believes 
to be true from a desire to benefit mankind.”301 Unsurprisingly, this idea of the virtue involved in 
maintaining a dissenting posture toward one’s society even when the substance of the dissent was erroneous 
was shared with Mill, who was always ready to praise those willing to make sacrifices for the sake of 
fidelity to “the true state of their mind.”302 
 Out of this diagnosis that structures of intolerance fell disproportionately on good rather 
than bad citizens Stephen built a potent rhetorical tactic. This was to concentrate on the identities of 
particular individuals who were both widely respected and whose conduct ran afoul of the laws 
which Stephen wanted repealed. In 1874, the year after Mill’s death, Stephen highlighted the tragic 
possibility that “Mr. Mill might have been prosecuted and excommunicated.”303 With this bit of 
counterfactual biography, he prompted his readers to contemplate the national loss that would have 
attended the imprisonment of Mill. A decade later he repeated the stratagem, this time using as his 
example the recently deceased economist-theologian-philosopher William Rathbone Greg, who will 
have a star turn as a commentator on representation issues in part two of the dissertation. Stephen 
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imagined how shameful it would have been if such a “distinguished author” and “eminent and 
useful member of the Civil Service” had “lost his income and his profession” and been thrown in 
jail.304 “The living authors who might be proceeded against in the same way,” Stephen continued, 
“are numerous and well-known, but it would be invidious to name them.”305 What it meant that laws 
inherited from times of persecution remained on the books was that candid souls were liable to be 
punished. It meant, moreover, that a great deal of the nation’s intellectual life lacked any legal 
standing: “a large part of the most serious and most important literature of our day is illegal….It 
may be said that so revolting a consequence cannot be true; but unfortunately this is not the case.”306 
This was, in Stephen’s eyes, a grave state of affairs for the English heart and mind. 
 Indeed, Stephen took this line of thought a step further: not only did the failure to bring the 
law into conformity with the cultural consensus on toleration imperil good citizens; it also 
empowered bad citizens, or at least amplified the dangers stemming from our worst emotions. Not 
the least of the evils associated with the unmodified common law was that it “afford[ed] a channel 
for the gratification of private malice under the cloak of religion.”307 It followed from the archaic 
condition of the criminal law that holders of heterodox opinions remained under the arbitrary will of 
their orthodox compatriots. In periods of panic or national distress, the law might be made an 
instrument for scapegoating unbelievers: a persecutory law, however silent in quiet times, was “like a 
loaded fire-arm too old and rusty to be fired, but lying about in a lumber-room. It may do no harm 
for years, but any accident may cause it to go off, and if it does, it will in all probability hardly do 
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anything but mischief.”308 The persistence of persecution in English law was, according to Stephen, a 
standing invitation to our worst selves to harm our best selves. 
 We have now seen that Stephen expected toleration to secure moral benefits with regard to 
honesty in the expression of beliefs and the enhancement of the moral quality of public discourse. 
But he awaited other benefits from it as well. These extended, characteristically, to the level of the 
formation of beliefs; Stephen agreed with the liberal-minded literati of his day in being preoccupied 
with “the ethics of belief.”309 If toleration facilitated the fulfillment of the duty to speak truth, it also 
ensured that one could fulfill the duty to seek truth. While Stephen occasionally lambasted what he 
thought were naïve pleas for impartiality in public debate,310 in company with other scientifically-
oriented Victorians he preached the imperative of apportioning one’s beliefs to evidence. To 
espouse a “certitude of truth before you have had time to consider any facts which look in the 
opposite direction” was an act of intellectual wrongdoing.311 Not even in matters of faith was one 
allowed to extend the region of belief beyond the obtainable evidence; to Stephen it was indubitable 
that “the common rules of logic and evidence are the rules by which people ought to think on 
religion as well as on other subjects.”312 To put any data or arguments beyond the “pale of 
discussion” was to weaken the evidential character of belief-formation and to suggest that justified 
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Stephen, Clifford was a member of the “Metaphysical Society.” Clifford and Stephen were the most uncompromising 
advocates of empiricism against invocations of the “supernatural” in this famous Victorian intellectual institution; 
Brown, Metaphysical Society, 283. This analysis should correct the caricature of Stephen as a communitarian who denied 
that it was possible to make moral judgments about the way in which people arrived at their beliefs; see e.g. Vernon, 
“Liberals, Democrats,” 308. 
 
310 See e.g. “Gladstone and Lewis,” 284. 
 
311 Stephen, “Certitude,” 37. 
 
312 Stephen, “Newman and Liberalism,” 769. See also Liberty, 207, 227: “Turn and twist as you will, you can never really 
get out of the proposition that the Christian history is just as probable as the evidence makes it, and no more”; “the 
questions whether we ought to believe in God and in a future state are questions of fact and evidence.” 
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belief need not “be supported by good evidence.”313 Compulsion of certain views under threat of 
pains and penalties, it goes almost without saying, violated this ethical outlook on the relationship of 
belief to evidence by introducing into the process of belief-formation considerations (such as the 
desire to avoid punishment) essentially unrelated to the assessment of the grounds for the belief. 
Since proper responsiveness to evidence was not only conducive to truth but also a central ethical 
requirement,314 state intolerance crippled and distorted the moral lives of citizens. 
 Stephen, then, attributed to toleration and the liberties of expression several kinds of 
benefits, which I have broadly classified here under the headings of pacific, epistemic, and moral. 
These grounds were sufficient for Stephen to advocate unlimited religious discussion and very 
expansive if not officially unlimited political discussion for his own time and place. But it should be 
acknowledged that they did not extend to one area: that of “obscene” literature. Like his brother, he 
did not believe that lascivious publications deserved the protection of the law.315 Stephen can 
occasionally read like the caricature of the prudish Victorian,316 and perhaps it is because of his 
discomfort with the subject that he did not write much about it. Nevertheless, despite the paucity of 
material explicitly addressing the subject, it seems clear that in his mind neither the pacific nor the 
epistemic rationales translated into a defense of “obscene matter,” nor again did the concern about 
the moral formation of beliefs. The commitment to sincerity may have provided a more promising 
avenue, since an artistic project of sincerely expressing sexual desires or accurately representing 
sexual experience could have intelligibly fallen under this rubric. But it seems probable that his own 
conviction of the immorality of such expressions, in combination with the fact that the truthfulness 
                                                 
313 Stephen, “Certitude,” 30. 
 
314 In the words of Clifford, “the existence of a belief not founded on fair inquiry unfits a man for the performance of 
his necessary duty”; Ethics of Belief, 73. 
 
315 Stephen Liberty, 82-4. 
 
316 See e.g. his disapproval of the “exceedingly dirty” moments in Voltaire; Stephen, “Voltaire as a Theologian,” 235. 
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with which he and his fellow liberals were concerned was above all truthfulness with regard to one’s 
beliefs, kept him from expanding the parameters of press freedom to include obscenity.317 
 
d) Fairness and the Limitations of the Law 
In addition to the three categories of advantages that we have surveyed, Stephen put forward 
a final reason for accepting the liberties of thought and discussion. This was that the traditional 
conceptual apparatus used to hem in the press was unsound. This apparatus hinged on the 
distinction between the “true” or “fair” liberty of the press and its licentiousness, the latter consisting of 
the publication of harmful falsities or subversive ideas.318 This distinction suffered from two failings: 
first, that in condemning the expression of immoral or dangerous views it begged the question of 
which views were moral and beneficial; second, that in permitting the penalization of “licentious” 
expressions it invested officials with the power to suppress dissent by classifying it as “license.” 
Fortunately, Stephen believed, the British public had wised up to the inconsistency between, on the 
one hand, the right of “unrestricted discussion of public affairs, carrying with it the right of finding 
                                                 
317 Even on this front, however, we should not be misled by the conventional picture of an authoritarian Stephen. The 
mid- and late-Victorian era witnessed a panic about lewd and pornographic literature. (Donald Thomas, A Long Time 
Burning, ch. 11. Thomas makes the interesting observation that Mill was not in the least concerned to fight this rising tide 
against obscenity; ibid., 215). Relative to this temper of the times Stephen was latitudinarian about sexually immoral 
expression. He proposed a liberalization of the current law on obscene publications which would protect the “exhibiting 
[of] disgusting objects, or [the] publishing [of] obscene books, papers, writings, prints, pictures, drawings, or other 
representations, if their exhibition is for the public good,” and he warned juries not to use the power of passing 
judgment against “publications on the relation of the sexes” which contained “bonâ fide expression of opinions 
commonly regarded as immoral” (Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law, third edition [London, 1883], 116-7. J.E. Hall 
Williams believes that Stephen was the first to formulate this “public good” defense for the publication of obscenity; 
Williams, “Obscenity in Modern English Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 20, no. 4 [1955], 637). Moreover, he 
was careful to distinguish obscenity in the narrow and legally punishable sense from “immorality in the wider sense,” and 
he made this distinction in order to ensure that works belonging to the latter category were not wrongly punished. (“A 
man might with perfect decency of expression, and in complete good faith, maintain doctrines as to marriage, the 
relation of the sexes, the obligation of truthfulness, the nature and limits of the rights of property, &c, which would be 
regarded as highly immoral by most people, and yet (I think) commit no crime…. I think that juries ought to exercise 
such a power with the greatest caution, when a man writes in good faith on a subject of great interest and open to much 
difference of opinion, and when no indecency of language is used, except such as is necessary to make the matter treated 
of intelligible”; ibid., 117.) In short, although a great deal of the depiction of sex to which we are accustomed in the 
media today would not have been permitted by Stephen, it would be wrong to believe that he did not attempt to square 
his objections to obscenity with his more general liberalism about the press. 
 
318 See e.g. Wickwar Struggle for the Freedom of the Press, passim; Aspinall Politics and the Press, ch. 2. 
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fault with public personages of whose conduct the writer might disapprove” and, on the other, the 
government’s invocation of “Pandora’s box” that was “the license of the press.”319 In modern 
England this distinction had been exposed as sophistry.320 
 The prominence of the jurisprudential distinction between liberty and license had waned 
over the course of the nineteenth century. Yet Stephen lamented that the moribund liberty-license 
dichotomy had been superseded by another distinction that purported to respect all “fair discussion” 
but which in actuality did nothing but hamper the free exchange of views.321 This was the separation 
of style and substance, of “the manner” and “the matter.”322 According to promulgators of this 
distinction, often invoked as an interpretation of the law of blasphemy, “decent and serious attacks 
on Christianity are permissible, but…the ‘decencies of controversy’ must be observed.”323 Stephen 
was contemptuous of this reasoning, both on the grounds discussed above,324 and on the further 
philosophical ground of the indivisibility of form and content.325 Greater than even these objections, 
though, was his estimate of the differential class-based impact of such laws: 
If you allow coarse and vulgar people to discuss these subjects freely, they must and will 
discuss them coarsely….You cannot in practice send a man to gaol for not writing like a 
scholar and a gentleman when he is neither one nor the other... Practically the result would 
                                                 
319 Stephen, Criminal Law, 349. 
 
320 Ibid., e.g. 367. Frederick Schauer thus moves too quickly in assuming that Stephen’s belief in a “strong central 
authority” carried with it any disapprobation for or desire to limit “freedom of speech”; Free Speech: A Philosophical 
Enquiry (Cambridge, 1982), 157. 
 
321 Stephen, Criminal Law, vol. 2, 367. 
 
322 Ibid., 475. 
 
323 Stephen, “Blasphemy,” 315. The common law offense of blasphemy, of whose “utter unfitness for these times” 
Stephen was “firmly convinced,” was not abolished in England until 2008; see Russell Sandberg and Norman Doe, “The 
Strange Death of Blasphemy,” Modern Law Review, vol. 71 (2008): 971-86. 
 
324 He complained that on such a legal scheme the authorities would be empowered to punish “any energetic, vigorous 
denunciation of the weak side of any religious system”; Stephen, “Blasphemy,” 316. 
 
325 “You cannot really distinguish between substance and style”; ibid., 315. It is worth highlighting that his rejection of 
the desire to penalize “heat, exaggeration, and fierce invective” is close in both style and substance to Mill’s attack on the 
suggestion that “temperate” and “fair discussion” of “all opinions should be permitted” while “invective, sarcasm, 
personality, and the like” were to be prohibited; Mill, On Liberty, 258. 
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be what it always has been. No such cases [against educated and affluent heretics] would ever 
be tried; and the result is that so long as the law is what it is, it will always afford an example 
of that unequal justice which is much the same as injustice. It will be a law which may now 
and then hit the weak, but which the strong will always evade.326 
 
The complaints that religious-political heterodoxy was a privilege that the upper classes reserved for 
themselves and that restrictions on the press were designed with the purpose of keeping the masses 
outside the discussion of these “dangerous” ideological currents were familiar ones in the nineteenth 
century, especially on the radical left.327 Stephen’s alignment with chartists and socialists on this 
grievance goes, to say the least, unaddressed in standard portrayals of him as simply Mill’s opposite 
number. That Stephen had such unexpected bedfellows on this point should be recalled when the 
more elitist dimensions of his thought are treated in section 2(b). 
Stephen’s antipathy toward the conservative credo that the state protected the just liberty of 
the press by restraining licentiousness extended to what he took to be the non-legal correlate of this 
position in the realm of public opinion. This was the notion that, however much latitude the law 
granted the press, it was inappropriate to pursue certain avenues of inquiry lest they lead to 
dangerous consequences. Mill was famously hostile to warnings that some ideas should not be 
discussed due to their potential for “subverting the foundations of society,” calling these 
                                                 
326 Stephen, “Blasphemy,” 315-6. Leslie Stephen may have had such passages in mind when he wrote of his brother: “I 
believe that there was no man living who had a more intense aversion than Fitzjames to all oppression of the weak, and, 
above all, to religious oppression”; Leslie Stephen, Life of Fitzjames Stephen, 326. 
 In his acceptance of the law of obscene libel Fitzjames likely did not live up to these instincts about equality 
before the law, for that law’s implementation was widely known to have an inegalitarian rationale; “lascivious” material 
which was acceptable in an aristocrat’s private collection was not fit for distribution to the lower orders of society. (See 
e.g. Christopher Hilliard’s discussion of the principle of “variable obscenity” – by which the same book warranted 
prosecution if it were likely to reach a mass audience but did not need to be prohibited if it could be expected to be 
consumed only by a select upper-class readership – which governed the regulation of obscene libel in England from the 
mid-Victorian period to the mid-twentieth-century; Hilliard, ‘“Is It a Book That You Would Even Wish Your Wife or 
Your Servants to Read?’ Obscenity Law and the Politics of Reading in Modern England,” The American Historical Review, 
vol. 118, no. 3 [2013]: 653-678.) That said, I have not found a passage in which Stephen explicitly employs this 
paternalist-inegalitarian rationale for the law of obscene libel, and his own example in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity of a 
justifiable prosecution for obscenity is taken from an aristocratic milieu; Liberty, 84. 
 
327 See e.g. the writings of the socialist-atheists G.J. Holyoake and W.J. Linton; Holyoake, A Short and Easy Method with the 
Saints (London, 1843), 18; Linton, James Watson: A Memoir, 3, 9. 
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admonitions “mere bugbear[s] to frighten imbeciles with,”328 and Stephen was hardly more amenable 
to the employment of such predictions as a means of keeping specific subjects out of the public 
debate. Though, unlike Mill or his brother, Fitzjames harbored serious doubts about the impact of a 
decline of religion on the moral condition of England, he did not consider these doubts a reason to 
deter either others or oneself from investigating such sensitive subjects as the truth of Christianity. 
Rather it was an ethical and intellectual failure “to say that the truth of a theological doctrine must 
not be questioned, lest the discovery of its falsehood should produce a bad moral effect”; in 
contrast, “the question of truth must precede the question of goodness.”329 Stephen lamented that 
“the number of people who are sincerely and earnestly desirous of arriving at truth, especially at 
theological truth, at any expense of suffering and labour, is small indeed,” and alarm at the 
consequences that would attend this arrival was a major contributor to the prevailing unconcern for 
truth.330 In short, he bristled at public opinion’s power to keep unpopular and unsettling views in the 
dark; this protectiveness toward vulnerable dissent should be borne in mind when we come to assess 
Stephen’s well-known defense of “social intolerance” in the next section. 
Contrary to his reputation today, then, Stephen was not a reactionary or authoritarian on the 
subject of intellectual-expressive liberty. Instead, he articulated a nuanced and multi-faceted position 
on the grounds and nature of toleration. Insofar as his clash with Mill concerned the freedom of 
thought and discussion, it was not, as it has often been imagined to be, a clash between secular and 
religious visions of politics, or between liberal and illiberal policies on the press.331 The Mill-Stephen 
                                                 
328 Mill, “Stability of Society,” in CW, vol. 25, 1181. 
 
329 Stephen, Untitled contributions in A Modern Symposium, Subjects: The Soul and Future Life and The Influence upon Morality of 
a Decline in Religious Belief (Detroit, 1878), 189, 265. 
 
330 Stephen, “Pascal’s Pensées,” 264-5. 
 
331 Pace e.g. Richard Vernon, who sees the Mill-Stephen quarrel as “a contest between religious and secular conceptions 
of moral and political life”; Vernon, Career of Toleration, 89. It must be remembered that Stephen was, even in the most 
orthodox periods of his life, an anguished believer who would never go beyond declaring the truths of Christianity 
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controversy must, rather, be understood as a contest between two visions of the value of toleration 
and of the implications of endorsing toleration for politics more generally. The causes of Stephen’s 
dissatisfaction with the rival Millian vision are the subject of the next section. 
 
2) The Critical Side of Stephen’s Thought on Toleration 
a) The Critique of Locke: Disagreement over First Principles 
 Although it has gone unrecognized by scholars, the target of the negative side of Stephen’s 
writing on toleration was broader than Mill, and his elaboration of a critical account of contending 
theories did not begin with his attack on On Liberty. Six years before the publication of Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity Stephen wrote an analysis of Locke’s Letters on Toleration. Because he saw 
continuity between Lockean ideas and “the popular views,” “the orthodox faith on the subject” in 
“the present day” which had received their most systematic elucidation in On Liberty,332 the earlier 
essay can be seen as a test-run for some of the argument of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. 
We saw earlier that Stephen was hostile to a priori, “intuitionist” claims in epistemology or moral 
philosophy, and this hostility extended to their appearance in political and social theory. As Peter 
Nicholson has observed, Stephen was a true inductivist, committed to the exclusion from 
philosophical discourse of all non-empirical normative principles.333 He agreed with Bentham’s 
assessment of the latter as arbitrary “contrivances” by which authors “avoid[ed] the obligation to 
appeal to any external standard, and…prevail[ed] upon the reader to accept of the author’s 
sentiment as a reason for itself.”334 Again following Bentham, for Stephen the only alternative to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
“probable.” By the time he wrote Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and most of the essays considered here he was already well 
on his way to losing his faith in anything resembling orthodox Christianity. 
 
332 Stephen, “Locke on Toleration,” 157. 
 
333 Peter Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists (Cambridge, 1990), 153. 
 
334 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford, 1907), 17. Stephen followed Bentham’s 
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arbitrary impositions of these intuitionist forms of morality was utilitarianism, which grounded its 
moral claims in facts about the world rather than in the wishes of philosophers or theologians, and 
which therefore supplied an independent standard for moral judgments.335 To be sure, Stephen’s 
utilitarianism was not identical to Bentham’s.336 But the important point here was that, for Stephen 
as much as for Bentham, practical reasoning which was not grounded in empirical observation and 
inductive method was specious. The principles which a priori moral philosophy claimed to deliver were 
truly no more than mere preferences which authors foisted on the public through the assumption of 
the mantle of moral authority. Moreover, since they lacked any reality beyond the wishes of their 
progenitors, they provoked “endless disputes” when they were invoked to resolve public 
questions.337  
The equation of appeals to natural rights or the moral sense with a desire to disguise 
personal sentiments as philosophical principles animated not only Stephen, but Victorian 
intellectuals of many stripes. Naturally there were exceptions. Yet British thought in the second half 
of the nineteenth century resounded not only with denunciations of natural rights, but also with 
(even more telling) matter-of-fact comment on the marginalization of such theories among the more 
                                                                                                                                                             
terminology in calling these non-utilitarian concepts “principles of sympathy and antipathy.” It should be recalled that 
Stephen was far from alone in finding these passages of Bentham particularly impactful: they were precisely the ones 
which had the greatest effect on the adolescent Mill; see Mill, Autobiography, 67-9. 
 
335 Stephen held that the most important “sense” in which he was “[him]self a utilitarian” was his belief that “from the 
nature of the case some external standard must always be supplied by which moral rules may be tested; and happiness is 
the most significant and least misleading word that can be employed for that purpose”; Liberty, 170. For an analysis of 
the relation of facts and values in Bentham of which, I think, much applies to Stephen, see Philip Schofield, “Jeremy 
Bentham, the Principle of Utility, and Legal Positivism,” in Bentham, Selected Writings, ed. Stephen Engelmann (New 
Haven, 2011), 425-59. 
 
336 See e.g. Stephen, Liberty, 215-27. 
 
337 Stephen, “Paley’s Moral Philosophy,” in Essays by a Barrister, 300. 
 Interestingly, the accusation that philosophers of abstract right were guilty of using grand ideas to cloak the 
imposition of their will was redeployed by Stephen against the vigorous activity of Victorian philanthropists: “Humanity 
is only I writ large, and love for Humanity generally means zeal for my notions as to what men should be and how they 
should live”; a philanthropist is an “unaccountable person with whom it is difficult to deal upon any well-known and 
recognized principles, and who is capable of making his love for men in general the ground of all sorts of violence 
against men in particular” (Liberty, 180, 182). The essays “Philanthropy,” “Doing Good,” “Morality and Sensibility,” and 
“Gamaliels” (all in Essays by a Barrister) are replete with similar sentiments. 
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educated strata of their society.338 Stephen was wholly in keeping with the “enlightened” liberalism 
of his time when he announced that such non-empirical a priori schools of thought were at present 
held only by “uneducated sophists” and that they had been “repudiated by the most influential 
school of liberals.”339 The problem, however, was that uneducated sophists were a powerful segment 
of society. Stephen would have agreed with the verdict rendered by his admirer, the Idealist D.G. 
Ritchie, in the year after his death: “Though disclaimed by almost all our more careful writers on 
politics and ethics, [the theory of natural rights] yet remains a commonplace of the newspaper and 
the platform” and thus was “capable of mischief.”340 Despite the disapproval of the best minds, 
ideas of natural rights and other a priorisms still polluted English political culture. 
Analyzing Locke for the Saturday Review was a chance for Stephen to investigate these 
damaging “commonplaces” at their source.341 Simply put, Locke was neither a utilitarian nor an 
historian, and he accordingly neglected the two tasks required of any advocate of a policy. These 
were to show: first, that following the recommended course was productive of some benefit; and 
second, that, in the conditions in which it would be implemented, the benefit could be expected to 
be produced without “too great an expense.”342 On Stephen’s reading, Locke had failed on both 
counts; he really had done no more than find creative ways of saying that he wanted toleration. 
                                                 
338 To give just a few examples from across the ideological spectrum: The liberal George C. Brodrick chided his political 
opponents in the debate over the Second Reform Act for rhetorically playing upon the well-known “English dread of a 
priori rights”; John Henry Newman noted that the “deep thinkers of the day” had rejected the thought that there were 
“certain Rights of man”; and Lord Robert Cecil, the future Tory Prime Minister (as the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury), 
observed that it was no longer permissible in political debate to offer other grounds for one’s views than “expediency,” 
the “ingenious network of political first principles which the industry of three centuries had woven” having been “laid 
aside.” See Brodrick, “The Utilitarian Argument Against Reform, as Stated by Mr. Lowe,” in Essays on Reform (London, 
1867), 14; Newman, A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk, on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone’s Recent Expostulation 
(London, 1875), 75-6; Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, “The Theories of Parliamentary Reform,” in Oxford Essays, Contributed by 
Members of the University, 1858 (London, 1858), 52. 
 
339 Stephen, “Mr. Hallam,” in Essays by a Barrister, 25; “Dr. Newman and Liberalism,” 770. 
 
340 Ritchie, Natural Rights, ix. 
 
341 Stephen, “Locke on Toleration,” 158. 
 
342 Stephen, Liberty, 35. See also “Locke on Toleration,” 169; “Laws of England,” 447. 
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“[Locke’s] whole theory” was “little more than a continued repetition of one thought in a variety of 
different forms of words,” to wit, that he had hypostasized his own preferences into moral entities 
which, he then asserted, had to govern the structure of states.343 Stephen objected to 
the method on which [the Letter Concerning Toleration] proceeds, which is to form a notion as 
to what a State ought to be, and then to make that notion the criterion by which you are to 
judge of the duties and functions of existing States. Locke’s plan, in fact, would appear to 
have been, to form in his own mind a scheme which appeared to him to be advantageous for 
the States with which he was acquainted, to take that as the model of a State, and then to 
condemn everything which diverged from it, on the ground that it was not agreeable to the 
law of nature.344 
 
Instead of forming an “abstract idea of a State,” which was nothing but “lost labour,” Locke ought 
to have posed to himself the “soluble problem…What, as a fact, are, and have been, the effects of 
such and such institutions, and are those effects good or bad?”345 Since he had not envisioned his 
task in this manner, the Letter was doomed to inadequacy. Stephen’s final assessment of the Lockean 
approach was unsparing: “it is not enough to measure every institution by your own standard of 
what is useful or desirable.”346 In Bentham’s parlance, Locke had asked us to accept his sentiment as 
a reason in itself. 
 As Stephen saw it, this problem of imposing preferences under the disguise of abstract ideas 
was accompanied by another, equally serious one: as normally occurred when “broad a priori 
principles” replaced genuinely reason-giving argument, Locke proclaimed the “separation between 
the temporal and spiritual powers” to be universally applicable, with no attention paid to context 
and history.347 In keeping with the historicist, developmental outlook of Victorian social thought, the 
                                                 
343 Stephen, “Locke on Toleration,” 163. 
 
344 Ibid., 163. 
 
345 Ibid., 163-4. 
 
346 Ibid., 164. 
 
347 Stephen, “Locke on Toleration,” 162, 173. 
 101 
 
universality of Lockean toleration struck Stephen as patently absurd.348 In “bas[ing] the duty of 
toleration upon…universal principles,” Locke undermined the credibility of his cause through 
theoretical overreach.349 In lieu of such false universality he ought to have elaborated “particular 
propositions” which contextually and consequentialistically supported toleration.350 As Stephen saw 
it, Locke’s error – the inflation of sensible but limited prescriptions into immutable verities – was 
typical of the methods of reasoning that had prevailed prior to the “essentially historical” social 
science of the nineteenth century.351 In a re-run of the arguments in section one about the “modern” 
character of toleration, Stephen called it a great “fault” of the Letters “that they apply to all ages what 
is true only of an age of high cultivation”; Locke had suppressed a crucial premise of the argument 
for toleration, which was that “human society has reached its present condition.”352 The substitution 
of preferences and abstractions for benefits and reasons, the inattention to the situational and 
historical, rendered the Letter an unconvincing document. 
 Stephen took the occasion of the commentary on Lockean toleration, then, to express his 
dissent from the a priorist and ahistorical character of the first principles that still constituted the 
“most widely popular [views] upon the subject.”353 The same objection, we will now see, was at the 
center of his reply to Mill, with the addition, in the latter case, of another layer of critique targeted at 
                                                 
348 “It is impossible to say that, under no circumstances, at no time, and at no place, can it be justifiable to persecute”; 
“there are states of society in which opinion, sentiment, and practice, are so closely and inseparably united, that neutrality 
and toleration are scarcely possible, and in such cases persecution can hardly be blamed”; ibid., 170. 
 
349 Ibid., 170. 
 
350 Ibid., 173. Such contextually-sensitive propositions, he continued, “in reality have a firm foundation of their own to 
rest upon.” 
 
351 Stephen, “Hobbes on Government,” in Horae Sabbaticae, vol. 2, 4. Stephen was comparatively mild in his censures of 
Locke, probably because he judged this rush to declare the eternal truth of everything which struck him as right for the 
England of his time more excusable in Locke than in his own contemporaries who ought to have understood social 
principles could only be declared valid with reference to a specified “period in human affairs.” Criminal Law, vol. 2, 376. 
The seventeenth century was a time when “the necessary materials for the historical mode of treatment did not exist”; 
“Hobbes on Government,” 5. 
 
352 Stephen, “Locke on Toleration,” 173. 
 
353 Ibid., 162. 
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the wider nest of beliefs in which religious and expressive liberty had been embedded. 
 
b) The Critique of Mill: Detaching Toleration from the “Religious Dogma of Liberty” 
 Two disclaimers are due at the outset of this subsection. First, I should remind the reader 
that we are not covering the whole of Stephen’s dissent from Mill, but only that part which bears on 
the issue of toleration and liberty of discussion. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity covered wider terrain than 
this, but those other themes are addressed here only when they come to bear on our main themes. 
Second, in reconstructing Stephen’s reading of Mill, I do not mean to endorse it. The accuracy of 
Stephen’s interpretation of Mill is debatable on many points. At various moments I will note what I 
consider to be errors of interpretation on Stephen’s part, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to enter into the intricacies of Mill exegesis that exist on nearly all of these issues. 
 Stephen’s rebuttal of Mill combined the core of his critique of Locke with a rejection of the 
cluster of (in his eyes) false beliefs that had grown up around the just policies of toleration and 
intellectual freedom. This section will take each of these aspects in turn. 
 In light of the consequentialist Victorian philosophical milieu sketched in the preceding 
subsection, it should be clear that when Mill announced in On Liberty that he was prepared to 
“forego any advantage” derivable from an appeal to the “idea of abstract right,” he was promising 
one of the least costly sacrifices in the history of philosophy.354 The problem, though, was that many 
of his contemporaries did not believe that he had actually carried out the promised sacrifice. 
Suspicions that Mill had abandoned utilitarianism, even in the relatively inclusive and undogmatic 
sense by which Stephen and his fellows had come to hold it,355 were rife in the years during and after 
                                                 
354 Mill, On Liberty, 224. 
 
355 Stuart Warner puts the point well and in a way that applies beyond Stephen to a large crop of the intellectuals of his 
time: “Stephen’s utilitarianism was not the technical, philosophical doctrine that one finds represented in Bentham or 
presented in Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. Rather, it was a certain disposition of mind that expressed itself by 
privileging observation and facts over abstract reason”; Warner, “Foreword,” to Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, x. It 
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the publication of On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, and The Subjection of Women.356 
It is true that debates about whether Mill ought to be regarded as a utilitarian have persisted into the 
present day357; but to some extent the persistence of this question has served more to obscure than 
to illuminate. Whereas today these are rather sterile academic disputes, in the Victorian era the 
accusation of deserting a consequentialist framework was a serious one. And this is precisely the 
accusation which Stephen levelled: explaining his motivation for Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Stephen 
wrote that Mill was a “deserter from the proper principles.”358 It was basically widely assumed that, if 
one could show Mill to have operated on notions of abstract right, this would be sufficient to 
discredit On Liberty tout court; to call Mill an “abstract right” theorist was perhaps the harshest epithet 
that could be given him.359 
 On the foundational philosophical plane, then, the assault on Mill reproduced the themes of 
the Locke essay – although the tone was less measured, for there was a personal sting in seeing the 
man who had exerted such influence on him betray the true principles. Mill had abandoned 
                                                                                                                                                             
is an overstatement, however, to deny that Stephen ascribed a philosophical substance and technique to utilitarianism; it 
would have been more accurate to say that utilitarianism was as much a disposition as a doctrine to him. 
 
356 Examples of the characterization of Mill as a theorist of some form of “abstract right” include: Robert Lowe, Speeches 
and Letters on Reform, (London, 1867), 35; ; F.C. Montague, The Limits of Individual Liberty (London, 1885), 183, 187; 
Sigwick, “Review of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” 293; D.G. Ritchie, The Principles of State Interference (London, 1891), ch. 3; 
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historicist consequentialism for “abstract principles about freedom.”360 Although he said that he “is 
no believer in abstract rights, the law of nature, the inherent equality of all men” but professes to be 
a “Benthamite,” sadly “he does not write like one.”361 Instead, in a way unbefitting his towering 
mind and more “like smaller men,” his views sprang from “his sympathies and antipathies.”362 Into 
his thought Mill had smuggled “notion[s] about natural rights which cannot be resolved into general 
expediency.”363 Far from attending to the lessons of “experience alone,” he had instead become 
infatuated with enunciating “very simple principle[s],” mere “theoretical” rules, which would apply 
“absolutely.”364 In short, Mill had fallen out of step with the best thinking of his time. 
In chasing these abstract, absolute chimeras Mill had stumbled into the same vices as Locke. 
First, he had grown numb to the proper weighing of costs and benefits in context and had indulged 
in distortive theoretical overreach: 
If Mr. Mill had limited himself to the proposition that in our own time and country it is 
highly important that the great questions of morals and theology should be discussed openly 
and with complete freedom from all legal restraints, I should agree with him. But the 
impression which the whole chapter leaves upon me is that for the sake of establishing this 
limited practical consequence, Mr. Mill has stated a theory which is very far indeed from the 
truth…365 
 
Unlike Locke, Mill had laid claim to the historical method as he had to the utilitarian perspective.366 
But to Stephen, this former claim was, like the latter, no more than lip service, intended to paper 
over the elevation of liberty into an absolute good for which there could be no qualification. In 
seeking for grand principles Mill had forgotten that, judged from the God’s eye point-of-view, all 
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recommendations in the domain of human affairs must repose on “narrow and special grounds.”367 
In the words of Sidgwick, it was “pure Benthamism” on Stephen’s part to reject Mill’s “fictitious air 
of demonstrative cogency” and to relocate the question on the ground of “probable reasoning.”368 
 As with Locke, the defect of ungrounded universalism shaded into a second fault, which was 
that the author’s preferences replaced his reasons. This was inevitable, because all true reasons arose 
from experience and experience of universals was impossible. Accordingly the universalizer and 
absolutist was bound to substitute his desires for genuine data and argument. Much of Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity consists of Stephen accusing Mill of offering mere “assertion” instead of 
“proof.”369 In sum, Mill had discarded the ideologically modest, empirically-bound methods which 
he officially endorsed for the unconstrained statement of his own preferences as operationalized in 
“some such theory as is involved in the expression ‘rights of man.’”370 
 That the question of Mill’s departure from consequentialist-experiential modes of political 
reasoning was understood to be the fulcrum on which the discomfort of Stephen and others turned 
is well illustrated by the pains which the self-appointed leader of the Millians, John Morley, took to 
prove that On Liberty “reposes on no principles of abstract right, but like all the rest of its author’s 
opinions, on principles of utility and experience.”371 We might ask, though, why this issue of Mill’s 
apostasy exercised Stephen so much. As his brother put it: “practically…the difference comes to 
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little” between Mill and “Mill’s opponents,” since the latter were “as tolerant as himself.”372 While 
Mill spoke of a “universal rule,” this was hardly discrepant in its policy repercussions from his 
opponents who made toleration a matter of “expediency” but affirmed that “in almost every 
conceivable case, toleration is clearly expedient.”373 If there was little policy fallout on the toleration 
question corresponding to this philosophical disagreement, did that mean that there were no 
practical stakes to the dispute about whether Mill was a covert a priorist? 
 The answer, for Stephen at least, was resoundingly no. As noted in the introduction, there 
were political disagreements of great real-world import (most notably on women’s equality) between 
Stephen and Mill.374 But there were other, less immediate negative consequences arising from the 
philosophical failures which Mill had come to typify. 
Unlike his brother, for whom social forces were the movers of history, Fitzjames accepted 
Mill’s judgment that ideas were the most important factors in “determin[ing] the moral and political 
state of the community.”375 It followed from this that poor philosophy eventually resulted in 
deleterious real-world outcomes. In the end “incorrect” theory turned “practically mischievous” and 
became a “serious embarrassment to rational legislation.”376 As Mill himself had taught, the non-
consequentialist modes of thought which Stephen deplored were the “fons errorum” from which the 
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least enlightened institutions and ideas in England derived.377 Hence in interrogating Mill’s political 
theory at its bedrock level, Stephen was turning the (true) Mill of the Logic against the (false) Mill of 
the famous later political writings. 
 It is particularly noteworthy how Stephen characterized the “popular” “school” of which the 
Mill of the 1850s-60s was the type.378 His name for “the theory about liberty advanced by Mr. Mill” 
was “the religious dogma of liberty”; its adherents were “worshippers.”379 Whatever one’s 
preconceptions about Stephen, it should be clear by now that these appellations were pejoratives. 
His point was that the “enthusiastic” (using the word in the original sense of overzealous 
Protestantism) devotees of this “creed of a religion” were guilty of a contempt for evidence and 
rational scrutiny, of letting “popular sentiment” overtake reason.380  
This religious vocabulary signaled a personal moral failing, namely, an insufficient concern 
for truth. In addition, it connoted a one-sidedness of outlook that was detrimental to the solution of 
political problems. Though we tend to associate the appreciation of many-sidedness and “partial 
truths” with Mill, Stephen saw the dictum that “truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is…a 
question of the reconciling and combining of opposites” as empty words in Mill’s mouth.381 Stephen 
preached back at Mill the homily which Mill surely thought he had been delivering:  
It appears to me that the erreur mère, so to speak, of most modern speculations on political 
subjects lies in the fact that nearly every writer is an advocate of one out of many forces, 
which, as they act in different directions, must and do come into collision and produce a 
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resultant according to the direction of which life is prosperous or otherwise.382 
 
Because there were “a number of objects the attainment of which is desirable for men,” public 
affairs had essentially to be the province of weighing and balancing; they were a probabilistic 
domain, and it was a dangerous “pretention” to strive “to attain to something more than 
probability.”383 In their usual forms, religious modes of thought were deleterious to practical 
reasoning; devotion to a “creed” was “ill-adapted” to the carefulness which the variety of political 
goods and harms demanded.384 A genuine political outlook – that of the inductivism which he 
defended – needed to be protected against the encroachment of religious dispositions of belief which 
were inconsistent with the probabilism, moderation, and empiricism appropriate to public life. 
 Thus at the foundational philosophical level Stephen’s critique of Mill broke from the earlier 
essay on Locke only to provide a fuller picture of the harmful intellectual approach with which these 
errors of first principle were associated. Of course, the critique of Mill was a more expansive affair 
than the engagement with Locke. In addition to objecting to the philosophical base which he 
believed was common to Mill and Locke, Stephen also raised concerns about what we might call the 
superstructure of Millian toleration. He believed that the reasonable conviction that “unlimited 
freedom of opinion” was a “very good thing” had, under Mill’s influence, become entangled with a 
host of other false and unsound views.385 Accordingly it was a central task for Stephen to dismantle 
the broader constellation of beliefs and attitudes of which toleration had wrongly come to be a part.  
 Before beginning to parse this host of views, it should be noted that when Stephen is picking 
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apart the medley of notions which had been incorporated into the “creed of liberty,” it can be 
unclear who is intended as the object of any specific stricture. Mill was the central figure against 
whom he wrote, not because every idea with which he found fault appeared in On Liberty, but 
because it was “absolutely necessary” to establish some fixed point, some “definite statement,” if 
one were to state “the grounds of one’s dissent from wide-spread and influential opinions.”386 Hence 
in the remainder of this section we face a question about when Mill himself was Stephen’s intended 
target and when he had in mind a vulgar Millian thinker left unidentified in the text. Fortunately, if 
the author under attack at any given moment can be uncertain, the content of the attitudes to which 
Stephen objected is relatively clear. 
 
i) Empirical Errors 
On Stephen’s accounting, the Millian or popular-Millian Weltanschauung had accreted several 
troubling superstructural elements. To begin, it contained empirical falsehoods. Two errors merit 
mention here: one in an overly optimistic and one in an overly pessimistic direction.387 To begin with 
the former: Stephen judged the claims of Mill and his school about the moral effects of intellectual-
expressive liberty implausible. While, as section one showed, Stephen attributed important moral 
benefits to the open society, these benefits were largely negative, that is, they consisted in the removal 
of the impediments to sincerity, moral courage, and the ethical formation of beliefs that persecuting 
societies erected. But Stephen did not accept a set of more robust claims to the effect that the 
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enshrinement of liberty en soi was sufficient to bring about a moral reformation of Britain. In 
particular he attacked what he took to be Mill’s sunniness about liberty’s power to produce vigorous 
character. While freedom of discussion did enable “that small class of persons whose opinions 
depend principally upon the consciousness that they have reached them by intellectual processes 
correctly performed” to avoid becoming holders of “dead beliefs,” for the average person liberty 
had no such invigorating impact:  
The notorious result of unlimited freedom of thought and discussion is to produce general 
scepticism on many subjects in the vast majority of minds. If you want zealous belief, set 
people to fight. Few things give men such a keen perception of the importance of their own 
opinions and the vileness of the opinions of others as the fact that they have inflicted and 
suffered persecution for them.388 
 
The truth that these freedoms did “not tend to zeal” was not, of course, reason to recur to the 
energizing implements of “the wheel, the stake, and the gallows.”389 But it was nonetheless 
important to recognize which goods liberty could furnish on its own and which would have to be 
generated from other sources. After all, was not the suspicion that the abolition of the old 
restrictions on opinion was inadequate in itself to generate probity and strength of conviction 
precisely why, as we saw in section one, both Stephen and Mill felt compelled to join the chorus of 
Victorians clamoring for more conviction and integrity in public life? 
 Because they offered so little resistance to the temptation to overestimate the power of 
liberty, the Millian faction was liable to a second empirical error: that of magnifying out of all 
proportion the existing threats to liberty in Britain. Mill had a propensity to portray British society as 
deeply intolerant despite its recent progress. To Stephen, Mill’s disaffection resulted from the 
transformative impact on character which he attributed to intellectual liberty; for, given that he 
depicted liberty as a kind of moral panacea, if his compatriots had not become the wonderful figures 
which his paeans to liberty depicted, then it could only have been because true liberty was lacking. It 
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was in consequence of this line of thinking that On Liberty was an “altogether melancholy” book,390 
full of dire pronouncements of Victorian intolerance. Yet to Stephen these complaints demonstrated 
a failure to appreciate the liberal character of their society. Indeed, in his initial review of On Liberty, 
he avowed “complete” “agreement” with the “general tone of the book” except for a befuddlement 
that Mill should have been so “melancholy” as to “humiliat[e]” his countrymen by berating them for 
ignorance of “doctrines which to so many persons appear to have long since passed from the sphere 
of discussion into that of action.”391 Contra Mill, Stephen thought that a consensus had developed in 
favor of intellectual freedom, and this appraisal contributed to his great frustration at the law’s 
failure to track public opinion on these matters.392 The reality was that England, far from being 
hostile to or “deficient in originality,” deserved approbation for its open and tolerant spirit.393  
 
ii) The Fetishism of Diversity and Its Corollaries 
The propensity to denigrate Britain as intolerant and conformist stemmed not only from 
outsized expectations about the benefits of liberty of thought and discussion, but also from a 
mistaken inference about what it meant to value this liberty. This brings us to a further element of 
the Millian outlook on toleration of which Stephen disapproved. In their alarmed estimates that 
“peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct,” and “originality in thought” were being stymied,394 Mill 
and the popular Millians treated what was essentially a predictable byproduct of liberty – an increase 
in the diversity of opinions and lifestyles – as an end in itself. In brief, Stephen accused Mill of 
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fetishizing diversity: “though goodness is various, variety is not in itself good”; “Mr. Mill worships 
mere variety.”395 Stephen’s dissent from Mill on this point was not equivalent to denying that the 
diversity of beliefs and characters was natural, nor that it was in many cases worthy of celebration.396 
What concerned Stephen about this feature of the Millian perspective was that the identification of 
diversity as ipso facto good struck him as invalidating our capacity to make discriminations amongst 
the array of opinions on offer: Mil covertly “assume[d] people cannot be trusted to judge any variety 
or alteration upon its merits”; he took for granted that “the common standards of good and evil 
were so thoroughly wrong that if men exercised any discretion as to the varieties which they would 
encourage or discourage, they would do more harm than good, and that, therefore, in the present 
bad state of affairs the best thing to do was to encourage all varieties.”397 Stephen reckoned that a 
shallow, triumphalist form of pluralism in which one refused to critically assess the range of 
ideological and policy options on offer had crept into On Liberty.398 
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 On Stephen’s interpretation, Mill’s fetishism of diversity had as its corollary two views which 
were even more troubling than this one. There was, at least, a grain of truth underlying the fetishism 
of diversity: diversity had, Victorians thought, accompanied the “progress of discussion” and the 
“rise of civilization”; to worship diversity was therefore an understandable error, a mistaking of the 
sign for the thing signified. Less excusable were two related propositions, which we might call the 
theses of the equality of opinions and of the neutered public sphere. Regarding the first: Stephen believed 
that Mill had cut out from under his feet any ground on which to say that some people’s opinions 
were superior to others. He had rendered himself unable to acknowledge the plain truths that “till a 
man has carefully formed his opinions on these subjects, thought them out, assured himself of their 
value, and decided to take the risk of proclaiming them, the strong probability is that they are not 
much worth having.”399 In his passion for liberty, Stephen thought, Mill had become blind to the 
fact that the beliefs of “a good man” who has “carefully studied” a subject were worth more than 
those of a “bad man” or an “ignorant preacher.”400 Toleration did not mean that all opinions were 
created equal – although this seemed to be a lesson of On Liberty. 
The second corollary thesis, which I labeled the neutered public sphere, is more difficult to 
capture. It amounted essentially to imputing an illusion of conflictlessness to Mill and the Millians; what 
they wanted, on Stephen’s interpretation, was a public discourse in which harmony, rather than the 
competition of ideas, interests, and ways of life, was the norm. But the former was a fundamentally 
false picture of the nature of collective life: “struggles there must and always will be, unless men 
stick like limpets or spin like weathercocks”; “there are and there must be struggles between creeds 
                                                 
399 Stephen, Liberty, 53. 
 
400 Ibid., 55-6. The revised edition of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity rescinded the attribution of this view to Mill, though 
Stephen maintained that it was true of the “popular school” which idolized him; on this point, the new edition read, 
“there was not really much difference between Mr. Mill and myself.” Stephen cited a passage in Mill’s Autobiography, 
which was published after the initial release of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, as evidence of their accord on this point, 
though he need hardly have waited for Mill’s memoirs to have known better: Mill’s corpus is replete with judgments 
about better and worse ways of holding and forming opinions, including what is one of the most notorious features of 
his political theory: the endorsement of plural voting; see Considerations, ch.8. 
 114 
 
and political systems”; “the intimate sympathy and innumerable bonds of all kinds by which men are 
united, and the differences of character and opinions by which they are distinguished, produce and 
must forever produce continual struggles between them.”401 Support for toleration did not mean 
getting rid of contest and antagonism, but channeling it into more productive avenues than mere 
violence. Rightly understood, controversy had not disappeared since the end of religious warfare and 
state persecution, but had only been stripped of its “brutality.”402 To illustrate the conflictual public 
sphere which he valued, Stephen appropriated the ubiquitous Victorian term “fair play.”403 Stephen 
elaborated at length, in typically punchy prose, on what this term encapsulated for him: 
De Maistre somewhere says that the persecution which the Church had suffered from the 
syllogism was infinitely worse than all that racks and crosses could inflict; and the remark, 
though odd, is perfectly true….Civil war, legal persecution, the Inquisition, with all their 
train of horrors, form a less searching and effective conflict than that intellectual warfare 
from which no institution, no family, no individual man is free when discussion is free from 
legal punishment. Argument, ridicule, the expression of contempt for cherished feelings, the 
exposure of cherished fallacies, chilled or wounded affection, injury to prospects public or 
private, have their terrors as well as more material weapons and more definite wounds. The 
result of such a warfare is that the weaker opinion—the less robust and deeply seated 
feeling—is rooted out to the last fibre, the place where it grew being seared as with a hot 
iron; whereas the prison, the stake, and the sword only strike it down, and leave it to grow 
again in better circumstances. A blow bruises, and discolours for a time. Nitrate of silver 
does not bruise, but it changes the colour of the whole body for its whole life.404 
 
Fortunately, this deep contestation between religious doctrines and political visions was not the only 
side of human existence. There were “more numerous and more powerful” “influences which tend 
to unite men and which give them an interest in each other’s welfare…than those which throw them 
into collision,” such that the “collisions” were surrounded “with acts of friendship and goodwill 
which confine them within limits and prevent people from going to extremities.”405 But this did not 
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make the collisions any less fundamental or inevitable. Social life was about sorting out one conflict 
after another, and this truth could not be wished away. Support for toleration was rightly based not 
in a utopian ambition that conflict should vanish, but in a more limited conviction that these 
contests ought to be resolved not in a violent but in a peaceful and truth-advancing way. 
Whether such a depiction of the ineradicably antagonistic orientation of the public sphere 
would actually have disturbed a philosopher who declared that truth had to emerge “by the rough 
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners” is disputable406; personally, 
I think that there was little daylight, except in tone, between the two on this issue. But Stephen’s 
perception that Mill’s theory could lead one to turn away from the combat of ideas and toward a 
more harmonious paradigm was widespread in the era; if he was wrong in attributing the thesis of 
the neutered public sphere to Mill the philosopher, he was right to attribute it to “Mill” the larger 
persona. For instance, Pollock stated as a well-known fact that “Mill proposes, by way of securing 
fairness, to give certain artificial advantages to the weaker combatants [in the contest of ideas], and 
seems to have persuaded himself that the conditions of the fight may be somehow rearranged so as 
to avoid the inevitable conclusion that…someone must come the worse off at the end.”407 Pollock, a 
good Fitzjamian, said this with disdain, but self-described Millians were happy to accept this 
depiction of Mill as an advocate for a kind of affirmative action for unconventional opinions that 
would correspond in the social-moral sphere to the “protectionism” that proportional 
representation offered to minority views in the legislative sphere.408 G.J. Holyoake, a working-class 
activist who conceived himself to be preaching the gospel of Mill, condemned Stephen’s outlook as 
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“poor-law” or “inclement Toleration.”409 This was toleration that “carries a Refrigerator in its heart: 
it has a congealing compassion for new ideas, under which they commonly perish. Only the hardier 
sort live and bud in more genial days.”410 To envision toleration on the model of a fair fight was “not 
only Hostile but shabby”; properly conceived, “toleration itself is aid to error as far as it goes…He 
who finds it against his conscience to aid opinion, not his own, is right to put it down.”411 In 
Holyoake’s eyes, what followed from Millian premises was a requirement of succor to those who 
championed minority views, even those of whose incorrectness one was most certain.412 Stephen’s 
model of public debate as a forum in which it was right and desirable that there be conquerors and 
conquered was merely the ethics of a persecuting society that had lost the courage to persecute. It 
was against this image of toleration that Stephen felt compelled to vindicate a more agonistic or 
conflictual version of public discourse. The nature of a regime of toleration was not that all views 
receive support or be placed on a footing of substantial equality; rather, the nature of a liberal system 
was only (in an analogy to boxing) that “precautions” be taken “to let the best man win.”413 All 
toleration was, was citizens fighting for their ideas and agendas by arguments, rather than by arms. 
  
 iii) Social intolerance 
Consideration of Stephen’s rejection of this harmonious paradigm brings us to the most 
notorious aspect of his thought on free discussion and the public sphere: his apology for “social 
                                                 
409 Holyoake, Hostile & Generous Toleration: A New Theory of Toleration (London, 1886), 5. This is a wonderful but sadly 
forgotten pamphlet. 
 
410 Ibid., 5-6. 
 
411 Ibid., 7-8. 
 
412 For an interpretation similar to Holyoake’s in the modern secondary literature, see Jill Gordon, “John Stuart Mill and 
the ‘Marketplace of Ideas’,” Social theory and practice (1997): 235-249. 
 
413 Stephen, Liberty, 68. 
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intolerance.”414 Stephen was “utterly unable to agree with Mr. Mill” that “social stigma” was akin to 
“legal persecution,” and he endorsed the justifiability of strong expressions of disapproval toward 
those with whose opinions one did not “sympathise.”415 It is worth dwelling on this aspect of Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity at some length lest it be thought that with his stance on social intolerance Stephen 
was taking back with the left hand the freedom which he had given with the right. 
 The basis of his apology for social intolerance was moral-psychological: it was grounded in 
the observation that disagreement often involved dislike.416 This was an empirical reality, but 
Stephen also gave it his normative assent. To take an issue under debate seriously was to recognize 
that we were in genuine conflict with those who disagreed with us, and to enter into a kind of 
combatant relationship with the other side.417 To ask people to suppress all signs of the feelings that 
attended such a relationship would be to introduce moral distortion into people’s lives; it was 
equivalent to asking them to “for[get] that opinions have a moral side to them,” since so long as one 
believed, as Stephen did, that the formation of beliefs was an ethical matter, it was natural that one 
have negative judgments toward individuals whom one regarded as having committed a fault in this 
respect.418 Moreover, the display of disapproval toward opinions which one believed to reveal 
deficiencies of character was a part of what it meant to engage in public life in a spirit of gravity and 
                                                 
414 Ibid., 51. 
 
415 Stephen, Liberty, 52-3; Mill, On Liberty, 240. 
 
416 “The fact is that we all more or less condemn and blame each other….I cannot understand how a man who is not a 
Roman Catholic can regard a real Roman Catholic with absolute neutrality….How the question of whether he is right or 
wrong can be regarded as one indifferent to his general character and to the moral estimate which persons of a different 
way of thinking must form of him is to me quite inconceivable….Controversies of this sort go to the very core and root 
of life, and as long as they express the deepest convictions of men, those who really differ are and must be enemies to a 
certain extent, though they may keep their enmity within bounds”; Stephen, Liberty, 53-4. 
 
417 See e.g. Pollock’s interpretation of Stephen’s employment of “social intolerance” as a way of forcing the reader to 
acknowledge the fact “that the whole aim of all serious discussion is to form a strong collective opinion on one’s own 
side of the question, and to gain for one’s own side the advantages in social influence and otherwise which flow from a 
strong collective opinion”; Pollock, “Review of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” 91. A similar positive moralization of the fact 
that “every new idea…must offend a great mass of prevalent opinion, and must struggle for existence among the ideas 
already in possession of the ground” is in Ritchie; see Natural Rights, 193-5. 
 
418 Ibid., 53. 
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probity.419  
In other words, what worried Stephen most about Mill’s prohibition on social intolerance 
was that it ran counter to the values of earnestness and sincerity which undergirded his support for 
the liberties of thought and the press in the first place. The fact that Mill had, to his mind, turned 
“liberty” against these values was indicative that On Liberty mistook true liberty for a pathological or 
“religious” version of it. Of course, unless this social intolerance were to be a form of completely 
ineffectual venting, it would have the effect of discouraging some kinds of speech; it would limit 
public expression in certain ways. In particular, “timid people” and frivolous folks who might wish 
to enter the fray but who were not really “prepared to fight” for their views would be deterred from 
speaking out.420 The number of voices weighing in on a question might be diminished relative to what 
it would be in the Holyoakean/Millian utopia of mutual encouragement among even the most 
antithetical views. But this reduction was not, in Stephen’s eyes, an infringement on liberty properly-
understood; to classify it as such was to commit a version of the fetishism which he decried. Liberty 
was not to be judged by whether some other variable – whether that be the diversity of ideas in 
circulation or the number of voices heard – was maximized.421 Stephen’s intellectual liberalism was 
not concerned with the multiplication of voices for its own sake but with securing the conditions in 
which new ideas could prove themselves worthwhile in the eyes of the public – conditions which, 
rightly or wrongly, he did not believe were undermined by social intolerance. 
                                                 
419 “Complete moral tolerance is possible only when men have become completely indifferent to each other—that is to 
say, when society is at an end”; ibid., 95. A similar idea was expressed by a reviewer of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity who 
was friendlier to Stephen than to Mill: “We all admit that society has no right to persecute an individual for his religious 
belief….[Nevertheless] our duty to abstain from expression of religious belief or disbelief – offensive, or it may be 
blasphemous, in the eyes of society – and, on the other hand, to avow it, is bound by the sincerity and strength of our 
convictions and consequent obligation to others. Society, on the other hand, is bound to listen when its sincerity is 
tested”; Herbert Cowell, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Mr. John Stuart Mill,” in Liberty: Contemporary Responses to John 
Stuart Mill, 298-320, 308. The essay was originally published in Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, Sept. 1873. 
 
420 Ibid., 52-3. 
 
421 In this way, Stephen can be usefully contrasted with the logic of Alexander Meiklejohn’s later “democratic” rationale 
for free speech, whereby more speech does seem to be equated with more freedom; see Alexander Meiklejohn, Free 
Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (New York, 1948). 
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To understand why Stephen was confident that social intolerance as he understood it did not 
violate intellectual liberty, it is important to note the extent to which his defense of it was (what 
American First Amendment lawyers would call) “content-neutral.” In providing an apology for it 
against On Liberty, Stephen’s goal was not to unleash social pressure against a particular set of views 
which he disliked.422 Instead, social intolerance as he portrayed it acted to discourage certain 
frivolous and unserious modes of utterance and to foster a more “ethical” (truthful, earnest) 
approach to public discussion; it would work, he seems to have thought, only against those people 
who did not hold their beliefs in an acceptable manner.423 In this respect, Stephen resembles those 
thinkers today who, concerned about the low quality of public discourse, wish to “elevate” and 
“purify” it without (they believe) taking a stand on the substance of the various beliefs themselves.424 
 Stephen’s defense of social intolerance thus had a “repressive” dimension insofar as it had 
the potential to diminish the quantity of voices raised on a question. But this was a repressiveness 
which, to his mind, stemmed directly from the values which undergirded his religious-intellectual 
libertarianism, and which did not undermine his (admittedly elitist and non-“maximalist”) stance on 
freedom of thought and discussion. To attempt to suppress social intolerance was a greater affront 
to liberal norms than to make peace with it as part and parcel of an agonistic public sphere. 
Given the attention which has been paid to Stephen on social intolerance, it behooves us to make a 
                                                 
422 Even “opinions on which the framework of society rests” needed to be attacked “in many cases.” What was 
objectionable was only that the bearer of such a searing critique should expect to be welcomed, rather than resisted, for 
putting forth his unconventional views; Stephen, Liberty, 52. This even-handedness with regard to substance is clear from 
the fact that, in the midst of his principal discussion of the subject, he licensed both the believer and the denier of innate 
ideas, both the Catholic and the anti-papist, to exhibit social intolerance so long as they were sincere in their positions; 
ibid., 53-4. 
 
423 Social intolerance was envisaged as a test that one held one’s beliefs earnestly and with due consideration, not a test 
of the substance of the belief: “No man has a right to give the signal for such a battle by blowing the horn, unless he has 
first drawn the sword and knows how to make his hands guard his head with it. Then let him blow as loud and long as 
he likes, and if his tune is worth hearing he will not want followers”; Liberty, 52-3. And see Cowell’s idea that social 
intolerance was a way of weeding out from the contest of ideas those speakers whose opinions were not backed by “real 
force of character”; Cowell, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” 308. 
 
424 Whether they are correct in so thinking is another story; Stephen’s own skepticism about dividing style and substance 
(covered in section one) casts some doubt on the matter. 
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further, often overlooked point: namely, that in truth he did not have anything approaching a doctrine 
on the subject. This area of his thinking is beset by tensions and confusions. 
 To begin with the more obvious difficulties. For one thing, in light of the considerations in 
section one of this essay “social intolerance” entailed a tightrope walk at the personal-psychological 
level – feelings of moral disapproval for certain views could not reach the point of making one deaf 
to the reasons and evidence that might tell in favor of those views, for this would be to violate the 
“ethics of belief.” Unfortunately, Stephen offered little practical guidance on how to succeed at this 
balancing act. For another, it is not clear whether there was a real difference between him and Mill 
on this point.425 After all, Mill never argued that the individual needed to put his feelings about the 
beliefs of others aside.426 Rather, what he objected to was something like extralegal collective action 
against holders of unpopular beliefs; it violated respect for liberty to try to bring out about the 
ostracism or silencing of minority views or lifestyles. Yet Stephen nowhere actually provided a 
positive argument for carrying personal distaste about beliefs to the brink of collective action. He 
did not argue for the intentional marginalization of smaller ideological groups by larger ones so 
much as urge that we should not “plaster…over” the hard sentiments that emerge from the 
confrontation of different worldviews.427 Although in the abstract Stephen expressed acceptance of 
what seem like collective expressions of disapproval, his examples stay at the more personal level of 
the hostility which he believes will be mutually felt by those who disagree about fundamental issues. 
 Beyond these difficulties, which are visible right on the surface of Stephen’s account, his 
notion of social intolerance was inadequate in several deeper ways. The first problem arises from the 
                                                 
425 In minimizing the distance between Stephen and Mill on social intolerance, I am in the company of Joseph 
Hamburger; see Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control (Princeton, NJ, 2001). However, where Hamburger 
effects this rapprochement by assimilating Mill to the standard view of the authoritarian Stephen, I do so by pushing in the 
opposite direction, that is, by moving Stephen toward the standard image of the liberal Mill. 
 
426 Social “penalties” for beliefs and behavior that were deemed vicious were consistent with an order of liberty so long 
as they were the “natural and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves”; Mill, On Liberty, 278. 
 
427 Stephen, Liberty, 54. 
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fact that, although he was critical of Mill for not maintaining a clear distinction between opinions 
and conduct, Stephen was himself not clear about whether the penalties of public opinion were 
equally appropriate to both belief and behavior, and his greater focus on the latter in these 
discussions seems to indicate that he saw defensible instances of the “moral coercion of public 
opinion” more as the manifestation of society’s disfavor toward “vice” than as means of keeping 
unpopular views from being expressed.428 
Second: if it is not apparent what he thought the appropriate target of social intolerance was, 
it is also unclear how much of it he was truly prepared to accept. Most scholars have only noted one 
half of Stephen’s rejoinder to Mill: namely, the normative defense of social intolerance. However, as 
we saw in subsection (i) above, he also replied by denying that “the restraints of public opinion, the 
‘social intolerance’ of which Mr. Mill gives such a striking account” were operative “at present.”429 
Despite the harsh rhetoric in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Stephen’s response was never simply that 
social intolerance was a positive thing, but also that it was not in fact a significant feature of English 
society. Hence Stephen waffled between the claims that social intolerance had a positive function 
and that it was simply not to be worried about because of its contemporary weakness. This 
hesitation, in conjunction with the stringent “limits to the possibility of useful interference with 
morals, either by law or by public opinion” which he demanded “be carefully observed,” calls into 
question just how far Stephen’s famous defense of social intolerance can with consistency be called a 
defense at all.430 The dubious character of his apology for social intolerance is reinforced by the fact 
that at times Stephen himself painted a Millian picture of social ostracism oppressing thought, on 
                                                 
428 Ibid., 90-1; see also 9-10. 
 
429 Ibid., 91. 
 
430 Stephen, Liberty, 105-6. And see Smith, Stephen, Victorian Rationalist, 172-4. 
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which occasions he admitted that public opinion could become “tyrannical.”431 
 Third: even insofar as Stephen can be understood as offering a positive rationale for social 
intolerance, this rationale was riven by a central divide. He gave, without any appearance of realizing 
the difficulty, two conflicting accounts of social intolerance with regard to the expression of beliefs. 
The first was what we might loosely call majoritarian, using this term not in an electoral sense but to 
indicate the widely-shared beliefs of a society.432 Holders of majority opinions were justified in 
impressing upon dissenters the strong social support for their positions; they did not need, as he 
thought Mill wanted them to do, to pretend that their views on religion or politics were simply one 
among innumerable, undifferentiable others.433 In tandem with this justification, however, was a very 
different elitist one which stemmed from Stephen’s aforementioned convictions about the inequality 
of opinions. On this view, social intolerance was an instrument to be wielded by “men who really 
study these matters” against the “impudence and rudeness” of the average man who thought his 
beliefs were as good as anyone else’s even though he did “not understand” what he was “talk[ing] 
about.”434 This elitist apology for social intolerance decidedly did not license the unserious or 
unscholarly – whether they belonged to the majority or not – to chastise their “betters” for being of 
different views.435 Yet he does not appear to have recognized the contradiction between these two 
                                                 
431 Mill was motivated “by a feeling – which we are afraid is but too well grounded – that, notwithstanding our political 
freedom, many causes are at work which tend to subject us to a tyranny far more searching, infinitely more powerful, 
and much more difficult to resist, than any which depends on merely material force”; Stephen, “Mr. Mill on Political 
Liberty [1],” 186. See also his exceedingly Millian alarm that “most writers are so nervous about the tendencies of their 
books, and the social penalties of unorthodox opinion are so severe, and are exacted in so unsparing a manner, that 
philosophy, criticism, and science itself too often speak amongst us in ambiguous whispers what ought to be proclaimed 
from the house tops”; “Buckle’s History of Civilization,” 471. 
 
432 For this majoritarian side of Stephen with respect to the law rather than public opinion, see Antal Szerletics, “The 
Theoretical Aspects of Legal Moralism,” Silesian Journal of Legal Studies, no. 1 (2009): 98-110. 
 
433 Stephen, Liberty, 52-3. And see Ritchie, Natural Rights, 193-5; Montague, Limits of Liberty, 211-2; Froude, “Plea for Free 
Discussion,” 280. 
 
434 Stephen, Liberty, 56-7. 
 
435 “It is one thing to say, as I do, that after careful consideration and mature study a man has a right to say such and 
such opinions are dishonest, cowardly, feeble, ferocious, or absurd, and that the person who holds them deserves 
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defenses of social intolerance – one which empowered the majority to give vent to its collective 
“enmity” toward those who challenged it on points that went to “the very core and root of life,” and 
another which enabled the intellectual elite to assert the superiority of its views.436  
In light of these difficulties, Stephen’s objections to Mill on social intolerance can only be 
said to be solidly anchored at one point: the sense that Mill’s refusal of intolerance at the social level 
corresponded on the moral-psychological plane to a requirement that individuals hold their beliefs in 
an untenable way, in which they were supposed to be committed to them while not ever allowing 
this commitment to spill over into disapproval of dissenters.437 Who was expressing the disfavor, 
about what, and to what degree – these were all ambiguous, to say the least. 
 
iv) The Rejection of Neutrality 
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity struck at one final tenet of the popular-Millian creed on freedom 
of thought and discussion, a tenet which Stephen regarded as the most damaging of all its errors. 
This article of the religious dogma of liberty was that intellectual-expressive freedom demanded the 
neutrality of the state in matters of belief. Though Stephen occasionally slipped into a neutralist 
idiom,438 he rejected the aspiration to neutrality enunciated by many strands of liberalism. He 
thought neutrality no more than a myth; this is the central theoretical lesson that he took away from 
                                                                                                                                                             
censure for having shown dishonesty or cowardice in adopting them, and quite another thing to say that everyone has a 
right to throw stones at everybody who differs from himself on religious questions”; ibid., 56-7. Stephen was even 
willing, in certain moments, to suggest that it was impossible for a person of intellectual attainments to show genuine 
“moral intolerance” to the uneducated mass, since people were entitled to opinions only if they were formed in 
accordance with the exacting criteria of the ethics of belief. Here again we encounter the inegalitarian potential of 
Victorian liberalism’s ethics of belief. 
 
436 Ibid., 54. 
 
437 Ibid., 53, 57. 
 
438 Interestingly, it was especially in contending against the push by powerful Evangelical groups to use state institutions 
in India to convert the native population that this neutralist language came out in Stephen’s work; see e.g. “Christianity 
in India,” in Essays by a Barrister, 150-9, esp. 154, 159. Stephen bitterly resisted intrusions by Evangelical missionaries into 
the governance of India. 
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his Indian experience.439 His brother articulated Fitzjames’s point-of-view with surpassing clarity: 
[In India] we had enforced peace between rival sects; allowed conversion; set up schools 
teaching sciences inconsistent with Hindoo (and with Christian?) theology; protected 
missionaries and put down suttee and human sacrifices. In the main, therefore, we had shown 
‘intolerance’ by introducing toleration. Fitzjames had been himself accused, on the occasion of his 
Native Marriages Bill, with acting upon principles of liberty, fraternity, and equality. His 
point, indeed, is that a government, even nervously anxious to avoid proselytism, had been 
compelled to act upon doctrines inconsistent with the religions of its subjects.440 
 
For Stephen, it was “simply impossible that legislation should be really neutral as to any religion 
which is professed by any large number of the persons legislated for”; it was hypocritical to concoct 
arguments that skirted the reality, which “everyone who has to do with legislation must find,” that to 
construct “laws and institutions” involved choosing “principles” to which the champions of other 
principles had to “give way.”441 In his countercharge to the enthusiasm for “neutrality” Stephen saw 
himself reminding “people [who] are not always aware of it” of the obvious truths implicit in their 
political practice,442 but in fact liberals of his time were very aware of these truths and not at all shy 
about embracing them. On the whole they refused to equate the religious and intellectual liberty that 
they enjoyed with the position of state neutrality; one need only read Lecky’s gripping portrayal – 
which he wrote to debunk the illusion of neutrality – of the British government weighing a variety of 
political, moral, and religious considerations before banning the suttee in India to see just how 
familiar Stephen’s viewpoint on this subject was.443 For the mainstream Victorian liberal, a free and 
                                                 
439 While in many regards Stephen’s thought changed in response to his time in India – for example, in his thinking 
about the defects of parliamentary regimes and party politics; his fears about democracy; his views on legal codification; 
his vision of rational political administration – as regards questions of intellectual and religious freedom it was really only 
in his determination to cure these liberties from the infection of neutrality that his experience in imperial government 
affected him. On the “imperial” viewpoint in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, see e.g. Colaiaco, James Fitzjames Stephen, 153. 
 
440 Leslie Stephen, Life of Ftizjames Stephen, 327. 
 
441 Stephen, Liberty, 40. 
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443 Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. 1, 532-40. For representative essays on the subject that made their argument in 
entirely domestic rather than imperial terms, see e.g. D.G. Ritchie, “The Moral Function of the State,” in Herbert Spencer 
and the Limits of the State, 167-82; T.H. Green, “Legislative Interference in Moral Matters,” in Green, Collected Works, 5 
vols., ed. Peter Nicholson (Bristol, 1997), vol. 5, 31-4 (henceforth cited as CW). 
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tolerant state was to be defended because it was the best state, not because it was a neutral state. 
 Stephen’s rejection of state neutrality put him not only in good stead with his 
contemporaries, but also placed him within a venerable tradition in the history of English political 
philosophy: Erastianism.444 During the religious conflicts of the seventeenth century Erastians 
asserted the supremacy of the state over the church in ecclesiastical matters, and in the succeeding 
centuries an Erastian empowerment of the state’s authority in the domain of religious belief and 
church organization had become a central element of much Whig thought. As Stephen qua historian 
knew well, the Erastian elevation of the state had been an instrument for the extension of toleration 
against the right, claimed by the Anglican Church, to restrict worship and belief to the “true 
religion.” This vindication of civil supremacy over religion in the interest of toleration was a feature 
of the most important work of English Erastianism, Hobbes’s Leviathan, and given Stephen’s 
admiration for Hobbes it is not surprising that his own understanding of toleration would follow 
more in Hobbes’s footsteps than Locke’s.445  
Recognizing the “thoroughgoing Erastian” heritage of Stephen’s thought is important for 
two reasons.446 First, it reveals how he could see himself as at once an upholder of state power and a 
proponent of religious liberty. Both his work in Indian legislation and his service as a barrister 
defending a Cambridge cleric from the “hoary fallacies which justify persecution” in ecclesiastical 
court primed Stephen to see the space of intellectual-religious liberty as a creation of the state rather 
                                                 
444 Few scholars have located Stephen within this tradition, although Smith does; Smith, Stephen, Victorian Rationalist, 233. 
 
445 For Hobbes’s support for toleration, see e.g. Richard Tuck, “Hobbes and Locke on Toleration,” in Thomas Hobbes and 
Political Theory, ed. Mary Dietz (Lawrence, KS, 1990), 153-71; Alan Ryan, “A More Tolerant Hobbes,” in Justifying 
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than, as on many liberal perspectives, a ratification of a pre-political condition or endowment.447 On 
this score Stephen, and the broad swathe of Whig-liberal opinion which embraced this view, 
contrasted sharply with the major strands of liberalism across the Channel; nineteenth-century 
French champions of toleration and expressive freedom, from Benjamin Constant to Jules Simon, 
tended to ground these policies in a set of individual rights beyond the purview of social power, and 
therefore to insist on state neutrality as a necessary correlate of a tolerant and free society.448 While 
the freedoms of religion and opinion were staple ingredients of liberalism in both countries, the 
French were warier of the state than was the Fitzjamian liberal who weighed so heavily in British 
political culture. 
Second, Stephen’s Erastianism endeared him to an unlikely group of readers: Idealist 
democrats. Writers of this school, imbued as they were with Hegel, wanted to restore the status of 
the state as society’s central moral agent, reclaiming it from a diminished “night-watchman” position 
and reaffirming its standing to pursue a vision of the common good that was not reducible to a 
predetermined set of individual liberties. For democratic writers of the 1880s-90s who were keen to 
cast freedom of opinion in a way that was consistent with an expansion of the state, the Erastian 
picture of toleration as a grant of civil authority looked more congenial to their hopes of raising the 
dignity of the democratic state than a Lockean account of the sources of freedom – an account 
                                                 
447 Stephen, Defence of Rowland Williams, 324. And for a typically Erastian picture of the state’s role in grounding liberty, 
see Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 111: “[several preceding lessons] may all be summed up in this one, that power precedes 
liberty—that liberty, from the very nature of things, is dependent upon power; and that it is only under the protection of 
a powerful, well-organized, and intelligent government that any liberty can exist at all.” 
 This opposition between an Erastian and a rights-based or contractarian notion of toleration parallels the issue 
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448 Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns” and Principles of Politics Applicable to All 
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which they, like Stephen, associated with Mill.449 Hence, in one of those ironies that mark the history 
of political thought, the concern of the antidemocratic Stephen to avoid a defense of the liberty of 
thought and discussion that would diminish the dignity of the state earned for him greater favor 
among some of the most profoundly democratic late-Victorian writers than the more democratic 
Mill.450 
This question of whether the liberal state was identical to the neutral state was not an idle 
philosophical one. It had political ramifications beyond affecting Stephen’s reception by different 
ideological groups. For one thing, the neutralist point-of-view was heavily invoked by proponents of 
the disestablishment of the Anglican Church.451 Stephen, like not only many Tories and members of 
the Anglican establishment but also many liberals,452 conceived of religious liberty and the 
justifiability of a church establishment (so long, of course, as this church was not persecutory) as 
separate issues. An established church was neither required nor prohibited on principles of abstract 
right, but was an institution subject to the same sort of contextually-specific, weighing-and-balancing 
practical reasoning as any other. Stephen thought that in most cases a religious establishment would 
be beneficial, both because of the general importance of faith to a society’s moral health and because 
(as touched on above) a strict “division between Church and State” had the negative consequence of 
giving the impression that “the State” and citizens in their “political capacity” were to ignore 
                                                 
449 See e.g. Montague, Limits of Liberty, 188. For a similar thought in the modern scholarship see also Abram Harris, 
“John Stuart Mill’s Theory of Progress,” in Mill’s Social and Political Thought, vol. 4, 17. To my knowledge Nicholson is the 
only scholar who has noted the Idealists’ preference for Stephen over Mill as a theorist of toleration; he could have 
pressed the point even further, though, since he touches on it only briefly and with regard to D.G. Ritchie alone. See 
Nicholson, Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, 294. 
 
450 “Insofar as this principle [of the absolute separation of church and state] is accepted and acted upon with real good 
faith, the State will be degraded”; Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 45. 
 
451 See e.g. Timothy Larsen, Friends of Religious Equality: Nonconformist Politics in Mid-Victorian England (Rochester, NY, 
1999), esp. chs. 3-4. 
 
452 Though not his brother; see “Suppression of Poisonous Opinions,” 436. Though he opposed his elder sibling on the 
practical point, Leslie did agree that toleration was a separate issue analytically from the question of state neutrality; see 
History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, vol. 2, 145. 
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everything but “mere police functions.”453 Naturally, the judgment could go the other way; though 
Stephen made disparaging remarks about the religious life of the United States,454 he never suggested 
that the American model of non-establishment was illegitimate. His hostility to the neutralist 
perspective among the disestablishmentarians of his era was, therefore, continuous with his dismissal 
of the a priorist Lockean framework on the grounds that it rendered impossible critical inquiry into 
the costs and benefits of various political arrangements. 
Even more fundamental than these questions of ecclesiastical politics, Stephen rejected the 
neutralist paradigm from a desire to protect the right of the British government to have an active 
domestic policy, to be able to embark on projects on behalf of the social good. Rightly or wrongly, 
Stephen was convinced that a consistent commitment to neutrality involved an unflinching 
libertarianism that precluded any positive action by the government beyond the barest police 
functions. “To force an unwilling person to contribute to the support of the British Museum is as 
distinct a violation of Mr. Mill’s principle as religious persecution,” Stephen insisted, and he went on 
to give an illustration that was particularly germane in a decade when the national public education 
system was being formed: “The difference between…paying a single shilling of public money to a 
single school in which any opinion is taught of which any single taxpayer disapproves, and the 
maintenance of the Spanish Inquisition, is a question of degree”; the former, he held, “infring[ed] 
the principle of liberty as stated by Mr. Mill” no less fundamentally than the latter.455 Consequently, 
                                                 
453 Stephen, Liberty, 45. 
 
454 Ibid., 45. 
 
455 Ibid., 12, 37. The question of whether Mill did in fact endorse a neutralist form of liberalism is a difficult one; from 
his corpus quotes on both sides of the issue can be drawn. On the one hand, his concern that political institutions be 
made to instantiate the proper “spirit” seems coincident with Stephen’s verdict that all legislation had to rest on 
principles and was therefore sectarian; see e.g. Mill, Considerations, 478. On the other, Mill’s discomfort on precisely this 
subject of state direction of education in chapter five of On Liberty is one of several instances which support Stephen’s 
worry that liberty à la Mill pushed one toward desiring a diminished role for the state. 
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On Liberty, despite Mill’s own intentions, amounted to an “attack on all government whatever.”456 
The only alternative to such a reductive take on the state as the principle of neutrality yielded was to 
admit that “governments ought to take the responsibility of acting upon such principles, religious, 
political, and moral, as they may from time to time regard as most likely to be true.”457  
 The principle of neutrality was, for Stephen, a tragic blunder. How could such a disastrous 
dogma have emerged? It was, in Stephen’s eyes, another manifestation of the attitude which 
underlay the expansion of the theory of toleration to include the vision of an unconflictual, 
harmonious public sphere. This attitude was an aversion to accepting the fact that – no matter how 
much progress in “civilization” and “discussion” had been made – politics in an ideologically diverse 
society (such as Britain was and seemed destined to remain) could not satisfy everyone. The freest 
and most liberal nation would still contain winners and losers, and the losers would submit and 
adapt because they had to. There was no utopia in which “compulsion may be laid aside,” in which 
consensus would replace coercion.458 Force was not about to vanish from the world of politics, not 
even in the progressive nations of “Europe and America.”459 Stephen objected, on the grounds that 
the “reasonable man” had a moral duty to face “existing fact[s]” with “as little partiality as possible,” 
to such illusions as that force was exiting the world of politics.460 In modern, free, tolerant states no 
less than in primitive, despotic, overtly violent ones, decisions had to be made, which meant that the 
losing side was forced to submit: “parliamentary government is simply a mild and disguised form of 
compulsion. We agree to try strength by counting heads instead of breaking heads, but the principle 
                                                 
456 Stephen, “Laws of England,” 474. 
 
457 Stephen, Liberty, 37. 
 
458 Ibid., 20. 
 
459 Ibid., 20. 
 
460 Ibid., 154. To drive home his point about the persistence of force in modern politics, he satirized Mill’s dictum that 
the despotism of “an Akbar or a Charlemagne” was needed only in “backward states of society”: “President Lincoln 
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is exactly the same….The minority gives way not because it is convinced that it is wrong, but 
because it is convinced that it is a minority.”461 The triumph of toleration and the extension of liberty 
that had been consolidated over the course of the nineteenth century, salutary as they were, had not 
changed the facts that force was a bedrock element of politics and that “the principal object of 
political argument” was not to eliminate it but to “direct that power aright.”462 
 As was his custom, Stephen expressed the point in a polemical manner, but the substance 
itself was commonplace. The nineteenth century had seen a spate of theories and movements that 
promised a completely consensual and noncoercive society; and it had seen philosophies of history 
which predicted that force would disappear as the march of liberty and reason advanced. In 
response, less utopian liberals felt compelled to remind their fellows that the freer and more just 
societies they had come to inhabit still rested, as did all others, on force. It should be remembered 
that the soberest and most moderate of Victorian political tomes, Sidgwick’s Elements of Politics, 
closed with the following words: 
It is important to see clearly that a form of government which shall enable every one to 
“obey himself alone” is chimerical. The coercion, by physical force in the last resort, of well-
intentioned adults, is an evil which we cannot hope to eliminate by any constitutional 
reforms; though to diminish it without sacrificing other benefits is doubtless among the 
most legitimate and important aims which constitutional reformers can propose to 
themselves.463 
 
This admonition contained more of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity than of On Liberty. Disciple of Mill 
that he was, on this question Sidgwick stayed close to Stephen. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
461 Stephen, Liberty, 21. See also “Parliamentary Government [1],” Contemporary Review, vol. 23 (1 Dec. 1873): 1-19, 5. 
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 Stephen has been called “a great dissenter” from the orthodoxies of his day.464 This is true, 
but only if taken in the right spirit. On the issue of toleration and expressive freedom, his dissent 
was of a finely targeted kind. He criticized the most prominent exponent of a “popular,” “quasi-
religious” current of the political culture, but he did so on behalf of what he believed (with much 
justice) to be the mainstream philosophical standpoint of mid-Victorian England. He was, for the 
most part, at home in a political-theoretical world that was liberal, consequentialist, and historicist all 
at once. 
 Indeed, the critical side of Stephen that we have been exploring in this section did not 
detract from his standing as a theorist of toleration; with the exception of dyed-in-the-wool Millians 
such as Morley, it seems rather to have worked in tandem with the positive side examined in section 
one to enhance his standing. Though it is frequently taken for granted that On Liberty is an 
“archetypal exposition of the philosophy of Victorian liberalism,”465 many Victorian liberals 
cherished the religiously and intellectually free society that they inhabited without thinking that On 
Liberty had delivered the definitive statement on the nature of that society. Stephen spoke for these 
liberals, if perhaps with a more contrarian tone than they themselves would have adopted. 
Like his positive account of toleration, Stephen’s critique of Mill was multi-dimensional. 
Deepening his investigation into Lockean toleration, he charged Mill with founding his intellectual-
religious libertarianism on a philosophically implausible basis; and he further accused Mill of 
distorting the theory of free thought and a free press by connecting it to an array of problematic 
attitudes and policies. In conclusion, however, it is worth noting one criticism which we might have 
expected from Stephen but which, revealingly, he did not in fact make. As has been mentioned, 
Stephen was skeptical of democracy. Yet he kept his criticisms of democracy separate from his 
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critique of the Millian creed of free discussion. In this regard he was a more careful reader of Mill 
than scholars today, who frequently assert that Mill saw a tight conceptual connection between 
democracy and the expressive freedoms.466 Mill and Stephen expressed opposed views on the 
prospects of democracy in Britain, but they were equally reluctant to treat intellectual-expressive 
liberty as a democratic proposition. Although their lifetimes witnessed both a great expansion of the 
suffrage and the consolidation of press freedom, Mill and Stephen were alike in treating the 
freedoms of thought and discussion as values that were independent of the questions of the proper 
extension of voting rights and the shape of the British state. In this approach they were, despite their 
differences, both in accord with the mid-Victorian liberal milieu; in contrast to France,467 it was not 
until the Idealists of the 1890s that the attempt to derive rights of speech and thought from the ideal 
of democracy itself gained traction.468  
This common absence in their theories stands as a reminder of what has been a major 
theme: namely, that for all the ways in which Stephen and Mill were at odds, their “points of 
agreement” were indeed “important and numerous.”469 Recent scholarship has emphasized the 
bitterness of their dispute, but this is to tell only a part of the story. It was only because they shared 
so much common ground that their differences felt so acute. 
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PART TWO 
Representation 
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Chapter Three 
 
Diversity without Democracy, 
The Theory of the Variety of Suffrages, Part One: Institutions and Sociologies 
 
 In 1914, one Philip Arnold Gibbons of St. John’s College, Oxford won the prestigious 
Gladstone Essay Prize for a composition in which he surveyed the history of British thought about 
parliamentary representation.470 Ironically, Ideas of Political Representation in Parliament, 1660-1832, 
despite earning an award named for one of the statesman most closely associated with the rise of 
British democracy, opened with a sympathetic description of the “unreformed parliament,” that is, 
the far-from-democratic system which prevailed until the First Reform Act of 1832 and in which the 
suffrage was both highly restricted on the whole and highly varied by the different customs and 
regulations that obtained in different constituencies. 
 More interesting, though, than the seeming incongruity between Gibbons’s appreciative 
depiction of the unreformed parliament and the democratic credentials of the prize was the 
particular form which his appreciation took. For Gibbons avoided the notes commonly played in 
apologies for aristocratic government – the nobility, independence, and wisdom of the rulers; the 
farsightedness of aristocracies in comparison to the fickle and unstable desires of the mob; the 
concentration upon high objects as opposed to base and material goods. What he valued about the 
unreformed system was, instead, its representativeness: “Speaking generally, it may be said that the 
unrepresentative character of the House has been considerably overrated, and that on the whole it 
represented fairly well such public opinion as there was in England”; theories of representation from 
the time had been correct in “generally recogniz[ing] the representative character of the House of 
                                                 
470 According to the Oxford Student Handbook from the previous year, the prize was given for an essay “on some 
subject connected with either Ecclesiastical History after 461 A.D., or the Political and Constitutional History of the 
British Isles, or Political Theory,” and it came with an award of £20 worth of books; Student’s Handbook to the university and 
colleges of Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 216. 
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Commons.”471 The eighteenth-century parliamentary system “was a good one as systems go, for it 
allowed free play for effective political forces…the political machinery provided a sufficient channel 
for the really efficient forces of political thought.”472 His forebears who had boasted of living, in 
contradistinction to their unfortunate European neighbors, under a “representative government” 
had not been mere dupes or fools. 
 Gibbons’s remark about the representative character of the unreformed parliament had a 
further strange feature. This was its suggestion that he was offering an assessment which would have 
struck his contemporaries as unfamiliar or incredible. But this was hardly the case; like many a 
scholar since, Gibbons was inflating the novelty of his thoughts. His judgment that parliament had 
not needed to await the advent of a democratic franchise to become representative was a 
commonplace one. For example, on this topic he not merely echoed the spirit of, but likely 
plagiarized, one of the eminent historical tracts of the period. The very first chapter of Leslie 
Stephen’s epic English Utilitarians had made the point in almost identical words.473 Although the old 
arrangements wound up, by the second quarter of the nineteenth century, in desperate need of 
transformation, it would be wrong, Stephen had alleged, to assume that until recently parliament had 
simply failed in its mission to represent the nation. 
 How could such authors as Gibbons and Leslie Stephen, writing in a (mostly) democratic 
Britain, look back on their country’s undemocratic past with sympathy for its representativeness? 
However implausible or counterintuitive this appraisal may sounds to us today, these authors could 
appeal to a robust tradition of thought about representation, one with centuries-old roots that would 
reach its apogee in an explosion of institutional designs and constitutional theories during the middle 
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decades of the nineteenth century. Appropriately for this dissertation, this approach to 
representation derived much of its power from the perception of and concern for diversity. 
 This vision of representation is what I will call, depending on the particular aspect being 
emphasized at a given moment, the mirror theory or the theory of the variety of suffrages. The former 
appellation corresponds to the desired end or outcome for the composition of the legislature – 
namely, that it should constitute an accurate image of the society for which it made laws. The latter, 
however, pertains to the level of means or technique – namely, that variation in electoral regulations 
across constituencies was the proper method for bringing the assembly into descriptive conformity 
with society. (The two labels also correspond to a difference between genus and species; as the 
succeeding chapters show, one could hold that resemblance to the nation at-large was a central 
virtue of the legislative body without believing that electoral differentiation was the best mechanism 
for achieving it. For the purposes of this chapter, though, the two sets of terms can largely be used 
interchangeably.) 
It is the goal of this and the following chapter to reconstruct and analyze this approach to 
representation, with special attention to themes related to ideological diversity. The next section 
sketches the origins and development of the mirroring school up through the First Reform Act. The 
longer succeeding section of this chapter and chapter four combine to address the aforementioned 
climax of this theory in the decades leading up to the Second Reform Act: the former canvasses and 
classifies various institutional schemes, most of them forgotten today, to which this theory gave rise 
during these years, and also interrogates the sociological premises on which these schemes were 
founded; the latter examines the set of values which motivated the creation of these schemes, as well 
as criticisms of and tensions between these values. 
 
1) Mirroring and Electoral Diversity before the First Reform Act 
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 As Quentin Skinner and Eric Nelson have recently shown, mirror theories of representation 
have been a critical element in British political discourse from the time of the English Civil War.474 
As conflict arose between king and parliament in the early 1640s, supporters of the parliamentary 
side argued that only an assembly could represent the country because only a numerous body, and not 
the single person of the monarch, could attain a likeness of or resemblance to the “whole body of 
the State” in “all parts.”475 Because parliament but not the monarchy had the capacity to re-present 
or capture the people in miniature, government by the former was representative while government 
by the latter was not, and therefore government by the former but not by the latter could be 
expected to respect and further the interests of the whole people. The resonance of these claims 
about the importance of the descriptive nature of the assembly’s representation continued in 
eighteenth-century clashes over the rights of parliament versus the prerogatives of the monarchy, 
especially during the crisis that precipitated the American Revolution. 
 These early, anti-monarchical formulations of the mirror theory of representation were not 
particularly concerned with the operation of the actual electoral system, though over the course of 
the eighteenth century an “Old Whig” view, articulated among others by Burke, of the connection 
between the descriptive satisfactoriness of the Commons (its status as an “express image of the 
feelings of the nation”476) and the traditional, inherited arrangements for the regulation of the 
suffrage began to appear.477 These arrangements were in essence a motley and uncoordinated 
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assortment of local customs which had, in Burkean language, grown rather than been made.478 This 
earlier variant of the theory, then, consisted of a kind of organicist and ex post facto justification: it 
was directed toward showing that the country already possessed a set of electoral institutions that 
translated the nation in all its diversity into the Commons. As the influential theologian and early 
utilitarian philosopher William Paley lovingly portrayed the electoral-representative system in 1785: 
“By annexing the right of voting for members of the House of Commons to different qualifications 
in different places, each order and profession of men in the community become virtually 
represented”; in this way “the irregularity in the popular representation,” however much it may have 
offended against the instinct for symmetry and order, guaranteed that “the condition, wants, and 
occasions of the people…[in] every quarter” were reflected in the legislature.479 Consequently, if one 
could see past the seeming “confusion in which it confessedly lies,” one would recognize “the 
variety of tenures and qualifications, upon which the right of voting is founded” to be a political 
blessing, for this variety “tends to introduce into parliament a corresponding mixture of characters 
and professions.”480 
 Despite this long history, however, it was not until 1818 that the archetypal theoretical 
coupling of the end of a composition of the Commons that mirrored society in its diversity with the 
means of electoral variety arrived in the form of an essay by the Whig philosopher, historian, and MP 
James Mackintosh.481 Mackintosh’s statement of the view was the one that would carry the most 
weight among the mid-Victorian cadre of authors who occupy the bulk of this chapter. What gave 
this article a special salience was not only the precision and clarity of Mackintosh’s statement, but 
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481 James Mackintosh, “Universal Suffrage,” Edinburgh Review, vol. 31, no. 61 (Dec. 1818), 165-203. 
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also a crucial change in the context in which it was delivered relative to its earlier expressions. Where 
the antagonist of the mirror theory on its first appearance and in many of its eighteenth-century 
manifestations was monarchy, Mackintosh’s adversary was democracy. He was fighting not royal 
power, but the philosophic-radical program of universal suffrage championed by Bentham.482 
 Mackintosh’s rejoinder to Bentham, analogously to Macaulay’s more famous “Whig” rebuttal 
to James Mill the following decade, began with a methodological dissent.483 Rather than homing in as 
Bentham had done on the matter of accountability and control, of restraining the sinister interest of 
MPs and aligning their interests with those of their constituents, Mackintosh argued that the primary 
question for the science of representative assemblies was sociological in nature: “To understand the 
principles of its [the ‘representative assembly’s’] composition thoroughly, we must divide the people 
into classes, and examine the variety of local and professional interests of which the whole is 
composed…whether that interest arises from inhabiting the same district, or pursuing the same 
occupation.”484 From this preliminary sociological inquiry one unavoidably made the discovery that 
society was a diverse entity – “in a great state, even that part of the public interest which is common 
to all classes, is composed of a great variety of branches” – and from this perception of diversity 
Mackintosh immediately deduced that “the proper composition of the House of Commons,” as well 
as “the justice of the government,” entailed that “each of these classes must be represented” 
directly.485 The great Whig’s conclusion, in short, was that the chief object of that branch of political 
science which concerned representative institutions was one to which the philosophic radicals paid 
scant attention: the adjustment of the composition of the House to match social reality. 
 Fortunately, in this case theory already coincided with practice. The electoral variation that 
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England possessed was superior to what any philosopher-statesman, who would have felt compelled 
to “act upon some uniform principle,” could have instituted.486 Mackintosh’s lesson was to 
appreciate the arrangements with which history had blessed the country: “we ought not to exchange 
our diversified elections for any general qualification.”487 “A variety of rights of suffrage,” he 
concluded trenchantly, “is the principle of the English representation.”488 
The variety of suffrages was vital to the prospect of representative government because “the 
labouring classes” and “lowest classes” so outnumbered the rest of society that a democratic 
franchise risked allowing the whole of the assembly to be returned by this “perpetual majority.”489 
The sociologically satisfactory “representation of classes” would give way to the unrepresentative rule 
of “numbers.”490 Mackintosh illustrated his fear of working-class monopoly of the legislature with a 
(well-chosen, given English anti-papist sentiment) thought-experiment: he asked what would happen 
to the “Protestant minority” if “we suppose Ireland to be an independent state.”491 By virtue of the 
great disparity in numbers between the two religions, the Catholics who comprised “four-fifths of 
the population” could bar the Protestants from entry into the “House of Commons” and thereby 
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“exclud[e] them from all political privilege.”492 If the reader found the prospect of such Catholic 
domination in Ireland to be a deviation from “just or equal government,” then he was bound to 
reject electoral democracy in England as well, for even if the groups of “oppressors and oppressed” 
would differ in the latter instance (namely, not on religious but on socioeconomic lines), the 
fundamental dynamics of exclusivity and unrepresentativeness would be the same.493 
 Importantly, Mackintosh was clear that his argument, although prompted by Bentham’s 
espousal of democracy and combating most intently the democratic alternative,494 also had as its 
target the political orientation at the opposite extreme. In truth, the chief wrong in the Benthamite 
creed of “uniform universal suffrage” pertained not to the second adjective but to the first; uniform 
restricted suffrage was likewise an evil.495 The problem with uniform restricted suffrage was that, since 
it “must incline towards independent property, as being the only ground on which it can rest,” it 
would deny the lower orders access to seats in the assembly; “true popular election” would no 
longer take place in any constituencies.496 Instead of a representative legislature, this arrangement 
would yield “a mere aristocracy” – which, he remarked, might very well suit the “situation and 
temper of the French nation” or please “Tory writers,” but which was unsuitable for British soil.497 
Thus, while the occasion for Mackintosh to theorize about representation was to refute the radicals, 
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the upshot of his theory was much broader. This was that, regardless of where one drew the line, the 
uniform suffrage was en soi a crucial mark against a government’s representativeness. Whatever other 
virtues it might have, a regime with electoral uniformity would have an objectionably classist and 
exclusive character.498 
 By the first third of the nineteenth century, then, the mirror theory of representation had 
traversed a large distance since its inception in 1640s antiroyalism. In the hands of the preeminent 
Whig intellectual post-Burke,499 the political salience of the principle that the legislature faithfully 
transcribe or re-present society in all its parts was not to favor parliamentary over personal rule, 
elected legislative over hereditary monarchical power. To Mackintosh the mirror theory was not an 
instrument for diminishing kings and exalt assemblies, but rather a reason for favoring one set of 
electoral rules over another; in his hands the mirror theory was a way of proving that 
representativeness could only be ascribed to a variegated as opposed to a uniform regulation of the 
suffrage.500 
 Before leaving Mackintosh, two further aspects of his theory of representation should be 
mentioned. First, it is worth noting explicitly a feature that the reader may have gleaned from the 
discussion of religious divisions above: namely, that Mackintosh was operating with a wide notion of 
“class.” This feature is important because it will persist in subsequent writers of the variety-of-
suffrages school. Class in Mackintosh’s texts often designated any stable community of interest, of 
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which economic groups were not the only ones.501 Second, in taking the accurate reflection of varied 
interests to be the foundation of parliamentary representation Mackintosh gave this principle priority 
over territoriality as the basis for constructing constituencies. While Mackintosh does not seem to have 
recognized this privileging of mirroring over territoriality as an important theoretical moment,502 this 
move would prove extremely fruitful in the hands of his mid-century descendants and open whole 
new possibilities for institutional design – including, most spectacularly, in the original plans for 
proportional representation, covered in chapter 6(c). For Mackintosh, as for the more creative 
reformers of subsections 2(b) and (c), what was ancient and principled about the British electoral 
system was not the territorial construction of constituencies, but the variety-of-suffrages as a 
mechanism for achieving the goal of the accurate representation of interests. 
 When the Whigs at last emerged from the political wilderness and formed a government in 
1830, however, they promptly ran afoul of Mackintoshian principles. Although it greatly augmented 
the number of voters, the reform bill which they proposed and finally passed in 1832 diminished 
Mackintosh’s cherished electoral diversity by standardizing the suffrage – and as a result cut the 
working-classes off from parliament in those boroughs which saw their low or nonexistent property 
requirements raised as a result of this standardization.503 In reaction, the Tories adopted the variety-
of-suffrages position as their own and turned it against the Whigs.504 The Tory MP for Oxford Sir 
                                                 
501 This expansive meaning of class is clear, for example, in the plea he made for Catholic emancipation: “The English 
Catholics are a large and respectable body of men, who do not possess the elective franchise. The class is unrepresented, 
and possesses no political security for its common interest…” Note also how the “principle” of representation is phrased: 
“that every great community, with distinct interests, ought to have separate representatives”; Mackintosh, “Parliamentary 
Reform,” 494, 475. 
 
502 The subject was merely broached en passant as he attempted to justify a plan for allotting additional seats to the 
interest of “science”: “If some representatives were in time to be allowed to learned societies, it would not be a greater 
novelty than the grant of the privilege to the two universities by James I”; ibid., 490. 
 
503 The Reform Act set the property requirement in all boroughs at the occupation of a house valued at £10 annual rent 
and in counties to tenants-at-will who paid £50 annual rent. 
 
504 On the trans-partisan character of the class- and interest-based schemes of representation at this time, see Joseph 
Hamburger, “James Mill on Universal Suffrage and the Middle Class,” Journal of Politics, vol. 24, no. 1 (1962), 174; Lively 
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Robert Inglis opposed the Whig bill in order to defend “the House of Commons [as it] is now,” 
which was “the most complete representation of the interests of the people, which was ever 
assembled in any age or country.”505 He continued, in a manner that would have fit perfectly into 
Mackintosh’s tracts, “it is the very absence of symmetry in our elective franchises which admits of 
the introduction of classes so various,” because these localized discrepancies allowed there to be 
“something to please every body, and to catch every body.”506 Similarly, the great Tory statesman 
and future Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, in a posture which presages the “Tory democracy” that 
would guide the Second Reform Act, set himself against reform on the grounds that it would “limit 
the franchise to particular districts and particular classes…sever[ing] all connexion between the 
lower classes of the community and the direct representation in this House.”507 In contrast to the 
present system which enjoyed “the immense advantage” that there was “no class of people, however 
humble, which is not entitled to a voice in the election of representatives,” after reform the lower 
ranks of society would lack any “champion within your walls.”508  
Probably the most vociferous of the Tory adopters of the variety-of-suffrages outlook was 
Archibald Alison, whose peculiar attempt to ensure the ascendancy of true conservative principles in 
the press during an age in which censorship and persecution were no longer admissible was analyzed 
in chapter one. In an 1831 essay Alison emphasized the treachery of “Sir James Mackintosh,” who 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Rees, “Introduction” to Utilitarian Logic and Politics, 37, 50. 
 
505 Inglis, Parliamentary Reform. Substance of the Speech Delivered in the House of Commons, on Saturday, the 17th December, 1831 
(London: J. Hatchard & Son, 1832), 29-30. 
 
506 Ibid., 30. 
 
507 He continued, “Why confine the privilege of voting to those who rent a House rated at £10-a-year?”; Peel, Speech of 
3 March 1831, reprinted in The Emergence of British Parliamentary Democracy in the Nineteenth Century, ed. J. B. Conacher (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), 30. 
 In 1867 Disraeli would explicitly reach back to such speeches as Peel’s to show that the Tories had historically 
been the party of the workingman; Saunders, Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848-1867 (Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2011).  273-4. 
 
508 Ibid., 30-1. 
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inexplicably supported “the present Bill” despite his previous convincing proof that uniformization 
of the suffrage was inconsistent with the goal of giving to all segments of society “a direct and 
immediate access to the legislature, without being indebted for it to the tolerance or indulgence of 
the other classes.”509 While he had a constricted notion of the proper place of the lower classes in 
politics,510 and was more concerned with what he perceived as the harm the bill would do to the 
representation of the “commercial, colonial, or shipping interests” than with any harm to the lower 
classes, even Alison’s version of the official Tory stance was consistent enough to admit that “the 
Radicals, like every other interest in the state, should be fairly represented in Parliament.”511 For the 
likes of Peel, Inglis, and Alison, as much as for the “Old Whig” of a preceding generation, the extent 
to which the Commons constituted an “express image” of the nation was a crucial metric upon 
which the electoral system was to be evaluated; a basic question to be resolved before the future of 
the suffrage could be decided was whether in fact the composition of the Commons coincided with 
the diverse society over which it stood. 
 
2) Institutions and Sociologies 
Despite the attention that it received during the decades spanning the end of the eighteenth 
                                                 
509 Alison, “The Reform Bill,” in Essays Political, Historical, and Miscellaneous, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons, 
1850), vol. 1, 35, 16. The article was originally published in Blackwood’s Magazine in 1831. See also the anonymous anti-
reform Observations on the British Constitution: “with reference to the representation of all the separate orders of the 
community, the constitution of the House of Commons is peculiarly felicitous. By virtue of the different rules of 
franchise that prevail in different electoral corporations, – some of which admit of an almost universal suffrage, while 
others are strictly oligarchical,—there is no class of persons in England who do not find an echo within the walls of 
Parliament. From the potwalloper of Preston, to the titled proprietor of Aldborough or Gatton, through all the 
intermediate ranks, this proposition holds equally true…One advantage is thus gained, which no uniform law of 
franchise could possibly secure; for at whatever point, short of universal suffrage, we fix the standard of qualification, 
some of the lower classes must be overlooked; while, on the other hand, if the standard be very far reduced, the 
franchise of the higher orders will be virtually compromised. Happily, the variety of the electoral qualifications prevalent 
in England allows us to steer a middle course, – it saves us from the dictation of demagogues, and the dangerous course 
of innovation which they are uniformly found to pursue ; it saves us also from an exclusively aristocratical Parliament, 
destitute of sympathy with popular feeling”; Observations (Edinburgh: Andrew Shortreed, 1831), 39. 
 
510 Alison, “The Athenian Democracy, in Essays, vol. 2, 303. 
 
511 Alison, “The Reform Bill,” 24-5. For a correspondingly global list of the relevant interests, see Observations on the 
British Constitution, 40-1, 112. 
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and first third of the nineteenth century, it was not until after Lord John Russell’s reopening of the 
question of parliamentary reform in 1848 that the theory of the variegated suffrage reached its 
zenith.512 In the 1850s-60s the extension of these originally Whig preoccupations regarding a system 
of franchises adequate to the representation of the polyphonic entity that was British society went 
even further than in the pre-Reform period; they became truly common property across the partisan 
spectrum.513 In this period of ascendance for the theory, an astonishing array of institutional 
schemes were promulgated which promised to bring the Commons into alignment with the 
condition of society and public opinion outside its walls. 
This section and the following chapter depict this theory – and the projects of institutional 
design to which it gave rise – in its heyday. The account is not exhaustive; a rendering of the full 
panoply of pamphlets, essays, and books that treated reform in this vein would fill a monograph on 
its own. My aim is more modest: to present a representative sampling of (in this section) the major 
institutional currents into which the theory flowed and (in the following chapter) the values which 
these authors wished their schemes to realize. 
Attempts to perfect the “representation of the country” by apportioning the suffrage such 
that, as one Whiggish-liberal stated it, “every class, every interest, every opinion was represented in 
                                                 
512 This effervescence in variety-of-suffrages schemes is in keeping with the character of these decades as (in Robert 
Saunders’s words) a time of “unique constitutional experiment”; see Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, Saunders’s 
excellent book is the only modern monograph to have examined the endeavor to render parliament “more popular 
without democratizing” it, and it has been an invaluable resource for me. In addition to Saunders, see two older articles 
from Francis Herrick: “The Reform Bill of 1867 and the British Party System,” Pacific Historical Review, vol. 3 (1934): 216-
33 and “The Second Reform Movement in Britain, 1850-1865,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 9 (1948): 174-92. 
 
513 This transmission across party lines was facilitated by the weakness of party discipline in the period. On the porous 
and shifting ideological and party scene in the Commons in this period, see e.g. Angus Hawkins, “‘Parliamentary 
Government’ and Victorian Political Parties, c. 1830-1880,” The English Historical Review, vol. 104, no. 412 (1989), 669; 
Robert Blake, Disraeli (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), 270-1; Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, 240. As 
Norman St. John-Stevas has colorfully described it, the decades between the Reform Acts experienced “a multiplicity of 
parties, and English politics resembled the politics of the French Assembly more closely then than they have done 
before or since”; see St. John-Stevas, “The Political Genius of Walter Bagehot,” introduction to CW, vol. 5, 75. 
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exact proportion to its weight and worth” followed a few different paths.514 For our purposes, it is 
helpful to divide the variety of positions on the proper form for mirroring or descriptive institutions 
into four categories, even if the exact boundaries between some of these categories cannot be fixed 
definitively. 
The first of these modes of envisioning a properly variegated suffrage and descriptively 
accurate Commons can be dealt with most quickly, for it required no new exercises in institutional 
design. This was the camp of supporters of the First Reform Act who defended the Act on the 
grounds that, although reform had reduced the amount of formal variety in the regulation of the 
suffrage, it had accomplished the substantive end of the variety-of-suffragists by increasing the degree 
to which the composition of the Commons conformed to the condition of society and public 
opinion outside it. Among other lines of defense,515 espousal of the alignment of the House with the 
nation beyond it was a popular one among the Whig politicians who made the Act; as the future 
prime minister and leading architect of the Reform Act Lord John Russell stated, 1832 had 
transformed the Commons into a “mirror of the sentiments of the people.”516 
Such defenders of the descriptive character of reformed politics tended to rely on two 
arguments to buttress their claims. The first was that the reduction of electoral diversity was dictated 
by a kind of social flattening. On this view, the middle class which benefited above all from the new 
electoral regulations was, empirically, so far the predominant force in English life that it warranted a 
                                                 
514 Bernard Cracroft, “The Reform Session of 1866,” in Essays, Political and Miscellaneous, 2 vols (London: Trübner and 
Co., 1868), vol. 1, 48. 
 
515 Other prominent apologies for Reform included that it had brought into power the most intelligent leadership 
possible, that it had reduced corruption, and that it had produced governments which had ended abuses and pursued 
correct policies. 
 
516 Russell, Letter to the Electors of Stroud: On the Principles of the Reform Act, third edition (London: Ridgway, 1839), 9. GC 
Lewis expressed this thought in typical fashion. “Our representative system has not been a sham,” he wrote. It 
succeeded in “represent[ing] the feelings and opinions of the people”; “that the existing House of Commons has 
reflected with fidelity the predominant opinions of the great body of the community, and particularly of the educated 
and intelligent classes, we hold to be a matter of fact, established by the evidence of general notoriety”; Lewis, “History 
and Prospects,” 279. 
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great shift of political power in its favor at the expense of those classes above and below them; to 
reorient parliamentary life around the middle class was not to impose a normative conception of the 
relative importance of classes, but merely to take account of the fact that English prosperity and 
public opinion had less robustly pluralistic roots than at an earlier time.517 The second claim was that 
a sufficient amount of electoral diversity persisted even after the standardization of the suffrage in 
the form of variety in the size and location of electoral districts.518 In these Whigs’ judgment, the 
difference between a metropolitan borough with thousands of urban voters caught up in the full 
swing of the industrial economy and a small borough with a few hundred electors engaged in a more 
local and traditional economic-social life was vast enough to secure a salutary diversity in the 
membership of the Commons.519 Hence, depending on the demands of a given debate, it was 
available to the stalwarts of 1832 either to embrace diminished electoral variety as the appropriate 
response to the predominant standing of the middle class, or to deny that any loss in the translation 
of the relevant aspects of social diversity into the representative structure had been suffered at all. 
A more telling instance of approval of the descriptive integrity of the reformed Commons 
                                                 
517 In this conception of the status of the middle class’s preeminence amongst economic groups we can see (a stylized 
but still important) contrast between English Whigs like Macaulay and French doctrinaires like Guizot: the former were 
more empirical and the latter more normative in their defenses of middle-class hegemony.  
While he does not put the contrast in terms of empirical versus normative conceptions, Vincent Starzinger’s 
analysis of the differences between Whig and doctrinaire views of middle-class precedence has a similar shape to my 
thought here; see Starzinger, The Politics of the Center, ch. 3. 
 
518 Even after he embraced a further measure of reform in the 1860s, Russell would still maintain that the Reformed 
Commons had great merit as a diversity-enabling device: “the character of our present House of Commons…is a 
character of extreme diversity in representation. Elections by great bodies, agricultural, commercial, or manufacturing, in 
our counties and great cities, are balanced by the right of election in boroughs of small or moderate population, which 
are thus admitted to fill up the defects and complete the fulness of our representation”; Russell, History of the English 
Constitution, 237. 
 
519 Take for example the verdict of GC Lewis that the mirroring of social pluralism was being sufficiently accomplished 
by the non-uniform system of territorial representation: “the principle of the representation of classes…is, to a 
considerable extent, involved in the principle of locality. Different classes and different interests predominate in different 
places; and by multiplying electoral districts, and varying their size and character, we give a representation to different 
portions of the community – to the weak as well as to the strong”; Lewis, “History and Prospects,” 289. See also his 
“Marshall on the Representation of Minorities,” Edinburgh Review, vol. 100, no. 203 (July 1854), 228-32; and John Charles 
Spencer, Lord Althorp, Hansard, Third Series, HC Deb 9 Aug 1831, vol. 5, 1060. The question of the adequacy of 
territorial districts to capture social diversity returns in chapter six. 
 In keeping with this view of the contributions to parliamentary pluralism of a variety of constituency types, 
mirror theorists tended to be highly skeptical of the proposal for equal electoral districts. 
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comes from the political commentary of William Rathbone Greg. His confidence in this dimension 
of the political system is more interesting from a theoretical and intellectual-historical point-of-view 
than that of someone like Russell, for Greg was both unmotivated by partisan maneuvering and a 
radical, innovative thinker in his own right – his appreciation of the status quo was dictated neither 
by the needs of party nor by intellectual timidity or conventionalism.520 
Greg wrote voluminously but unsystematically on parliamentary reform; it would be an act 
of interpretive overreach to attribute to him anything like a theory of representation, since his writing 
on the subject really had only one fixed point – the rejection of democracy as unrepresentative and 
class-based, a verdict which we will scrutinize more closely in chapter 5(a).521 Indeed, his opinion 
even on the point in question was not steady: he did not consistently enunciate satisfaction with the 
representativeness of the reformed Commons. At times he spoke of the need for further 
improvement to render the assembly “as fair and complete an organ as practicable of the various 
interests and elements which compose the nation” and to achieve a more “fair and beneficent 
proportion” for “all classes.”522 Yet while the “inadequate admission…of the labouring classes” was 
a “blot” on the “actual Parliamentary suffrage,” Greg’s considered view seems to have been that it 
was not an especially serious one with respect to the descriptive properties of the Commons.523 It was 
                                                 
520 Greg was an extremely interesting figure: his life was subject to great swings in his personal financial fortunes; he was 
one of the most controversial Victorian writers on religion due to his skeptical theology and his importation of German 
methods of Higher Biblical criticism; he went through an epoch of intense enthusiasm for “animal magnetism”; and he 
was famous in his lifetime for maintaining the closest correspondence of all Englishmen with Tocqueville. See e.g., John 
Morley, “W.R. Greg: A Sketch,” in Critical Miscellanies, 3 vols. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1886), vol. 3, 213-60; Brown, 
The Metaphysical Society, 130-1; Ruth Edwards, The Pursuit of Reason: The Economist, 1843-1993 (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1993), ch. 13. For an analysis of Greg on representation similar in some ways to mine, see Saunders, Democracy 
and the Vote, 91-4. 
 
521 The opposite of “fair representation – a faithful reflex of all these varieties” was democracy, “the system of election 
by numbers” which would “virtually throw the whole representation into the hands of one class only”; Greg, “The 
Expected Reform Bill,” Edinburgh Review vol. 95, no. 193 (Jan. 1852), 250. 
 
522 Greg, “Representative Reform,” Edinburgh Review, vol. 96, no. 196 (Oct. 1852), 471; “Representative Reform,” 
Edinburgh Review, vol. 106, no. 215 (July 1857), 269. These two articles with the same title will henceforth be distinguished 
by “Representative Reform [1]” and “Representative Reform [2].” 
 
523 Greg, “Parliamentary Purification,” Edinburgh Review, vol. 98, no. 200 (Oct. 1853), 567. 
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“beyond dispute” that “the actual electoral law…does enable the country to express its opinion 
clearly and forcibly”; the Reform Act had brought “fully and fairly…to bear upon Parliament the 
feelings and opinions – the prejudices and passions – the well- or ill-understood interests of the 
country.”524 “Theoretically imperfect as our actual franchise is,” he summed up, “Parliament yet 
does, in fact, respond, with very great sympathy and promptitude, to the ascertained wishes of the 
country.”525 Despite its warts, no reasonable analyst could deny that British politics benefitted from a 
legislature that was a “bona fide representative,” a “faithful representative” of society properly 
understood.526 
The reformed Commons received such high marks for representativeness from Greg for 
two reasons. First was that the degree of working-class voicelessness under the current arrangements 
was exaggerated; the pecuniary qualifications were low enough, Greg estimated, that “many of the 
more deserving of the lower classes…are on the register.”527 Second, and more important, was the 
rationale of societal flattening that we noted above. The ascendancy of the middle class was the 
paramount social phenomenon of the nineteenth century; the “voice of the country” was now 
indisputably that of “the middle classes.”528 To this great sociological shift the fitting response was a 
sort of parliamentary compression, and this compression was the guiding principle of the great law 
of 1832; it managed, as no other institutional means could have done, to “curtail the representative 
power of both the higher and the lower orders in favor of the middle ranks.”529 Hence in reducing 
the influence both of the landed aristocracy and of the lower classes – in taking power “out of the 
                                                 
524 Greg, “Representative Reform [2],” 259; “Expected Reform Bill,” 214. 
 
525 Greg, “Expected Reform Bill,” 237. For additional similarly positive judgments, see e.g. “Representative Reform [2], 
270-1; “Parliamentary Purification,” 567. 
 
526 Greg, “Expected Reform Bill, 214, 240. 
 
527 Ibid., 240. He qualified this pronouncement with: “though confessedly fewer than is desirable.” 
 
528 Ibid., 240. 
 
529 Greg, “Representative Reform [1], 456-7. 
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hands of these parties and plac[ing] it in that of the middle classes” – the Reform Act had improved 
parliament qua image of society, for this latter class was by a large margin the leading generator of 
the ideas and prosperity of England.530 
 Supporters of the status quo were, however, far from possessing a monopoly on the mirror 
theory. Quite the contrary: the unprecedented energy devoted to arguing for a variety of suffrages as 
the institutional bedrock of a representative system proceeded from dissatisfaction with the 
                                                 
530 Ibid., 456. 
It did not follow from Greg’s sense of the descriptive satisfactoriness of the mid-century Commons that he was 
completely content with the current system. In particular he spoke of three potential alterations: (a) a set of twenty-six 
“NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES” to be elected by a nationwide vote, instead of from a local territorial 
constituency; (b) the enactment of a 50£ savings qualification for the franchise to broaden the current censitary 
requirements, which were based solely on the value of real estate; and (c) a form of minority representation known as the 
cumulative vote. The first and last of these topics will return in chapter six. For present purposes, however, it suffices to 
remark that none of these proffered amendments implied a condemnation of the descriptive dimension of the Reformed 
parliamentary system; on the contrary, he took the adequacy of this aspect of the Commons so much for granted that he 
was willing to put forward proposals that ran counter to it in order to promote other political goods. The innovation of 
national representatives was, in Greg’s mind, not a remedy for any deficiency of representativeness but first and 
foremost a technique for raising the intellectual caliber in the House. He believed that the prospect of voting in a 
national constituency rather than in a local one would appeal to educated voters, while the less educated would remain 
on the rolls in their local district; moreover, the opportunity of standing for the whole nation would attract to a 
candidature the nation’s brightest luminaries, those who would otherwise bristle at having to kowtow to the narrow 
demands and private interests that dominated in any given locality. As a result, more of the “ablest” and most “high-
minded” men would seek to enter the Commons. Likewise, the addition of a path to enfranchisement through savings in 
addition to real property – which seems, given that it would increase the working-class vote, to be a descriptively-based 
proposition – was motivated not by the ambition to enhance reflectiveness of the full range of public opinion but by a 
quite other principle, namely, a non-descriptive criterion of political capacity. Whereas, as will become clear as this 
chapter progresses, a thoroughgoing variety-of-suffrages descriptivist dismissed any claims about an individual’s 
entitlement to the suffrage, the unsystematic Greg tasked the electoral system with both producing a societal mirror and 
incorporating all of his “fellow countrymen [who] are qualified to exercise” the suffrage, and he thought that possession 
of property, suitably expanded by his modification to take account of savings, provided a tolerable gauge of capacity. 
Finally, even his endorsement of the cumulative vote, which was meant to give minorities within a local constituency the 
chance to secure representation, did not carry with it a denigration of the Reformed Commons qua mirror of society. 
This was because Greg saw the cumulative vote predominantly in prospective terms: rather than a corrective to current 
ills, it was a way of mitigating the damage to representativeness that the potential democratic uniformization of the 
franchise would do; in practice the present state of affairs already provided the advantages of the cumulative vote 
through the “variety of our constituencies.” 
Greg’s desire for further electoral innovation derived, then, not from dissatisfaction with the Commons’s 
performance on the metric of descriptiveness, but from its shortcomings with regard to other principles and ends for 
which he held the representative system responsible. To perceive the status quo as descriptively satisfactory did not 
necessarily mean accepting it unconditionally. The very fact that Greg had no interest in systematizing his extensive 
commentary on the Commons thus, paradoxically, makes him one of the richest writers of the period from a theoretical 
point-of-view. For he is a reminder of the truth that, wherever representative government has existed, the electoral 
system has been the object of many different practical desiderata and normative criteria that can cohere, or fail to 
cohere, in an abundance of ways.  
On the national representatives, see “Representative Reform [1],” 498-500; on the savings deposit qualification, 
see “Representative Reform [1],” 479-80, “Expected Reform Bill,” 265-6; on the cumulative vote, see “Parliamentary 
Purification,” 622-3, Rocks Ahead, or, The Warnings of Cassandra (London: Trübner and Co., 1874), 7-8; “The 
Achievements and the Moral of 1867,” The North British Review, vol. 47, no. 93 (Sept. 1867), 222.  
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exclusivity of the mid-century Commons. This dissatisfaction stemmed from two sources. The first 
was the impression that, however well suited the Reform Act may have been to the state of Britain 
in the early 1830s, it had become outdated due to social and intellectual developments that had 
transpired since its passage. This was a potent charge against defenders of the status quo, since the 
Whigs who had been the architects of 1832 had been fervent progressivists.531 As Henry Warwick 
Cole (whom we will examine more closely in subsection 2(b)) wrote: “the time is ripe for new 
arrangements which shall bring our political institutions in closer conformity to the altered state of 
society.”532 John Eardley Eardley-Wilmot (who will return in subsection 2(a)) took the sentiment 
even further; for him, the simple truth that the Reform Act had been passed a third of a century 
earlier sufficed to provoke doubt about its current fitness, for “the Representative System cannot be 
expected to remain as it stood in 1832.”533 A progressive nation like Britain continually needed to 
revise its electoral arrangements in order to maintain the appropriate correspondence between 
parliament and the society over which it ruled; having neglected this task after 1832, parliament had 
fallen out of step with Britain. 
 The second source of discontent regarding the unrepresentativeness of the reformed 
parliament did not depend on any reading of recent British history or any progressive historical 
metaphysics. Instead, it directly attacked the provisions of the Reform Act itself; in particular, it 
fastened onto what is, at least in the eyes of modern liberal-democrats, the Act’s most paradoxical 
                                                 
531 “The Whigs did not have a static view of society; they were not bent on keeping things as they were….This generous 
view of man underlay the Whig spirit of reform”; Ellis A. Wasson, “The Spirit of Reform, 1832 and 1867,” Albion, vol. 
12 (1980): 164-74, 172. The progressive character of Whiggism was visible in their thinking about toleration, as covered 
in chapter one. 
 
532 Cole, The Middle Classes and the Borough Franchise (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1866), 9. 
 
533 Eardley-Wilmot, A Safe and Constitutional Plan of Parliamentary Reform (London: William Ridgway, 1865), 4. And see 
Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, 167-8. 
 In the manner of Gibbons and Stephen in this chapter’s opening vignette, Bagehot projected the point about 
historical change determining constitutional shifts further into the past: “On the whole, the English constitution of the 
last century, in its best time, and before the occurrence of changes which we shall soon describe, gave an excellent 
expression to the public opinion of England”; “History of the Unreformed Parliament, and Its Lessons” in CW, vol. 6, 
274. 
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feature. This was that, as discussed earlier, although the law increased the size of the electorate, it 
curtailed the local variation in the franchise and thereby had the consequence of making the 
electorate both more numerous and less inclusive. Like the Tories mentioned in section one who saw the 
exclusivity of the bill’s property requirements vis-à-vis the working classes as a reason to retain the 
unreformed electoral structures, mid-Victorian reformers of many stripes, including the great Walter 
Bagehot who will appear in section 2(a), would come to lament the Whigs’ abandonment in 1832 of 
the view of the suffrage which Mackintosh had directed against Bentham in 1818. In effect, mid-
century proponents of a revived variety of suffrages appealed from the later Mackintosh – the one 
who stood by his Whig brethren as they pushed for the Reform Act – to the earlier Mackintosh – 
the one who had taken to the Edinburgh Review to defend a varied suffrage against illiberal democracy 
– in the name of a renewed increase of diversity in the franchise and, hence, of the reopening of 
direct electoral paths for the admission of working-class ideas and interests into parliament.534 
 Both from the perception of societal change and from a negative appraisal of the exclusivity 
of the Reform Act itself, then, mid-Victorian reformers sought to put electoral multiformity back in 
the center of the theory and practice of parliamentary representation. These two lines of argument 
for an installment of multiformity-enhancing reform mingled intimately in the works of the authors 
addressed here, though some emphasized one over the other – an emphasis that could have subtle 
but significant institutional repercussions, as we will see. 
Thus in one of those provocative twists of fate that characterize the history of political 
thought, a way of thinking about representation that had originated for the sake of justifying a 
condition of the suffrage that had come about in an undesigned and evolutionary manner was 
embraced, in the 1850s-60s, as a template for the conscious, deliberate improvement of the 
                                                 
534 Bernard Cracroft, who straddled the line between a variety-of-suffragist and a democratic reformer, expressed this 
frustration at the parliamentary marginalization of the working class in colorful terms: “At the present moment, railways, 
beer, sugar, insurance offices, are all more effectively represented in the House than labour”; Cracroft, “The Reform 
Session,” 47-8. 
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parliamentary system. Unlike both their forebears who had lauded an inherited political tradition and 
their contemporaries who defended the mirroring properties of the reformed system, advocates of 
the differential franchise during the theory’s mid-century peak had to devise their own set of 
institutions which would satisfy the demanding standard of descriptive accuracy.  
 This task of design was a difficult one. Because their vision of reform was founded on the 
value of representativeness, and not on, say, a technocratic or paternalistic conception of good 
governance, there was necessarily a sociological phase as well as a constructive phase to their projects.535 
Their institutional recommendations required a grounding in a (sometimes implicit but often 
explicit) sociological account of the relative importance of the nation’s different “classes, interests, 
and opinions,” for knowledge of the social state to be matched or reflected had to precede the 
construction of institutions whose merit would lie in their matching or reflecting capacity. The 
argumentative burden on designers of variety-of-suffrage schemes was therefore doubly heavy: they 
needed both to articulate a convincing sociological portrait and to demonstrate that the institutions 
which they prescribed were appropriate instruments for translating this sociology into the 
Commons. Given these hurdles, it was natural that mirroring proponents of increased electoral 
diversification would form a more divided camp than mirroring apologists of the status quo. Against 
this latter group, the rejuvenated “old-Mackintoshianism” of the 1850s-60s can be understood as 
splitting into three broad schools, in addition to the defenders of the status quo already named. I will 
treat these schools in ascending order based on the degree to which their prescriptions departed 
from the then-existent electoral arrangements. 
 
a) Selective Tailoring 
 From the perspective of the history of political thought as taught today, the best-known of 
                                                 
535 For the technocratic rejoinder to the variety-of-suffrages program, see chapter 5(c). 
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the cast of writers considered in this chapter is Walter Bagehot. Complementing the discussion of 
him in part one, his copious writings on representation bear out the verdict that he was an 
archetypal Victorian536; just as his thought about toleration and liberty of discussion was 
characteristic of a range of mainstream convictions, his interventions into the debates about 
parliamentary reform were typical of the variety-of-suffrages school at its apex.537 
 As would be expected from an author exemplary of this tradition, Bagehot expressed and 
interlaced both reasons for dissatisfaction with the status quo delineated above. First, he charged the 
Reform Act with betraying genuine Whig-liberalism by diminishing the variety in the franchise. 
Instead of finding a means to increase the power of the middle classes and counter the corrupting 
influences of oligarchic and royal patronage538 which would have respected the “crazy-quilt pattern” 
of local suffrage regulations then in existence,539 1832 had decreased the multiformity of the 
suffrage, rendering Commons membership less diverse and cutting the lower classes off from 
parliament altogether. Bagehot explicitly appealed to the Mackintosh of 1818 who had elaborated 
the principle of the variety of franchises540 against the Mackintosh who would later stand by the 
Whigs in their push for a uniformizing Reform Act. The “varying qualification,” long embraced by 
the “more philosophic of liberal statesmen” over any “uniform ‘right of suffrage,’” had been 
sacrificed to the exigency of producing a “simple bill” that would remove the worst “abuses” of the 
                                                 
536 G.M. Young calls him the “greatest of Victorians”; see “The Greatest Victorian,” in Victorian Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), 116-28. 
 
537 For a fuller reconstruction of Bagehot’s thought on representation – one which takes into account, as cannot be done 
here, his views on America and on the broad sweep of English political history – see Greg Conti and Will Selinger, 
“Reappraising Walter Bagehot’s Liberalism: Discussion, Public Opinion, and the Meaning of Parliamentary 
Government,” History of European Ideas, vol. 41, no. 2 (Mar 2015): 264-91. 
 
538 Bagehot, “History of the Unreformed Parliament,” 272. 
 
539 Starzinger, The Politics of the Center, 64. For Bagehot’s sympathetic description of the suffrage regulations before 
Reform, see “Lord Althorp and the Reform Act of 1832,” in CW, vol. 3, 220-3; “History of the Unreformed 
Parliament,” 284. 
 
540 He called Mackintosh’s essay the “authoritative exposition of liberal doctrine”; Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” in 
CW, vol. 6, 221. 
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old system and quell the swelling “semi-revolution.”541 Such was the sad end of a central electoral 
tenet of liberalism.  
 Second: while countering the standardization of the franchise was an important undertaking 
simply as a matter of principle, the urgency of doing so was compounded, on Bagehot’s telling, by 
recent social changes. The sad irony of the Reform Act was that it had disenfranchised the urban 
working classes precisely at the moment at which their claims to a parliamentary voice were growing 
strongest. According to Bagehot, for most of English history the working classes had lacked the 
intelligence or interest to attend to national affairs, and therefore they had not contributed to the 
formation of that public opinion which it was the duty of the electoral “machinery” to convey 
accurately into the Commons.542 Along with many other liberals, Bagehot haled that this un- or pre-
political condition persisted among the rural laboring population.543 Yet, he judged, there had since 
1832 arisen a segment of the working classes who did contribute importantly to the development of 
public opinion through its distinctive “sentiments on public affairs.”544 This was the advanced, 
intellectual component of the working classes, the “town artisans” and “the lower classes…in the 
                                                 
541 Ibid., 220-1. 
 
542 Ibid., 221. 
 
543 “There are no ideas among our ignorant poor”; “there are not in the enormous majority of country towns any 
working men who have much opinion about politics”; Bagehot, English Constitution, in CW, vol. 5, 403. Similar judgments 
of the “ruralocracy” were frequently heard across the Channel during these decades, where Liberals decried the 
peasantry for maintaining Napoleon III’s imperial regime out of excessive concern to protect their property and out of 
incomprehension and indifference toward genuine political sentiments; see e.g. Roger Price, Napoleon III and the Second 
Empire (London: Routledge, 1997).  The most Francophilic of all Englishmen, JS Mill, agreed with this verdict: “The 
millions of voters who, in opposition to nearly every educated person in the country, made Louis Napoleon President, 
were chiefly peasants who could neither read nor write, and whose knowledge of public men, even by name, was limited 
to oral tradition”; Mill, “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,” in CW, vol. 19, 326. 
 This negative verdict on the English lower class has fallen out of favor in historical scholarship, though one 
does encounter the occasional modern historian who seconds Bagehot’s analysis; see e.g. F.B. Smith, The Making of the 
Second Reform Bill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 52. It ought to be noted in this connection that there 
was no national system of public primary education in England until the Elementary Education Act of 1870. 
 
544 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 196. 
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larger towns [who have] opinions to state.”545 The social, economic, and (above all) intellectual 
progress of this group entailed an adjustment in the electoral system that would recognize its greater 
socio-ideological standing.546 
Provision of seats for the urban working classes thus had to be made for parliament to fulfill 
its function as a mirror of society and for parliamentary discussion to possess all the “materials” of 
sentiment, opinion, and interest needed for it to be truly informed and deliberative. To accomplish 
this feat Bagehot advocated an updated version of the “old system of representation…based on a 
variety of franchises.”547 His plan of non-uniform representation was simple, especially in 
comparison to those which we will soon see. First and most importantly, he would introduce 
universal or near-universal suffrage in a score of major industrial cities,548 while maintaining the post-
1832 property requirements in all other constituencies. In these democratic urban boroughs the 
electoral roll would be dominated by working-class voters, who would thereby be empowered to put 
candidates of their own class (or at least of their own choosing) into the House. Second, he rounded 
out his reform proposal by suggesting a rural-to-urban transfer of seats that would enhance the 
influence of industrial centers at the expense of the overrepresented “landed interest” in a way that 
would better reflect the preponderance of the “growing parts of the country” over the “stationary” 
parts.549 With these amendments, he boasted, the “general accordance of parliamentary with national 
                                                 
545 Bagehot, English Constitution, 315; “Parliamentary Reform,” The Works and Life of Walter Bagehot, Mrs. Russell 
Barington, vol. 3, 173. The St. John-Stevas edition leaves out the note from which the final quote in the above sentence 
was taken, dated 18 Feb. 1859, which Bagehot added to the original text. 
 
546 For Bagehot on the relationship between “political structure” and “social structure” more generally, see Alastair 
Buchan, The Spare Chancellor: The Life of Walter Bagehot (London: Chatto and Windus, 1959), 188. 
 
547 Bagehot, “Lord Althorp and the Reform Act of 1832,” in CW, vol. 3, 223. 
 
548 It is not precisely clear if there were to be any minor restrictions; see Paul Smith, “Introduction,” to Bagehot, The 
English Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xxiv. 
 
549 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 193. 
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opinion” would be restored.550 
Insofar as Bagehot sought to reintegrate the working class into the political system and to 
revive the principle of electoral diversity, then, his mechanism for doing so was to selectively tailor the 
suffrage. Following on a process of sociological discrimination, he calibrated the suffrage to fit the 
facts ascertained about the state of society and public opinion, lowering it in those places and only 
those places where doing so would achieve the admission of “really organic interests and ideas” which 
were at present excluded from parliament.551 Bagehot’s method was to note those elements of the 
social-intellectual order which were missing from parliament and then to target those geographical 
areas in which they were predominant for a localized revision of the franchise requirements; in his 
mid-Victorian moment this meant reducing the suffrage where it could serve to create an inlet for 
the town artisans, but in future contexts it might involve carrying out this operation in other 
constituencies to carve out a space for other groups.552 
Before passing to other schemes of this selective-lowering sort, two further features of 
Bagehot’s approach deserve comment, since they bear on themes that will recur throughout this half 
of the dissertation. First, he calculated that on his plan there would be forty MPs for “the lower 
classes.”553 Although forty working-class MPs may seem a modest total, Bagehot was convinced of 
its robustness. His plan, he went out of his way to emphasize, would produce more working-class 
MPs than could be expected from the combination of plural voting and proportional representation 
                                                 
550 Ibid., 191. 
 
551 Walter Bagehot, ‘“True Liberalism” and Reform’, in CW, vol. 6, 360. 
 
552 On Bagehot’s openness to the future expansion of the political order as an instance of the larger Victorian paradigm 
of growth and evolution, see Jones, Victorian Political Thought, 70. 
 While there is the crucial difference that today we do not alter the franchise across districts, we might still call 
this method Bagehot-mandering to highlight the continuity between it and the current American practice of tailoring the 
boundaries of constituencies to create “majority-minority” districts in pursuit of the goal of fair racial representation. 
 
553 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” The Works and Life of Walter Bagehot, Mrs. Russell Barington, 174. 
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endorsed by that famous “advanced liberal,” John Stuart Mill.554 While Mill would enfranchise a larger 
number of his laboring fellow citizens – the only Millian exclusions were those who could not “read, 
write, and…perform the common operations of arithmetic” and those who were receiving “parish 
relief” (that, is municipal government aid for poverty)555 – this greater measure of enfranchisement 
was, Bagehot judged, a red herring. Despite Mill’s protestations to the contrary, the plain truth was 
that his elitist democracy would not “give so much power to the working class” as Bagehot’s openly 
nondemocratic system would: 
By the adoption of [Mill’s] scheme, you would give to the working classes no characteristic 
expression in the legislature; you would give them an influence in every constituency in 
appearance considerable, but which would be of no practical avail to them as a class, because 
on all characteristic points their voice would be neutralized…by the more numerous votes 
given for that very purpose to the more educated classes.556 
 
What mattered from the perspective of “real representation” was not votes, but seats – and seats 
were come by not through a widespread distribution of “votes…scattered through many 
constituencies” but by assigning to the working class a concentrated and “preponderant influence in 
at least some constituencies.”557  
This single-minded focus on seats over votes followed directly from the fact that the locus 
of concern for the mirror theory was the composition of the Commons; they attended with great 
concern to the regulation of the suffrage, but only as the instrument for bringing about the desired 
                                                 
554 Ibid., 174. Mill, of course, did not agree with this assessment. 
 
555 Mill, Considerations, 470-2 
 
556 Bagehot, “‘True Liberalism’ and Reform,” 358; “Parliamentary Reform,” The Works and Life of Walter Bagehot, Mrs. 
Russell Barington, 174. Similarly, Cracroft called it a “fallacy” to make “the polling-booth and not the votes in the House 
of Commons the test of representation”; “The Reform Session, 67. 
 
557 Bagehot, “The Defeat of the Ministry and the Prospects of Reform,” in CW, vol. 6, 306; “The Withdrawal of the 
Reform Bill” in CW, vol. 6, 333. 
 Bagehot levelled the same charge against the set of “Liberal” (meaning here the party and not the philosophy) 
reform plans that dispatched altogether with the mirroring mechanism of a “diversity of qualifications in different 
constituencies” and sought simply to locate the suffrage nationally at the point at which the maximum number of 
working-class voters could be admitted without created a working-class majority on the electoral rolls; “Parliamentary 
Reform,” 223; “‘True Liberalism’ and Reform,” in CW, vol. 6, 358. 
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composition.558 The issue of any given citizen’s personal possession or non-possession of the vote 
was unimportant; what mattered was identifying the allocation of the suffrage that would best serve 
the end of accurate mirroring. Bagehot, who followed the logic of his theory of representation to its 
conclusion, could thus blithely assert that “to have a good Parliament, we must disfranchise some 
good constituents.”559 Having a good parliament meant, for Bagehot, empowering the urban 
working class in a way that did justice to its newfound social-intellectual importance, and this 
required not the “sham-representation” of many votes accompanied by few or no MPs, but rather 
substantial “direct representation in the House of Commons.”560 To speak of the level of 
enfranchisement as a political good in abstraction from the makeup of the House was to operate 
with a mistaken theory of the nature of representation. The only relevant metric of a group’s 
participation in parliamentary government was the number of seats it “command[ed],” not the 
number of votes it counted.561 
                                                 
558 “The suffrage is not so much a natural claim as a civil function – not an indefeasible right, but a means to an end”; 
Greg, “The Expected Reform Bill,” 262. Contrast this with the deep religious-symbolic significance of the suffrage in 
French thought at the time, and in American thought at various periods; see Pierre Rosanvallon, Le sacre du citoyen (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1992); Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 
ch. 1. 
 
559 Bagehot, ‘Parliamentary Reform’, 223. In this passage Bagehot was using the term “disfranchisement” not only to 
indicate the formal denial of the suffrage to someone, but also more broadly to describe the position of consistently 
finding oneself on the losing side of elections due to occupying the position of a permanent minority in a constituency 
(as, he believed, would be the case for “upper-class” voters in the boroughs to which he wished to grant universal 
suffrage). This usage was far from peculiar to Bagehot, as will be seen throughout this and the following chapters. 
 Russell gave a nearly identical formulation: “It is not necessary, however, although every class ought to have an 
influence in elections, that every member of every class should have a vote.” The fact of a “butcher at Hackney” having 
the franchise while a butcher elsewhere lacked it was in itself no demerit in a system of representation; Russell, History of 
the English Constitution, 180. 
 In section three of the next chapter, we will see how this indifference about the possession of the vote by every 
individual connected up with a sense of the proper functioning of a deliberative system of representation. Although they 
tend to prefer random sampling and lottocratic measures, contemporary epistemic democrats themselves often 
demonstrate a parallel kind of insouciance about universal suffrage. This resemblance should lead us to question just 
how robustly democratic epistemic democrats are; compare, for example, David Estlund’s openness to the replacement of 
“universal voting rights” by a form of “democratic regency” with the variety-of-suffragist conception of a deliberatively 
necessary restriction of the suffrage; Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 181-2. 
 
560 Bagehot, “The Defeat of the Ministry and the Prospects of Reform,” 306-7. 
 
561 Ibid., 307. 
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The second aspect of Bagehot’s approach that will prove resonant later in this dissertation 
was his recognition of the difficult argumentative burden involved in applying this theory of 
descriptive representation. Befitting his standing as one of the most self-aware of Victorian writers, 
Bagehot acknowledged that the sociology which undergirded his reform proposal was, first and 
foremost, his own, and that it may not have appeared self-evident to his compatriots: “The most 
difficult thing to establish by argument is an evident fact of observation. There are no statistics of 
opinion to which we can refer, there is no numerical comparison which will establish the accordance 
of parliamentary with social opinion”; indeed, this task was even trickier during the frequently 
recurring “periods” when “public opinion was much divided and strongly excited.”562 The truth 
about which “interests and ideas” were the “really organic” ones, and how one of these should be 
weighed against the others, was not indisputably revealed to all Englishmen; instead Bagehot would 
have to convince the public that his plan was the one that would renew the connection between 
assembly and society, that forty members was the fitting amount for the working classes and that a 
more general displacement of seats from rural to urban was what would reflect the present condition 
of the country. This admission of the difficulty of the sociological inquiry involved in the design of 
mirroring institutions would have literally struck home for Bagehot, since Greg, who looked more 
fondly on the middle-class hegemony initiated by the Reform Act, was his brother-in-law. For 
Bagehot the compatibility of subscription to the goal of descriptive representation with a multiplicity 
of institutional designs was a lesson learned inside the family. Yet in spite of this difficult lesson, he 
held to the hope that his proposal would ultimately be recognized as the proper corrective of the 
“bias” and “defects” that distorted the parliamentary image of the nation.563 
Through the reinvigoration of the principle of electoral diversity, representativeness would 
                                                 
562 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 188. 
 
563 Ibid., 191. 
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be restored to the Commons and the specter of rule by “a single class” which loomed over any 
standardization of the suffrage, be it oligarchic or democratic, would be fended off.564 Bagehot’s 
conception of the theoretical heritage of his prescriptions was accurate: this was as direct an 
application of Mackintosh’s vision as was possible in the mid-century, and indeed he had effected a 
kind of Burkean rhetorical maneuver, appealing from the new to the old Whiggism on the 
representation question. 
Bagehot was hardly alone in seeking to remedy the unrepresentativeness of the Commons 
through selectively varying the suffrage across geographical constituencies: his scheme was 
exemplary of the slew of plans that sought by judicious alterations of the suffrage to place “a certain 
body of, say fifty or a hundred, special representatives of the masses” in parliament.565 Given that 
Bagehot can be treated as a kind of type of these standard plans, it is worthwhile to spend the 
remainder of this subsection looking at two authors whose projects fitted the selective-tailoring 
mold in a less clear-cut manner but who nevertheless viewed themselves as operating with the same 
framework. This will allow us to see how pervasive the variegated suffrage was as a norm of 
institutional redesign. For even proposals which appeared quite different at the institutional and 
rhetorical level could be understood as procedures of reform through selective tailoring. To take one 
instance, from an author about as far as possible from the “elitism” often attributed to Bagehot566: 
“A Reformer” who took up the mantle of a working-class champion presented his reform scheme as 
a version of the same model. In his eyes the national discussion on reform had been polluted by 
reactionary elements in British culture which suffered from “the oppressive nightmare of the 
                                                 
564 Bagehot, “The Defeat of the Ministry and the Prospects of Reform,” 306-7. Bagehot was as much a critic of oligarchy 
as he was of democracy, although the former aspect of his position has received far less attention; see Conti and 
Selinger, “Reappraising Walter Bagehot’s Liberalism,” section 3. 
 
565 Dicey, “The Balance of Classes,” in Essays on Reform, 79. 
 
566 See e.g., C. H. Sisson, ‘The Case of Walter Bagehot’, in The Avoidance of Literature, ed. Michael Schmidt (Manchester: 
Carcanet New Press, 1978), 349–438. 
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disastrous effects it is supposed will ensue from the admission of the working man to the 
franchise.”567 This bigoted fearfulness prevented clearheaded evaluation of the institutional options 
available at this political juncture. Fortunately, the author himself was under no such dire delusions. 
He judged the poor to be as politically capable and reliable as the classes above them, for they were 
possessed of a “sound common sense.”568 In light of this bullish estimate of working-class political 
capacity, it is not surprising to find our “Reformer” among those authors who decried the First 
Reform Act for severing the tie between parliament and the lower classes.569  
And yet, despite these “populist” or “democratic” leanings, the “Reformer” retained the 
principle of the variety of suffrages, seeking manhood suffrage in boroughs only while maintaining a 
requirement of ownership of agricultural land in the counties in order to ensure direct representation 
for the “rural” interest and character type.570 While this appears a much greater measure of working-
class empowerment than Bagehot’s, given that the “Reformer” wished to institute an extensive 
suffrage in all boroughs and not just a cluster of the largest ones, in fact he predicted from his 
arrangements an outcome similar to Bagehot’s. This was because, where Bagehot anticipated from 
the town artisans a rapid politicization and a distinctively class-based political style,571 the 
                                                 
567 A Reformer, A View of Parliamentary Reform (Wallingford: W. Payne, 1867), 11-2. 
 
568 Ibid., 10. He also promoted the political fitness of the working classes by denying that they were liable to act, by 
simple force of their numbers, to the exclusion of the interests and opinions of other groups: “few bodies of working 
men wholly pull together, but are as much subject to diversity of opinion as other classes”; ibid. 9-10. The significance of 
observations of this sort will be addressed in chapter five, section one. 
 
569 Ibid., 12. 
 
570 The “Reformer” had a very strong impression of the difference between borough and county constituencies and of 
the element of diversity which this distinction was responsible for maintaining in parliament; ibid., 14-5. 
 It is important to note that high Whigs such as Russell could share the same mindset of seeking varied 
representation while disavowing any particular fears about the working class. Russell was “persuaded” that a “House of 
Commons exclusively representing working men” would not “instal anarchy, destroy property, or uproot the 
monarchy.” Nevertheless, he objected to a Commons monopolized by the working class on the grounds that “a 
representation of one class would not give an image of the property, the experience, the knowledge, the wisdom of 
England”; Russell, History of the English Constitution, 237. 
 
571 The artisans have “strong class feelings, strong class prejudices, strong class hopes…they have an inherent political 
aptitude”; Bagehot, “The Withdrawal of the Reform Bill,” 332-3. 
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“Reformer” rejected both these notions.572 Consequently, in order to bring the urban working-class 
voices which he valorized into parliament he judged it necessary to cast a wider electoral net than 
Bagehot had done. The “Reformer” enfranchised the working class more broadly to compensate for 
its minimal energy and distinctness as a political corps; in order for the representatives of the urban 
laborer to participate meaningfully in the Commons alongside those of rural landowners and of the 
urban propertied classes many more of the former, in a wider range of districts, would need to 
receive the right to vote. Yet, as distant as his prescriptions were from Bagehot’s, the difference took 
place purely at the level of application. The “Reformer” shared with the editor of the Economist both 
a principle (the mirroring Commons) and a technique (the sociologically-grounded apportionment 
of the suffrage). Although he operated from different sociological and political-psychological 
premises, he was, just as much as Bagehot, tailoring the suffrage across geographical constituencies 
in such a way that “every class and interest” would be reflected accurately.573 
A glance at a third entrant, from yet another region on the ideological map, helps to 
reinforce the appeal and range of selective, sociologically-based lowering of the suffrage as a 
framework for reform. The Tory John Eardley Eardley-Wilmot, 2nd Baronet, despite his solid 
conservative credentials, sought the electoral integration of the working classes as a foundational 
political goal.574 In contrast to what we might call Bagehot’s “cognitivism”575 about representation – 
his concern to delineate the various streams of public opinion, to match the distribution of beliefs in 
the Commons to their distribution outside – Eardley-Wilmot approached the sociological dimension 
                                                 
572 A great many workingmen were apathetic about politics and therefore unlikely to “take the trouble to go to the poll,” 
and even among those who were politically energized there was often found a deferential temperament that was 
receptive to the voices of “property, social connections, and intellect”; “Reformer, View, 16, 21. This latter point will 
also be taken up in chapter five. 
 
573 Ibid., 20. 
 
574 R. J. Smith, “Wilmot, Sir John Eardley Eardley-, second baronet (1810–1892),” rev. Catherine Pease-Watkin, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29626]. 
 
575 I am of course not using this term in the technical senses in which it is used in psychology or philosophy today. 
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of his reform effort by delving into a maze of statistics on economic matters such as savings 
deposits and imports and exports. With these in hand, he proclaimed that a “progress in the wealth 
and prosperity of the country” remarkable enough to warrant a shift in electoral-representative 
structures had occurred.576 This progress was, according to his investigations, “due mainly” to the 
“productive classes.”577 The problem was, then, how to transfer influence to the working class 
“without handing over a preponderating portion of the power…to any particular class, the object 
being that each section of the community should be fairly and adequately, but not exclusively, 
represented.”578 His suggestion was to lower the property qualification in counties but to lower it 
more greatly in boroughs, and to complement this reduction with the preservation of the “small 
boroughs” in order that parliament could continue to benefit from the distinctive character of their 
representatives.579 This reform, in which variation in constituency types interacted with variation in 
the suffrage, was devised to save the Commons from the worst fate of legislatures, that of “being 
too limited and one-sided.”580 
 Coming from conflicting ideological orientations and advocating different pictures of the 
institutional future of English parliamentarianism, the “Reformer,” Eardley-Wilmot, and Bagehot 
were yet united in their general approach to the revival of the representativeness of the Commons. 
For all three the problem of representative reform was the problem of allotting the suffrage across 
the panoply of constituencies so as to improve the resolution on the image of society imprinted in 
the assembly. 
                                                 
576 John Eardley Eardley-Wilmot, A Safe and Constitutional Plan of Parliamentary Reform (London: William Ridgway, 1865), 2. 
 
577 Ibid., 2. 
 
578 Ibid., 4. 
 
579 Ibid., 13-4, 22. As mentioned earlier, small boroughs were usually small market towns in rural areas. Many reformers 
(including Bagehot and, as we will see, others in this chapter) wished to abolish them in order to transfer their seats to 
more populous cities. 
 
580 Ibid., 1. 
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b) Class-Specificity 
 Henry Davis Pochin was in many ways very similar to Walter Bagehot. In addition to being 
only two years apart in age, they were both successful in business in addition to being active 
politically (Pochin in chemical manufacturing and Bagehot in banking); they both stood for 
parliament as Liberal candidates and failed; and they were both supporters of women’s suffrage.581  
But beyond these general biographical affinities, the two shared an outlook on the basics of the 
reform question. As was true for “the greatest Victorian,” in Pochin’s mind the convictions both 
that the reformed parliament had legislated well,582 and that the progress of the country nevertheless 
made a further installment of reform necessary, existed side-by-side. While England was in the midst 
of a period of competent governance, the indubitable truth that “the people generally have advanced 
into a higher stage of civilisation than that for which the Constitution of 1832 was judged adequate” 
made amendment of the representative machinery an urgent matter. In particular, the most 
progressive part of the nation was the “Wage-class” of the largest, most economically-developed 
boroughs583 – by which Pochin seems to have meant something close to, if sociologically less 
specific and more inclusive than, Bagehot’s prized category of “town artisans.” Again, like Bagehot, 
he took for granted that the benighted rural laborers, who are left entirely offstage in the Plan of 
Parliamentary Reform, were not candidates for entry into the electorate; only those segments of the 
working class which had “grown in numbers, intelligence, and productive power” such that “their 
interests and opinions” would be wronged without “recognised and fitting exponents,” were of 
                                                 
581 On Pochin, see Trevor Boyns, “Pochin, Henry Davis (1824–1895),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/47964]. 
 
582 “Looking at the history of the House of Commons for the last forty years, and the many important measures framed 
and passed to promote the well-being of the masses, it cannot fairly be said that our present system of selecting men 
suited to the work to be done, and the varied interests to be represented, has not on the whole worked well”; Pochin, A 
Plan of Parliamentary Reform (London: Whitfield, Green, and Son, 1866), 4. 
 
583 Ibid., 7. 
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concern to him.584 Finally, the actual number of seats which these two wished to devote to the “clear 
and distinct utterance for the opinions and sentiments of the Wage-class” was in the same ballpark, 
though Pochin was rather more generous (fifty-six in his case to Bagehot’s forty).585 
Even more revealing of their common mindset was the fact that Pochin ascribed to his 
views precisely the same provenance as Bagehot had done: his Plan of Parliamentary Reform was meant 
to restore the luster to, and to supply the institutional embodiment of, “the old principle of variety 
[which] was preferred and cherished…by so eminent a Whig, and so profound a political 
philosopher as Sir James Mackintosh.”586 Like the editor of the Economist, he enlisted in the ranks of 
the “eminent authorities” who now recognized that the uniformization introduced in 1832 “was an 
error and a disastrous departure from the previous course of the constitution.”587 Only by a return to 
original Whig principles could the representativeness of the Commons be perfected and the 
democratic tyranny exercised by “a single class with so overpowering a number” be averted.588 
Pochin’s conception of the purpose and impact of an updated program of differentiated suffrage, 
then, could have been inserted seamlessly into Bagehot’s voluminous output on the subject. 
 Yet despite this wide area of overlap, there was an important difference between Pochin and 
Bagehot – a difference by which Pochin’s proposal diverged formally from the status quo in a more 
radical way. This was that Pochin intended to reserve the fifty-six seats for major urban 
constituencies exclusively for “the present unrepresented portion of the inhabitants… those who 
                                                 
584 Ibid., 9. 
 
585 Ibid., 17, 11. 
 
586 Ibid., 20-1. 
 
587 Ibid., 20. 
 
588 Ibid., 6. Here Pochin departed from his friend John Bright, the famous radical Liberal MP: “John Bright’s scheme” 
was one of those which would “launch us upon the steep incline from which the prospectively indefinite view [of 
universal suffrage] hinted at already, glooms in the distance”; ibid., 6-7. In stark contrast to Bagehot, Pochin and his wife 
tended toward radicalism politically; Boyns, “Pochin.” 
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reside in houses below the value of £10.”589 Bagehot, and all subscribers to the “selective tailoring” 
model of the variegated suffrage, sought to reduce the property requirement in certain populous and 
industrially advanced cities in order that the advanced working classes in these districts would make 
up a majority of the electorate. From their perspective, what it meant to remedy the deficit of 
working-class representation was to create working-class-majority constituencies, constituencies in 
which the working class, when united, could be sure to put a member of its choosing into 
parliament. For Pochin, on the other hand, the project of granting a “reasonable share of elective 
power” to the “Wage-class,” “a fair share of political power in the National Council” that would 
fulfill the promise of a government that mirrored society and public opinion, involved implementing 
working-class-specific constituencies.590 Pochin did not advocate lowering the value of property 
stipulated for the suffrage in these boroughs; rather, this provision was to be left constant, and the 
constituencies solely of £10 or greater householders would carry on in these cities unaffected. His 
desired response was instead to establish independent constituencies for the poorer electors 
alongside the currently existing censitary districts. As he explained: 
I propose…that a new [electoral] register shall be formed early [i.e. soon] in each of these 
selected large towns; that this register shall be as democratic as may be found workable, not 
stopping perhaps even at household suffrage. To give an example:  – In Manchester, under 
this scheme, the possessors of the present £10. franchise would continue to retain two 
members; and the possessors of the new democratic franchise I propose, would by 
themselves alone return other two members; so that the middle-class and working-class 
elements of Manchester, would each be represented by two members chosen by each class, 
under the operation of its own special register. This plan would result in…fifty-six members 
to be elected entirely by the Wage-class.591 
 
On the Bagehot model, the working classes would gain their own MPs in virtue of winning 
elections. On the Pochin plan, the working classes would have their own MPs in virtue of possessing 
their own electorates. 
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This divergence from the selecting-tailoring configuration had important implications. For 
one, it promised different practical effects. In contrast to the contending paradigm, for example, it 
did not provoke fears that it introduced working-class voices into parliament only at the cost of 
sacrificing the voices of another, particularly important segment of the British population. This was 
the charge that Mill had levelled against Bagehot’s renovation of the variety of suffrages. Bagehot’s 
plan was, in Mill’s words, unacceptably “violent” because it would “giv[e] up the representation of 
the large towns to day-labourers, by establishing, in them, equal and universal suffrage, thereby 
disfranchising the higher and middle classes of those places, who comprise the majority of the most 
intellectual persons in the kingdom.”592 The best minds of England were, in the eyes of Mill and of 
many others, disproportionately concentrated among the educated and professional strata of 
precisely those major urban constituencies in which Bagehot would institute manhood suffrage. Yet 
the establishment of manhood suffrage in these boroughs entailed the threat that they would be 
consistently outvoted by the working classes and consequently cease to have representation in the 
Commons. In the kind of unexpected turn that reminds one just how complicated an enterprise it 
can be to disentangle the various strands of nineteenth-century liberalism, the “democrat” Mill 
decried Bagehot, whom modern scholars often castigate for elitism, for advancing a vision of the 
future of parliament in which the country’s true intellectual elite would be silenced.593 In Mill’s 
alarmed estimate, parliamentary reform à la Bagehot amounted to a simple substitution of the urban 
lower classes for the urban educated classes, a shift which would reduce the intellectual standard of 
British politics and diminish the descriptive representativeness of the Commons (since the urban 
elites contributed more to the formation of public opinion than any other segment of society). 
                                                 
592 Mill, “Recent Writers on Reform,” 364.  
 
593 On Mill’s democratic reputation see e.g. Graeme Duncan, “John Stuart Mill and Democracy,” in John Stuart Mill’s 
Social and Political Thought, Critical Assessments, vol. 3, 69. For a quite subtle analysis of the “paradoxes” involved in Mill’s 
standing as the “greatest thinker of English democracy” from the generation after Mill’s death, see John MacCunn, Six 
Radical Thinkers, ch. 2. 
 171 
 
No such objections could be brought against Pochin’s class-specific scheme for 
enfranchising the urban proletariat; Pochin was explicit that much of the value of his project lay in 
the clear demarcation between socioeconomic groups which allowed him to include the working 
classes while preserving urban upper-class representation in its integrity. Naturally, since he believed 
that it was not “desirable to increase the present number of seats in the House of Commons,” the 
extension of seats to the working classes had to come at the expense of some other set of seats; in 
Pochin’s case, these were seats belonging to small boroughs.594 But because he did not accept the 
commonplace, dear to a host of “centrist” Whigs and liberals, that the small borough voters had a 
distinctive and valuable sensibility that warranted a place in the representative system, he did not 
equate the diminution of these constituencies with any descriptive loss. For these reasons Pochin 
could be confident of the superiority of the practical operation of his scheme; it would endow urban 
wage-earners with a “material and substantial” parliamentary presence without betraying the genius 
of English representation, which was that it was “spread and divided among many classes” with no 
group of significance excluded.595 
Pochin was not a political philosopher, so it was on these practical advantages, predictably, 
that he dwelt. But there were also important conceptual differences between his scheme and the 
other models. Relative to the reformed system and to selective-lowering proposals, Pochin’s plan 
had a distinct conception both of the unit of representation and of the relationship between the 
representation of a class and the ideological makeup of that class. Given the theoretical import of 
these differences, it is worth saying a word about each of them. 
First, regarding the unit of representation: while in its actual operation Pochin’s endeavor to 
produce a sociologically accurate Commons was to be limited by the constraint on the number of 
                                                 
594 Pochin, Plan, 11. 
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MPs (at, in his view, the trivial cost of a reduction of small boroughs), in principle his class-specific 
approach could have turned the Commons into an almost infinitely fine-grained portrait of British 
society and public opinion. This greater flexibility, this greater potential for descriptive fine-tuning, 
came from its rejection of the assumption, operative in Bagehot, that the form of a constituency was 
a geographical region to which a single rule of suffrage applied. On this picture the variety of 
suffrages was a variety between districts, not within them. Geographically bounded communities 
remained for Bagehot and company the primitive unit of representation. 
Pochin’s class-specific reform, however, dispensed with this singular focus on geography. 
Within the same territorial unit could exist separate constituencies; constituencies operating over the 
same space could be made independent by virtue of an alternate criterion: class. Socioeconomic 
standing was no less capable than residency of defining membership in a constituency. As noted in 
section one, this expansion beyond residency as the criterion for membership in a given electorate 
was not an innovation; he was, rather, taking up the radical baton dropped by Mackintosh decades 
earlier. And by the time of Pochin’s pamphlet several other experiments in the construction of non-
territorial electoral demarcation (of which some will be considered later), had appeared; moreover 
university constituencies accounted for six seats in the Commons before the Second Reform Act 
(which expanded the number to nine).596 But though his inclusion of non-residential factors in the 
erection of districts was not novel, the theoretical importance of this difference within the pantheon 
of variety-of-suffrages arguments nevertheless comes out clearly when we observe that on Pochin’s 
approach, though not on Bagehot’s,597 it becomes conceivable that every citizen could be sorted into 
an appropriate group-based constituency invested with the proper voting power according to 
                                                 
596 University constituencies, it should be noted, would proliferate further in 1918 before being abolished in 1950. Six 
university seats remain today in the Irish upper house. 
 
597 Even the most fortunate distribution of population and the most craftily made efforts at gerrymandering cannot 
eliminate the friction that prevents a geographically-based system from being a perfect mirror; Andrew Reeve and Alan 
Ware, Electoral Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Introduction (London: Routledge, 1992), 47, 87. 
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sociological observations about this group’s weight and significance. On Pochin’s reasoning there 
was no barrier in principle to organizing constituencies according to ever more finely-drawn 
socioeconomic categories (such as professions or union membership instead of merely classes) or 
other factors (such as religion) should these be judged to have greater political salience.  
This insight that the realization of a mirror theory of representation might require 
constituencies to be understood in ways other than (as Gladstone would say in another context) as 
simply geographical “integers”598 brings the class-specific version of the variegated suffrage close to 
two other sorts of electoral machinery for achieving the desideratum of sociologically-accurate 
parliamentary diversity: the more radically pluralistic and diversified schemes discussed in the next 
subsection, and proportional representation, which is the subject of chapter six. Indeed, we might go 
so far as to say that the gap between Pochin and the writers in the following subsection, large as it is 
at the level of institutional prescriptions, was empirical rather than conceptual: the gap consisted 
solely in the fact that the latter thought that more intricate delineations of special constituencies 
were demanded to give a full reflection of their country’s diversity than the former did. However 
timidly applied in his own hands, Pochin was operating in a conceptual universe in which the quest 
to accurately translate England’s “varied classes” into parliament might involve quite other 
implements than the traditional territorial district.599 And he may himself have contemplated such 
further refinements as a consequence of his plan – while he hoped his scheme could settle the 
matter for the moment, could close the present “pressing and urgent” episode in the history of 
reform, he welcomed any “safe and timely” adjustments that the continued development of the 
country might later necessitate.600 
                                                 
598 Gladstone, Speech of June 15, 1870, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, vol. 4 (London: Cornelius Buck, 
1870), 147. 
 
599 Pochin, Plan, 6. 
 
600 Ibid., 17. 
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The second noteworthy theoretical upshot of the move from class-majority districts to class-
specific ones concerned the relationship between the goal of representing a class (or any 
demographic group, for that matter; recall the wide sense of class with which these writers are 
working) and the conception of the ideological makeup of the class.  The extent to which 
socioeconomic classes were ideologically uniform or multiform was, as will be covered in chapter 
five, a hotly debated question in the mid-Victorian period. The ability of a selective-tailoring design 
to remedy the deficit of working-class spokesmen in the Commons was predicated on the answer to 
this question lying in the direction of uniformity. With majority rather than exclusively working-class 
districts, the goal of gaining entry into parliament for working-class voices could be accomplished 
only if working-class opinion was relatively homogeneous, for if the working class was fractured in 
its beliefs then the victorious candidate could very well stand for something quite other than 
working-class ideas in any clear sense. Under a Pochinian arrangement, on the contrary, no 
assumption of ideological homogeneity was needed in order for the working class to place its 
champions in the House. Class-specific constituencies, in other words, held out the prospect of 
enabling a diverse and conflicted working class, and not just a united one, to have its own 
parliamentary agents. This method of variegated suffrage, unlike the one analyzed prior to it, would 
allow not only the working-class point-of-view, but working class points-of-view in the plural, to make 
their parliamentary mark. 
 Pochin was not the lone reformer during the climactic period of the variety-of-suffrages 
theory to place class-specific electorates at the center of his plan. The celebrated Whig historian 
Edward Creasy concluded his popular primer on constitutional history The Text-Book of the 
Constitution with a call to implement an arrangement very similar to the one that Pochin would end 
up adopting.601 Like Pochin he wanted to “pare away fifty members” “out of the smaller and most 
                                                 
601 Creasy’s endorsement of working-class-exclusive electorates testifies particularly well to the degree to which this had 
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notoriously corrupt boroughs, and the smaller counties” in order to free up these seats for “working 
men.”602 In contrast to Pochin, Creasy did not assign these new “democratic” districts to the most 
advanced urban boroughs, but he advised for the creation of these new seats that Great Britain be 
divided into fifty equal electoral districts in which all male residents not currently enfranchised who 
met certain minimal criteria would be eligible to vote.603 Creasy was thus conceptually a very close 
antecedent to Pochin, though empirically and sociologically they differed: Creasy, in opposition to 
Pochin and the wider liberal consensus, did not privilege the urban worker over the rural laborer. 
 In the year that Pochin published his Plan another close relative of his scheme appeared. In 
keeping with a point which I have pressed throughout, this contribution to the reform debate came 
from the opposite party milieu; where Pochin was a Liberal friendly to the radical wing of his party, 
in his own reform tract Henry Warwick Cole did not hide that he was writing as a Conservative 
partisan.604 Cole took for granted the standard liberal sociology which privileged the urban working 
classes over their rural counterparts, and therefore devised a “special application” of the electoral 
law for the “largest towns only.”605 What Cole sought to do was to replace, in these urban boroughs, 
the current arrangement by which all electors voted in common for the (almost always) two 
                                                                                                                                                             
become a mainstream position, for Creasy embodied “parliamentarianism at its most typical”; H. C. G. Matthew, 
“Creasy, Sir Edward Shepherd (1812–1878),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; 
online edn, May 2006 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6660]. Revealingly, Creasy cited Mackintosh on the 
long constitutional pedigree of a “variety of classes” exercising the borough franchise; Creasy, The Text-Book of the 
Constitution (London: Richard Bentley, 1848), 51. 
 
602 Creasy, Text-Book of the Constitution, 62. 
 
603 “Give a vote in the election of the district member to every male aged twenty-one years, who has no vote for any 
county or borough, who has resided for a year in the district, who has not been convicted of any criminal offence for the 
last seven years, or received parish relief for the last year, and who is able to read and write”; ibid., 62. Interestingly he 
also explicitly wished that the ballot be used in these democratic elections. 
 
604 Cole, The Middle Classes and the Borough Franchise (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1866), 68-71. His 
partisan affiliation was not overly important to him, though; he agreed with the prevalent view that partisanship had 
been experiencing a period of weakness: “There has, in former times and during several centuries, been a series of 
struggles between the Whigs and the Tories, about which men still differ in sentiment, if not in opinion; but both those 
parties have really ceased to exist since 1832, though they may have left traditions behind”; ibid., 76. 
 
605 Ibid., 2. 
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members to be returned with a new system in which “separate electoral bod[ies]” would be assigned 
to wealthy (he called them “middle-class,” though by this term he really did not mean to extend 
below the top economic decile) and working-class voters.606 He explained his scheme as follows: 
to take Westminster for an example, we should have one member for the first division of 
the borough returned by the Middle-Class electors as their representative, and a member for 
the second division returned by the Working Class electors as their representative.607 
 
By a half-and-half division of seats Cole would therefore transform an “aggregate of about 68 cities 
and boroughs returning 138 members to Parliament” into “69 members” directly elected by the 
working class and the same number by the middle classes; his class-specific constituencies 
outnumbered the more modest provisions of Pochin (56), Creasy (50), and Bagehot (40).608 Cole 
followed these others in considering this increase to be substantial. Like Bagehot, he boasted that his 
proposal was more inclusive than those of famous figures on the “left”: just as Bagehot went out of 
his way to stress that his electoral machinery would generate more working-class representatives 
than Mill’s, Cole bragged that his plan was more inclusive and working-class-friendly than that of the 
great Whig reformer Lord Russell. Unlike the forays of Whig oligarchs, his plan alone would place 
the different classes on a proper “footing of equality.”609 In the manner of the anonymous 
“Reformer” of the previous subsection, Cole avowed no fear of the lower orders610; his was a 
scheme, he stated flatly, that would honor and satisfy all classes.  
For all the similarities between this trio, Cole’s contribution split from those of Creasy and 
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Pochin in one respect: he wished to preserve the small boroughs.611 This disagreement did not ruffle 
Cole’s confidence that his was the plan that would at last turn parliament into the mirror of society it 
was supposed to be and square the circle of admitting “large masses of the Working Classes” 
without “swamping” the rest of society.612 Cole’s institutions were the ones by which 
parliamentarians would finally come to “reflect and represent the opinions of their fellow 
countrymen.”613 
 Before leaving this subsection, a final point ought to be made about the relationship between 
the designers of class-specific districts and the selective lowerers analyzed earlier. I have called the 
former more “radical” than the latter, and indeed they were in the obvious sense mentioned above: 
their preferred electoral arrangements departed more widely from the arrangements in place at the 
time than the selective lowerers’ did. And yet it would be wrong to equate the greater radicalism of 
their institutional designs with a greater radicalism of social sympathies. As we have already begun to 
glimpse, and as will continue to see throughout this half of the dissertation, Victorian political 
thought is distinctly resistant to being broken down along a unitary left-right spectrum, and this is 
especially true on the subject of representation. Just as adherence to the variety-of-suffrages 
framework came in the mid-century to cut across and complicate partisan affiliation, so particular 
variations on the variety-of-suffrages theme did not correspond neatly to any rank-ordering of the 
general ideological predilections of the authors. Given that it seemed an open question to Victorians 
whether the reforms advocated by Bagehot, whose rhetoric was staunchly hostile to democracy, 
                                                 
611 Ibid., 64. 
 
612 Ibid., 1; see also 21, 67. 
 One of the most curious details of Cole’s essay is the explanation he gives of the ubiquitous use of the term 
“swamping” to signal the classist character of universal suffrage: “The use of this expressive word, as applied to the 
franchise, has received the sanction of a great thinker of the age, Ralph Waldo Emerson. As a citizen of the United 
States, he has had personal experience of the lamentable fact that the Middle Classes in that country abstain, in despair, 
from taking any part in politics, because they feel themselves ‘hopelessly swamped’”; ibid., 1. Apparently in Cole’s mind 
the Transcendentalism of New England was a cousin of the variegated-suffrage school of old England. 
 
613 Ibid., 21. Cole was here turning a quote from John Bright against Bright himself. 
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were not in fact more empowering of the working class than those of the much more democratic-
sounding Mill, it should not surprise us to observe an even greater measure of confusion reigning 
within the various variety-of-suffrages camps. 
 This point about the indistinctness with which the institutional content of a given scheme 
mapped onto wider social sensitivities is well illustrated by a feature of Cole’s essay on which we 
have not yet touched.614 This was that, despite his unfrightened stance toward working-class political 
attitudes, his endorsement of the “radical” proposition of class-specific constituencies, and his 
comparatively high allotment of sixty-nine seats for the urban working class, he saw himself as the 
champion of the (very affluently defined in his sociology) “Middle Classes.” To Cole, the reformed 
parliament, rightly understood, was anything but the middle-class triumph which its Whig patrons 
advertised it as being: “the necessity of recognising the more important members of [the Middle 
Classes] as a definite political body or class, and of assigning to them a distinct political existence, 
continues to be disregarded by our leading Statesmen.”615 It was in order to remedy this state of 
neglect toward the country’s leading class that Cole set about to develop a “scientific” assessment 
for a “new distribution of political power” that would avoid either maintaining the unsatisfactory 
status quo or bringing about “the political extinction of the Middle Classes” which he predicted, in 
Tocquevillian-Bagehotian fashion, would ultimately follow any further uniform reduction in the 
property qualification.616 His purpose was not, he stressed, to forge any “such predominance of the 
Middle Classes over any other as to render class legislation possible”; rather he sought the “just” end 
                                                 
614 Fittingly, this lesson about the indeterminacy of the connection between institutional plans and broader political 
values holds for the other schools of representation discussed in this dissertation as well. 
 
615 Ibid., 7. To drive home this message about Whig shortcomings with respect to the political position of the middle 
class, Cole chose a quote from Macaulay on “that brave, honest, and sound-hearted class” as his epigraph; ibid., title 
page. 
 
616 Ibid., 19, 22, 72-3. He quoted Democracy in America at length to the effect that “when a nation begins to meddle with 
the electoral qualification, it may easily be foreseen that, sooner or later, it will happen that that qualification will be 
entirely abolished.” 
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of ensuring to the “intelligent Middle Classes”, through the strategy of cordoning off a “first 
division” for them in the major cities, a substantial band of MPs who “would represent their 
opinions, protect their interests, and give to them a direct and practical influence in the legislation of 
the country.”617 Although it guaranteed a solid swathe of working-class MPs – outstripping both the 
projections of many contemporary competing schemes and the proportion of representatives that 
this class occupies in many democracies today – the true target of this parliamentary affirmative 
action was not the lower orders but their betters, who rightly demanded a security that they “would 
not be swamped.”618 For Cole, class-specific electorate construction was a technique not so much of 
empowerment for the working class as of insulation for the middle class. It was a technique for 
protecting those above from those below, a technique that had the advantage not only of being 
efficacious but also of being “open and direct” in its “methods.”619 Class-exclusivity was an 
instrument for delivering the good of meaningful middle-class representation in as fair, effective, and 
transparent a manner as possible.620 
Cole’s self-understanding as a promoter of justified middle-class desires for a more 
independent parliamentary presence is even more revealing of the indeterminacy about the left-right 
valence of specific schemes when compared with two figures from the previous subsection: Greg 
and Eardley-Wilmot. Cole shared with Greg a strong conviction of the sociological centrality and, 
hence, rightful political leadership of the middle class. Yet this shared conviction produced disparate 
institutional preferences, since Greg believed that the Reform of 1832 had by and large succeeded in 
                                                 
617 Ibid., 67, 56. 
 
618 Ibid., 55. 
 
619 Ibid., 28. Cole’s foil for the openness and directness of his program was the “complicated puzzling method 
propounded by Mr. Hare,” that is, proportional representation. 
 
620 Cole’s vision of class-specific constituencies as a prophylactic for upper-class influence is provocative in light of the 
recent zeal for class-based institutions in “populist” political theory. Victorian conservatism and John McCormick’s 
version of Machiavelli are surprisingly united in the wish to institutionalize class difference and guarantee separate 
“popular” representation; McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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establishing the deserved parliamentary hegemony of the middle classes, while Cole thought that 
1832 had fallen short of “procur[ing] from British statesmen a fitting recognition of their real 
political importance.”621 Though each conceived of himself as an advocate of the same social group, 
Greg’s contentment with the current structure led him to put forth little more than minor tweaks to 
the status quo in his reform writings, whereas Cole’s discontent caused him to accept fundamental 
alterations to the traditional British electoral system. 
In comparing Cole and Greg, then, we find institutional misalignment where we would have 
expected, from their seemingly common allegiance to the middle-class cause, to find alignment. 
However, in comparing Cole with another Tory, Eardley-Wilmot, we find a different sort of 
mismatch. Eardley-Wilmot, as we noted above, took his project to be a vindication of working-class 
claims, a vindication meant to reflect the greater weight which working class interests and opinions 
now objectively bore after decades of progress. This self-conception was, moreover, not inaccurate: 
he argued for policies that were genuinely expansive of the electorate both in the boroughs and the 
counties. Cole, on the other hand, was staunch in characterizing his intervention as a middle-class 
one. And yet, from a serious point-of-view, of the two proposals it was Cole’s that was the more 
supportive of the working class. You will recall that Bagehot thought the proper standard for 
measuring the degree to which a scheme improved the standing of the working classes was the 
number of seats rather than the number of voters it created – on its own the vote was a “useless” 
mirage “unless you give them some members [of the Commons] also”622 – and it is a similar sense 
that the vote rings hollow if it does not result in representatives with whom one identifies that 
underlies much contemporary public discourse on the unrepresentativeness of the American 
                                                 
621 Cole, Middle Classes, 11. 
 
622 Bagehot, “Present Aspects of Parliamentary Reform,” in CW, vol. 6, 257. 
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Congress and other national legislatures.623 Thus although Cole envisioned the move to class-specific 
districting more as a technique of insulation than as one of empowerment vis-à-vis the working 
class, by Bagehot’s rubric his proposal may very well have been more parliamentarily empowering of 
the lower orders than Eardley-Wilmot’s less concentrated, more “uniform Enfranchisement” 
program.624 (It is hard to say for sure since Eardley-Wilmot, unlike so many of our authors, provided 
no estimate of the number of seats his program would put “absolutely at their disposal.”625 Yet it is 
likely that he would have registered below Cole’s figure, since he stated that on his scheme even in 
the boroughs, which were not intended as the counties were to “represent[] the element of 
property,” “property” would not lose “its just and legitimate influence.”626) Perhaps only in the 
sociological and institutional welter that formed the backdrop to mid-Victorian political thought 
could a writer like Cole, who could barely stop lamenting for a second the political maltreatment of 
the “men who give the City its real importance,”627 wind up a solider friend of the working class than 
those whose rhetoric more vigorously trumpeted working-class claims. 
In short, what makes this period so provocative and rich from the perspective of the theory 
of representation is also what makes it so confusing and difficult to interpret: namely, that radicalism 
in institutional design was not necessarily the outcome of radicalism in social sympathies or 
ideological allegiance, nor was rhetorical boldness or authorial self-conception an accurate sign of 
the balance of power which an author actually wished to strike between the different segments of 
society. The schemes of variegated suffrage varied as much among themselves as did the array of 
                                                 
623 See e.g. Nadja Popovich and Feilding Cage, “Are you reflected in the new congress?” The Guardian USA, 6 Nov. 
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624 Eardley-Wilmot, Constitutional Plan, 32. 
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suffrages within any one of them. 
 
c) Radical Revisionism 
 The selective lowering of a Bagehot and the targeted class-specificity of a Cole did not 
exhaust the imaginativeness and boldness of reform recommendations. A final camp incorporated 
into their proposals sites of representation other than the territorially-based constituencies which 
remained the building-blocks of the schemes examined so far. In other facets as well members of 
this camp struck out further than those authors who treated an assortment of boroughs and counties 
much resembling the then-existing structure as elemental. These thinkers were as committed to the 
principle of the variegated suffrage as any of the foregoing figures, and often as` invested in showing 
the compatibility of their schemes with the venerable lineage in English politics of the non-uniform 
franchise. And yet they applied this principle in radical and revisionist ways. 
This subsection discusses four such radical revisionists. The combination of fidelity to the 
variety of suffrages with openness to profoundly remodeling the electoral-parliamentary framework 
was – unsurprisingly, as we have now seen – not limited to any one corner of the ideological 
universe. As a result, the quartet examined here includes two establishment spokesmen, one Whig 
and one Tory; a working-class radical; and a highly eccentric liberal. 
To begin with the latter: in 1857 George Harris, a failed lawyer, devoted collector and 
cataloger of old manuscripts, and writer on all manner of subjects, published an essay with the grand 
title The True Theory of Representation in a State.628 Though Harris was a close friend and protégé of the 
                                                 
628 Harris, The True Theory of Representation in a State (London: Longmans, Brown, Green, and Roberts, 1857). The subtitle 
encapsulates much of importance about the descriptive theory and the pluralistic sociological outlook that undergirded 
it: or, The Leading Interests of the Nation, Not the Mere Predominance of Numbers, Proved to Be Its Basis. On Harris personally, see 
E. I. Carlyle, “Harris, George (1809–1890),” rev. Catherine Pease-Watkin, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12389]. 
 Saunders classes Harris with Tory writers in the one mention he gives him, but it is unlikely that Harris was 
affiliated with the Tories and certain (as we will see) that his aim was not to “shore up the Tory interest or increase the 
representation of the land”; Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, 61. It is much more likely that Harris identified as a Whig, 
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statesman Henry Brougham, whose quintessentially Whig insights about the role of a free press in 
bolstering political stability we examined in part one, the True Theory was anything but a text typical 
of the Whig milieu. In truth, Harris’s essay reads as a slightly crazed document, at least when judged 
against the unadorned and straightforward character of most Victorian political writing. It is full of 
scholastic jargon and elaborate corporeal metaphors for the polity reminiscent of an earlier age, and 
its prose is strikingly impenetrable for a text envisioned not only as a philosophical treatise on the 
“first principles of political government, and of parliamentary representation,” but also as a practical 
contribution to the ongoing debates about parliamentary reform.629 
Harris’s tract was atypical not just stylistically, but substantively as well. In stark contrast to 
the general philosophical tenor of the period, sketched in chapter two, Harris operated in an 
explicitly combinatory framework, attempting to marry claims of “natural right” – of “an undoubted 
and inalienable right” to vote – with the utilitarian and historicist modes of thought dominant in 
these decades.630 Harris was one of the rare authors outside of the Idealist tradition of the end of the 
century to see any merit in the proposition that “the enfranchisement of the people was an end in 
itself,”631 though insofar as he placed some value in premises other than the utility-, interest-, and 
diversity-based ones which characterized the school of mirroring representation he was quite close 
                                                                                                                                                             
given his close relationship with Brougham, his association with the predominantly Whig British and Foreign Review, and 
his decision to write a biography of the Whig Chancellor the First Earl of Hardwicke (The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
[London: Edward Moxon, 1847]). While the preface to the True Theory does make mention of two Tory reformers 
(Eardley-Wilmot, whom we have already encountered, and Augustus Stapleton, whom will we encounter in this section), 
these mentions were not intended to show that Harris was of their party but rather to show that he was beyond party. He 
was displaying bipartisanship in showing that his researches appealed to those of “opposite politics and opinions”; True 
Theory, vi-vii. 
 
629 Ibid., viii. The True Theory was hardly Harris’s only work to be found lacking in accessibility. In his later Philosophical 
Treatise on the Nature and Constitution of Man (1876) he “reverted to the principles and terminology of the medieval 
schoolmen, and he completely ignored the methods and conclusions of contemporary scientific psychology”; Carlyle, 
“Harris, George.” The historian W.L. Burn called the True Theory a “pseudo-philosophical and far from lucid work”; 
Burn, “The Fancy Franchises,” Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 8 (1954): 240-245, 243. 
 
630 Harris, True Theory, 58, 20. 
 
631 Green, “Parliamentary Reform,” Speech of 25 February 1868, in CW, vol. 5, 234. 
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to John Stuart Mill.632 Harris stood outside the mainstream political culture, although in the company 
of some influential minds, in taking the vote to be a natural entitlement of (male) citizens. 
Yet for Harris as for Mill these ideas contained only part of the truth. Where Mill went on to 
clarify that from an equal right to vote it did not follow that there was a right to an equal numbers of 
votes, and that therefore plural voting violated no fundamental norms of political equality,633 Harris 
accompanied his egalitarian proclamations with the clarification that a natural right to the suffrage 
did not entail that constituencies be constructed in a sociologically undifferentiated manner.634 The 
half-truths of “the numerical or democratic theory” were, instead, to be subordinated to the 
exigencies of making “the representative body in a State” “an epitome or abridgment of whole civil 
body or community” that could “fairly reflect or shadow forth the form or outline of it.”635 The 
parliamentary image which a democratic suffrage would produce would be distorted and partial, 
because the uniformity of its electoral regulations was out-of-sync with the diversity that 
characterized the “general and leading interests of the state.”636 Consequently the actual endeavor to 
design representative institutions was to be guided by principles which were distinct from and which 
superseded the egalitarian implications of a freestanding subscription to natural rights. These 
principles which were to regulate institutional design came in the form of “four distinct axioms”: 
1. That all the essential and real interests of the State ought to be represented in its legislative 
assembly. 2. That they ought all to be directly represented there. 3. That each ought to be 
                                                 
632 Mill likewise declared, contra Bagehot’s untroubled assertion that “to have a good Parliament, we must disfranchise 
some good constituents,” that it was “a personal injustice to withhold from anyone…the ordinary privilege of having his 
voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs”; Mill, Considerations, 469. 
 
633 Mill, Considerations, ch. 8. 
 
634 Modern democratic theory remains split on this question of whether sociological undifferentiation is demanded by 
the value of political equality. For a negative answer, see Charles Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), chs. 6-7; for an affirmative one, see Jonathan Still, “Political Equality and 
Election Systems,” vol. 91, no. 3 (1981), 375-94. The question of what equality demanded with respect to the suffrage 
was most thoroughly broached in the Victorian era during the debate about PR, which will come up in chapter six. 
 
635 Harris, True Theory, 18, 23-4. 
 
636 Ibid., 9. 
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represented in due proportion to its relative importance. 4. That they ought so to be 
represented that, as much as possible, they may all harmonise together.637 
 
Thus, for all of his rhetorical and philosophical heterodoxy, at the end of the day the core Whig 
tenets of descriptive representation won out in Harris’s vision of parliament. It is a testament to the 
gravitational pull of the theory in this era that even a part-scholastic, part-natural-rights theorist – 
just about as strange a species of political animal as existed in the Victorian ecosystem – would 
nevertheless give a quite orthodox list of standards for the construction of national assemblies. 
The a priorist egalitarian strand of Harris’s thought was not, as we will see below, mere 
hollow words. But it was not on the terrain of natural rights that the action of the book took place. 
For the natural-rights strain dictated simply that as many people be enfranchised as possible. But 
how was this desired mass enfranchisement to be accomplished in such a way that distortion and 
partiality were prevented from afflicting the image of society created in the assembly? 
Harris’s answer was simple: by undoing 1832. In contradistinction to several of the other 
variety-of-suffragists who pushed for another measure of reform on the grounds both that the 
uniformizing tendency of the First Reform Act was harmful and that recent developments in society 
had caused its sociological accuracy to deteriorate, Harris was completely uninterested in the latter of 
these reasons. In another interesting departure from the norms of his period, no narratives of 
historical progress enter into his thinking. The evils of 1832 did not require a subtle grasp of recent 
social history to be understood.  
On Harris’s evaluation, the Reform Act was a disastrous piece of legislation– so bad that it 
pulled off the difficult feat of possessing seemingly contradictory deficiencies. On the one hand, by 
diminishing the extent of differentiation in the franchise, it proceeded implicitly on the principle that 
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“numbers” alone were to be “taken into consideration in the establishment of this system.”638 And 
yet, because the government that passed Reform lacked the courage of its democratic convictions, 
the Act imposed censitary requirements that left vital components of British life out of the system 
altogether: “freemen, and those who were distinguished by the uneuphonious title of ‘pot-wallopers,’ 
and as ‘scot-and-lot’ voters, were all engulphed together in the merciless abyss of this tremendous 
measure.”639 The entire “popular element” of the state had been swept aside.640 Hence the result of 
1832 was a wholly “defective representation.”641 In the aftermath of this great legislative folly, the 
task facing the architect of parliamentary reconstruction was to restore the principle of electoral 
variety to its former preeminence and to target it such that it would “correspond with… the 
different interests of the State.”642 A more complete and accurate mirror of society through more 
finely targeted electoral diversity: this was the lesson of the True Theory. 
For all of his eccentricities, when Harris set out to provide this mirror he followed the 
method of institutional construction implicit in the variety-of-suffrages theory with a notable 
                                                 
638 Ibid., 43. The Whig makers of the Act would obviously (and correctly) have disputed the identification of a reduction 
in the variety in the franchise with the endorsement of universal suffrage. After all, given certain sociological views 
compression of the representative system could stem just as easily from the mirror theory as diversification. 
 
639 Ibid., 18. 
 
640 Ibid., 19. This is not say that Harris thought property qualifications were simply oligarchic; he allowed that there was 
some sense to the older idea that a minimal property requirement could enhance popular representation. The argument 
for the populist interpretation of censitary thresholds went as follows: (a) a property threshold was a sign of 
independence; (b) dependent citizens were corruptible; (c) corruption rendered the assembly unrepresentative of public 
opinion. Hence it was possible to defend property restrictions “not from any jealousy of the people partaking too largely 
in the representation, but in order to prevent the legitimate influence of the people being unduly swayed by those who 
are possessed of wealth and power,” although Harris himself dissented from this view; ibid., 20. For this defense of 
property restrictions in the American context, see Alex Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the 
United States (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 10, 22, 322. 
 
641 Ibid., 42. For Harris there was another reason, supplementing this sociological inaccuracy, to reject the censitary 
baseline for the suffrage. This was that it sent an overly materialist message about the nation’s values; it promoted “the 
money-loving spirit of the age”; ibid., 18. Frederick Denison Maurice, a Christian socialist who will be discussed in 
chapter five, lodged an identical critique against the reformed parliament’s property requirements for “mak[ing] money 
the standard of worth, the characteristic glory of the citizen”; Maurice, The Workman and the Franchise (London: Alexander 
Strahan, 1866), ix. See also Holyoake’s linkage of the Reform Act’s property requirements with “that worship of 
materialism and property which is attaining a deplorable prevalence in England, so destructive of the finer qualities of 
man”; Holyoake, The Workman and the Suffrage (London: Holyoake & Co., 1859), 8. 
 
642 Harris, True Theory, 59. 
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scrupulosity and clearness. As noted earlier, if the accurate reflection of interests was the basis of a 
representative assembly’s legitimacy, it followed that an account of what those interests were had to 
precede any attempt at institutional design, lest the electoral regulations enacted produce a 
composition of representatives that was, judged against the facts about the societal distribution of 
interests, arbitrary and ill-sorted. Harris obliged, carrying out a preliminary exercise in sociology 
before setting forth his own proposal. Interestingly, and contrasting with the bulk of his 
differentiated-suffrage comrades (although not, as was noted, with Bagehot), Harris candidly 
confessed the challenging character of the sociological enterprise: the “definition and adjustment of 
these different…interests,” the inquiry “into the nature and relative importance of the different great 
interests of the State,” was hardly self-evident: it was “a task of considerable difficulty, and may 
admit of very wide discussion.”643 His prose may have been opaque, but he was committed to 
practicing the mirror theory conscientiously and according to the proper order of operations, as well 
as to acknowledging its difficulties. 
Harris’s admission that answers to the sociological question were disputable may well have 
been in response to startled pushback at his own notion of the makeup of the nation. For Harris 
offered a distinctive, not to say bizarre, reading of the constitutive elements of British society. 
Indeed, in keeping with his unusual anti-contextualism and indifference toward recent social-
historical changes, it was not entirely clear that his sociology was even a sociology of Britain, as 
opposed to some kind of deduction from a vision of the a priori necessary characteristics that 
inhered in the concept of a society; as he explained in the midst of the sociological portion of the 
book, he was striving to illuminate how “every political body is…as extensively and as essentially 
influenced by different interests, as it is constituted of different individuals.”644 From this murky 
                                                 
643 Ibid., 24-5, 22. 
 
644 Ibid., 24, my italics. 
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deductive process Harris emerged with a six-fold classification of the interests for which 
representation had to be secured: “I. Virtue. II. Intelligence. III. Order. IV. Property. V. 
Professional. VI. Popular.”645 (It is worth noting en passant the resemblance between Harris’s 
hypostasis of norms and attributes into real social entities such as to extend the realm of what it was 
possible to represent and the expansive view of representation which Pierre Rosanvallon supports 
and theorizes today.646) It is only possible here to sketch the content of the categories as presented in 
the True Theory, which contains in-depth explorations of each one, but it is nonetheless important to 
give some impression of what Harris conceived as falling under these headings. By virtue, Harris 
meant those institutions and stations of life that were particularly associated with “religion and 
morality” and the “principle of rectitude,” chief among which were the clergy, which Harris came 
close to envisioning as an estate of the realm in the manner of ancien régime France; this “interest” 
was to a marginal degree already satisfied by “the presence of the bishops in the House of Lords,” 
but since the upper house had ceased to play an important role in legislation it was imperative to 
find a point of entry for them into the Commons.647 By intelligence, Harris hoped for the expansion of 
the tenet of the university constituency into a “distinct and independent separate representation” of 
“learned bodies” and groups of highly educated citizens.648 The third category, order, was the least 
readily comprehensible of all; in the abstract he wanted to comprehend all those social avenues 
through which the values of “law,” “justice,” and “allegiance” were realized, though in the concrete 
he seems mostly to have been concerned to maintain the large number of “lawyers” in the House.649 
The final triumvirate of property, professional, and popular referred to more familiar demographic groups 
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646 See especially Rosanvallon, La légitimité démocratique: Impartialité, reflexivité, proximité (Paris: Seuil, 2008). 
 
647 Harris, True Theory, 25, 27. 
 
648 Ibid., 28-9. 
 
649 Ibid., 30-1. 
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– with the latter, which he also titled “the people generally, more especially…the poor,” constituting, 
he stressed, as “essential [a] branch of the community” as any other.650 Such was the unique and 
confusing medley of pieces which made up (British?) society on Harris’s reckoning, and which it was 
the obligation of the designer of a representative system to convey accurately into the assembly. 
Before outlining the institutions which he believed were dictated by this analysis, it is 
worthwhile to make a final observation about the sociological side of his theory. This is that, counter 
to most of his variety-of-suffrages cohort, Harris was careful to distinguish between the mirroring 
that was required to create a satisfactory assembly and a complete mirror that would reflect every 
aspect of social reality. The parliamentary mirror was for Harris a necessarily selective one. For one 
thing, a distinction had to be drawn between the “real and true interests [which] should be 
represented” and those “influences,” such as “anarchy and corruption,” which, however great their 
effect on society, were to be kept out on the grounds of their harmfulness.651 He illustrated the point 
about the selectivity of the genre of descriptive representation to which he adhered with the example 
of “the thieves and pickpockets of London” who, despite being “a very numerous, a most 
intelligent, and a particularly industrious body of men,” had never been made the subject of a 
“formal complaint…to Parliament that they are not adequately represented there” – even though, he 
continued cheekily, “ if they were so represented, great ameliorations in our criminal code might 
through their aid be effected.”652  
The discriminations requisite for the composition of the representative body were not 
                                                 
650 Ibid., 35-6. He employed, as was his wont, a corporeal metaphor for clarification: “the people are to a State what the 
body and the vital functions are to a man, the care of which…it is absolutely essential should obtain a due share of 
attention”; ibid., 36. 
 
651 Ibid., 37. Jane Mansbridge similarly accepts the need for normative selectivity in descriptive representation today: 
“The process of choosing representatives should select to some degree against those views that are useless or harmful to 
the polity as a whole”; Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 
‘Yes,’” Journal of Politics, vol. 61, no. 3 (1999), 634. 
 
652 Harris, True Theory, 14. 
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limited simply to guarding against the inclusion of obviously pernicious social factors. Within the 
class of “true and real” interests a division had to be made between those the nature of which was to 
participate in the representative system and those which “require no representatives” in “the 
legislature”; he gave, as instances of the latter group, the “judicial, and naval, and military interests of 
the nation.”653 He did not, however, set forth criteria for separating these two groups of real interests 
– one might call them the representation-necessitating and representation-excluding interests – assuming, it 
seems, that the matter would be obvious to readers. 
It should be clear that Harris did not think these selections would be particularly 
controversial; he was decidedly not granting that there was a space of indeterminacy or that 
reasonable disagreement about the distribution of interests to be included in parliament. He thought 
he was merely making the commonsensical (though often unaddressed or elided) point that 
representative government did not entail the reproduction simpliciter of society; representativeness 
did not mean indiscriminateness or comprehensiveness in imaging society. But in facing up to the 
truth that the sociological work entailed by the theory of the differentiated franchise inevitably 
involved a layer of judgment, a screening process about what and what not to include, which was 
not reducible to simply reading off the collection of elements that in toto constituted the nation, 
Harris came much closer than his fellow variety-of-suffragists to acknowledging that the sociological 
component of their projects was not a solely neutral or empirical accounting of social facts.654 
 What was the institutional result of this process of sociological deduction, classification, and 
                                                 
653 Ibid., 38. 
 
654 We might go so far as to draw a parallel between these remarks of Harris on the theory of descriptive representation 
and Fitzjames Stephen’s thoughts on the theory of legislation more generally. Where, as we saw in chapter two, Stephen 
pronounced “neutrality” in lawmaking to be impossible even for the most liberal of governments, Harris claimed that it 
was simply unavoidable that even the most “genuine, liberal, and comprehensive” design of representative institutions 
would involve a selectivity about which features of society to include; ibid., 95. Harris was not as perspicuous as Stephen, 
though, and certainly did not grasp the full implications of what he was saying on the topic. 
 This theme of the questionable neutrality or self-evidence of the sociologies on which variety-of-suffrages 
schemes were founded is the subject of chapter five, section two. 
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discrimination? By a path which is not easy to re-trace, and which is not especially relevant for our 
purposes, he arrived at a four-fold division of types of seats: (1) “learned, professional, and 
commercial corporate bodies”; (2) “property voters”; (3) “professional voters”; (4) “personal 
voters.”655 Each of these divisions was to receive 150 members, and each was to be voted for only 
by those in the relevant identity group. The composition of the second and third kinds of 
constituencies should be clear. The fourth consisted of all those (literate) men who were not 
enfranchised under one of the preceding headings; it corresponded to the “popular interest.” The 
first and least clear category was a collection of bodies – ranging from universities to the Bank of 
England, from the East India Company to the London Stock Exchange, from mining companies to 
canal companies – to which anywhere from one to a half-dozen seats were granted and for which 
“membership, proprietorship, or annual subscription” conferred the vote.656 
 This plan was, quite obviously, a radical modification of the then-current arrangements. It 
incorporated class-specific constituencies657 in a more far-reaching way than the applications of it 
examined in the previous sub-section. Where the latter envisaged a twofold division in a selection of 
urban boroughs, Harris advocated a tripartite division (categories 2-4) for “every town and county 
constituency.”658 Further, he promoted a vast expansion of non-territorial membership-based 
constituencies which, as mentioned above, existed in the reformed system only in the form of seats 
for Cambridge, Oxford, and Dublin Universities. Harris was striking out far from the normal 
parliamentary path, redesigning the system, one can say without much exaggeration, from the 
ground up. And yet the inspiration for this revisionism – the end to which all of these 
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657 This term is appropriate to Harris only if we keep in mind the broad notion of class operative in Mackintosh; in 
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658 Ibid., 57. 
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unconventional means were directed – was, as we have seen, perfectly orthodox: “that every class 
may be independently represented, and that no one class may overwhelm the interests of the others” 
and “virtually disfranchise” them.659 
 Apart from these glaring alterations, several other features of Harris’s plan deserve mention. 
First, it reduced the size of the Commons from 658 to 600 members. Second, this reduction, as well 
as the carving out of seats for corporate bodies, was to be effected entirely at the expense of the 
small boroughs. As with Pochin in the previous section, Harris did not lament the passing of the 
small boroughs, for he attributed to them no special sociological value; since they “represent[ed] no 
particular interest,” they could be jettisoned without any diminution of representativeness.660 
 Third, the plan involved plural voting. Plural voting in the True Theory did not take the more 
familiar form of weighted voting, that is, graduating the number of votes that an elector possessed 
within a single constituency according to the amount of property owned (as the future Tory Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury, then Lord Robert Cecil, was urging661) or the degree of education attained 
(as in Mill’s version of plural voting). Instead, plural voting took place on Harris’s scheme insofar as 
the citizen could exercise one vote in each constituency for which he qualified for the suffrage.662 (This 
form of plural voting already existed in the Victorian era – owners of property could vote both in 
their place of residence and the place in which their property lay, and university alumni could vote 
both for their university seats and in the appropriate territorial constituencies.663) 
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663 Like the university vote, this latter form of plural voting – the so-called “business vote” in multiple constituencies – 
persisted in England until 1948; see Reeve and Ware, Electoral Systems, 25, 63; Neal Blewett, “The Franchise in the United 
Kingdom: 1885-1918,” Past & Present, no. 32, 44-7. The final remnants of plural voting in local elections were not 
removed until 1968; Enid Lakeman, How Democracies Vote, third edition (London: Faber & Faber, 1970), 59-60. 
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 The most important observation to make about Harris’s version of plural voting is that it 
was not an exception to the sociological representativeness which oriented his theory; it did not 
originate in some other set of paternalist or elitist values. The rationale for the electoral structures of 
the True Theory was sociological and descriptive all the way down. Consequently, when a wealthy 
Edinburgh doctor who had bought land was permitted to vote for the seats belonging to his 
university, the college of surgeons in the city, and the professional and property constituencies in his 
borough, while the Manchester working man was enfranchised only for the popular constituency in 
which he lived, this discrepancy did not register the former’s moral-intellectual superiority or the 
greater economic “stake” which the former had in the body politic. The Edinburgh doctor’s greater 
number of votes was, rather, meant to reflect the greater multifariousness of his social participation; 
since he partook of or entered into a broader swathe of the manifold interests that constituted 
society, a mirroring suffrage could not but enfranchise him many times over. The (so to speak) more 
variegated person would necessarily (and rightly) be more multiply enfranchised by a system of 
variegated suffrage.664 Plural voting was not chosen as an end or good for its own sake, but was an 
ineluctable byproduct of the consistent implementation of the electoral mechanisms of mirroring. 
Such, at least, was Harris’s interpretation of what he was doing: every provision of his plan was 
dedicated to producing an assembly “not only more fair for the various great interests of the State, 
but…more liberal” and better able “to secure an efficient representation of the mass of the people, 
than any which has been either devised or demanded.”665  
The purely sociological-descriptive valence of Harris’s acceptance of plural voting can be 
usefully contrasted with Mill’s endorsement of weighted voting. For Mill, plural voting was not a 
downstream result of fidelity to the goal of representativeness; a “graduate suffrage” based on 
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education was, rather, a good in itself, an expression of fundamental values which it would it be “in 
principle wrong” for the representative system to ignore.666 Weighted voting was a matter of 
respecting the truth “that every one is entitled to some influence, but the better and wiser to more 
than others”; not to graduate the suffrage was to countenance the “false creed” that “any one 
man…is as good as any other.”667 To Mill the normative sphere from which plural voting issued was 
quite other than that of representativeness and descriptive accuracy; it came from a moral-political 
elitism that was distinct from the world of values which Harris thought relevant to the design of 
representative institutions.668 For Harris but not for Mill, social realities, and not elitist lessons, were 
the only subject matter of the representative system. 
The eschewal of elitism in his electoral architecture segues smoothly into the fourth and final 
feature of the theory that merits attention, namely, that of all the interests into which Harris 
dissected society it was the “poor” or “popular” element which he believed was most benefitted by 
his scheme. Under the unrepresentative structure put into effect by the Reform Act no group was 
“suffer[ing] more than the one comprehended in Class VI”; a principal motivation of Harris’s 
intervention was to bring about a reversal of their fortunes.669 From no voice at all in parliament, he 
wished to lift them to occupancy of a quarter of the seats – an “influence” which was sufficiently 
“extensive” to reflect their sociological significance, and which would at last give them “fair sway” in 
the House.670 He was so confident in the robustness of the popular component of his plan that he 
predicted that it would put an end to democratic agitation: “all sincere radicals, all the advocates for 
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universal suffrage and for the general extension of the franchise” would be satisfied to learn that the 
true principles of “fair representation” called for such an impactful transfer of power to the lower 
class.671 (It would, naturally, also satisfy the “Conservative Party” since it would “ensure the fair 
representation of intelligence, and property, and the higher influences of the State.”672 The True 
Theory was, hence, the path to national reconciliation.) Harris thought his program was one of 
popular liberation – not liberation, of course, for Class VI to become a “despot” or to seize “the 
only influence, or the predominating influence” in parliament, for no class was entitled to such 
standing.673 But liberation, nevertheless, in what was to him the only sense that accorded with the 
values of representative government – that is, for the electoral structure to enable groups of citizens to 
participate independently and with due weight in the forum of national legislation. 
Harris perceived a kinship between his proposal and an essay by one Augustus Stapleton. In 
fact, as we will see in the next chapter, the connection between their ideas was imperfect. Harris, 
however, appears to have been eager to build bridges, and he welcomed work which, even if 
indifferent to his notion of proper “first principles,” helped to reinforce “practical” convictions in 
favor of his kind of scheme.674 Although he is the uneasiest fit of all the authors considered in this 
chapter, it is worth looking briefly at his essay, since it both contained a radical revision of the 
electoral system and expressed sympathy with the model of inclusive and variegated suffrage. 
While we have examined conservative entries into the variety-of-suffrages catalog above, 
Stapleton’s Suggestions for a Conservative and Popular Reform exceeded these writings in the 
vociferousness with which it announced its allegiance to the Tory party. After having served in his 
twenties as the private secretary to Tory Prime Minister George Canning (about whom he would 
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write multiple biographical works), Stapleton became deeply devoted to propagating the Tory 
cause.675 On the subject of reform, his rhetorical and political strategy hung largely on outflanking 
the Whigs and revealing them as betrayers of their own values of variety and representativeness. 
With the opposition discredited, political space would open for the Tories to step in with their own 
sociologically-rich project of reform. The Suggestions thus advanced in two stages: 1) an assault on the 
Whigs; 2) the exposition of a suitable Tory alternative. 
 Stapleton’s attack on the Whigs centered on the 1832 Reform Act, of which he had an even 
lower opinion than Harris. His critique was sweeping and multidimensional; some of it is not 
relevant to our discussion, and some of it will be treated in the following chapter. At this juncture 
what is most important about his critique is that it condemned the Reform Act for the diminution of 
parliament’s representativeness through the elimination of “the direct representation of the poor.”676 
Stapleton presented 1832 as an exercise in Whig hypocrisy: he contrasted the Whig philosophy that 
the Commons should be a mirror the sentiments of the nation with the outcome of the law, which 
was to have impaired the representation of the “various classes and different interests which make 
up this entire nation.”677 As we saw with Harris, Stapleton traced the uniformization effected by 
Reform to the tacit acceptance of the “numerical majority” or “the democratick power” as the sole 
foundation for parliamentary legitimacy, and he explained the imposition of the censitary 
requirement as a failure of courage and consistency on the part of the Reformers.678 The practice of 
the Reform Act was that only property ought to have a voice in government; its principle, on the 
other hand, was that only the “mere will” of the majority, rather than the full extent of the nation’s 
                                                 
675 W. P. Courtney, “Stapleton, Augustus Granville (1800/01–1880),” rev. John Wolffe, Oxford Dictionary of National 
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676 Stapleton, Suggestions for a Conservative and Popular Reform (London: Published for Hatchard, and Ridgway, Piccadilly, 
1850), 46. 
 
677 Ibid., 35-6. He presented the Whig, pro-diversity point-of-view through a series of quotations from Russell. 
 
678 Ibid., 37. 
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diversity, had a claim to be present in the assembly.679 And these two adverse notions, which only a 
law as deeply flawed as the Reform Act could manage to combine, were equally far from the truth 
about parliament. 
 After having dispatched the legacy of 1832, Stapleton delivered his own prescriptions for 
reform. In this constructive phase he was much less rigorous in adhering to the mirroring method of 
electoral design than was Harris; indeed, contra Harris, he did not precede the institutional sketch 
with a sociology of any sophistication. This was not just a result of sloppiness; the absence of deep 
sociological inquiry stemmed as well from Stapleton’s only partial commitment to the theory of 
descriptive representation (a theme which will be resumed in the next chapter). But despite this 
divergence, the general shape of Stapleton’s institutions resembled Harris’s in several major ways. 
Two are of particular significance here.  
First, under the rather capacious heading of representation for “the learning and education 
of the country,” he assigned fifty-eight seats directly to a series of corporate bodies (many of which 
would reappear in Harris’s longer and more creative list) ranging from the Inns of Court to retired 
military servicemen to the clergy of both established and dissenting churches.680 These seats were to 
be made available through the consolidation of small boroughs which, in contrast to these bodies, 
could make no claims to possessing particular knowledge or interests. Stapleton was thereby 
executing a massive transfer of seats away from territorial constituencies – territory, again, was being 
downgraded in favor of another method of recognizing relevant and representable groups. 
Second, Stapleton also made provision for the reentry of “the poor man” within the pale of 
the constitution.681 In order that “the poor should have some persons chosen by themselves to 
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explain their sentiments and state their grievances to the legislature,” he suggested that twenty-six 
seats be regulated on the very inclusive “Scot and Lot” franchise, one seat being allocated to each of 
twenty-six geographical divisions based on the dioceses of the Anglican Church.682 This was a much 
smaller number than Harris granted his “popular element,” and it was lower than the more modest 
totals of the plans which sought working-class enfranchisement within major urban boroughs alone. 
But, despite the smaller sum, Stapleton shared with Harris the aspiration to achieve a truly national 
representation of the poor, as opposed to the projects of sociological discrimination that sought the 
enfranchisement of the advanced segments of the working class alone. 
Though less empowering of them, Stapleton’s plan was thus more inclusive of the working 
classes than the selective-tailoring or urban class-specific schemes surveyed above. Hence we 
encounter another version of the paradox noted above whereby the First Reform Act widened the 
electorate while also increasing its exclusiveness: Stapleton’s proposal gave fewer seats to the lower 
classes than his competitors’, but it enfranchised these classes more completely. From the 
democratic, or the liberal, perspective of the twenty-first-century reader, which is normatively 
preferable: Stapleton’s proposal of broad enfranchisement but a smaller working-class presence in 
the Commons, or Cole’s and Pochin’s narrower and more selective enfranchisement coupled with a 
larger allotment of working-class seats? 
 A third radical revisionist, Henry George Grey, the Third Earl Grey, was almost the 
diametric political opposite of Stapleton. While Stapleton was a Tory spokesman, Grey was a leader 
of mid-century Whiggery, one of the party’s most prominent politicians and most prolific publicists, 
as well as the scion of one of its great families. Befitting his paternity – he was the son of the prime 
minister who had passed the Reform Act – Grey’s reformism was not tinged with sourness toward 
1832; unlike Stapleton, whose writing conveys a kind of annoyance at having to participate in a 
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project of parliamentary redesign, an annoyance overcome only by the urgency of recovering from 
the damage wreaked by the Whigs, Grey took up the mantle of reform without misgivings. Re-
entering the terrain of electoral-parliamentary design was not, for him, a repudiation of 1832 but a 
proceeding that carried on its “wisdom.”683 
Continuing in the spirit of 1832 did not mean leaving its measures uncriticized. Remarkably, 
given the identity of his father, Grey voiced the same dissatisfaction with the homogenizing aspects 
of 1832 so common in this generation: 
It was likewise, in my opinion, an error in the Reform Act (but in the circumstances of the 
time an inevitable one), that it gave the whole Representation of the country to 
constituencies which were everywhere so much of the same character. The former 
distinction, with respect to the nature of the Franchise between Counties and Boroughs, was 
indeed kept up, but the great diversity which had prevailed in the right of voting in different 
Boroughs was almost entirely done away with; and in spite of some reservation of vested 
rights, the £10 householders were made everywhere the masters of the town representation. 
It has been argued, and I think with justice, that though there were obvious and decisive 
objections to the capricious manner in which the Franchise varied in different Boroughs 
under the old constitution of the House of Commons, this arrangement, with all its faults, 
had yet the advantage of giving a better representation to some classes of society than they 
now enjoy.684 
 
Like Greg, Grey saw the Reform Act as fundamentally a work of electoral compression. By its 
provisions the political influence of both the poor and “the higher class of the town population” had 
been reduced.685 But where Greg celebrated this diminution of the representation of the 
socioeconomic extremes, judging it to stem from the just recognition of the preeminence of the 
educated, industrial, commercial middle-classes above the other segments of British society, Grey 
lamented that this compression had been taken too far. As a result the country was now perilously 
close to being ruled by one class alone: 
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685 Ibid., 118. Pace Greg, for whom the traditional landed aristocracy was the group at the top that had been most 
diminished politically, Grey did not express consternation about the reduction of its influence in particular. The object 
of Grey’s concern in this passage seems more likely to have coincided with what Mill meant by the “most intellectual 
persons of the kingdom” who lived in these cities. 
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Under the Reform Act, the £10 householders are everywhere masters of the Borough 
elections, and thus the middle class to which they belong is invested not with a 
preponderance (which it is admitted it ought to have), but with a monopoly of political 
power, to the injury of the working class on the one side, and of the highest class of the 
town population on the other.686 
 
The light of decades of subsequent experience had exposed that, accompanying its great successes 
(such as counteracting corruption), the Reform Act had damaged the Commons qua mirror of 
society. The second act of the reform movement would therefore need to incorporate variegation 
into the electoral structure in order to repair its machinery for descriptiveness and inclusiveness. 
 The difficulty was that, in Grey’s eyes, there was no possibility of reviving the variety of 
suffrages in anything resembling its old form. The arbitrary, haphazard character of the unreformed 
assortment of suffrages had been acceptable when it was revered as an organic growth, a heritage 
passed down by centuries of success in constitutional government. But to impose, through 
parliamentary legislation, distinctions without differences – to pass new laws granting the vote, as 
Bagehot and others were advocating, to the “artisan in Manchester” while withholding it from the 
identical “artisan in Macclesfield” – would not be tolerated in mid-century Britain.687 What was 
needed in this more modern, more rationalized political environment was a way for the diverse 
elements of society to gain access to parliament without instituting a new set of locally varied 
suffrages. 
 How was one to achieve a sociologically satisfactory inclusion of the salient divisions in 
                                                 
686 Ibid., 118. See also 206: “The changes made by the Reform Act, and especially the abolition of the various rights of 
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687 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 223. While Bagehot and company were correct in retrospectively placing a high value 
on the unreformed variegated franchise, they were wrong in prospectively recommending it as the next stage of reform: 
“The fact that the former variety in the rights of voting did, at least to a certain degree, answer the purpose described, 
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such arbitrary differences to exist between different places”; Grey, Parliamentary Government, 214. 
 Grey was here simply applying to the topic of the suffrage the idea, familiar in nineteenth-century political 
thought, that variety, however salutary, was extremely fragile when confronted with the standardizing tendencies of 
modern reformism. Constant gave a characteristic statement of it; although “the freest country in our world, Great 
Britain, is governed by very diversified laws,” it was unfortunately true that “this variety could hardly serve as a model” 
for theorizing or designing institutions from scratch; Constant, Principles of Politics, 155. 
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society without recourse to a mode of suffrage that had become an anachronism? Grey articulated 
more the intimations of a plan, a list of the pieces that a satisfactory reform would have to include, 
than an actionable scheme.688 Yet the general thrust was clear: supplementing the local constituency 
with other units of representation. “The present facilities of communication,” he urged, could be 
utilized to enable “men united together not by living in one place, but by engaging in some common 
pursuit” to vote for “a common Representative.”689 This transcendence of territoriality as the 
grounding for the distribution of seats would allow for representatives elected exclusively by specific 
“classes” and “industries.”690 Grey did not descend into detail regarding the allocation of seats to 
particular classes, professions, and sectors of the economy, but three aspects of his sketch stand 
out.691 First, much like Harris, he emphasized that the most important beneficiary of these quotas 
would be “working men.”692 Second, there was an openness to his call for profession-based 
representation that even the zeal of Harris to catalogue and integrate the existing corporate bodies 
did not rival: Grey seems to have envisioned that even professions which had not already developed 
civil-society associations should be organized for the purpose of sending a member to parliament.693 
Third, in contrast to the other authors examined heretofore, he empowered the Commons to hold 
                                                 
688 On the way Grey thought about his proposals, see James Winter, “The Cave of Adullam and Parliamentary Reform,” 
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689 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 214. The thought that “modern technologies of communication and locomotion” 
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692 Ibid., 213. 
 
693 “I am not aware of any reason why those who have worked in certain trades for a given time should not be registered 
and formed into a corporate body with the right of electing Members of the House of Commons”; ibid., 213. 
 Grey’s work in particular reveals the continuity between the more radical version of the English mirror theory 
and the continental tradition of corporatist representation; on the latter, see Anthony Black, Guild and State: European 
Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ, 2003), part 3. 
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internal elections. These intra-Commons elections were for two groups of members: (a) twelve-to-
fifteen life-tenured members of special eminence or expertise694; (b) a supplement of a “limited 
number of Members” that would enable the party in government to hold a more stable majority.695 
 Summing up Grey’s place in this tradition is not a straightforward task.696 On the one hand, 
he is almost an emblem of the theory of the differentiated suffrage. His endorsement of it as a leader 
of mid-Victorian Whiggery and the son of the second Earl testifies to its mainstream appeal in the 
period, and his willingness to embrace creative innovations of the electoral fabric evinces the 
resources for institutional redesign inherent in the theory. For Grey, the variety of suffrages was as 
eternal in its status as a truth of representative government as it was adaptable in its applications to 
particular political contexts. On the other hand, he endorsed reforms that accorded uneasily with the 
tradition: the third of the proposals considered in the previous paragraph, as will emerge in the next 
chapter, undercut or at least stood in tension with core normative values of the theory; and his 
endorsement of a form of minority representation, the cumulative vote, took him into terrain 
foreign to that of the differentiated suffrage. 
 The ambiguous philosophical position underlying Grey’s relationship to the variety-of-
suffrages school did not trouble, of all people, G.J. Holyoake, the atheist and socialist whom we saw 
in chapter two developing Mill’s theory of toleration into a demanding ethic of a harmonious public 
sphere. Holyoake cited Grey as an exemplary writer on reform697; this alignment of figures so 
disparate in their politics and social backgrounds illustrates pointedly the diffusion of this vision of 
representation, corroborating the complaint of the democrat Albert Venn Dicey (about whose 
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opposition to the variety of suffrages much more will be said in the following chapter) that “this 
view is entertained by persons who disagree in everything else.”698 
 Like Harris, Holyoake was more eclectic in the philosophical sources of his thought on 
representation than the Whig of Bagehot’s stripe who rigorously eschewed any invocations of 
abstract right; Holyoake decried the withholding of the franchise as the violation of “a moral right” 
and equated the condition of the “non-elector” with that of “the slave.”699 Also in step with Harris, 
however, was the fact that his heterodox pronouncements did not issue in a substantive theoretical 
dissent about the foundations and composition of parliament. Quite the contrary; the extent of his 
agreement with the prevailing tenor of the period is well captured in his unequivocal condemnation 
of simple electoral democracy as a relic of the old “Radical rut.”700 Unsurprisingly, given his 
working-class roots and sympathies, Holyoake did not himself predict any great ills from the 
working-class hegemony that would come from immediately lowering the suffrage. Nevertheless, he 
felt that an “absolute guarantee” had to be given against the newly-enfranchised groups “swamping” 
the other elements in society.701 He was adamant that it was no moral gain at all to effect a mere 
swap of class power, to put “the educated and wealthy classes” into the “position” of “sufferance” 
which had traditionally belonged to those below them in the social hierarchy.702 On the contrary, the 
only just mode of settling the reform question was to arrive at a suitable system of “qualified 
franchise.”703 Holyoake did not put forth a full scheme of his own, but he did emphasize his 
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enthusiasm for “Earl Grey’s scheme, so far as relates to the establishment of Guilds,” as a 
mechanism to “enable Labour to be heard in its own name in the House of Commons” and to give 
“some representation to their own feelings, interests, and ideas” that did not risk an “absolute 
transfer of power” that would wrongfully put all other groups at the mercy of the laboring 
element.704 Thus on the “franchise question” there was little daylight between the radicalism of the 
activist for working-class emancipation and the radicalism of the Whig patrician.705 
 Harris, Stapleton, Grey, Holyoake – thinkers of conflicting temperaments and allegiances all 
drawn to a traditional theory, counterintuitively, for the sake of the radical potential intrinsic to it for 
reimagining the sites and scope of representation. Fulfilling the promise of a mirroring Commons 
and maintaining fidelity to the bedrock precept of differentiation in the suffrage did not mean 
timidity in confronting the nation’s greatest institutional question. 
***** 
For all its vibrancy and widespread approval in its mid-Victorian heyday, by the end of the 
century the practical failure of this vision was apparent. Its active political force deteriorated in the 
face of the defeats of the Second and especially Third Reform Acts, the latter of which established a 
uniform and inclusive (though not quite universal) suffrage and equal electoral districts; its 
philosophical cogency diminished as the egalitarian and democratic Idealist school made incursions 
against the more utilitarian and experiential outlook to which the variety of suffrages was yoked. 
 Yet the theory did not suddenly evaporate; amidst a slew of minor, uncompelling 
appearances706 it would receive at least one profound, vigorous fin de siècle statement. This came from 
W.E.H. Lecky, the historian and philosopher who made an appearance as a theorist of toleration in 
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chapter two. In his magisterial Democracy and Liberty of 1896 Lecky expressed the Mackintoshian 
outlook with about as much fidelity as is imaginable after the passage of eight transformative 
decades. It is a testament to the tenaciously liberal appeal of this theory that it could be defended 
less than a half-decade shy of the twentieth century by a sitting Liberal Unionist MP (as Lecky was at 
the time) as the best possible institutionalization of liberal values. 
Lecky’s political thought was more nuanced than the reactionary paternalism often attributed 
to him.707 He was, for instance, an advocate of the referendum, a firm critic of “plutocracy,” and a 
sympathizer with many aspects of trade-unionism.708 But these modern sympathies did not dampen 
his disaffection with one prominent feature of turn-of-the-century politics: the uniform democratic 
suffrage.709 In its place, he advocated a modified version of the “old system of representation” 
whereby, through “a diversity in the system of election,” it was possible to “represent, and to 
represent in their due proportions, the various forms and tendencies existing in the nation.” 710 The 
advent of electoral democracy had accustomed Britain to a condition “much less truly 
representative” than it had experienced under the older arrangements, but this change in political 
form did not correspond to any change in the ultimate source of legitimacy for legislative assemblies, 
which was “to represent with the same completeness and proportion the various and often 
conflicting class interests, so that the wants of each class might be attended to and the grievances of 
each class might be heard and redressed.”711  
If Lecky was acute in bringing intellectual and political history to bear in support of his 
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preferred vision of representation, he was lacking as a predictor of future trends; he prognosticated 
an imminent return to the old model once Britons had come to realize that “democracy destroys the 
balance of opinions, interests, and classes on which constitutional liberty mainly depends.”712 The 
mirror theory, thought Lecky, was a timeless truth that would outlive electoral democracy, which 
was neither the endpoint of political history nor the last word on the theory of representative 
institutions. His prediction has yet to be proven right, though out of our modern “crisis of 
democracy” it remains unclear what institutions await liberal societies in the coming decades.713 
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Chapter Four 
 
Diversity without Democracy, 
The Theory of the Variety of Suffrages, Part Two: Values and Criticisms 
In 1967, exactly a century after the Second Reform Act which marked the beginning of the 
end for the liberal fermentation in the theory of nondemocratic but representative government, 
Hanna Pitkin spoke of the theory of descriptive representation as quite obviously “only a partial 
view” of the subject.714 As another theorist has written, Pitkin’s assessment was typical of the 
unpopularity into which descriptive representation had fallen within normative political theory in the 
second half of the twentieth century.715 While descriptive representation has returned to prominence 
in recent years, a turn largely spurred by deliberative democrats in search of means to enrich 
deliberation in assemblies through the inclusion of a wider range of viewpoints,716 most scholars 
today inhabit a normative universe from which the idea of engineering electoral arrangements to 
ensure that the composition of the assembly accord with a predetermined sociological analysis 
appears alien at the least, and likely also illiberal, reactionary, or paternalistic – in direct contrast, it 
might be added, to the verdict of Holyoake that a “Qualified Suffrage” was the antidote to the 
“paternal theory” still held onto by Victorian patricians.717 It is thus particularly incumbent upon us 
to probe the reasons why, at a high-water mark for British liberalism, so many thinkers subscribed to 
a view which within a century would looked almost a relic to political theory. Now that we have seen 
the range of sociological and institutional permutations of mirroring reform, we need to inquire into 
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the values which motivated the theory, which gave it its meaning and appeal. Why did the diverse, 
inclusive, mirroring Commons strike so many mid-Victorians as a cornerstone political good? This 
chapter is directed toward answering this question. 
 First, a preliminary observation about the relationship between this chapter and the previous 
one is in order. The level of values was less divided than the level of schemes. While particular 
institutional plans varied almost endlessly, a relatively stable set of values underpinned endorsement 
of the variety of suffrages, of which the most salient will be investigated here. Although there is a 
striking degree of consistency in the articulation of these values across the spectrum of our authors, 
certain authors gave greater weight to some values over others – and some authors’ presentations of 
the normative dimension of their schemes exposed strains and fissures in the connections between 
these values. In the course of presenting the different ends and ideals which coalesced in the theory 
of the variety of suffrages, I will also explore these tensions and the criticisms to which they gave 
rise, both from friends and foes of the theory – with the exception, in most cases, of criticisms from 
a democratic perspective, which will be treated in chapter five. 
 Four values formed the normative core of support for the variegated franchise: justice, the 
rule of public opinion, deliberation, and stability. Each of these – and the criticisms which they 
provoked – will be examined in turn. 
 
1) Justice 
 The first of these values, justice, was the least clearly articulated of the four. Appeals to it 
were made, but usually in an undertheorized, unsystematic manner; it seldom received a fully-fledged 
argument demonstrating its connection to their preferred electoral system. This peculiarity of the 
variety-of-suffragists’ treatment of justice derives, I suspect, from trepidations about the relationship 
between justice and the consequentialism (relatively inclusive and undogmatic as it was) that 
dominated the public-intellectual landscape of the time. The allergy to natural rights claims that 
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marked the bulk of these authors extended to the discourse of justice, which likewise seemed to 
push in the direction of an individualistic egalitarianism that, if accepted, would ultimately usher in a 
democratic franchise.718 With only a few exceptions, the authors in this chapter were not 
philosophers, and they lacked the philosophical resources or self-confidence that emboldened Mill 
to demonstrate that, despite the ordinary-language distinction between justice and expediency, 
justice could feature coherently in moral-political discourse without positing its “existence in Nature 
as something absolute.”719 As a result their propensity was to speak of the mirroring Commons more 
as a source of benefits than as a site of justice. 
 Nevertheless, something very much like justice (and occasionally even the fraught word 
itself720) underlay the imperativeness characteristic of the variety-of-suffragists’s advocacy. In 
particular, the moral gravity with which they imbued their frequent pronouncements that the 
accurate parliamentary reflection of society just was what made the British government representative – 
that if the image of the nation in the Commons was distorted then the nation lacked a government 
worthy of that august adjective – bespeaks a conviction that representativeness as they understood it 
was not simply one among a number of commensurate political goods which, in the complicated 
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conditions of modern politics, had to be traded off against one another.721 In a way that parallels the 
conclusions in chapter one about Mill on the liberty of discussion, by and large proponents of the 
differentiated suffrage sought, without officially questioning a basic consequentialist framework, to 
remove their cherished vision of representation from the process of “weighing and balancing” 
multifarious considerations, and instead to establish the differentiated suffrage on its own absolute 
footing.722 This belief in the lexical priority of representativeness vis-à-vis other qualities of the 
Commons comes through in Bagehot’s claim that, even if the course of policy being pursued were 
excellent, “the House of Commons will be defective” so long as “the single, unbending franchise 
introduced in 1832” persisted in excluding the working class, or in Stapleton’s remark that “the 
theory of the Constitution is, that every subject of the Queen ought to be actually or virtually 
represented: but stretch the existing representation as you may, it cannot be made to adapt itself to 
that theory. The really poor are neither actually nor virtually represented.”723 Similar sentiments 
abound in this literature. 
 Whether we call it justice or adopt some other name for the entitlement that all “really 
organic interests and ideas” find spokesmen in the Commons, the critical point is that the tradition 
of electoral variety ascribed an independent normative weight to the inclusion of the full range of 
important classes, views, and segments of society, a weight not clearly reducible to any utility 
calculus. Unlike an orthodox Benthamite such as James Fitzjames Stephen who launched a blistering 
attack on Mill for distinguishing, in The Subjection of Women, between the categories of “wrong in 
itself” on the one hand and “hindrances to human improvement” on the other,724 even such an 
unsteady subscriber to the mirror theory as W.R. Greg could describe the parliamentary 
                                                 
721 For more on the question of tradeoffs between representativeness and other goods, see section (3). 
 
722 George Herbert, “Liberty and Socialism,” 107. 
 
723 Bagehot, English Constitution, 315. Stapleton, Suggestions, 46. 
 
724 JF Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 129. 
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marginalization of the working class as not only a “defect” but an “injustice.”725 This was not justice 
in the democratic sense of electoral equality, but it was what we might term “justice as inclusivity.” 
An inclusive constitution (“the fair participation of all classes in the representation and the 
government”) was of the very essence of representative government – it was what separated it, as we 
have encountered time and again in this chapter, from democracy (the rule “of numbers”) and 
oligarchy (the rule “of property”).726 These rival regimes were less just because they were less 
inclusive, because they did not carve out space for the several groups which constituted the nation. 
While the vast majority of the authors surveyed here would have disagreed with Mill that it was “a 
personal injustice” to be denied the vote,727 this disagreement was not equivalent to a denial that the 
misdistribution of the suffrage was a case of injustice. The locus of the injustice had merely shifted, 
from the non-possession of the suffrage to the lack of a spokesman with whose social-ideological 
position one could identify. For the variety-of-suffragists, a deficiency in representativeness was very 
much a deficiency in justice. 
 The significance of this freestanding normative investment in sociological inclusivity can be 
grasped more clearly when contrasted with another prominent nineteenth-century theory of 
representative government, one in which elitist notions of political capacity entirely trumped 
descriptive aspirations. In the decades preceding the climax of the variety of suffrages in Britain, 
across the channel the historian and politician François Guizot and the doctrinaire school combatted 
the idea that the representative system properly conceived had anything to do with imaging or 
reflecting the underlying society.728 The doctrinaire notion of “political capacity” was at the opposite 
                                                 
725 Greg, “Parliamentary Purification,” 567. 
 
726 Greg, “Representative Reform [2],” 257; “Parliamentary Purification,” 567. 
 
727 See ch. 3, note 632. 
 
728 This point has been made by Pierre Rosanvallon: “there is nothing to ‘represent,’ in the etymological meaning of the 
term, for Guizot”; La démocratie inachevée (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 119. See also Le Moment Guizot (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 
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extreme from descriptiveness: it was designed to screen all but men of “reason, truth, and justice” 
out of the electoral process.729 As prime minster in the latter days of the July Monarchy, Guizot 
adamantly rejected any extension of the limited franchise of that regime – a franchise so restricted 
that, although Guizot consecrated his political career to the cause of middle-class government, the 
censitary requirement was actually too high for even most of the bourgeoisie to participate.730 
Electoral politics, even in an era in which “the representative form of government” was the 
centerpiece of “the political institutions of Europe,” was a domain that belonged uniquely to the 
elite of the capable.731 
 Guizot was not a popular figure with our group of British authors. His unpopularity was 
overdetermined; other reasons for their disfavor will be discussed in section (4). But it was anchored 
primarily in the contrast between the kinds of opinions for which the doctrinaires and the variety-of-
suffragists believed there ought to be spokesmen in the assembly. Whereas Guizot wanted only 
objectively wise and reasonable ones to be entertained in the Chamber of Deputies, to British 
descriptivists non-judgmentalism about the “truth” or “reasonableness” of views held in the 
electorate was dictated by the commitment to representativeness. As Cole put it, in a striking display 
of the anti-Guizotian sensibility manifested by this vision of representation, “the Working Classes 
                                                                                                                                                             
93-4. It is also worth noting that the judgment that Guizot had emptied representation of any meaning substantially 
corresponded with Tocqueville’s blistering critique of the July Monarchy as a system in which the views and interests of 
only a narrow slice of the bourgeoisie had any voice; see Tocqueville, Souvenirs (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), 13-4. 
 
729 François Guizot, The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe, trans. Andrew R. Scoble (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2002), e.g. 295, 334. On this Guizotian doctrine and its relationship to his principle of “the sovereignty of 
reason,” see the introduction to this edition by Aurelian Craiutu, xii-xiii, as well as Craiutu, “Guizot’s Elitist Theory of 
Representative Government,” Critical Review, vol. 15. no. 3-4, (2003), 261-284; Rosanvallon, “François Guizot and the 
Sovereignty of Reason,” in Rosanvallon, Democracy Past and Future, ed. Samuel Moyn (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006), 117-26. 
 
730 Only roughly 200,000 Frenchmen, out of a total population of 35,000,000, could meet the property requirement for 
the franchise; on the suffrage under the July Monarchy, see e.g., Furet, Revolutionary France, 1770-1880, ch. 7; Alan 
Kahan, Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 36-37. 
 His obstinacy in the face of the campaign for electoral reform is widely credited with bringing about the 
February Revolution that ended the July Monarchy. 
 
731 Guizot, History of Representative Government, 12. 
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and the little shopkeepers connected with them, should have members of their own in Parliament, to 
represent and explain their wishes and opinions, and make their dumb voice articulate” whether or 
not “their grievances [were] real or imaginary.”732 Similarly for Bernard Cracroft, a supporter of 
Gladstone’s failed reform bill of 1866 who nevertheless considered himself within this 
nondemocratic tradition of mirroring and interest-representation, the grounds for “introduc[ing] a 
distinct working class element into the House, in order to represent working class thought and 
feeling there” were unrelated to the character of their beliefs but hinged solely on their being “the 
third great interest in the country” alongside “land and commerce.”733 The evaluation of capacity did 
not enter into the matter of defining the boundaries of the representative system.  
 This disagreement with the doctrinaires emerges with particular clarity in Bagehot’s writings. 
Bagehot demanded that all opinions, regardless of their content, which were “extensively 
entertained” and “widely diffused” find entry into parliament.734 Electoral systems were not meant as 
techniques for confining the political process solely to correct views – ones that could in Guizotian 
fashion be recognized from some higher perspective as reasonable and true. The legislature, Bagehot 
underscored, had to contain “the sentiments, the interests, the opinions, the prejudices, the wants, of 
all classes of the nation.735 The elevation of the value of inclusiveness over any possible objective 
standard for electoral regulation stemmed in turn from a foundational feature of his political theory, 
which was that the proper arbiter of the performance of a “parliamentary government” could only 
be the public opinion of the nation: 
Who is to judge [whether parliament is doing well]? Is it to be some panel of philosophers, 
some fancied posterity, or some other outside authority? I answer, no philosophy, no 
posterity, no external authority, but the English nation here and now. 
                                                 
732 Cole, Middle Classes, 23. 
 
733 Cracroft, Essays, vol. 1, 47-8. 
 
734 Ibid., 195. 
 
735 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 195. My italics. 
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Free government is self-government—a government of the people by the people.736 
 
Although few of his fellow variety-of-suffragists traced their institutional preferences back to the 
foundations of political epistemology in this way (and likely even fewer would have agreed with this 
kind of skeptical internalism about political judgment), they were all united in the conviction that the 
fortunes of a favored agenda or the desire to secure the field for correct tenets could not be allowed to 
trump the representative dimension of political life.737 
 The rejection by Bagehot and company of the doctrinaire attempt to replace descriptive 
representation with a strictly capacitarian conception of electoral politics was, it should be said,  
partly epistemic in its motivation – as will be shown in section (3), subscribers to the differentiated 
franchise were not only descriptivists but also deliberativists, and as such they ascribed a central role in 
the process of answering political questions to the national discussion that culminated in the 
“deliberative House of Commons.”738 Yet it was equally, as we have seen, a difference at the level of 
justice, of what was owed under representative government to the different segments of the 
                                                 
736 Bagehot, English Constitution, 306. Bagehot, of course, did not have a democratic interpretation of the meaning of that 
last phrase; in fact, he thought that the “American form of government” was “in every true sense less popular” than the 
English”; “The Present Crisis in America,” in CW, vol. 6, 173. 
 
737 This is not to say that these authors always lived up to their theory. In particular, they occasionally blanched in the 
face of socialism, and the fear on the part of some of these writers that the people were sure to embark on mass 
expropriation if so empowered kept them from complete consistency in their descriptivist commitments; see e.g. Greg, 
“Representative Reform [1],” 466; Donald Winch, “The Cause of Good Government,” 103 (on Macaulay); Cole, Middle 
Classes, 81; Eardley-Wilmot, Safe Plan, 8. Nevertheless, while the majority of variety-of-suffragists, like the majority of 
public intellectuals at the time, were pro-free-market, the terror at impending socialism was for most of them 
constrained in comparison to those political writers most resistant to mirroring values; see e.g. Salisbury, Lord Salisbury on 
Politics, e.g. 33, 144, 186, 210; John Austin, A Plea for the Constitution, 19-21. Austin, for one, had a strictly authorization-
based grounding for representation; Plea, 5. 
 In truth it is hard to find a single prominent Victorian thinker who did not at one point veer away from a fully 
consistent logic of representativeness out of fear for the fate of “property.” This extended even to JS Mill, whom some 
scholars are wont to claim for socialism. As a teenager Mill boldly declared that whether or not “the people are desirous 
of destroying property” was “irrelevant” to the issue of parliamentary reform. He betrayed this declaration a decade later, 
however, when he granted that the question “of fact” about the degree to which the “body of the operatives, or that 
portion of the body whom the rest follow, do in fact entertain opinions or feelings at variance with any of the primary 
principles of good government” ought to be investigated in conjunction with plans for the “extension of the suffrage.” 
Although he would eventually return to a more consistent non-judgmentalism in representation upon his conversion to 
PR, not even the “saint of rationalism” was always able to maintain his attachment to representative principles in 
confrontation with the perceived threat to property. See Mill, Speech on the British Constitution [2], 19 May 1826, in 
CW, vol. 26, 380; “Rationale of Representation,” 32. 
 
738 Bagehot, “Conservative Criticism on Liberal Politics,” in CW, vol. 6, 321. 
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community. To hold to a rigid censitary cut-off – to maintain, as Guizot had done, that the 
“scattered elements of reason” which the Chamber had to “collect and concentrate” were all 
effectively located within a narrow rung of the socioeconomic ladder739 – was to evacuate 
representative government of any meaning and instead to institute simple class-rule.740 It was to 
supplant the vision that politics should have a connection to society in its integrity with the a priori 
selection of a part that should rule over the whole. 
 The disavowal of suffrage-regulation as an arena for the direct implementation of a broader 
notion of political capacity entailed, as these mirroring theorists were willing to admit, giving up on 
the traditional dream of the Commons as a congress of the nation’s wisest individuals. Indeed, they 
were cognizant not only that the descriptive enterprise would in practice produce a membership that 
would deviate from what a process that selected only for wisdom or correctness would yield; they 
were also aware that they were abandoning it as a theoretical ideal. They could not agree with the 
young Salisbury that “the very Utopia of representation” would be just to inject the greatest quotient 
of intelligence possible into the Commons.741 True, the variety-of-suffrages school was certainly not 
                                                 
739 Guizot, History of Representative Government, 345. 
 
740 A very similar argument about the betrayal of representative principles involved in excluding a group from the vote 
out of consideration of its intellectual character or the content of its view was taken up by the women’s movement in 
response to liberal politicians who cited women’s conservatism as a reason to continue their disfranchisement: “Surely 
representative institutions require that all differences of opinion should have their due and proportionate weight in the 
legislature. No class of persons ought to be excluded on account of their political opinions….A representative system 
which excludes half the community from representation surely is a farce. The question ought not to be ‘How will 
women vote if they have the franchise?’ but, ‘Is representative government the best form of government that can be 
devised?’ If the answer is in the affirmative, the exclusion of women from electoral rights can in no way be justified”; 
Millicent Garret Fawcett, “The Electoral Disabilities of Women,” in The Subjection of Women: Contemporary Responses to John 
Stuart Mill, ed. Andrew Pyle (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1995), 232-3. The essay originally appeared in the Fortnightly 
Review, May 1870. See also Pyle’s introduction to this edition, xxii. To put Fawcett’s thought here in the vocabulary that 
has guided this chapter, she saw the gender restriction as instituting male class-rule, as opposed to representative 
government. This argument was still crucial for the New Liberals in their advocacy of women’s suffrage: see e.g. L.T. 
Hobhouse, Liberalism, in Liberalism and Other Writings, ed. James Meadowcroft (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 128. 
 
741 Salisbury (then Lord Robert Cecil), “Theories of Parliamentary Reform”, 56. 
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untouched by elitist presuppositions or indifferent to concepts of capacity742; moreover, as noted 
above with regard to Greg, in addition to their proposed instantiations of the norms of mirroring 
they hoped as well that the intellectual caliber of MPs could be bettered, and occasionally devised 
amendments specifically geared to this purpose. Yet they were in general clearheaded enough to 
perceive that the maximization of intellect or right-thinking and the achievement of 
representativeness stood in tension; they grasped that the two could not be pursued simultaneously 
without granting priority to one over the other. While one does not encounter in this tradition 
statements equivalent to accepting (what are often given as reductios of projects of descriptive 
representation) that “morons should be represented by morons,”743 mid-century mirror authors were 
not afraid to acknowledge that their search for representativeness involved some intellectual 
sacrifices.744 Hence Bagehot’s explanation of the outcome he desired from measures of working-
class representation. This was not “simply to find representatives in the best of the working classes,” 
to give force to “the most thrifty and careful of the working classes…the best judging of their class.” 
Quite the contrary: “we are not now seeking legislators who will exercise a correct judgment, but 
rather spokesmen who will express popular sentiments.”745 With a frankness that is refreshing in 
comparison to similar debates today (as well as with their own poor handling of a parallel tension 
between values that is the subject of section [3]), Bagehot and company recognized that no 
institution could fulfill a mission of both guaranteeing the desired amount of diversity and selecting 
for only the wisest or most deserving members. To advocate the mirroring Commons was to 
                                                 
742 See e.g. Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 203-4. 
 
743 J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 314. See also A. Philips 
Griffiths and Richard Wollheim, “How Can One Person Represent Another?,” Aristotelian Society vol. 34 (1960), 190. 
 
744 See e.g. Mackintosh’s frank statement that “the best choice” was “not the sole object of representation”; “Universal 
Suffrage,” 191-2. 
 
745 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 218-9. In this passage Bagehot was almost certainly criticizing his brother-in-law 
Greg, among others, for injecting an inappropriate elitism into their thinking about working-class representation. 
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dispense with the “truism” that “Government should be in the hands of the wisest” in favor of a 
parliamentary condition with more modest intellectual expectations: instead, “all which we ought to 
desire” was that the Commons should “contain true and adequate exponents of all class interests 
[and] should coincide in opinion with the fair intelligence of the country.”746 In consequence it is not 
surprising to find these authors occasionally offering the consoling thought that great knowledge 
and sagacity were not needed to be an MP – thus one of the central themes in Bagehot’s studies of 
contemporary politics was that English government got on fine even though MPs were merely 
“excellent specimens of the average Englishman.”747 In selecting representativeness as the 
characteristic par excellence of the just legislature, the variety-of-suffragists were displacing the 
meritocratic notion of the electoral system as a means of filtering out a chosen body of the wisest 
citizens, and accepting that the individuals composing it might fall well short of what one would 
envision from “natural aristocrats.”748 
***** 
 Independent of its interaction with other values and empirical assumptions, however, the 
concentration on justice alone has only so much explanatory power; the goal of justice, as 
interpreted here, certainly does not demand the acceptance of these specific institutions. One 
question, in particular, has likely occurred to the reader. If inclusivity was important on grounds of 
justice, how could the exclusions which existed in some of these schemes – typically that of the rural 
laborer – be defended? If parliamentary inclusiveness was a defining attribute of the just society, why 
                                                 
746 Salisbury, “Theories of Reform,” 54; Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 200-1. 
 
747 Bagehot, “The Unseen Work of Parliament,” in CW, vol. 6, 47; John Burrow, “Sense and Circumstances: Bagehot 
and the Nature of Political Understanding,” in That Noble Science of Politics, 178-9. And see Bagehot, “The Character of Sir 
Robert Peel,” in CW, vol. 3, 238-71. 
 
748 See e.g. The Federalist, nos. 10 and 57. For a broad but brief overview of the “older” notion of elections as techniques 
for ratifying “merit and virtue,” see Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy, 53-9. The most historically and theoretically 
sophisticated analyses of the classically elitist side of elections are Olivier Christin, Vox Populi: Une histoire du vote avant le 
suffrage universel (Paris: Seuil, 2014); Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
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did some of these plans fall short of comprehensiveness in the picture of society that they wished to 
capture? 
 To answer this question, and to begin filling out a normative picture that is left 
underspecified by justice alone, we need to turn to a second normative plank of the mirror theory: 
the rule of public opinion. 
 
2) The Rule of Public Opinion 
 The mere name of this second value tells us little. For attestations of the rightful reign of 
public opinion abound in the mid- and late-Victorian periods. John Morley satirized this doctrine for 
becoming a kind of national shibboleth,749 and even when a writer took issue with the slogan, as did 
the economist Stanley Jevons, they frequently wound up acknowledging that there was no other 
possibility but that public opinion be “the ultimate court of appeal.”750 Both the normative 
investment in the idea that the primary force in politics ought to be public opinion and the 
impression that it was in fact the directive puissance in public affairs were at all-time highs.751 How 
could so ubiquitous a talking-point – one which received assent from those who were anything but 
hard-and-fast descriptivists about representation – give an answer to the vital question just posed? 
How did this omnipresent refrain operate among the variety-of-suffragists? 
 First, in those authors who advocated the exclusion of certain groups from the suffrage, 
invocation of the rule of public opinion served to justify those exclusions. This issue brings us face-
                                                 
749 “Among the numerous grounds for national complacency which the newspapers discover for us…none is more 
conspicuous or more delightful than the irresistible might of public opinion in this favoured land….But none of these 
things move us so mightily as the ceaseless panegyrics upon the majesty of public opinion”; Morley, “The Weakness of 
Public Opinion,” in Modern Characteristics, 239-40. 
 
750 Jevons, The State in Its Relations to Labour (London: Macmillan, 1882), 20. Other important contemporary testaments of 
the centrality of public opinion in the Victorian political psyche are Leslie Stephen, “Our Rulers – Public Opinion,” 
Cornhill Magazine, vol. 21, no. 123 (Mar. 1870): 288-98, Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in 
England during the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1905), ch. 1. 
 
751 See e.g. Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, 7-8, 23, 134. 
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to-face with a fundamental divide within the camp of electoral diversity: those who believed that the 
population of rural laborers ought not to possess the suffrage, and those who sought to include 
them as one among the several basic elements of British society. The omission of rural workers from 
their reform proposals of the former stemmed, as noted above with regard to Bagehot, from the 
conviction that they lacked substantive opinions about politics. In contrast to the artisans in a select 
batch of urban centers whom Bagehot sought to include in order that the distinctive sentiments on 
politics which had developed among them could gain a parliamentary hearing, in the rural and 
underdeveloped semi-urban areas (as his brother-in-law put it) the “lower classes had no political 
principles and no social strength or independence”; they displayed an “utter inability to form any 
political opinion.”752 In light of the opinionlessness which characterized all but the advanced artisans 
among the lower classes, democracy in mid-Victorian Britain could only be the rule of those with no 
opinions over those with opinions. It would effect the transfer of electoral power from “sincere” 
citizens acting on behalf of truly public “views and feelings” to “men who have no political 
convictions and scarcely any personal predilections”; the man “who has no political opinions at all” 
would now be the most numerous participant in elections.753 Given the great ethical weight which 
Victorians placed on sincerity and earnestness, the enactment of a democratic suffrage in conditions 
of a dearth of lower-class belief would mean a decline in the moral caliber of politics as judged from 
the perspective of the “ethics of belief.” But even more fundamentally, such an electoral situation 
would hinder the representative system from fulfilling its mission. It would impair the task of 
representation. 
 This impairment stemmed from the fact that, if the rural working classes were without 
opinions, then they necessarily did not contribute to that public opinion into alignment with which 
                                                 
752 Greg, “Achievements of 1867,” 219, 212. And see ch. 3, note 543. 
 
753 Greg, “Achievements of 1867,” 232; “Parliamentary Purification,” 577, 583. 
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these reformers sought to bring the Commons. Since the working and pauper classes did not 
participate in the formation of public opinion, for the simple reason that they had no opinions to 
offer to the national discussion, it would be inappropriate to grant them the suffrage. Being without 
opinions, they ought to be without the vote, because those who “had no opinion on matters of 
legislation and administration” by definition could not “send to Parliament members” who would 
represent their views.754 If the criterion for the possession of “political power” was some kind of 
“political capacity,” this capacity Bagehot defined largely in terms of being “intellectual enough to 
form opinions” of one’s own – a far cry from Guizot’s notion of capacité.755 The result of 
enfranchisement not stopping at this threshold was that elections would introduce distortions of 
public opinion into the very process of composing a Commons. Public opinion, therefore, would 
not reign.756  
By lifting the working class into a majority in all districts, then, democratization involved 
almost by definition a kind of usurpation; instead of public opinion ruling, the composition of 
parliament would be swayed by votes which had no opinion-content behind them.  
But the case was potentially even worse than the analysis to this point has made out, for this 
necessary falsification of public opinion could be exacerbated by one (or, worse, a combination) of 
two deleterious processes. Since it is in Bagehot’s works that the vision of a gap between a 
government of public opinion and a democracy of the opinionless appeared most clearly, I will 
follow him here. 
The first of these processes was that money would crowd all other considerations out of 
politics. With no convictions of their own determining them to cast their vote for a certain person 
                                                 
754 Bagehot, “History of the Unreformed Parliament,” 285. 
 
755 Ibid., 304. 
 
756 The enfranchisement of citizens without opinions could only by accident be neutral with respect to the translation of 
public opinion into parliamentary policymaking: namely, if the distribution of the votes of the opinionless happened 
randomly to match the true contours of public opinion. 
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or party, Bagehot believed that such opinion-less persons, who were “almost sure to be corrupt,” 
would give their vote to whichever side offered the largest bribe.757 Without the stake in politics that 
the possession of beliefs and principles furnished, there was no reason for them to “abstain from 
selling their vote,” and thus it was illusory to pursue democracy when democracy would only “mean 
the rule of money.”758 In all probability a democratic suffrage would yield a corrupt, cynical 
plutocracy, thereby sacrificing, for the sake of greater formal inclusiveness in the political system, the 
influence of genuine public opinion on the course of government.759 
If nothing else, though, the thesis of working-class lack of belief would seem to have spared 
authors like Bagehot and Greg the prospect of “swamping” which typically frightened the defender 
of electoral variegation. For in the absence of beliefs, how could the enfranchised masses stand in 
sufficient unison to expel less populous groups from the representation? Bagehot’s second possible 
doleful outcome squared this circle. His prediction was that, although the un-advanced working 
classes lacked any definite ideas or principles to guide their political conduct, they would 
                                                 
757 Bagehot, “History of the Unreformed Parliament,” 305. Or in the words of his brother-in-law, “it seems probable 
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758 Bagehot, English Constitution, 403, 406. Several decades later Sidgwick was still following Bagehot almost exactly on 
this point; see Elements of Politics, 382-3. 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 256-8. See also K. Theodore Hoppen, “Roads to Democracy: 
Electioneering and Corruption in Nineteenth‐Century England and Ireland,” History vol. 81, no. 264 (1996): 553-571; 
Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel. 
 There is an interesting resemblance here between the prediction that formal democracy would lead to practical 
plutocracy and Hobbes’s denial that in practice a democracy could be anything other than an “aristocracy of orators”; 
perhaps we could say that the former was the nineteenth-century version of the latter. Hobbes, Elements of Law, ed. 
J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), II.xxi.5. Given the present consternation about the oligarchic 
character of many twenty-first-century democracies, some prescience ought perhaps to be allowed to these writers. 
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nevertheless feel themselves “supreme in the country.”760 This feeling of class supremacy would lead 
them to form a “permanent combination” in order to ensure that the only candidates returned came 
either from their own class or from that subset of middle- and upper-class politicians who were 
willing to ape the manners of the working-man.761 On this second scenario, Bagehot seems to have 
been presaging a kind of “identity politics” avant la lettre, where the clear perception of interests and 
the discussion of policy and principle would take a backseat to questions of personality and group 
membership. The working class, unguided by anything that could properly be called “political 
sentiments” but spurred on by “demagogues” and exultant at being liberated from having to 
“acknowledge their superiors,” would fill Westminster only with their “single class.”762 On this 
second prognosis of democratized English politics, public opinion would be betrayed not by the 
outright reign of money, but by the replacement of the idea-possessing, public-opinion-shaping, 
politically experienced upper- and middle-classes with the blind majority of the working class. There 
is a sense, then, in which Bagehot and Greg offered the bleakest depiction of working-class 
swamping in this whole genre; for instead of one set of ideas and convictions crowding out all 
others, they predicted that a set of feelings and instincts unworthy even of the name of ideas and 
convictions would displace all true ideas and convictions. And hence an ideal which united every 
thread of mainstream nineteenth-century British political thought – that not wills but reasons be the 
currency of parliamentary government763 – would suffer a decisive demise.  
Thus the first way in which the value of the rule of public opinion entered into mid-century 
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763 The principle received innumerable formulations: that the “House yields” only to “reason” and “argument,” that “the 
arms of reason” and not “mere will” be the tools of the Commons, that “not the mere will of the majority…govern a 
Nation, but justice and reason”; Inglis, Parliamentary Reform, 49; Mill, Considerations, 478; Grey, Parliamentary Government, 
181. 
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mirror theory was to justify exclusion of the non-opinion-holding segments of the nation. Many 
Victorian intellectuals, of a range of political stripes, warned at one point or another in their political 
commentary of the dangers of ushering mass opinionlessness into electoral politics.764 Indeed, there 
was more than a family resemblance between the perception of this peril and a Henry Maine-strain 
of anti-democracy, which emphasized the intolerant hostility to untraditional ideas of the lower 
classes.765 But, so far as I have found, it was only within the more exclusionary strand of the mirror 
theory that this concern was elevated into a principle – we might call it the opinion-holding principle – 
which could serve to regulate the boundaries of the suffrage. 
The opinion-holding principle could possess this justificatory power in virtue of the special 
link between their vision of accurate representation and opinion – the conjuncture of the rule of 
public opinion and the mirror theory of representation installed opinion as an important item on 
which the machinery of descriptive representation was to operate, a central piece of the picture to be 
taken, so to speak. For this reason I employed earlier (in writing specifically of Bagehot) the ungainly 
term cognitivism to describe a facet of their theoretical orientation; by this I mean simply that in the 
                                                 
764 Two of the great “university liberals” who were sympathetic to the democratic cause in their youth came to see the 
absence of genuine ideas among the newly enfranchised demos as a peril of democracy. James Bryce observed a 
degradation in the governing of large U.S. cities and attributed it to the Americans’ wrongheaded enfranchisement of 
recently arrived immigrants, a group that “can hardly be said to possess” “political opinions…for they have not had time 
to learn to know the institutions of their new country.” Similarly, Leslie Stephen bemoaned the impact of “newly 
emancipated masses without developed political convictions,” whom he feared were susceptible to demagogic priestly 
manipulation (especially in Ireland); in the terminology of this chapter, he worried that enfranchising the masses would 
lead to the replacement of “public opinion” with “clerical opinion.” Even those who had no inclination to turn their 
backs on a wider suffrage, such as John Stuart Mill and the Liberal MP and PR reformer Leonard Courtney, 
acknowledged that the question of whether “a large number of the inhabitants of these islands [were] capable of forming 
an opinion on the conduct of public affairs” lingered over much contemporary political contemplation;  
 See Bryce, The American Commonwealth, second edition, 2 vols. (New York: Commonwealth Publishing, 1908), 
vol. 2, 318; Jeffrey Paul von Arx, Progress and Pessimism, 32 and Stephen, “Are We Christians?,” in Stephen, Essays on 
Freethinking and Plainspeaking, 126-76; Courtney, “Political Machinery and Political Life,” Fortnightly Review, vol. 20, no. 115 
(July 1876), 74; Mill, Speech of 2 November 1868 on the Westminster Election, in CW, vol. 28, 339. 
 
765 It was my intention to have discussed the great legal historian Henry Maine’s pessimism about democracy under the 
rubric of “liberty of thought and discussion after Mill.” Since I allude to it at a couple points in the remaining chapters, a 
brief word ought to be said about it. Dissenting from a rival notion of democracies as fickle and instable, in his 1885 
tract Popular Government Maine launched an attack on democracy (understood by him as much in a Tocquevillian sense 
more as a social state than as an electoral rule) as the regime of intolerance. This was based in his idea that the average mind 
was deeply closed to all novel ideas. Therefore democracy meant an end to freedom of mind and a suppression of 
nonconformity – in everything from scientific inquiry to seeming trivialities of manners and fashion. See Maine, Popular 
Government: Four Essays (London: John Murray, 1885), passim. 
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long list of objects of representation which appears in these texts – classes, interests, groups, 
elements, stations, parts, opinions, ideas, sentiments, convictions, views – the latter half of the list, 
the cognates for belief, had a particular priority. The various attempts to divvy up the “objective” 
social space captured by the former half of the list, as we will see more clearly in the next section, 
were ultimately valued because they tended to correspond to differences of opinion or outlook. It 
was this correspondence which, they believed, saved their schemes from the charge of arbitrariness 
which would have ensued if they had proposed (to adapt Locke’s famous examples of civically 
irrelevant categories) to carve out special constituencies for those with “black Hair or gray Eyes.”766 
The mirror theory – even when it was given the names of class or interest representation – was a 
mechanism for ensuring that the “grounds…of full debate,” the array of “arguments” and 
“differences of opinion” were positioned in the house in a manner that accorded with their felt 
strength in the nation at-large.767 To take institutional measures for the parliamentary presence of a 
group which one could reasonably expect not to have any distinctive political vision to advance (say, 
constituencies based on the first letter of one’s surname) was to violate the spirit of the theory by 
drawing distinctions without differences.768 From this perspective, to enfranchise those who not only 
had no distinctive vision, but rather no vision at all, was to court political risks which were not worth 
running. Even though the making of philosophically precise distinctions between categories like 
class or interest, on the one hand, and opinion or perspective, on the other, occupied very little of 
the variety-of-suffragists’ attention, this privileging of the latter was intrinsic to the logic of their 
                                                 
766 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 55. Note that this quotation appeared earlier to illustrate a different point 
about the moral-psychological causes of the inefficacy of persecution. This passage, while understudied relative to other 
parts of the Letter, is one of Locke’s richest and sits at the intersection of several strands of argument. 
 
767 Pochin, Plan, 18; Cole, Middle Classes, 67. 
 
768 This theme is echoed in contemporary descriptive representation literature which invokes a salience or relevancy 
criterion; see e.g. Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks?,” 634. This criterion is an object of consternation 
among opponents of descriptive representation, who castigate it as a means of covertly introducing normative notions 
into a discussion which presents itself as empirical; see Andrew Rehfeld, The Concept of the Constituency (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 149. 
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position. 
To state the point differently: Eugène Pelletan was contemporaneously devising a theory of 
electoral politics which might be summed up by the phrase, we vote because we think.769 By amending 
this phrase we can arrive at something like a formula for specifying the operation of sociologically 
accurate representation: a group has seats in the Commons because it thinks differently in some relevant way. 
Contributions to public opinion which could not be expected to come from another source were 
what furnished an “interest” with a claim for the assurance of seats on its behalf. 
Yet if in excluding a wide swathe of the working classes, variety-of-suffragists were simply 
following the logic of descriptive representation in an age obsessed with public opinion, why did a 
large number of our authors depart from Bagehot and make provisions for their parliamentary 
participation? There were, I think, two reasons for this discrepancy, though they were not spelled 
out by the authors themselves. The first was a disagreement on the empirical front. These figures, it 
appears, would have denied that there was any deficit of political ideas among the rural lower class, 
at least with respect to their urban counterparts; that they did have such ideas seems to have been 
the assumption on which proposals such as Creasy’s and Stapleton’s to divide the nation into a 
number of equally-sized districts reserved for the working class proceeded.  
More difficult, however, is the case of Harris. Given Harris’s avowal of an abstract right to 
vote, his enfranchisement of the entire working class did not need to involve any dispute over the 
facts of opinion-holding in different demographics. Thus his heterodox adherence to natural rights 
                                                 
769 “The political life of a people consists at once of thinking and of voting; by thought, it forms an opinion; by the vote, 
it records the opinion; if a people never thought, it would not have need of the vote; it is obvious that it votes only on 
the basis of a good or bad idea, but an idea all the same. At bottom it is thought alone which constitutes the political life 
of a nation”; Pelletan, Les droits de l’homme (Paris: Pagnerre, 1858), 127-8. 
 Pelletan was a great French liberal-republican, Anglophile, and opponent of the Second Empire. It was my 
intention to examine his thought at length in the chapter on French defenses of toleration. He had an extremely rich 
theory that combined a quasi-mystical, spiritualist notion of abstract right with many standard English themes. He is also 
important for having laid out one of the earliest full-fledged theories of parties, where these were seen not just as 
collections of legislators cooperating within the assembly but also as associations which structured public deliberation 
more generally and thereby kept groups competing within society from needing to resort to violence. In addition to Les 
droits de l’homme, this theory was laid out in Le Droit de Parler (Paris: Pagnerre, 1862). 
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dictated that “the people” not be left out while the professional, learned, landed, clerical, and 
commercial elements were afforded a voice. But his unconcern about any reputed deficiency of 
opinions among those workers not comprehended in the “town artisan” category also bespeaks his 
resistance to the just-described ideational turn among his variety-of-suffrage comrades – a resistance 
that was of a piece with his being out-of-sync with the intellectual tenor of the time more generally. 
While Harris worshipped at the contemporary altar of public opinion, he did not link this value up 
with an injunction to actually investigate the ideological condition of the country at the present 
moment. On the contrary, the deductive, unempirical bent of his sociology pushed him to classify 
the several interests according to his sense of what the essential functional parts of a society were, in 
a fashion that recalls a premodern notion of society’s natural orders more than just about any 
document from this social-scientific and inductive milieu. Just as older images of the estates of the 
realm gave ideological diversity no place in its system of social differentiation, but instead grounded 
this differentiation in natural, objective differences in the role and purpose of the estates, Harris 
does not seem to have thought that opinions might have any special status in the project of mapping 
the social.770 This mix of faith in natural rights with indifference to the intuition that it was in the last 
analysis something like opinion which provided the representation-relevant basis for distinguishing 
social groups was a second cause for a mirror theorist not to wind up in with the Bagehot-Greg 
stance, and it applies in some degree to Holyoake as well. 
***** 
Now that we have seen how the value of the rule of public opinion could serve to vindicate 
a seeming incongruity between the ideals of inclusivity and representativeness and the presence of 
certain exclusions in some of their plans, it is worth taking note of a few of the more salient of the 
                                                 
770 Though I think that he presses this point with too much absoluteness, contrasting Harris with his contemporaries 
does bring out the kernel of truth in Rosanvallon’s point about “opinions” replacing “social estates” as the basic units of 
representation in the modern world; Rosanvallon, Le peuple introuvable, 141-3. For more on the concept of a society of 
orders, see ch. 5, note 1087. 
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normative dimensions of the conception of public opinion shared by virtually all subscribers to the 
mirror theory. What did the public opinion to which they devoted so much empirical and theoretical 
attention look like, and how did their conceptualization of it compare with other contending 
visions? Let us look at four features of public opinion as they envisioned it. 
 First, “public opinion” for the proponents of electoral diversity came with a condition of 
durability. The concept for them had a necessarily temporal dimension; an intellectual snapshot of 
the nation at a given moment – in modern politics, the result of a single “public opinion poll” – did 
not necessarily reveal anything deserving of the name. For they distinguished caprice or whimsy, the 
reaction of the people in an “excitable” moment – what Lecky called “mere fashion”771 – from 
public opinion properly so-called. It was through its staying power that an idea proved its place as a 
“genuine conviction”; the country had to show itself to be “determined” or “in earnest” on a 
question, a view had to ratify itself as belonging to the “free and deliberate opinion of the nation,” 
before it attained the normative status at which a view demanded translation into law.772  
This accent on durability, it ought to be said, undoubtedly had an elitist skew to it; it 
incorporated into the very definition of public opinion the condition that the “influential and 
educated portion of the numbers of the community” should have weighed in and been heard by the 
populace over the din of mere “demagogues” who preyed on the passions.773 Yet the tilt of the 
concept toward the “superiors [who] understand these matters”774 was, in comparison to other 
                                                 
771 Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. 2, 406. 
 
772 Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. 2, 406; Bagehot, English Constitution, 268; Harris, True Theory, 98. For the mid-
Victorian generation of writers, the paradigm instance of such a rightful conversion into policy of durable public 
sentiment even when it had economically and socially revolutionary implications was the repeal of the Corn Laws in 
1846; see e.g. Greg “Representative Reform [2],” 271. 
 
773 Greg, “Expected Reform Bill,” 214; Cole, Middle Classes, 80. 
 
774 Greg, Enigmas of Life (London: Trübner & Co., 1872), 48. This notion was itself the persistence into the mid-Victorian 
era of a view of public opinion inflected by the notion of the guidance of “natural superiors” from earlier in the 
nineteenth-century; see e.g. J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 307. 
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currents of nineteenth-century thought, relatively muted.775 Moreover, although the influence of the 
“educated classes” was in their eyes necessary for the formation of a proper public opinion, their 
vision of public opinion was unspecified with regard to content. True, as mentioned earlier, 
members of the variety-of-suffrages stamp occasionally blanched at the implications of their theory 
when confronted with socialism. Yet on the whole they resisted the temptation to build into the 
concept of public opinion a set of “correct” substantive beliefs about politics. This forbearance 
from determining the content of the public opinion which they exalted stood in sharp contrast with 
earlier attempts to theorize public opinion, as exemplified by the liberal Tory W.A. Mackinnon’s 
inclusion of “proper religious feeling” as a defining element of public opinion in his path-breaking 
1828 treatise On the Rise of Public Opinion.776 The variety-of-suffragists were concerned to differentiate 
“settled opinion” or “real public opinion” from the “passing clamour” stirred up by “loud 
agitators,”777 and to do this they invested the durability or persistence of beliefs with normative 
significance. But they refrained from restricting the category of public opinion to particular goals or 
points-of-view and accepted that the ultimate arbiter of legislative disputes was “public opinion 
[when it] has been finally made up.”778 
If public opinion was characterized by durability, this was a consideration that applied to the 
short- or medium-term. In the long-term, however, theorists of electoral diversity envisaged public 
opinion as dynamic and shifting: “You can no more expect different generations to have exactly the 
same political opinions, to obey exactly the same laws, to love exactly the same institutions, than you 
                                                 
775 James Thompson’s observation about the relative inclusivity of Bagehot’s notion of public opinion – “he was careful 
not to impose overly stringent intellectual requirements on membership” in the domain of public opinion – applies to 
the variety-of-suffrages cohort more generally; Thompson, British Political Culture and the Idea of Public Opinion, 56. 
 
776 Mackinnon, On the Rise, Progress, and Present State of Public Opinion, in Great Britain and Other Parts of the World (London: 
Saunders and Otley, 1828), e.g. 1, 5. 8. On Mackinnon personally and as an influential theorist of the rise of the middle 
class, see Warhman, Imagining the Middle Class, esp. 299-303, 359-61. 
 
777 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 238; Bagehot, “Mr. Gladstone,” in CW, vol. 3, 438-9. 
 
778 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 64. 
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can expect them to wear identical clothes, own identical furniture, or have identical manners.”779 To 
affirm the rule of public opinion was to commit to a kind of political open-endedness.780 It was to 
eschew finality, not only in norms and values but also in institutions – including electoral 
institutions. In contrast to the aim of instituting a final settlement of the franchise question often 
attributed to the makers of the First Reform Act,781 at its mid-century height the school of electoral 
diversity mostly disavowed any intention to erect permanent rules for the suffrage. As the social-
intellectual shape of the nation changed, electoral arrangements would need updating in order to 
track these changes. “Finality is a delusion;” in order to keep the parliamentary system in sync with 
the rise of new classes, interests, and opinions, future generations would have to carry on in “the 
good old track of Constitutional progress by means of Constitutional Reform.”782 The social, 
economic, and intellectual progress which had rendered inadequate the unreformed system as well as 
the reformed one established in 1832 could be expected to continue, and thus the allowance for 
“safe and timely extension…at some future time” was a vital part of any reasonable outlook on 
reform.783 The variety-of-suffrages conception of the authority of public opinion thus contained in 
its own way more than a small dose of the old philosophic-radical search for a politics in which “the 
dead [do not] chain down the living.”784 
 A third feature will likely come as no surprise to the reader: the vision of public opinion with 
                                                 
779 Bagehot, “The Chances for a Long Conservative Regime in England,” 229. 
 
780 “Bagehot’s mind was always experiencing, and always working its observation into pattern, into system, but – and 
here we touch on his central excellence or virtue – into a system open towards the future”; Young, Today and Yesterday 
(London: Hart-Davis, 1948), 243. 
 
781 See e.g. Southgate, Passing of the Whigs, 15, 306. For dissenting scholarship on the significance of finality as an end for 
the Whigs of 1832, see Wasson, “The Spirit of Reform,” 173; John Milton-Smith, “Earl Grey's Cabinet and the Objects 
of Parliamentary Reform,” Historical Journal, vol. 15, no. 1 (1972), 73-4. 
 
782 Creasy, Text-Book, 63. 
 
783 Pochin, Plan, 17. 
 
784 Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies,” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols., ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 
1838-43), vol. 2, 494. 
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which the mid-Victorian mirror theory operated was not an individualistic or aggregative one. Just as 
the units to be represented through their institutions were not persons but groups – most often classes, 
but also professions, memberships of corporate bodies, or ideological movements – so the public 
opinion which was integral to their understanding of free government or national self-determination 
rejected individualistic-aggregative modes of characterization. For this band of writers, to believe 
that the sociologically indiscriminate counting of heads produced government by public opinion was 
simply to mistake what public opinion was.785 Here, for instance, is Greg forcefully stating his dissent 
from individualistic premises: 
For what is a Nation, in a highly advanced and complicated state of civilisation like ours? Not 
a mere aggregation of millions; not a homogeneous mass of units; but a congress of ranks 
and classes…having, it is true, one common real ultimate interest, but varying in their 
characters, occupations, and immediate aims; called to special duties, discharging separate 
functions, guided by peculiar tastes and desires, representing different phases of intellect and 
opinion, and considering questions of government and social policy from widely divergent 
points of view.786 
 
What it meant that the nation ruled itself was, quite simply, analytically unrelated to the results of a 
process that would tabulate the views “at the top of the head” of an assortment of individuals.787 
The constituent parts of the “public opinion” which it was the duty and even the definition of 
representative governments to render into law were, rather, ranks, classes, characters, phases of intellect – 
that is, social-ideological facts the existence of which transcended what one would extricate from a 
procedure of random sampling or sociologically unspecified suffrage.788 Or, as Lecky stated in a 
                                                 
785 A similar conception of public opinion persists today in John Dryzek’s “discourse” model of deliberative democracy; 
see Dryzek, “Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy,” Political Theory, vol. 29, no. 5 (2001): 651-669. This 
similarity should lead us to wonder just how “democratic” Dryzek’s model of deliberation really is. See also the idea that 
“issues” and not just “persons” should be the object of democratic representation; Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, 
“The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science, no. 11 (2008), 
397. 
 
786 Greg, “Expected Reform Bill,” 250. 
 
787 I take this phrase from John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992). A similar skepticism about how informative such surveys are – how genuinely the findings gleaned really 
constitute anything deserving of the name opinion – pervades much American political science. 
 
788 Greg, “Expected Reform Bill,” 214. 
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more defensive way as the century closed in democratic fashion: “Every one who will look facts 
honestly in the face can convince himself that the public opinion of a nation is something quite 
different from the votes that can be extracted from all the individuals who compose it.”789 Instead, 
public opinion was a term that denoted a kind of intellectual geography. To discern it was akin not 
to the mathematical task of adding up individual expressions of belief but to the work of the 
cartographer; the political scientist had to map “the area of public opinion,” the surface of which 
was made of “the various interests and opinions of a great nation.”790 Given that public opinion was 
an entity of a different order than doing sums of individual statements of opinion, the electoral 
system which would realize its sway over parliament placed no intrinsic value on – and could only 
incidentally approach – one which sought to translate into the assembly the personal desires of the 
citizenry considered in an undifferentiated manner. 
 This anti-aggregative picture of public opinion was hardly unique to the descriptive tradition 
that has occupied us here. A range of schools of thought with diverging political orientations 
espoused a version of it – including majoritarian democrats who often conceived of the local 
geographical constituency as an integral community of opinion,791 as well as some proponents of the 
“individualistic” method of STV.792 For example, one can find in Victorian positivism – that exotic 
attempt to plant Auguste Comte’s philosophy in the incompatible soil of English liberalism which 
was very far removed in nearly every way from the political sensibilities of the mirroring camps – 
disavowals of individualistic ideas of public opinion that exceeded in forcefulness any expressions in 
                                                 
789 Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. 1, 21. 
 
790 Ibid., 21. 
 
791 See e.g. Colin Tyler, Idealist Political Philosophy (London: Continuum International Publishing, 2006), 70. 
 
792 The perplexities associated with Victorian PR’s ambivalent relationship to a communal notion of public opinion are 
addressed in chapter six. 
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Lecky’s corpus.793 What separated Mackintoshian mirror theorists’ conception of the public opinion 
that ruled the country from that of Comtean radicals was not its organicist or collectivist dimension, 
but another factor altogether. 
 What distinguished these two approaches to public opinion was, rather, a fourth feature, one 
which has been present throughout the whole chapter: diversity. To Comteans like Frederic 
Harrison, the “controlling power of opinion – the corner-stone, that is to be, of all rational 
government” was comprised of two parts: the moral energy of the working class to set the ends of 
politics and the leadership of strong and expert executive authority to devise and enforce the 
means.794 The latter element was, moreover, not an equal partner. It was a concession to the 
complexity of social problems – since the working class were “not capable as a body of efficient 
administration of affairs,” they were in practice restrained “not to rule but to supply the motive to 
rule.”795 But when it came to the “choice” of leaders and the determination of “results” to be 
pursued, Harrison granted this solely to the working class, because, in a manner similar to Marx, 
“the working class is the only class which (to use a paradox) is not a class. It is the nation. They 
represent, so to speak, the body politic as a whole.”796 This was entirely opposed to the embrace of 
sociological complexity which, as we have seen, marked the proponent of electoral variety. Given 
that the society which they strove to represent was a complex, multi-part organism, the opinion that 
                                                 
793 See e.g. the words of Frederic Harrison: “public opinion abhors this fatal mathematical equality, this absurd 
multiplication of ciphers”; “The Revival of Authority,” Fortnightly Review, vol. 13, no. 73, (Jan. 1873), 18. See also his 
distinction between “the independent opinion of individual voters” and “the organic opinion of masses”; Order and Progress 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1875), 98. 
 
794 Harrison, Order and Progress, 147-52, 231-2. 
 
795 Ibid., 230-1. 
 
796 Ibid., 151. While this tenet of Harrison’s positivism obviously appealed to the rising ranks of English socialists, we 
should avoid the assumption that it characterized the full socialist spectrum. Ramsay MacDonald, for instance, saw the 
relationship between representation and diversity in a way that was continuous with much of the variety-of-suffrages 
tradition, as did many elements of the labour movement in the last third of the century. See MacDonald, Socialism and 
Government, 2 vols. (London: Independent Labour Party, 1909), esp. vol. 1, ch. 2; A.W. Humphrey, A History of Labour 
Representation (London: Constable and Co., 1912), passim. 
 233 
 
arose to guide its politics would necessarily include several streams of thought; if, in the words of 
their Christian socialist contemporary F.D. Maurice, the “sign of what this age is” was above all a 
profound appreciation of the “medley of parties and influences” and an “evident consciousness in 
each of any two contending parties that its own conclusions and position are not entirely 
satisfactory,”797 then the variety-of-suffragists had as strong a claim as any political movement to be 
exemplary of their epoch. Public opinion was in their eyes a diverse, composite phenomenon: “it is 
natural” that men “will habitually differ; [that] great national questions will divide the nation; [that] 
great parties will be formed.”798 The consensus, or rather series of consensuses, which emerged to 
claim the mantle of public opinion had the nature not of a projection of a single set of ideals or 
interests – this was, the variety-of-suffragists agreed with Mill, the mark of stagnant or Asiatic 
societies799 – but of an assemblage of partial truths.800 That the government should run in accord 
with the ideas which gained favor after subjection to criticism, amendment, supplement from this 
chorus of perspectives was the message which they intended to convey by signing onto the 
watchword of the rule of public opinion. 
 Distilled from all of this diversity was what was variously called by such phrases as a 
“determination of public opinion” or a “resolution of the national mind,” and it was these 
determinations and resolutions which were ultimately to set the direction of national policy if Britain 
                                                 
797 Maurice, The Workman and the Franchise, 187. 
 
798 Bagehot, “History of the Unreformed Parliament,” 273. 
 
799 On Bagehot, Mill, and the fear of “the awful, rock-like immobility of most of human society,” see Burrow, Whigs and 
Liberals, 108-10; Georgios Varouxakis, Victorian Political Thought on France and the French (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002), 118. 
 
800 The emphasis on public opinion as a split, polyphonic agglomeration of different strands competing and coalescing 
can be contrasted not only with the Comtean position but also with an older view of public opinion. This view, 
characteristic of the eighteenth century, took public opinion to be a kind of monolithic constraint on the freedom of 
action of potentially maleficent rulers; see e.g. Joseph Priestley’s, “The Stability of Governments,” in Priestley’s Writings on 
Philosophy, Science, and Politics, ed. John Passmore (New York: Collier Books, 1965), 189: “The sense of the people, as we 
call it, though no nominal part of the constitution, is often felt to be a real check upon public measures by whomsoever 
they are conducted; and though it is only expressed by talking, writing, and petitioning, yet tumults and insurrections so 
often arise when the voice of the people is loud, that the most arbitrary governments dread the effects of them.” 
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was to consider itself free. But was there good reason to believe that from this forge of diversity 
came good policy?  
This question was answered by a third value of the variety-of-suffrages tradition: 
deliberation. Deliberation has, as we will see, a strong claim to be considered the normative heart of 
their theory – and it was the locus of much critical reaction from their contemporaries. 
 
3) Deliberation 
 This value and the foregoing one were linked by the dual role that public opinion played in 
the mirror theory. On the one hand, public opinion was the object of representation: its accurate 
reflection was the end or outcome of the electoral machinery which they sought to implement. On 
the other hand, however, it was the means – the material cause, if you will – of another aspect of the 
legislative process: the deliberation which took place in the Commons. Public opinion in its 
polyphony was, to variety-of-suffragist eyes, the resource or subject-matter of parliamentary 
discussion. It was the stuff of which “government by discussion,” to use the ubiquitous Victorian 
phrase, was made. 
 As a result of the bipartite place that it occupied, the misrepresentation of public opinion 
caused a two-fold wrong. First, misrepresentation meant that certain strands of public opinion were 
excluded (or given fewer seats than they deserved), which was a miscarriage of justice to the groups 
involved; they ought to have been present, or been present in a certain magnitude, but were not. 
Their conceptualization of this wrong was the subject of section (1). If this was the wrong as seen 
from the strictly descriptivist standpoint, it took on a different dimension when seen in the deliberativist 
light. From this perspective, the mistranslation of public opinion rendered deliberation partial and 
therefore rendered it a less reliable bearer of the benefits expected from it. To employ a term which 
has appeared throughout this chapter, this partiality created a “class Parliament” in one direction or 
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another;801 hence the repeated condemnations of class rule expressed not only a defect of 
representativeness but a defect of deliberativeness as well. To allege that an assembly had succumbed to 
the dominance of a class was to call it both unrepresentative and undeliberative. 
 This was not, to mid-century champions of electoral diversity, a simply conceptual point 
about what followed theoretically from the dual status which they assigned to public opinion. 
Instead, it was a point the practical explanations for which and the real-world manifestations of 
which obsessed them. What they meant by the problem of the partial Commons was tantamount to 
an earlier, broader version of what is now known as the “diversity trumps ability theorem.”802 We 
might call it, for the purposes of this chapter, the “diversity trumps character” postulate, to better 
reflect the blend of intellectual capacities and moral dispositions on which Victorians focused in 
describing their exemplary legislator. 
 To take Bagehot as an illustration: the editor of the Economist made the “moderate” MP a 
central character in the success story that was English parliamentary history. Only if “the 
overwhelming majority of representatives are men essentially moderate” was it possible to maintain 
parliamentary government; “intrinsically moderate, careful, and almost shrinking men” were the best 
suited for legislative positions.803 Bagehot was thus anything but agnostic about the kind of 
temperament most appropriate for assemblyman. And yet, despite his profound interest in the 
character traits appropriate to MPs, he was clear about the insufficiency of fulfillment of this moral-
dispositional criterion for the creation of an epistemically robust legislature. 
                                                 
801 Cowling, 1867: Disraeli, Gladstone, and Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 40. 
 
802 See e.g. Scott Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007). 
 
803 Bagehot, English Constitution, 299, 297. It was the lack of this quality that had caused the French – an “overexcitable 
population” addicted to “grand principle[s]” and thus unable to respond pragmatically to social problems as they arose – 
to prove so inept at operating parliamentary institutions and to repeatedly succumb to authoritarianism; Bagehot, 
“Letters on the French Coup d’État of 1851,” 60-1. For more on this facet of England’s negative perception of the 
French, see Varouxakis, Victorian Political Thought on France, e.g. 84-5, 89-90. 
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No mechanism of appointing legislators solely on the bases of their personal characteristics, 
even if it ensured that all 658 members were models of moderation, was preferable to a properly 
mirroring electoral system that brought within it all relevant information and perspectives. 
For Bagehot, moderation without the diversity that came with descriptive representativeness would 
mean that, despite the best intentions of MPs, it would be impossible for them to govern with the 
wisdom that could only come from including the full range of relevant groups; they would lack the 
“materials” for “a judgment” that could embrace public opinion in its many facets.804 The “diffused 
multitude of moderate men” were “just as likely to be tyrannical towards what they do not realise, 
inapprehensive of what is not argued out, thoughtless of what is not brought before them, as any 
other class can be,” and consequently it was “of the utmost importance that there should be in the 
House of Commons some persons able to speak…the wants, sentiments, and opinions of every 
section of the community.”805 In other words, a moderate assembly could still be a “stubbornly 
stupid” one if it was rendered unable to respond to public opinion due to the absence of a suitable 
diversity among its members.806 There was no substitute at the level of individual MPs’ personal 
attributes for the realization of multi-faceted public opinion at the level of the composition of the 
collective. 
 The theme of “diversity trumping character” was echoed in various ways by authors 
sympathetic to the project of differentiated franchises. Pochin stated it in unadorned fashion with 
respect to the gains he saw from earmarking seats for the urban working-class: “the information 
thus obtained would be of great service to the country, both as affording an opportunity for 
                                                 
804 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 195. 
 
805 Ibid., 195. 
 
806 Ibid., 195. And see the similar sentiment expressed by the Liberal MP Edward Buxton in his essay “The Liberal 
Dilemma,” quoted in Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, 168. 
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conviction by argument…and also as affording reliable data for future legislation.”807 Without 
working-class input in the Commons, decisions made by even the most enlightened and best-
intentioned membership would suffer, for they would lack the attitudes and attributes which only 
the working class could provide. To this school of thought there was no ersatz for the expression 
and advocacy of group preferences and perspectives by those who belonged to the group; these 
figures flatly denied the possibility of achieving (at least among a critical mass of practical politicians) 
the Millian ideal of a person so undogmatic and open-minded that he would be able to understand 
and state the position of his opponents even better than they could themselves.808 Consequently 
even the most “patriotic” and “noble race of men,” if in full possession of the assembly, would 
produce “class legislation”; the only true antidote to this ill was to allot to all fundamental interests a 
“sufficient force to carry weight and authority into deliberation.”809 Not the character of the 
politicians, but the presence of “representatives of [each] class,” gave security against parliament’s 
instigation of “class evils.”810 Only if a parliamentary inlet for the “beliefs” of the “organic portion of 
the working classes” were found, wrote Maurice, could the nature of social and political problems be 
“thoroughly and satisfactorily expressed”: 
A whole set of questions which are now most imperfectly handled in the House of 
Commons – handled by men looking at them from a distance – seeing them from their own 
points of view – unable to sympathize with labourers if they wish it ever so much – would 
then be submitted to fair and reasonable discussion.811 
 
                                                 
807 Pochin, Plan, 18. 
 
808 “The hardiest assertor, therefore, of the freedom of private judgment—the keenest detector of the errors of his 
predecessors, and of the inaccuracies of current modes of thought—is the very person who most needs to fortify the 
weak side of his own intellect, by study of the opinions of mankind in all ages and nations, and of the speculations of 
philosophers of the modes of thought most opposite to his own….A man of clear ideas errs grievously if he imagines 
that whatever is seen confusedly does not exist: it belongs to him, when he meets with such a thing, to dispel the mist, 
and fix the outlines of the vague form which is looming through it”; Mill, “Bentham,” in CW, vol. 10, 91. 
 
809 Cracroft, Essays, vol. 1, 27-8. 
 
810 Ibid., 27. 
 
811 Maurice, The Workman and the Franchise, 233. 
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As one would expect given their classification of democracy as a form of class rule, variety-
of-suffragists believed that legislatures suffered deliberative deficits not only when the lower classes 
went without sufficient weight and authority to make their wants and reasons heard, but when higher and 
more powerful classes were unduly marginalized as well; the perception that this marginalization was 
occurring with regard to the commercial ranks of the great cities was, as we glimpsed earlier, the 
source of Cole’s dissatisfaction with the status quo.812 Sidgwick, whom we will see in the next chapter 
combining sympathy with the aims of the variety-of-suffrages model and an impression of its 
untenability in the face of democratic counterarguments, gave a cogent recapitulation of this line of 
thought in his Elements of Politics. Unless the “various elements of the community” were directly 
represented through an “adequate selection of persons who…combine special experience in 
different departments of social life,” the “assembly” would be liable to lack both a “keen concern for 
the interests” of all parts of society and a wide enough “knowledge” for “dealing in a statesmanlike 
manner with all the problems presented to a modern legislative body.”813 Given “men as they are,” it 
was not possible for an assembly to approximate wisdom – to “possess such knowledge as is 
obtainable of the general tendencies of social development and the effects of different social causes”  
– other than through a measure of variety in membership.814 
The perceptive reader will have noted that in this sensitivity about the harm threatened to 
legislation by the absence or minimization of important strands of interest and opinion were blended 
two separable worries. The first is the more humdrum one encapsulated by the adage “out of sight, 
out of mind” – that the welfare of those classes who were without parliamentary sway would be 
neglected; this was what Holyoake had in mind when he castigated the reformed Commons as a 
                                                 
812 Citizens of “great commercial importance, wealth, and tax contributions,” “bankers, merchants, professional men and 
traders” lacked suitable representation for their “political views, feelings, and opinions”; there was a dearth of MPs “who 
can speak authoritatively the opinions of the important classes”; Cole, Middle Classes, 39. 
 
813 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 371. 
 
814 Ibid., 371. 
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“Rich Man’s Club” that paid attention to little but the “views and comforts of the ‘upper ten 
thousand.’”815 Yet this was the less fundamental strain of their criticism. For it was liable to the 
simple counter that, however it may look to those who wished for different policies to be pursued, 
the current members were concerned with and looking after the well-being of all classes.816 Instead, 
the foundation of their picture of the policymaking costs incurred by unrepresentativeness was that 
unrepresentativeness could not but impoverish the discussion by which measures were enacted and 
majorities were formed, and therefore could not but have a general tendency to yield worse lawmaking. 
If parliament were to be dominated by only one or a few social types, then the truths conveyed by 
the excluded groups would not bear on the legislative agenda. 
The essence of the variety-of-suffrages rendition of “diversity trumps character” amounted, 
then, to the warning that there were no workarounds for the harms resulting from partial 
deliberation, that the deliberative deficit resulting from inadequate representative machinery could 
not be made up for by maximizing the enlightenment or moderation of the personnel. This warning 
was, in turn, entirely of a piece with the observations about the one-sidedness, partiality, and 
fallibility of the human mind which (as shown in part one) figured so largely in the theory of 
intellectual liberty and the tolerant society; it was the lesson of (in one liberal Anglican theologian’s 
words) “the one-sided imperfectness” and “limited…perception” of the individual at work on the 
parliamentary plane.817 This was On Liberty for legislatures: it was that text’s insight about the 
perniciousness of assuming one’s infallibility related to the composition of assemblies. Mill himself 
recognized this congruence. His manner of articulating the connection is striking enough to warrant 
being quoted at length: 
                                                 
815 Holyoake, Liberal Situation, 17. 
 
816 See e.g. the Tory poet William Edmonstoune Aytoun’s “Reform Measures of 1852,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 
vol. 71, no. 437 (Mar. 1852): 369-86, esp. 371; Austin, Plea for the Constitution, 10. 
 
817 S.R. Bosanquet, Eirenicon (London: Hatchard & Co., 1867), 50, 17. 
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Sir, there is a better way of persuading possessors of power to give up a part of it: not by 
telling them that they make a bad use of their power—which, if it were true, they could not 
be expected to be aware of—but by reminding them of what they are aware of—their own 
fallibility. Sir, we all of us know that we hold many erroneous opinions, but we do not know 
which of our opinions these are, for if we did, they would not be our opinions. Therefore, 
reflecting men take precautions beforehand against their own errors, without waiting till they 
and all other people are agreed about the particular instances; and if there are things which, 
from their mental habits or their position in life, are in danger of escaping their notice, they 
are glad to associate themselves with others of different habits and positions which very fact 
peculiarly qualifies them to see the precise things which they themselves do not see. 
Believing the House to be composed of reasonable men, this is what we ask them to do. 
Every class knows some things not so well known to other people, and every class has 
interests more or less special to itself, and for which no protection is so effectual as its 
own…. Is there, I wonder, a single member of this House who thoroughly knows the 
working men’s views of trades unions, or of strikes, and could bring these subjects before 
the House in a manner satisfactory to working men?...What is asked is a sufficient 
representation to ensure that their opinions are fairly placed before the House, and are met 
by real arguments, addressed to their own reason, by people who can enter into their way of 
looking at the subjects in which they are concerned….[At present, if MPs] condescend to 
argue [with working-class voices], it is from premises which hardly any working man would 
admit; they expect that the things which appear self-evident to them will appear self-evident 
to the working classes; their arguments never reach the mark, never come near what a 
working man has in his mind, because they do not know what is in his mind. Consequently, 
when the questions which are near the hearts of the working men are talked about in this 
House—there is no want of good will to them, I cheerfully admit—but all that it is most 
necessary to prove to them is taken for granted.818 
 
This drawing of the link between the fallibility of the human mind and the urgency of institutions 
which would secure to each class its own representatives occurred, it should be said, in a speech in 
favor of Gladstone’s quite un-variety-of-suffrage-like 1866 reform proposal, and of course Mill’s 
idea of a proper system of representation was PR and not a plan for revived electoral variegation. 
But as far as rooting the need for every class to possess its own parliamentary spokesman in a 
psychology of limitation, closedness, and one-sidedness, and of thereby charting the route from the 
deliberative partiality of the Commons to the deterioration of its legislation, there was hardly any 
daylight between Mill and this chapter’s reformers. This dark psychology of opinion, and the 
aspiration to overcome it through the norms and institutions of a deliberative society, were, after all, 
not peculiar to Mill, so we should not be shocked to see its lessons carried out at the level of 
parliament by a slate of reformers that included Bagehot, Lecky, and Holyoake, all of whom made 
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much of these themes of fallibility and the consequent necessity of diversity throughout their 
political theory. 
Hence it was as natural for Lecky as for Mill to describe the epistemic impairment that 
would afflict the Commons in a democratic situation in which only the candidate who could make 
“appeals to [lower] class interests or class animosities” in terms of the consequence that there would 
be no influence for “conditions of thought and life widely different from their own.”819 Hence 
Bagehot defined “true Liberalism” in a way eminently germane to the Considerations on Representative 
Government as holding up “the true ideal of Parliament [which] is to have the largest number of really 
organic interests and ideas meeting together in the representative assembly, to try each other’s strengths 
and weaknesses.”820 Just as, per the analysis in chapter two, it was a hallmark of “genuine Liberalism” 
in the public sphere to recognize “that a willingness to hear every side of every question is the 
condition…of vigorous faith,”821 so it was a hallmark of liberalism in the parliamentary sphere that 
“discussion at least among all possible views and interests before [legislative] decision be…part of the 
system.”822 If toleration and a free press were prerequisites for the individual to have justified 
confidence in his beliefs, by parallel reasoning there could be no justified confidence in the quality of 
legislation passed through parliament if voices which contributed to public opinion systematically 
risked not being “heard at all” in the assembly.823 Public opinion was reliably bigger and more 
expansive, more fully incorporative of the variety of “consolidated feelings and matured opinions” 
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in which inhered those partial truths of which good legislation had to take account,824 than the mind 
of any one kind of person or the predilections of any one class could be. The reflection of public 
opinion was, accordingly, the indispensable bedrock of a truly deliberative Commons. 
 Once the dictate to realize public opinion in full was met, then the logic of the epistemic 
defense of toleration kicked in with respect to the Commons’s direction of policy; as Cole put it, in 
response to an imagined objection of a reader anxious about the increase in “differences of opinion” 
that his scheme would cause in the Commons: “when discussion is free, the best arguments will 
prevail in the end, and the country at large derive advantage.”825 As an anonymous mirror theorist 
had written in defense of the unreformed parliament: in a “fair field of debate” for the “free 
expression” of all relevant sentiments, such as was provided by an assembly in which the member 
from one class or interest had to “be content to take his seat by the side of” members from other 
groups, the “truth” could not but “command [the House’s] assent.”826 If modern societies were 
arenas for the playing out of what I called in part one of the dissertation a “practical theodicy” with 
respect to the evolution of beliefs, their assemblies were not exceptions to this optimism but settings 
in which it was borne out. 
 But surely the dynamics in parliament were different from those in society at-large. Even if 
one could expect the truth to conquer in the public sphere over the long-run as views were 
criticized, refined, and adjusted in light of new arguments and discoveries, this did not mean that 
laws were passed because they proved themselves to be objectively productive of the greatest public 
good. Were there not passions and pathologies peculiar to assemblies, incentives of party loyalty, 
personal advantage, etc. among members which clouded the consideration of arguments on their 
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own terms? Did the variety-of-suffrages crew simply skirt these questions by stipulating that 
whatever legislation a properly constituted assembly approved was by definition the optimal one?827 
Why wasn’t the legislature the exception to this progressive rule? 
 Before delving into the specifics of their answer to these questions, it ought to be stressed 
that the rosy picture painted of the epistemic properties of a diverse Commons applied only when 
their properly representative Commons was realized, or at least approximated. If corruption, 
whether of the “plutocratic” genre sketched in the previous chapter or of an older kind of 
monarchical patronage with which early-nineteenth-century Whigs were preoccupied,828 were 
prevalent, then parliamentary deliberation would be hollow, since members would be responding 
not to public reasons but to private interests. And, as we have seen, if the electoral regulations 
invested one class with such an overwhelming preponderance that their will could be imposed 
without needing to answer to reasons not their own, lawmaking would tend to be hasty and sectarian 
rather than public and enlightened. All of their optimistic assurances about the quality of policy were 
predicated on avoiding these fates. 
 If these obstacles were surmounted, as our authors assumed they would be were their 
schemes to be implemented, then the Commons would constitute an authentically deliberative site. 
Yet overcoming these massive structural barriers still left the more mundane problem of selfishness 
or class-interestedness among MPs. Even if “the truth will, in the long run, pierce all the mists raised 
by the intrigues of the jobber, or the violence of the partisan,”829 it was not clear how this 
overarching belief in the conquering power of truth applied to decisions on specific bills by a body 
                                                 
827 Another way of framing the question is to ask, were their paeans to parliamentary wisdom committing the kind of 
“survival” fallacy that Frederick Schauer has associated with certain facile versions of the epistemic argument for free 
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828 For more on the former, see Bagehot, “John Stuart Mill upon the Increase of Corruption,” in CW, vol. 6, 347-50. On 
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vols., (London: R. Griffin, 1856), vol. 2, 347-383; Mackintosh, “Parliamentary Reform,” 483. 
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of folks devoted to the advancement of particular interests and ideologies. What about the fact that 
members sitting for the landed agricultural interest were unlikely to examine disinterestedly and in 
conformity to a proper “ethics of belief” a bill on the indemnification of cattle who died of 
disease?830 Could dissenters and Catholics be relied on to take a public-spirited view on issues of 
Anglican Church reform? 
 It is indisputable, I think, that a progressivism about the emergence of truth and the march 
of mind inflected even their more “scientific” attempts at analysis of parliamentary deliberation. 
Without doubt mirror theorists imported the broader convictions that “one error counteracts or 
neutralizes another” and that the “variety of our beliefs” was generative of epistemic advance from 
other domains of thought into the Commons without a full argument spelling out why these wider 
conclusions applied here.831 Nonetheless they were far from uninterested in the empirics of 
deliberation in the legislative forum, and they crafted models of how the Commons could deliver on 
its promise as a deliberative space that did not depend on a naïve view of all MPs as impartial 
deliberators motivated solely by the demands of reason.832 
 For one thing, theirs was not an image of legislative deliberation as foolproof. If despite their 
general progressivism they admitted that there was “no sort of infallibility about the court” of public 
discourse,833 they allowed an even greater margin of error to the court of MPs, operating under the 
host of pressures and constraints that attended the politician’s life. But they remained confident that 
assemblies constructed as they wished would attain the good of reasonable and deliberation-
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responsive legislation more often than on any other alternative. This confidence derived from the 
belief that if the manifold of classes and ideologies were present in the assembly, then in most 
debates one could count on there being a set of MPs whose stance would not be determined by their 
selfish interests or bedrock ideological commitments bearing on the question. This crop, 
supplemented by those members whose natural love of the common good outweighed the tug of 
personal or class gains, would have no reason to be unreceptive to argument or to decide the 
question on grounds other than the respective strength of the cases presented. Given the existence 
of this undetermined clutch of members, even the biases of self-interested or prejudiced members 
could work to good effect insofar as these interests and prejudices motivated them to state the case 
for their positions in the strongest possible terms, to leave no stone unturned in their support.834 
Adamancy or heatedness in error could therefore serve the end of wise construction of laws in 
promoting the comprehensiveness of deliberation.835 The presence of fervent champions on all sides of 
an issue, including the incorrect ones, was essential to the process of crafting policy that would serve 
the public good, since it meant that no trenchant objection or salutary amendment would be 
overlooked – and since, contra Guizot, the variety-of-suffragist held that one learned which opinions 
partook of justice and reason only after evaluating how they fared in the trial of government by 
discussion. So long as their (admittedly stringent) requirements for the composition of the 
Commons were satisfied, then what was true of the general “struggle to discover truth” – namely, 
that “if a man plays his part manfully and honourably in such a struggle, he deserves our gratitude, 
                                                 
834 This is in a sense a version of familiar thoughts about the “necessity of error” applied to parliament; see e.g. C.L. Ten, 
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even if he takes the wrong side,” for “our antagonists” were doubling, from a higher point-of-view, 
as “our co-operators”836 – was true as well of the pursuit of good legislation.  
In short, without having ideal deliberators, something approximating an “ideal legislative 
speech situation” with respect to the quality of deliberation and the goodness of policy was, the 
variety-of-suffragists believed, nevertheless practicable. Of course, there could be no guarantee that 
this disinterested, reason-guided core would always be in a position to tip the scales. But given the 
multifaceted character of society and public opinion which they sought to represent, they believed 
that with some regularity it would be; when this degree was not being obtained, that was a sign that 
the electoral system was failing in its representative dimension and that a further installment of 
reform was needed. (For instance, this was the situation which Mackintosh’s thought-experiment 
about Catholic Irish democracy, cited in the previous chapter, was meant to illustrate.) Put 
differently, the Commons could fulfill its function as a “mediator” among the “wide variety of social 
‘interests’” only if it contained a group of persuadable members, and the school of electoral diversity 
believed its programs were effective means to keep such a group there.837 
 This explanation of why better representation would counter the “many errors in legislation” 
which were traceable to “defective representation” received an assortment of expressions from 
different authors.838 What united them was their attempt to give a sense that the healthy 
representative assembly was a space in which a kind of epistemic division of labor was operative, 
that the process in which they placed so much faith in their apologies for diversity and justifications 
of toleration in society at-large did not have to stop at the doors of the Commons. In the economy 
of giving reasons relevant to legislation, MPs of different kinds would do different jobs: those of 
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attacking, defending, moderating, combining different insights, and of settling the final decision. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps the most vivid articulation of this intra-Commons differentiation of 
deliberative tasks came from Bagehot. Bagehot carried over his model of “quasi-judges” and “a sort 
of advocates” as the two kinds of players in “the process by which truth wins in discussion” in the 
public sphere into the parliamentary arena – indeed, given the dates of composition of the pertinent 
writings and Bagehot’s lifelong attentiveness to parliamentary affairs, it is more likely that this 
figuration of different epistemic functions originated within the legislative context.839 More than the 
legislative success of the Commons being grasped as a microcosmic version of the larger processes 
that allowed truth to emerge in society, for Bagehot the intellectual fruitfulness of the public sphere 
was to be understood through the analogy to an expanded Commons. 
Bagehot thought that his proposed reforms would enable an appropriate distribution of seats 
between “class advocates,” unyielding “delegates” of the major idiosyncratic “wants, sentiments, and 
opinions of every section of the community,” and “unbiassed judges” who were not predetermined 
by “class prejudice or class interest.”840 This latter group served as the “critical and impartial 
audience” which could evaluate the solidness of the claims advanced by “every class and every class 
interest.”841 “Argument in the legislature” was enlightening because “those representatives” who on 
a given issue assumed “the character of advocates” for “particular opinions and interests” and 
“singular wants and notions” were incomparable from the perspective of generating reasons, 
expressing wishes, suggesting goals for policy (and, conversely, of generating objections and 
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rebuttals to opposing suggestions842), while the “neutral and judicial” members were capable of 
evaluating with dispassion the merits of all these ideas: they were competent to “weigh their 
arguments, estimate their often conflicting assertions, and in the last resort decide.”843 With the posts 
of “judge” and “commissioned advocate” satisfactorily filled, there occurred a kind of chemical 
transformation of the nature of the opinions involved.844 Once “due voice” was given to the heap of 
“special type[s] of thought” from the “shipowner” and the “manufacturer” to the “landlord” and the 
“clergy,” once every “eccentric idiosyncrasy,”  “characteristic creed,” and class bias had made itself 
heard, a verdict emerged which was both “purged of class prejudices” and which encapsulated the 
best that “ordinary intelligence” could make of the matter.845 This quasi-“judicial” model of 
deliberation in representative assemblies – in which “various members [who] ought to represent the 
various special interests, special opinions, special prejudices, to be found in the community” brought 
the cases, and a “neutral body of no sect” approximating the “general average intelligence” of the 
country passed the judgments846 – was the soundest possible engine for accumulating the full span of 
views in society and turning this sum into reasonable, impartial decisions about policy.847 As one 
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 Bagehot was using the term “party” here in such a way that it comprehended both political parties in the 
narrow sense and broader groups of likeminded politicians. As a result we can see his thought as a bridge between a 
traditional notion of the epistemic value of diversity and a more modern view of deliberative politics in which parties are 
the dominant forces for ensuring contestation of ideas. In the completed version of the project, I plan to address this 
positive conception of parties as deliberative agents in the chapter on the “moral” debate over PR.  
 
843 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform, 195; “Oxford and Mr. Gladstone,” in CW, vol. 3, 442. 
 
844 Bagehot, “Oxford and Mr. Gladstone,” 442. 
 
845 Bagehot, “Present Aspects,” 252. 
 
846 Bagehot, English Constitution, 219-20. 
 
847 To use a term from Melissa Williams’s helpful categorization of different notions of impartiality, the proponents of a 
variegated suffrage conceived of impartiality as “inclusiveness of issues”; Melissa Williams, “The Uneasy Alliance of 
Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy,” in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, 129-31. As these chapters show, a 
few of her other categories – “impartiality as absence of bias: participants” and “impartiality as inclusiveness: persons” – 
were decisively rejected by this school. The latter principle, however, was accepted by anti-proportionalist democrats and 
PR supporters, although these two schools differed over its implications. 
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Liberal MP summed up pithily, in a statement in which one could glimpse both the point about 
diversity in membership ensuring comprehensiveness in deliberation and the point about different 
members occupying different roles with regard to the setting of policy: “This is the use of a 
Parliament. We educate each other. All knowledge is brought to account….Even prejudice has a 
certain use in checking excess in another direction. The decision is taken in the main by a number of 
shrewd and silent judges, whose ears are ever open and minds are ever at work.”848 Because of this 
division of deliberative labor, properly representative assemblies could be expected to perform to a 
high epistemic standard: to obtain the best policy that “ordinary intelligence minus class prejudices” 
could offer.849 
The confidence in the division of epistemic labor among MPs was articulated in different 
ways by different authors in this camp. As one would expect from a group which comprehended so 
much variation in sociological analysis, the details of their pictures of the economy of parliamentary 
deliberation varied across writers; they were not in perfect accord about how to describe the roles 
fulfilled by different sorts of MPs or about which kind and proportion of MPs played certain parts. 
For Bagehot, for example, while members of the several groups would find themselves occupying 
the roles of advocate and judge on different occasions, to a large extent the neutral, judgment-
passing “average intelligence” would be supplied by members from the “small boroughs” who on 
the whole possessed “less definite character” and “characteristic prejudice” than members hailing 
from constituencies more closely marked by class or by the “special dialect of any bit of England.”850 
The combination of these small-borough members, the more open-minded stratum elected from 
class-distinct constituencies, and those “advocates” whose uncompromisingness was tempered by 
                                                 
848 Sir John Salusbury Salusbury-Trelawny, quoted in T.A. Jenkins, Parliament, Party, and Politics in Victorian Britain, 18. 
 
849 Bagehot, “Present Aspects,” 252. 
 
850 Bagehot, “Present Aspects,” 252; “Oxford and Mr. Gladstone,” 443. 
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the influence of party loyalty would form, he hoped, a “preponderance” in the Commons that could 
craft a centrist consensus that could stand for “the nation itself” amidst its diversity.851 This differed 
from the proportion of “advocates” to “judges” which Greg seems to have envisioned, at least in his 
more agonistic moments – Greg’s idea of “middle-class government” did not involve a tepid, 
consensual, bourgeois politics à la Guizot’s July Monarchy.852 Stapleton assigned the task of 
“impartial umpires, between contending interests” to those members who sat for “learning and 
education,” while everyone else would, it appears, be an advocate of some interest.853 Mackintosh’s 
seminal early statement partook of a more traditionally hierarchical differentiation of epistemic tasks: 
“judgment” was best rendered by the “landed proprietors” among MPs, who as a class tended to be 
more “neutral” and “impartial on more subjects than any other class of men.”854 These members of 
“leisure, large property, temperate character” were to sit in judgment on the claims brought forth by 
spokesmen of other classes less inclined to contentment with the status quo, in particular those 
proposals of innovation and reform originated by the distinctive representatives of “the lower 
classes.”855 The latter’s “character was an important element in its composition,” but it had “to be 
                                                 
851 Bagehot, English Constitution, 220; “Present Aspects,” 252. 
 
852 We desire “that the aggregate of these 658 chosen men shall, fairly and in due proportion, reflect and understand all 
those interests, feelings, opinions, and classes of character, which constitute the permanent elements of the nation. We 
desire that the slow intellects of the country should be represented, as well as the quick intellects of the city; the 
conservative sentiments of the sturdy drags on the movement, as well as the keen and impatient energy of the movement 
itself; the refined and philosophic, as well as the contentious and extreme; those who cherish pastoral delusions, as well 
as those who hug the scarce wider or more real hallucinations of bare utilitarianism; those who love peace, as well as 
those who love progress; those who are contenting with an unaugmenting competence, as well as those who ‘are in haste 
to be rich’”; Greg, “Expected Reform Bill,” 252. Greg, in so many ways a stodgy conservative, endorsed a contestatory 
parliamentarianism that shares a great deal with modern “agonistic democrats.” 
 
853 Stapleton, Suggestions, 40. 
 
854 Mackintosh, “Universal Suffrage,” 30. 
 
855 These were “men of popular talents, principles, and feelings; quick in suspecting oppression; bold in resisting it; not 
thinking favourably of the powerful; listening, almost with credulity, to the complaints of the humble and the feeble; and 
impelled by ambition, where they are not prompted by generosity, to be the champions of the defenceless”; ibid., 176-7. 
 Mackintosh’s thought here about the importance of balance in the legislature between the contented, stasis-
leaning segments of the population and the discontented, improvement-oriented ones would find echoes in the post-
mortems for the July Monarchy. Prévost-Paradol, for instance, who was otherwise very sympathetic to the Guizotian 
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checked and restrained by others of a different character” – although of course the same could be 
said “of any other of those bodies which make useful parts of a mixed and various assembly.”856 
Underneath this multiplicity of depictions of the epistemic division of labor was a thought 
nearly constitutive of the variety-of-suffrages school (and of its neighbors in reform aspirations to be 
covered in the following chapters): namely, an optimistic impression of the relationship between 
social and ideological diversity and the quality of political decisions. “The great variety…of different 
elements entering into its composition,” remarked Grey, was the cause of the historic and (with 
reform) future excellence of the Commons.857 “The most dangerous of experiments” to the 
legislation of the country, Greg wrote, was a “change” which “would throw the representation” into 
just one of the several hands which now played different instruments in the symphony of 
deliberation.858 
 A related picture of how “conviction by argument” could function as the rudder of the 
legislative ship without presuming men to be better than they were found its way into the 
Considerations on Representative Government:  
if the representative system could be made ideally perfect, and if it were possible to maintain 
it in that state, its organization must be such, that these two classes, manual labourers and 
their affinities on one side, employers of labour and their affinities on the other, should be, 
in the arrangement of the representative system, equally balanced, each influencing about an 
equal number of votes in Parliament: since, assuming that the majority of each class, in any 
difference between them, would be mainly governed by their class interests, there would be a 
minority of each in whom that consideration would be subordinate to reason, justice, and 
the good of the whole; and this minority of either, joining with the whole of the other, 
                                                                                                                                                             
program, thought it a great defect of this regime that the Chamber was reserved for “only citizens arrived at a certain 
fortune, a solidly settled fortune, who were in consequence mostly content with their fates, which is a bad disposition of 
mind for recognizing in a timely way the need for change and progress by which modern societies are always more or 
less agitated”; La France Nouvelle (Paris: Michel Lévy, 1868), 324-5. Prévost-Paradol was a moderate in the doctrinaire 
mold under Napoleon III, serving the Empire as ambassador the United States until his suicide at only forty. 
 
856 Mackintosh, “Universal Suffrage,” 177. 
 
857 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 71. 
 
858 Greg, “Expected Reform Bill,” 253. He had in mind here the ills caused by the monopoly of representation, in 
particular, of “the energetic, and the pushing – the men to whom repose is torture – the men to whom the past is all 
contemptible, the present all sombre, the future all golden.” 
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would turn the scale against any demands of their own majority which were not such as 
ought to prevail. The reason why, in any tolerably constituted society, justice and the general 
interest mostly in the end carry their point, is that the separate and selfish interests of 
mankind are almost always divided; some are interested in what is wrong, but some, also, 
have their private interest on the side of what is right: and those who are governed by higher 
considerations, though too few and weak to prevail against the whole of the others, usually 
after sufficient discussion and agitation become strong enough to turn the balance in favour 
of the body of private interests which is on the same side with them. The representative 
system ought to be so constituted as to maintain this state of things: it ought not to allow 
any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against 
truth and justice and the other sectional interests combined.859 
 
Some scholars have been dismayed to find Mill pinning such hopes on this (what strikes them as 
flimsy) view of the ground of “reason’s” steady influence over lawmaking.860 It would have been 
surprising, however, not to have found such a passage in the Millian oeuvre, given that its absence 
would have placed Mill further away from the liberal mainstream on representative government than 
he in fact tended to be. Read in context, what is surprising is not that Mill should have assented to 
this thought about how a realizable “deliberative body” would work, but that his version of the 
theme should have been so neutered – amounting basically to hoping for a 50-50 split of seats 
between labor and capital and invoking a moralistic notion of the few truly deliberative individuals 
who turned the tide – relative to the more pluralistic and fluid social imaginaries at work in other 
figures.861 In contrast to competing contemporary visions and to other aspects of his own writing 
about deliberation and representation, Mill’s portrait of the intersection of these two themes in the 
Commons was a rather stilted one. 
 Supplementing the more immediate, policy-relevant epistemic benefits of the deliberative 
Commons were a wider set of educative effects. For most scholars of political thought, the idea of 
an educational impact deriving from politics in the nineteenth century conjures up Tocqueville on 
                                                 
859 Mill, Considerations, 447. 
 
860 See e.g. Pitkin, Concept of Representation, 203; Duncan, “John Stuart Mill and Democracy,” 79. Dennis Thompson’s 
reading of this passage, while not concerned with situating Mill in context, is probably the closest in spirit to what I say 
here; see Mill and Representative Government, 125-6. 
 
861 Mill, Considerations, 424. 
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the sense of empowerment and industriousness which democracy spread through civil society or 
John Stuart Mill on the improving power of the franchise.862 But to mid-Victorians, neither of these 
was the most common way in which politics was supposed to operate educatively. Instead, the chief 
educational contribution of politics was the rich debate in the Commons. The contestation in the 
Commons focused the national mind – it gave the public a site in which it could evaluate the different 
positions taken; since all facets of society ideally were present there, following its debates gave the 
citizen an occasion to transcend the limited domains of his region, religion, or occupation and to 
encounter the nation as a whole in what we might call its reason-giving dimension. Thus 
parliamentary deliberation was a preeminent “means of enlightening the minds of the People, and 
dispelling prevailing errors.”863 Government could act as a spur for “intellectual activity and moral 
improvement” insofar as it made “those contests for power which are inevitable amongst men, take 
the form of debates upon questions of policy, and upon the measures affecting the interests of the 
Nation which are brought before Parliament. These debates are thus rendered a valuable instrument 
for enlightening the public mind.”864 Bagehot called this the “teaching function” of the Commons – 
a function which, on his taxonomy, was parasitic on the fulfillment of another “office,” the 
“expressive” one, for its debates could only be educative on the condition that they fully 
“express[ed] the mind of the English people on all matters which come before it.”865 The assembly’s 
deliberations, we can now see, enhanced wisdom in a very broad sense: they enabled wiser decisions 
on legislation, and they helped the citizenry itself to become wiser. 
 But there was certainly a paradox, or at least what looks like one from a twenty-first-century 
                                                 
862 See e.g. Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum,” in The Foundations of Social Choice Theory, eds. Elster and Aanund 
Hylland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 103-32. 
 
863 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 71. 
 
864 Ibid., 13. 
 
865 Bagehot, English Constitution, 289-90. The two were so closely linked that he distinguished them only as “a sort of 
technicality.” 
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democratic standpoint, about this latter benefit. What made the Commons such an indispensable 
intellectual institution was that it was “only by parliament, the great national institution in which every 
one takes some interest” that an “efficient discussion in practice” of an issue could draw the 
attention of all “the very miscellaneous multitude” that was “the public.”866 Yet this discussion was 
edifying only if it encompassed the diversity and descriptive accuracy to qualify as genuine 
deliberation – and this qualification was capable of fulfillment (depending on the author) only if 
either some citizens were excluded from the franchise or if the suffrage, although universal, 
proceeded on a basis of sociological differentiation which rendered the electoral impact of voters 
unequal. Thus in order for the Commons to discharge its duty of providing enlightenment for all, it 
was necessary that not all participate equally in the electoral system. In order for parliament to 
improve all minds, it could not simply be the product of aggregating, undifferentiated, all votes. To 
be edifying the Commons had to be deliberative, but to be deliberative it had to avoid democracy. 
 This picture of the deliberative legislature likely sounds illusory to the observer of legislative 
politics in modern democracies, which hardly seem to exemplify the salutary division of epistemic 
labor or the other deliberative excellences which these authors placed at the very heart of 
parliamentary government. On this front it is important to emphasize two points. First, to reiterate: 
with the exception of the status quo defenders, this model of deliberation was not seen as actually 
realized. To its greatest theorists such as Bagehot (and, as we will see later, the champions of PR), 
the mid-century Commons was only imperfectly deliberative. And yet, second, they felt that there 
were sufficient glimpses of true legislative deliberation to make their deliberative ideal seem 
realizable with the right reforms. The conditions of the era’s politics were such that deliberation in 
their demanding sense of it seemed that it could become the lifeblood of the modern legislature – 
this is part of what is meant in the frequent references to this period as the “classical age” of 
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parliamentary politics.867 These authors came of age in and developed their conceptions of politics at 
a time of “genuine parliamentary government,” those “few brief decades in English history, [when] 
what was said in the Commons actually swayed the outcome of legislation.”868 In a theme to which 
we shall return shortly, party discipline was weak in this period869 – too weak for some, such as 
Gladstone.870 While the bulk of our authors attributed a positive role to parties in structuring 
political debate, helping to secure working majorities for the passage of legislation, and enabling the 
appointment of a functioning executive cabinet, the parties they lauded were mild and club-like in 
comparison to modern party machines.871 Centralized parties which could enforce unanimous 
adherence to a platform were anathema to this kind of deliberativism; party hegemony would 
prevent members from responding to the full array of reasons in an epistemically valuable way, 
constraining them and effectively transferring the locus of power from parliamentary debate to the 
“wire-pullers” behind the scenes who directed the parties’ movements.872 This period of the “heyday 
of the private member” – when party was important but not determinative, and parliamentary 
oratory could appear an enduring means of changing hearts and minds – was a rich backdrop against 
which to theorize a politics in which deliberation was central.873 Moreover, this period of the height 
of the Commons’s deliberativeness corresponded with the height of interest in the debates in the 
                                                 
867 See e.g. Somervell, English Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 73; R.H.S. Crossman, “Introduction,” to The English 
Constitution, ed. Crossman (London: C.A. Watts & Co., 1963), 17, 35; Buchan, Spare Chancellor 184; Nadia Urbinati, Mill on 
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Commons, which was the focal point of the intellectual attention of virtually the whole literate strata 
of the British population.874 It was for Victorians a truism that the content of the House’s debates 
percolated through society as a whole, influencing the intellectual tone and political convictions of 
the nation – and this influence amplified the urgency of raising parliamentary discourse to the 
highest possible level. The epistemic and educative properties ascribed to the assembly’s deliberation 
did not come from nowhere; they were rooted in the experience of the age. To employ a phrase 
from a quite other sphere of political theory, for these authors deliberative representative government 
looked to be a “realistic utopia.”875 
 If the previous paragraph fleshed out the realistic portion of the above phrase, it is worth 
putting the accent on the latter word as well for a moment. The student of political philosophy will 
recall that Mill proclaimed “the ideally best form of government” to be “representative 
government.”876 He was, it ought to be evident by now, not alone in such sentiments: from Harris to 
Lord John Russell, a wide swathe of the authors in this chapter and similar figures from the time 
would have assented to this statement. What deserve attention here are the full reverberations of this 
shared utopianism. For there are variations of utopianism, milder and more extreme versions of it. 
When these authors – at least the more sophisticated of them who sought to approach politics with 
a comparative lens – held deliberative representative government to be the best form of 
government, they did not mean that it was the first among good options, that it was merely 
preferable by degree to less representative, less deliberative, more authoritarian forms. For them, the 
consequence of lacking something that at least approximated their desired institutions was not 
                                                 
874 See e.g. Stefan Collini, Public Moralists, 34, 122. Collini tries to give the modern reader a sense of the magnitude of this 
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simply less effective policy, less sagacious lawmaking. It was worse; the fate of societies without such 
governments was that most formidable of nineteenth-century bugbears: stagnation. In short, they 
not only held up their preferred form of government as the best possible; they also had a dystopian 
image of those forms that fell short of it. 
 The reason for their dystopianism about non-deliberative regimes was that “government by 
discussion” was not just the capstone of the discursive societies theorized in part one – it was their 
precondition, as well. At the risk of repetitiousness, it is worth reminding ourselves of some 
conclusions from earlier in the dissertation in order to understand this point. 
 To wit: Victorians believed that most societies (even in Europe) were stagnant. This meant 
(depending on the approach and phrasing of the author) that one class, one character type, one set 
of ideas and values dominated the social-mental landscape in such a way that innovation and novelty 
could not arise. This was the primitive state of society, and most peoples had never emerged from it. 
 But the situation was even bleaker than the foregoing would indicate. For not only was it 
difficult to exit the primitive condition: escaping it was not a once-and-for-all achievement. The 
progressiveness that came with entering the “age of discussion” was fragile, for relapse was always 
possible. Some of the avenues by which the progressive society could be undermined were 
considered in part one, but there was another not covered there: namely, that the legislature would 
cease to operate deliberatively. What was the connection between the degree of deliberativeness in 
the legislative forum and broader societal-intellectual regression? Once again, it was Bagehot who 
expounded the logic in most depth. 
 For Bagehot, government by discussion was the lifeblood of modern, civilized societies 
(read: England), without which they would return to the condition of premodern ones like India; it 
was the sole social process which could durably keep at bay the forces hostile to diversity and new 
ideas which were inherent in human nature. On this perspective, the deliberative Commons caused 
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and consolidated spectacular, world-historical intellectual gains. In the absence of the constant 
stimulus provided by this form of government and the exemplars of the deliberative virtues that it 
supplied, all progress would cease, for the primitive instincts of man which encouraged imitation, 
submission to custom, and hatred of minority views would bring an end to intellectual inquiry.877 As 
soon as the Commons, on which so much of the nation’s attention was trained, substituted 
“unimpeded command” as modeled by the world’s “best finished democracy”878 for “reasoned 
arguments” in “regular representative assemblies,” “the mass” of the country would cease to be 
amenable to “important thought.”879 If political power proved to be inaccessible to “the impact of 
argument and the play of mind upon mind,” then a major impetus to intellectual inquiry and a 
source of courage in maintaining and arguing for presently unpopular opinions would dry up.880 
Only government that “lives by discussion” could provide the public with the resources and the 
motivation for “continual learning” by which it could “grow and learn” and “come[] to know great 
principles and understand great questions.”881 But for the fact that deliberative assemblies provided 
daily testimony of their importance to the “business” of public affairs, “argument and dissertation” 
would seem meaningless to the average man.882 Without government by discussion to “quicken[] and 
enliven[] thought all through society,” stultification would overcome all aspects of life, even those, 
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like the natural sciences, that appeared furthest from politics.883 As Bagehot immodestly concluded, 
the reason why Darwin and Newton had appeared in England and not elsewhere was because 
England was the nation in which government by discussion had operated longest.884 
 Because of the close continuity of the political reasoning – and the mental life more broadly 
– of parliament and the public, getting reform wrong entailed dangers of not only a political sort 
narrowly construed, but of a more general epistemic-moral-mental sort. Bad representative 
institutions threatened to turn Britain from a “progressive” to a “retrograde” society.885 Paralleling 
the judgment passed by defenders of intellectual and expressive freedom that apathy and absence of 
inquiry were worse than any error could be, 886 the replacement of genuine deliberative government 
by class-rule or an “overweening dictator” or an assembly inured to public opinion was far more 
deleterious than any particular policy mistake could be.887 
 The conception of deliberation with which the variety-of-suffragists were at work was, in 
sum, a mixture of high faith and almost otherworldly expectations with detailed interest in the 
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empirics of its operation.888 The complex character of the commitment to deliberation among this 
strand of parliamentary reform belies the gap that is often imagined to have existed between Mill – 
the ardent moralist responsive to high ideals, the speculative thinker on politics par excellence889 – and 
the doggedly practical, realist, and businesslike political culture of the mid-Victorian era.890 Compare 
Mill, for example, to Bagehot. While Bagehot himself contributed to the stereotype of Mill as a more 
idealistic and speculative thinker than righter-minded compatriots like himself,891 he was, every bit as 
much as Mill, a political theorist of discussion and deliberation, of the “salutary effect” of the 
“collision of opinions” (Mill’s words), of the “action and reaction of many kinds of minds” and the 
contestation between “men of various occupations, various tendencies, and various sympathies” 
(Bagehot’s).892 Mill may, as he claims, have derived his ideal of “many-sidedness” and his hymns to 
diversity from foreign sources such as Humboldt and Tocqueville,893 but the British public had been 
prepared to receive his lessons through a domestic tradition: the tradition of the representative-
deliberative Commons, from Paley and Mackintosh through Bagehot and Grey. While Mill’s deep 
affection for all things continental led him to look outside his homeland for wisdom on these 
themes, there was a rich native tradition of political thought which gave expression to their meaning 
and significance and which was thriving throughout the years of his life which were most devoted to 
                                                 
888 This is a combinatory space that modern deliberative democracy is struggling to occupy today; witness the frequent 
desire for a more “institutional” deliberative democratic theory as in e.g. Graham Smith and Corinne Wales, “Citizens’ 
Juries and Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies vol. 48, no. 1 (2000): 51-65. 
 
889 E.g. the portrait of Mill painted in Reeves, John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand. 
 
890 See e.g. Émile Boutmy’s classic contrast between the businesslike and un-idealist English and impractical and 
moralistic French; Boutmy, Essai d’une Psychologie politique du Peuple anglais au XIXe siècle (Paris: A Colin, 1902), esp. 205-21. 
Boutmy was one of the early titans of modern French social science and a founder of Sciences Po. 
 
891 See Bagehot’s two review articles on Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government, in CW, vol. 6, 336-46, esp. 341-2. 
 
892 Mill, On Liberty, 257; Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 193. 
 
893 Mill, Autobiography, 200, 260-1; On Liberty, 215, 261. 
 261 
 
theorizing representative government.894 
In sum, Bagehot and the bulk of his colleagues in representative but nondemocratic reform 
maintained with a fidelity equal to Mill’s the vision that what was permanently valuable in politics 
was the interplay of diverse opinions and ideas. “The whole fabric of English society is based upon 
discussion,” Bagehot wrote – a claim which even Mill could not outdo.895 When Carl Schmitt was 
looking for worshippers of the parliamentary idols of “discussion and openness,” he might just as 
easily have selected Bagehot as Mill.896 After all, it was Bagehot who used the pages of the Economist 
to give this forceful response to the malcontents who would decry parliamentary government as 
“mere talk”: “those who so think have simply no conception of the nature of popular government. 
In such a government it is not too much to say that ‘speech is action.’”897 Deliberation was the 
essence of what a nation did in its political capacity. It was society’s central task qua body politic, and it 
was also the wellspring of the wider set of goods which marked it as a free and progressive society. 
 This fundamental fact about Bagehot’s theory – that deliberation upon the whole span of 
views and interests which constituted English public opinion was the primary political good – has 
                                                 
894 My analysis here resembles a point originally made by John Burrow that the “liberalism” which we equate with Mill 
was not as distinct as often imagined from an older “Whig” outlook; see Whigs and Liberals, esp. ch. 3. Among other 
goals, Burrow wanted to present Burkean Whig thought on representation as a forerunner of the Millian-Victorian zeal 
for variety. On this point Burrow was not only right, but far more right than he knew – he did not examine in depth the 
literature on diversity in representation as it continued through the mid-Victorian period, and he therefore was unable to 
draw out the full implications of his intuitions. 
It should be said that the thought about the parliamentary-representative genesis of the “nineteenth-century 
conception” of diversity and many-sidedness can be pushed far enough that it would begin to parallel Richard Tuck’s 
argument on the origin of the concept of the autonomous individual lying in the concept of the autonomous state that 
had been developed in the field of international relations; Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the 
International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). It is not clear if Burrow wished to go all 
the way in the direction of casting a standard for personal ethics as an importation from the domain of representative 
institutions, although he sometimes speaks as if he does. If this was his intention then one would find, in Burrow as in 
Tuck, the level of the individual following that of the collective/institutional: the many-sided, open-minded person who 
received such praise from the Victorian intelligentsia following and individualizing the model of the diverse, inclusive, 
and reason-giving parliament. 
 
895 Bagehot, “Average Government,” 87. 
 
896 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 2. 
 
897 Bagehot, “The Non-Legislative Functions of Parliament,” 43. 
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proven difficult for even the most sensitive of his readers to appreciate. His admiring biographer, for 
instance, complained that Bagehot had “confuse[d] means with ends” and failed to specify “what all 
this discussion should be about,” had failed to construct a “vision of society” to stand as the 
outcome of his deliberative parliamentarianism.898 While one may wish to reject the political theory 
of Bagehot and the variety-of-suffragists for any number of reasons, it would be wrong to attribute 
to them this particular confusion in their conception of the value of deliberation – just as it would 
be wrong to allege that it was only confusion on Mill’s part that led him to care so much for liberty 
instead of having directed his attention to offering a clearer picture of what his liberty-realizing 
society ought to look like. The variety-of-suffragists were aware, and were happy to accept, that their 
conceptions of public opinion and deliberation committed them to a kind of open-endedness and 
provisionality in the substantive prescriptions which they offered. The conversation – “the giving of 
reasons,” “discussion, explanation, controversy” – was greater, they thought, than any of the 
particular conclusions to which it led.899 
***** 
Deliberation was a watchword of mid-Victorian parliamentarianism. There was widespread 
assent that the country received great blessings from having “an assembly which so much takes to 
itself the character of a deliberative council,”900 and really only the positivists among the relatively 
mainstream political schools denied its importance.901 Given its prominence, we ought not to be 
surprised that the view of it elaborated here was not the only picture of legislative deliberation 
current in this milieu, and that there was a great deal of contestation and uncertainty about what 
exactly a deliberative legislature involved. 
                                                 
898 Buchan, Spare Chancellor, 210. 
 
899 Bagehot, “Average Government,” 87. 
 
900 Hallam, Constitutional History of England, vol. 2, 400. 
 
901 Harrison, Order and Progress, 213-8. 
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The remainder of this section is devoted to examining three anxieties provoked by the 
variety-of-suffragist treatment of this theme. While they are related in various ways, for the sake of 
clarity it is best that they be prized apart. The subjects dealt with are an interesting blend of 
criticisms overtly made at the time and tensions that the theorist today can draw out of their 
thought, even if the extent to which they were themselves aware of them is difficult to ascertain. We 
might name these three sources of concern about the version of deliberation presented in this 
chapter the technocratic rebuttal, Greg’s problem, and Grey’s problem. 
The technocratic rebuttal is the simplest and easiest to understand of this trio, in part because it 
remains with us in a form very similar to that which it had then; the fight today between epistemic 
democrats and the various defenders of the rule of experts and intellectual elites closely echoes this 
particular Victorian clash. This rejoinder to the mirror theory involved a straightforward denial of 
that theory’s conception of deliberation. While these objectors retained the language of deliberation 
and could imagine no better way of exalting the Commons than by calling it the greatest 
“deliberative Assembly that ever existed,” in their minds deliberation had no special relationship to 
the kind of diversity which obsessed the mirrorers.902 Instead it was an activity which the wise few –
those in fullest possession of the “science of government”903 – performed on behalf of the rest of 
society. 
For our purposes the most interesting articulation of this point-of-view was that of Robert 
Lowe. Lowe’s opposition to the enfranchisement of the working class was the most controversial of 
the 1860s, both for the inflammatory terms in which he spoke of the lower classes and for his 
instrumental role in defeating Gladstone’s Reform Bill of 1866 (and ending his government) even 
                                                 
902 See e.g. Robert Lowe, Speeches and Letters on Reform, 86, 36. 
 
903 Ibid., 34. 
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though he was a Liberal MP.904 Lowe was a liberal both in respect of party and of his own broader 
ideological self-conception, and he could even occasionally be heard to sing a paean to 
representativeness when it seemed most germane to the anti-democratic message.905 But his defense 
of the settlement of 1832 did not repose on any of the arguments about the representativeness of 
the status quo described earlier. Instead, he upheld the Reformed Commons as an assemblage of the 
most competent men in the kingdom, as a body possessed of the technical, empirical, and practical 
knowledge required for directing a “complicated and artificial society.”906 To Lowe the sole vector of 
evaluation of an assembly was whether its membership was possessed of these knowledges and 
competencies; any additional question of correspondence between this membership and an image of 
the society outside the House was irrelevant. Indeed, Lowe was completely nonplussed by the label 
of “class government” for his beloved Commons, and he cited Macaulay (wrongly, on my view) to 
prove the mainstream Whig credentials for his indifference to descriptive accuracy.907 
For Lowe the proof of this legislative wisdom was in the pudding. He explicitly rejected the 
proposition that working-class input could have improved policy even in those areas which most 
intimately affected them; he believed that their interests were better looked after by the Reformed 
                                                 
904 On Lowe’s extraordinary life, see Arthur Patchett Martin, Life and letters of the Right Honourable Robert Lowe, viscount 
Sherbrooke, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1893). He is occasionally remembered today for the ire which 
his education reform bill drew from Matthew Arnold; see Arnold, “The Twice-Revised Code,” in Matthew Arnold and the 
Education of the New Order, eds. Peter Smith and Geoffrey Summerfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 
157-97. Winter notes both that the bluntness of Lowe’s animadversions on the working class were an embarrassment to 
MPs with similar substantive views, and that Lowe was a radical on every issue but the franchise; Winter, “Cave of 
Adullam,” 40-1. 
 
905 “For, although it is quite true that a Bill for the Redistribution of Seats should aim at making Parliament a mirror of 
the country, it is also true that there can be nothing more inappropriate than the argument when applied to the 
enlargement of the franchise. For to pass a Bill which puts the power in a majority of the boroughs into the hands of the 
working classes, is not to make this House a faithful reflection of the opinion of the country, but is to make it an 
inversion of that opinion by giving political power into the hands of those who have very little social power of any 
kind”; Lowe, Speeches and Letters, 175. 
 
906 Ibid., 10. 
 
907 Ibid., 164-5. 
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Commons than they would have been by an assembly more responsive to their voices.908 It was to 
him a definitive rebuttal to Gladstone’s and other reform proposals that “no one has…shown a 
single practical grievance under which the working classes are suffering which could be remedied by 
the proposed alteration.”909 Here we spot a crucial difference between the Lowean technocratic 
vision of the Commons and the mirroring representative one: whereas someone like Pochin 
supported reform even as he acknowledged having a high opinion of the current Commons 
membership’s character and performance,910 for Lowe such a stance was not even conceivable – one 
of the main thrusts of his apologetics for the current arrangements was precisely to foreclose the 
possibility of evaluating the membership of the Commons as a concern distinct from its 
performance. 
 This difference was noticed in the moment both by mirror theorists and others. Critics of 
Lowe were aghast that he should have continued to speak of representative government when his 
arguments consisted of nothing but “indirect ridicule of the representative principle”; they were 
“perhaps the first time in our history that the theory of a paternal oligarchy has been so nakedly 
stated; or that the House of Commons has stood forth in the new part of the Benevolent 
Autocrat.”911 Whatever continuities of vocabulary were preserved, Lowe had, it was believed, 
substituted a strictly capacitarian for a descriptive politics – he wanted English parliamentarianism to 
instantiate outre-Manche the July Monarchy – and consequently it was natural for resistance to his 
views to call upon the values of justice and the rule of public opinion reconstructed above. But the 
nub of the dispute with Lowe took place on the terrain of this third value of deliberation. Lowe’s 
                                                 
908 Ibid., 43-4. 
 
909 Ibid., 43. Needless to say, most of his opponents thought that they had amply pointed out such grievances. 
 
910 Pochin, Plan, 4. 
 
911 Cracroft, Essays, vol. 1, 161; Harrison, Order and Progress, 132. Such critiques of Lowe resemble the attacks on Guizot 
and the Doctrinaires for having emptied the word “representation” of any meaning; see above at note 728. 
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opponents were not satisfied just to point out that the MP for Kidderminster had fallen afoul of 
widespread norms of representativeness. More ambitiously, they hoped to have their cake and eat it 
too – to use their conception of diversity as an epistemic trump to prove that the wise deliberative 
legislation which Lowe desired could only be the result of the mirroring which he rejected. 
 Once Lowe’s pole of the debate has been brought into the picture it becomes easier to 
observe fissures and gradations within the school of electoral variegation. Sidgwick, for instance, 
begins to look like a midway figure between a technocratic or capacitarian approach and a 
descriptive one. On the one hand, his emphasis on the partiality of viewpoints and the epistemic 
need for diversity sound strikingly mirroring; on the other, his tendency to speak of the objects to be 
represented in their diversity not in terms of “classes, interests, opinions, sentiments” but in terms 
of “ability” and “special empirical knowledge” echoes more of Lowe than of his opponents.912 In 
short, it is ambiguous whether Sidgwick believed that some objective threshold which certified a 
view as “knowledge” or a group as possessing “ability” had to be crossed before any claim on 
representation was activated. There is thus unclearness about where precisely the greatest utilitarian 
after Mill wished to draw the line between capacity and descriptiveness. 
 Similarly, as pointed out during the reconstruction of institutional programs, not all of the 
reforms advocated by these figures derived from the search for greater descriptive accuracy.913 
While, as we have seen, one could justify allocating a great number of seats to the “intelligent 
classes” wholly from within the sociological or descriptive framework either on the basis of their 
greater contributions to public opinion and national prosperity or, as Harris did, by building 
“intelligence” and “virtue” in an ontological way into one’s account of society, these reformers 
                                                 
912 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 371. 
 
913 It is important to bear in mind this point that even authors who announced their fidelity to the descriptive ideal did 
not derive all of their prescriptions from it, for the plurality of normative sources for a single scheme of representation 
will be an important part of our analysis of PR. 
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occasionally recommended amendments that were geared to increase the intellectual caliber of the 
membership detached from any representative roots. Hence, when Stapleton spoke of seeking that 
“learning and education would obtain their due weight in the legislative scale,” he was arguing in a 
descriptive idiom; but when he asserted that the constituencies should be evaluated based on their 
likelihood of returning “men of an elevated morality” “best fitted for discharging legislative duties” 
and not “the puny ranks of democratick politicians,” he was speaking the language of Lowe.914 
Likewise, Greg was not to be bothered with providing any underlying theoretical coherence to the 
separate elements of his scheme; while he could have cast his suggestions for national constituencies 
and savings-deposit enfranchisement as mirror-improving amendments, he instead viewed them as 
intelligence-improving ones.915 There was a comparable ambiguity in Grey, whose defense of his 
proposal of internally-elected life members seems to have been driven partially by the diversity-
promoting motivation of providing space for “unpopular opinions” and partially by the 
competence-promoting one of guaranteeing the “ablest men” seats.916 Several thinkers were riven by 
this duality. If the logical thrust of their position was to privilege diversity over intelligence or 
character in legislative deliberation, they often did not interpret their position in an exclusive, either-
or manner. If no amount of intellect or virtue could save the assembly from the harms that followed 
a lack of diversity, they were hopeful that diversity might be accompanied by these excellences rather 
than by stupidity or immorality, even if (as shown earlier) they accepted that the value of 
representativeness was inconsistent with any project for maximizing merit. 
 Our discussion of the technocratic rebuttal has thus exposed a certain tension in the theory 
of deliberation that came with the advocacy of plans of variegated suffrage. But it was a tension of a 
                                                 
914 Stapleton, Suggestions, 46, 38. 
 
915 For other moments in the Greg corpus in which representativeness seems to be subordinated to an objective notion 
of intelligence, see e.g. Rocks Ahead, 29-31; “Parliamentary Purification,” 619-20. And see above, ch. 3, note 530. 
 
916 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 71, 218. 
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mild sort. For while these authors did not always specify that in giving their version of “diversity 
trumps ability” they were not denying that ability could still make a positive contribution on policy 
outcomes, there was no logical inconsistency in affirming diversity to be indispensable to legislative 
deliberation while also according an important role to the personal attributes of the members. This 
was what Bagehot did coherently in describing an ideal Commons as one that joined moderation in 
its members’ character with representativeness in the distribution of members relative to public 
opinion. Nor was there any incoherence in Greg giving the representativeness of the Reformed 
House a passing grade while also hoping to inject greater intelligence into the body. A more acute 
(and interesting) tension emerges in what I referred to above as Greg’s problem. Greg’s problem, 
which could travel with the kinds of concerns that motivated the technocratic rebuttal but was 
analytically distinct from them, was the challenge of whether the Commons could be both deliberative 
and representative at once. Stated differently, it was the question of whether the values of deliberation 
and the rule of public opinion were consistent with one another. I give the dilemma this name not 
because it was an issue peculiar to his writing (it was not), but in recognition of the fact that Greg 
made an effort to respond theoretically to the issue. This was a problematic which went to the heart 
of mirroring parliamentarianism, but which was largely ignored – or at most handled indirectly – by 
our authors, in contrast to the directness with which some of them addressed the tradeoffs between 
descriptivity and meritocracy. At the least it is certain that none of them solved the tension. 
Before entering into the project of reconstructing the problem as they saw it, it is worth 
stating that I do not regard their lack of a clear, trenchant resolution as a failure on the part of this 
school of thought. Much as Dennis Thompson reads John Stuart Mill’s political theory as a dialectic 
between the principles of competence and participation without considering it a failure that Mill 
didn’t show how one flowed from or was resolved into the other,917 I think that much of what 
                                                 
917 Thompson, John Stuart Mill and Representative Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), passim. 
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makes the wider orbit of nineteenth-century British political thought so rich is the interaction 
between the principles of deliberation and representation. Moreover, it is not simply that in this time 
and place the tension between these two ideals was more creative than destructive. On the contrary, 
Greg’s problem points to a kind of perennial antinomy that any comprehensive theory of modern 
politics will have to take up; the suppression of one side of this polarity can only result, I suspect, in 
an implausible and unattractive theory.918 The only cause for disappointment with the variety-of-
suffragist treatment of the matter lies in their having so seldom openly broached the conceptual 
disjunction between the aspirations to deliberative and to representative government. 
Greg’s problem arose when skeptics about this optimistic account of how descriptive 
representation and deliberation worked in tandem drove a wedge between the two concepts in a way 
not dissimilar to the tearing asunder of utilitarianism and egalitarianism (which had in the 
Benthamite school been taken together more or less unproblematically) by the Victorian economist 
F.Y. Edgeworth. Edgeworth complained of Bentham’s formula “the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number”: “is this more intelligible than the ‘greatest illumination with the greatest number 
of lamps?’”919 Analogously, for these critics deliberativeness and descriptive representativeness were 
not complementary dimensions of a body like the Commons, but rather conflicted with one 
another. 
 Why did they mean by saying that these two values stood in tension? They meant, first and 
foremost, that mirror theory deliberativism was flawed because it only looked at public opinion in 
one light; it saw public opinion solely as the resources or matter for deliberation, rather than (to the 
critics, its more salient feature) as a constraint on deliberation.920 Public opinion, from this largely but 
                                                 
918 To my mind this issue qualifies as one of what Rosanvallon calls “contestations and tensions always being reborn”; 
La démocratie inachévée, 405. 
 
919 Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics (London: C. K. Paul, 1881), 117. 
 
920 For a similar framing of tensions in the theory of representation in the preceding century, though in a different idiom, 
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not exclusively Tory perspective, was a set of pressures external to the House which distorted the 
deliberation within it. If the Commons was to arrive at its decisions in a deliberative manner, then, 
they thought, the dictates of public opinion as such must be of no significance; as Inglis articulated 
the point with regard to the agitation for reform, “the mere multiplication of numbers, asking for 
what they have not, can never, without reference to the reasons which they urge, be an argument to 
which a deliberative body can be justified in yielding.”921 Public opinion, considered as the 
distribution of views and preferences in the country, was, to a thinker of Inglis’s persuasion, simply 
of no relevance whatsoever to the conduct of the Commons: “we are not sent here day by day to 
represent the opinions of our constituents...their general interests we are bound to consult at all 
times; but not their will, unless it shall coincide with our own deliberate sense of right.”922 If the fact 
that the public “demanded” a policy were reason for its enactment, it followed that the Commons 
would not be a deliberative assembly at all but something more like the American Electoral College 
as it has come to operate; it would be simply a kind of grand and unnecessarily numerous notary of 
the popular will.923 Indeed, if this public demand were interpreted to contain a threat of civil 
disturbance unless a given law were passed, then it “will entirely annihilate our deliberative character, 
and will reduce us to the mere function of speaking the will of others.”924  
What is most important to recognize is that from Inglis’s point-of-view the contravention of 
proper deliberative government did not require that one believe the national voice had reached the 
volume of unrest or that one adopt a political theory which posited that it was the absolute “duty of 
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924 Ibid., 5 For more on this Tory line of thought in the context of the debate over the Reform Act, see Joseph 
Hamburger, James Mill and the Art of Revolution, 44. 
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an English minister, or legislator, to legislate in exact obedience to every popular demand.”925 All 
that was needed for the deliberative status of the Commons to be compromised was that “the 
wishes and wants of the people” en tant que tel count as a reason among others to take up a particular 
course, as a weight in the decision-making balance.926 The “myriads of their petitions…the millions 
of their hands” belonged to a different category of thing than genuine reasons.927 Instead, what 
constituted a body as deliberative just was that it was determined solely by the quality of reasons – 
and not by pressures or clamors or simple numbers – in the course that it set: “This House yields, 
when it yields at all, to the reason and the arguments by which those wishes and those wants are 
enforced.”928 In other words, a truly deliberative assembly never, properly speaking, acted on public 
opinion; it ratified public opinion when it was correct, and rejected it when it was wrong: “I am sent 
here to legislate, not for their will, but for their interests.”929 
 For the Tory writer, then, the state of public opinion revealed only what the country wanted 
and supported but not whether those wants were justified or rational or in their interest – the latter 
questions were what the deliberation in the House was to decide. In contrast to the standard variety-
of-suffragist picture of public opinion as a composite entity which by its diversity and 
comprehensiveness enriched the conversation that could be had in the Commons, this outlook 
perceived public opinion as a force attention to which was more likely to harm than to refine 
consideration of the legislative matters at hand by distracting MPs from sounding the true merits of 
the question. Consequently, they thought, public opinion and the outcomes of the Commons’s 
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deliberative process would coincide only casually and sporadically, namely, when public opinion 
happened to be right. Any more intimate connection between public opinion and the course of 
legislation, such as that envisioned by mid-century descriptivists,930 was without place in Inglis’s 
thoroughgoing deliberative assembly. 
 In the previous chapter I noted that Stapleton fit more uneasily than the other authors 
treated there into the overall architectonic of the theory of electoral diversity. The reason for this 
qualification can now be made apparent: he detached public opinion from deliberation in a manner 
more Inglis- than Bagehot-like. Stapleton regarded public opinion with the jealous eye of someone 
whose top priority was to guard the independence of the “deliberative assembly.”931 Despite the 
many aspects of his tract, covered already, which overlapped with the mirrorers, he was at odds with 
them in his contempt for public opinion. “The present House of Commons,” he lamented, “is easily 
swayed on one side or the other by the breath of public opinion.”932 The important question, he 
went on, was not, has the Commons “‘responded quickly and readily to publick opinion.’ But the 
reall important question is, has this responsiveness resulted in an increase of publick happiness and 
prosperity?”933 To Stapleton the latter question was simply rhetorical; he was quite certain that it had 
not, and he listed many policies which to his (very conservative) mind had been foolhardy.934 But 
there was a deeper point underlying his criticisms of particular policies: namely, the disjuncture 
between a truly statesmanlike approach to public affairs and a subservient approach in which the 
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politician sought to descry the movement of public opinion and follow its trail.935 The first, from his 
standpoint, corresponded to a deliberative assembly; the second, to an assembly that was merely 
representative. 
 This desire for freedom from public opinion in the evaluation and formation of policy had 
its bounds, even for Inglis-Stapleton Toryism. These bounds were elections.936 But even these limits 
they wanted drawn loosely. For one thing, election was seen by them as (prospectively) a mechanism 
for authorization, for investing one person with the right to act in their constituents’ name, and 
(retrospectively) a mechanism for accountability interpreted more in the sense of punishing 
misdeeds or moral deficiencies than of enforcing a specific legislative program favored by 
constituents. The idea that the import of elections was that the MP stood for or had responsibility to 
the views of his constituents in any more immediate way was anathema to them. Indeed, they were 
happy that competitive elections did not return all the members of the Commons; they defended the 
array of “close” or “rotten boroughs,” those which were “owned” by a “proprietor” who could 
nominate whom he wished for the seat, in large part for being what we would call in today’s 
parlance the ultimate “safe seats” – seats in which, on their understanding, the member by virtue of 
the security of his tenure could afford to focus entirely on the quality of arguments for and against 
proposed legislation.937 
                                                 
935 As a protectionist, he naturally chose the 1846 repeal of the Corn Laws as an instance of the latter: “Now the 
permanent status of the country could not have so completely changed in so short a time, as to render that advisable in 
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which ought not to have been definitely settled on the ground of popular will”; ibid., 25-6. He also made an identical 
criticism of Robert Peel’s flip-flop on the issue. 
 
936 “If in our conduct there be error, our constituents have their remedy at a dissolution. At that time we surrender our 
stewardship to those by whom it was committed to us; and receive it again, or not, according to their will, and their 
estimate of our conduct”; Inglis, Parliamentary Reform, 14. 
 
937 Although the “close-borough system… doubtless was, grossly abused, by some of those who had controul over those 
boroughs,” it was nevertheless true that “the close-borough representatives were, in reality, the ballast of the unreformed 
House of Commons….they [the close-boroughs] were destroyed, and thus was the ballast of the unreformed House of 
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 Now, it was open to the proponent of descriptive representation who supported his scheme 
on the ground that it reconciled the just claims of public opinion and parliamentary deliberation to 
respond that by “public opinion” he did not mean mere “popular clamor” or “momentary will” but 
rather a conviction that emerged from extended discussion in which all the standpoints and opinions 
had been weighed. This was true: in seeking a politics of public opinion properly so-called they did 
not believe that they were doing anything that would inhibit “due consideration of objections to 
measures for which there is a popular cry” or impair the process of “testing by discussion the 
soundness or fallacy of conflicting arguments.”938 And yet this response did not constitute an answer 
to the real heart of the objection; instead, it only postponed the question. For even if public opinion 
were rational and durable rather than passionate, fickle, and contrived by demagogues, there still 
arose an apparent conflict between the identification of the Commons’s duty as being to craft laws 
that would realize or conform to the public mind and the identification of its duty as being to engage 
in free and genuine deliberation about the public good. Public opinion on the idealized view of it 
that one finds among “Whig” writers hemmed in the space necessary for legislative deliberation no 
less than it did on the disparaging view of the “Tories.” Whatever the condition of the public mind, 
it was equally the case that some independence from it was required for the Commons to qualify as a 
deliberative body, and not as a mere notarizing or ratificatory one. Just as someone carrying out 
instructions from a manual is not a deliberator even if these instructions were themselves written by 
a committee after deliberation, so “government by discussion” was not actualized even if the parties 
or constituencies which dictated to the House exemplified deliberativeness in their own domains. 
 The recognition that there was a tension between deliberation and representation in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commons got rid of, and none other was shipped in its room to steady the vessel in its renovated state. Every 
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sense of accordance with the wider distribution of views was not solely an insight of outsiders to this 
school of thought. Hints of such recognition found their way into even the most orthodox theorists 
of deliberative representative government. For instance, Greg urged during the first of his articles on 
parliamentary reform that “the general silence and indifference” on the reform question rendered 
the hour particularly opportune for the Commons to take the issue up, since such a “quiet time” 
furnished an excellent occasion for the House’s “wide and profound consideration” of the “merits 
alone” of the various “measures to be proposed.” 939 We can spot in this passage an awareness of 
how the claims of representation and deliberation could pull apart. Greg’s message here was not just 
the mundane one that the fires of “popular passion” and “impatient excitement” were not ideal for 
“deliberation” and reasoned reflection, though it was in part that.940 At a deeper theoretical level his 
point was that – even on fundamental constitutional issues – deliberation did not need to wait on 
representation; he was opposing the idea that what we might call the spokesman function of the MP 
must be primary, for this idea would imply that, in the absence of views in the constituencies for 
which the MP could advocate, he could not participate in parliamentary discussion of a particular 
matter.941 
 More commonly, however, moments of clarity about the distinction between deliberation 
and representation came not from considering the status quo or reflecting on their own proposed 
systems, but emerged in a second strand of their critique of democracy. This strand overlapped 
                                                 
939 Greg, “Expected Reform Bill,” 235-6. 
 
940 Ibid., 235. 
 
941 Greg articulated the reasoning to which he was opposed as follows: “If the Legislature is to be confined to the 
function of discerning, embodying, putting into shape, and carrying into effect the deliberate decisions of the nation, 
then Parliament would be clearly premature in moving in a matter of such vital moment as organic change, since the 
nation has not summoned it to action, and has enunciated no opinion as to the extent and direction of that action”; ibid., 
235. 
 Despite the nineteenth-century tenor of much of her theory, Urbinati resists the label “descriptive 
representation” precisely because she wants to avoid the implication that she is denigrating the constructive role of the 
MP; Urbinati, “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation,” Political Theory, vol. 28, no. 6 (2000), 
760. I believe, however, that she is mistaken in doing so. 
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significantly with a strain of the critique of proportional representation. For now, let us just say this: 
in addition to the central objection to democracy as an unrepresentative and class-based regime, 
several figures launched a further attack. When Sidgwick, writing in amazement at “the nature and 
extent of the influence of parties on representative government” near the turn of the century, 
stressed how little this phenomenon was foreseen by earlier generations of writers, he in fact was 
underestimating his forebears.942 Many anti-democrats, including variety-of-suffragists like Bagehot, 
predicted that the need to mobilize large numbers of voters which would arise with a democratized 
electorate would transfer effective political power from a deliberative assembly to massive, 
centralized parties directed by unelected “wire-pullers” whose art was not practical reasoning or 
deliberation but “electioneering.”943 Legislative deliberation would cease, or at least dwindle in 
importance, for members would have no leeway to change their minds and therefore would not be 
susceptible to being convinced by an exchange of ideas in the House. Bagehot referred to such a 
state of affairs – which he forecasted as resulting both from first-past-the-post democracy and from 
PR regardless of the degree of enfranchisement – as “constituency government,” and he deemed it 
not a modification, but a direct contravention, of “parliamentary government.”944 The mild parties 
and measure of independence for the individual MP which were essentials for a “deliberative 
assembly” would vanish in a democracy because democracy meant the dominance of party.945 
 For present purposes, what is theoretically important about this negative appraisal of 
                                                 
942 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 590. 
 
943 Bagehot, English Constitution, 297, 299. See also e.g. Grey, Parliamentary Government, 157; Salisbury, On Politics, 275, 351; 
Greg, Rocks Ahead, 31-2, 162-5, “Achievements,” 229; Aytoun, “Reform Measures,” 370; JF Stephen, Liberty, Equality, 
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1875 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 118. On this front the anti-democrats were certainly not without 
prescience: alarm at the hegemony of parties would be a major theme of the first recognizably modern political scientists 
of democracy – the likes of James Bryce, Moisei Ostrogorski, Robert Michels – in the generations following Bagehot and 
company. 
 
944 Bagehot, English Constitution, 298. 
 
945 Ibid., 304. 
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democracy as an electoral system which enhanced the disciplinary power of parties was that, while it 
was often accompanied by jeremiads against the corruption, oligarchic character, and 
unrepresentative nature of parties, it did not depend on these diagnoses. “Party bands and fetters,” 
after all, could be seen as augmenting the representativeness of members insofar as they put forth a 
“doctrinal creed in politics” for which voters could express clear assent or dissent.946 Even in a case 
where the tenets to which the MP was yoked contained nothing but “goodness,” he was still 
“hopelessly enslaved,” a “mouth-piece” and not a true deliberator.947 The truth was that there was a 
basic tradeoff between the MP being “free” and the constituency or party to which he answered 
being “in earnest.”948 Where the latter state of affairs was in existence, the MP was more representative 
in the descriptive sense to which these thinkers were attached – he was more likely and able to bring 
sentiments and ideas truly held by a portion of the public to bear on parliamentary debate. But a 
House of such MPs was deliberatively weakened, for the House’s deliberation was better served by 
electorates which on the whole were characterized by only “vague preferences” at the level of 
“particular doctrines.”949 
 Another way to articulate this tension is to set it within the perspective of the individual MP. 
If so far we have envisioned it as a question of how to divide up the political terrain between the 
public opinion that was supposed to be represented and the deliberation that was supposed to occur 
in the assembly, we could reframe it as a conflict within the psyche of the representative. For the 
variety-of-suffragist demanded that the MP serve two masters: he was to stand for a view or a class in 
                                                 
946 Ibid., 304. 
 
947 Ibid., 304-5. 
 
948 Ibid., 304. Bagehot provocatively analogized the status of an MP in this situation to “the case of a dissenting 
minister” who was “ruled by his congregation.” I intend to revisit this assessment in the uncompleted chapter on PR, 
because importantly he delivered this line as part of his prediction of how PR would undercut parliamentary deliberation. 
 
949 Ibid., 304. Sidgwick was one of many thinkers who would continue through the end of the century to follow 
Bagehot’s line on the drawbacks for representative government of electors having very strongly held views, even going 
so far as to say that it was important to “keep alive in the mass” of citizens the sense that they ought not to have “fixed 
political dogmas”; Elements of Politics, 557-8. 
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order to contribute to the sociological accuracy of the Commons; and he was to engage in deliberation, 
which required an openness to the other side of the argument, a willingness to change his mind if it 
was shown that his own position was untrue or inconsistent with the public good. The MP appeared 
to be under dueling obligations: a “representative” obligation of fidelity and constancy to the views 
of his electors, but a “deliberative” obligation of openness and flexibility with regard to his own 
views. To hold to deliberative representative government was to deny that there was a single duty 
encompassing the MP’s position. 
 In additional to its intrinsic historical and theoretical importance, this material on the 
challenge of conceptualizing the relationship between deliberation and representation – both for 
Victorian thought generally and especially for the school of electoral-diversity-based reform – has 
the added benefit of deepening our understanding of a more famous controversy: the eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century debate about delegate versus trustee conceptions of the representative. 
Unlike the way in which it is frequently presented, this was not such a simple matter as the contest 
of an “aristocratic” notion of the intelligence and virtue of the MP versus a “democratic” desire for 
accountability and restraint on sinister interest. While their resistance to delegation contained an 
elitist dimension – they agreed with the substance of Mill’s analogy of the legislator to the physician 
who worked for the patient’s health without following the patient’s orders950 – this resistance was 
not reducible to any elitist premises about the intellectual demands of statesmanship. Indeed, the 
hostility to voter-mandates rested more fundamentally on the seriousness with which they took the 
ideal of the Commons as a deliberative body. Qua deliberativist, then, the variety-of-suffragists and 
their ideological neighbors opposed delegation as a comprehensive statement of the representative’s 
                                                 
950 Mill, “Pledges [1],” article in the Examiner from 1 July 1832, in CW, vol. 23, 491. And see e.g. Greg, “Expected 
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function (as for example in some philosophic-radical literature).951 Yet they did not adopt the stock 
Burkean position either.952 Too strident a denial of delegation looked like it might hollow out their 
notion of representation altogether; the Burkean belief that the MP owed his electors nothing but 
his “unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience” risked landing them in a 
simple Lowean technocratic picture of the Commons.953 The position they really wished to occupy 
was a middle ground, although shaded perhaps somewhat more against delegation than lying right in 
the center of the terrain – a position very close to Mill’s mature stance, although they were even less 
interested than Mill in entering into any exact casuistry about the circumstances in which binding or 
leaving the member at liberty was appropriate.954 Representatives were charged with maintaining a 
significant connection with the views of their constituents; they were not simply to discuss and make 
policy as if ignorant of and unanswerable to the latter. But qua deliberator on the public good they 
could not be locked into specific positions by voters (or by parties). In the words of Brougham, who 
wound up preferring a more democratic electoral system than the subjects of this chapter preferred 
but whose thought on the MP-constituency relationship was wholly orthodox to them, all that the 
“soundest views of representative legislation” could stipulate was that there ought to be a “general 
coincidence between the conduct of the delegate and the sentiments of the electors.”955 Here, they 
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seem to have felt, they ran up against the limits of what political theory could say. 
 Given the deeply contextual nature of the balance of considerations that would determine 
when it was proper to act as the committed spokesman versus the unencumbered deliberator, it is 
not particularly surprising that they laid out few theoretically elaborate treatments of the delegate-
trustee question. But, as I mentioned at the outset of this discussion, it is surprising and 
disappointing that they made so few direct attempts at a theory of the relationship between 
constituency and representative that would capture the tightrope which they wanted to walk 
between values. In part, this was because the perfect union of deliberation and representation as it 
regarded the level of the individual MP and his constituents was not their locus of concern; they 
were concerned with the Commons as an institution and at that level the medley of defects at the 
individual plane could redound to the benefit of the whole. So long as there was a healthy 
distribution of “special advocates” and “impartial judges,” it was not so urgent if the former had 
been reduced to mere mouthpieces by parties who did not permit deviation from a pre-selected 
platform or if the impartiality of the latter in fact stemmed from their paying less scrupulous 
attention to the views of his constituents than perfect fulfillment of his role-obligations would have 
dictated. The Victorian theory of legislative deliberation was not centered on providing an ethics for 
MPs or voters, but on depicting a functional economy of reasons and arguments. 
 Nevertheless, Greg did come close to delineating en passant a theory of the ideal relationship 
between voter and MP. Fittingly, given his renown for importing German Biblical Criticism into 
England, he named it in his favorite tongue: stand-punct representation. Greg gave his concept an 
openly elitist inflection (it appeared alongside a defense of the power of the Lords and the monarchy 
that was unusual within this tradition). His target was the expansion of delegation: he wanted to 
prevent electors who wished to “decree what shall be done themselves” from encroaching on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
“the precise limits of independence claimed and allowed must depend on the individual and the circumstances”; 
Chamberlain, “The Caucus,” Fortnightly Review, vol. 24, no. 143 (Nov. 1878), 739. 
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province of the MP in a way that threatened to bring back “the old Athenian plan of direct 
government by the people, practised before the principle of representation was discovered.”956 The 
electorate had to be kept from “deciding on measures instead of selecting men,” since it was in his 
eyes unfit for the former.957 But despite his attachment to the elitist language of “men not measures” 
as the voter’s domain, Greg did not limit the voter to considering solely the personal fitness of the 
candidate; had he done so, he would have flagrantly contradicted all of his descriptivist 
pronouncements. Instead, that descriptive dimension was satisfied by the elector alighting on 
someone who shared his perspective; he was to choose, and grant suitable deliberative freedom to, a 
qualified and intelligent candidate, but he was to do so within the camp of people like him in the 
relevant ways. “The function, theoretical and actual, of the electors, was that of choosing men 
qualified, by knowledge of their interests and participation in their point of view (identity of stand-
punct, as the Germans would express it)…to represent them.”958 This manner of demarcating what 
was being described or reflected by descriptive representation has echoes today in theories of 
“perspectives” as the objects of efforts at descriptive inclusion in political assemblies, and this 
modern literature seems to imagine that there is something distinctly democratic, or at least new, 
about such a conception.959 For Greg, however, this attachment to “point-of-view” as both the basic 
unit to be included and the proper link between voter and representative was simply a faithful 
updating of the “original[]” assumptions underlying the development of a “great council of the tiers-
état,” which was that lords did not share a standpoint with commoners and therefore that the latter 
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needed their own space of representation.960 Stand-punctism was just an extension of a venerable 
tradition of English thought. 
Most of our variety-of-suffragists – and even Greg in other moments, many of which have 
already been quoted– would have dissented from this manner of carving up the spheres of 
deliberation and representation. They usually had no quarrel with voters fixing on true believers in 
their particular sentiments and ideas; indeed, their system was intended to facilitate this and turn it to 
best political effect.961 Yet some set of thoughts that shared the same rough shape of these passages 
in Greg would seem to have been required of these writers. Why then did more adherents to 
deliberative representative government not attempt to construct analogs to Greg’s stand-punct 
conception, imperfect as it was, of the place of the representative in the broader economy of 
opinion-holding and reason-giving? There are, I believe, two reasons for this dearth of explicit 
theorizing about a middle road that could do justice to both the deliberative and representative 
functions of the MP. The first is that, without giving the matter sustained theoretical attention, such 
a middle course was implicit in much of their theorizing. Bagehot is exemplary of how an unstated 
stand-punctism could orient a set of institutional judgments that might otherwise look unconnected. 
As has been noted at various points heretofore, Bagehot was opposed to both oligarchy (as 
embodied, on his reading, in the unreformed parliament) and “constituency government” (to which 
he believed that the Second Reform Act and proportional representation, but not his own proposal, 
would lead). One way of elucidating the unity behind these two oppositions – the one which has 
been most underscored so far – is to remark that in his eyes these were both manifestations of class-
rule, oligarchy by definition and “constituency government” insofar as it was likely to enter British 
politics as a byproduct of democracy. But another way of articulating how these two oppositions 
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961 Even the Tory Stapleton drew the line in a way more empowering of the elector: the elector was to seek out 
exponents of his “principles” although preferably not of his “specifick measures”; Suggestions, 8. 
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stemmed from a common ideal would be to say that they each, though from different angles, made 
the deliberation between perspectives impossible: oligarchy because most perspectives were excluded from 
the assembly, and “constituency government” because, even in the case that it was not accompanied 
by the corresponding democratic class-dominance, deliberation was replaced by the edicts of parties 
and electors. A similar unelucidated yet present middle path seems to underlie Grey’s conviction that 
the Commons which he desired would be “both alive to public opinion” and yet permit sufficient 
latitude from the yoke of “popular caprice.”962 Deliberative representative government existed in a happy 
medium, between (on the one hand) harmful insulation from, or exclusivity with regard to the full 
span of, public opinion and (on the other) complete dictation of representatives’ views and conduct. 
Insofar as proponents of electoral diversity suggested such an in-between as the proper space for the 
work of the MP, their political commentary was not overly hampered by the absence of a more 
widely-shared and explicit concept of stand-punctism, although from a theoretical perspective this 
absence makes for a disappointing lacuna. 
The second reason why so many variety-of-suffragists neglected to offer their own 
equivalent of a stand-punct theory that could take steps toward reconciling representativeness with 
deliberation was, I think, that to them these two norms largely did not appear distinct. This 
conflation was in part due to the manner in which their faith in the epistemic power of conversation 
among diverse points-of-view connected the two in their eyes. But it also owed much to the fact that 
most of these authors saw the mid-century Commons as both imperfectly deliberative and 
imperfectly in tune with public opinion, and as far as the actual Commons of their time was 
concerned they traced the former imperfection largely to the latter. In their rush for reform and their 
eagerness to cast their plans as corrective of all that troubled the country’s parliamentary regime, 
they overlooked the distinctness of the deliberative and representative deficiencies. They ran 
                                                 
962 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 218. 
 284 
 
together two discrete deficits – a deliberative deficit and a representative deficit – because they thought they 
were suffering from both; in committing this confusion they resemble a great deal of modern 
deliberative-democratic literature, which proceeds on the unexamined assumption that the democratic 
deficit and the deliberative deficit afflicting the contemporary United States and other Western liberal-
democracies are identical.963 Just as, so long as twenty-first-century politics remains in its present 
deficient state, many of us will desire from legislative assemblies and related forums greater measures 
both of deliberation and of robustness in representing social diversity, the mid-Victorian theorist of 
representative reform perceived no scenario in which his reform would bring these values into 
conflict in the real political world.  
If this school of reformers did not make fine analytical distinctions between 
representation/achieving the rule of public opinion and deliberation, this was in large part because 
they believed that in practice British parliamentarianism, properly reformed, would operate in such a 
way that each would be improved. It was also because they were sure that they could easily 
recognize (as they did in passing judgment on parliamentary-electoral arrangements past, present, 
and potential) when one side of the equation had become too dominant, at which point they trusted 
that the English capacity “to amend, to engraft, to modify, to curtail” would be adequate to 
recalibrate to a better balance.964 Their confidence that the fuller realization of public opinion in the 
Commons was also the condition of improved legislative deliberation prevented them from treating 
the two values with the distinctness and clarity which would have been necessary for them to 
possess a really complete theory of government at once representative and deliberative.965 Because 
(with the exception of the status quo apologists) they believed that the present arrangements were 
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neither sufficiently attuned to public opinion nor sufficiently deliberative, it was easy for them to 
simply assume that representativeness and deliberation always travelled together. 
A more grievous theoretical inadequacy, however, was what I termed Grey’s problem. Greg’s 
problem denoted a sin of omission, a missing piece which kept this body of literature from attaining 
the theoretical heights it might have reached; it was not inconsistency at a fundamental level. Yet this 
latter is what one finds in Grey’s influential tract. 
Grey’s trouble arises from this: we have in this chapter encountered two accounts of the 
source of legitimacy for the Commons. One, exemplified by Lowe and Inglis, staked the normative 
credentials of the assembly on the quality of its deliberation and the wisdom of its policy (it is not 
clear which exactly of these is the proper formulation, or even if for them there could have been any 
daylight between the two). The other, the mirroring view on which we have dwelt, identified the 
normative grounding of the Commons with its representativeness and set deliberation, as crucial as 
this was to them, downstream of this value. While there were certainly moments of ambiguity in a 
literature more political than philosophical, especially around the fringes of our group, it is 
reasonably clear, as we have shown, that these thinkers’ last word was that Britain was a representative 
government and that this meant that resemblance to the country was what legitimated the dominant 
chamber. 
Despite being such a prominent voice for the “qualified suffrage” and supporting many 
reforms that fit clearly within the variety-of-suffragist framework, with Grey the matter was not so 
neat. Of the various topics discussed in these chapters, the one of which Grey seems to have been 
most convinced was the indispensability of diversity for a satisfactorily deliberative Commons – 
both for the epistemic advantages in crafting legislation and for the wider educative effects, in which 
he was one of the most fervent believers of his time. The presence of “able men holding unpopular 
opinions, as well as of Members expressing the conflicting views of the various classes of society, 
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and of the many different interests which exist in the Nation” was the hallmark of an excellent 
Commons; at its best, “the House of Commons is also very unlike all the other Representative 
Bodies of which I have ever seen a description. It is distinguished from them mainly by the variety 
of the elements which enter into its composition.”966 “It would be desirable,” he went on in a show 
of amity toward Hare and Mill, that “men of almost every variety of opinion” should find their way 
into the House – and he was certain that there was nothing in his reform proposals to suggest 
otherwise.967 The opportunity of “making their arguments heard in Parliament,” distributed among 
all the possible wellsprings of enlightenment which existed in society, was the goal of the 
composition of the Commons.968 
This rhapsodizing about the blessings of a diverse assembly fit comfortably within the 
standard mid-Victorian mirroring vision of the Commons – as did his frequent statements which 
took for granted that descriptive representation was the bedrock of the House. But in fact the Third 
Earl was not so sure of his footing. For he equivocated greatly on the relationship between the intra-
Commons diversity which he so lauded and the principle of representation. “The notion commonly 
entertained of a perfect Representation of the People” was, he clarified, not beloved of the Greys – 
it had not motivated his father in making the Reform Act, nor was it guiding his own suggestions.969 
“What is called a perfectly pure system of Representation” bore no relation to reform of the House, 
for “some of the most faulty parts of our present system of Representation incidentally serve useful 
purposes.”970 
Why did Grey occasionally switch into this representation-deflating idiom? For two 
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intimately related reasons. First, he was unable to hold his ground as steadfastly as his variety-of-
suffragist fellows against a quite different view of representation: a certain democratic view (this is 
hardly the only one, as we will see in the following chapter) in which representation was not a 
technique for creating an image of the nation but was instead a mechanism for delivering consent or 
authorization – consent which had to come from everyone. In the face of this “Chartist” or 
“French” or “abstract democratical” view, the thoroughgoing mirrorer was simply unmoved: he 
denied that such “complete suffragists” were in possession of a theory of “representation” at all; 
branded them campaigners for “exclusive or overwhelming” class-rule; and flatly asserted its 
incorrectness in light of “our whole Parliamentary theory.”971 Grey, however, was less solid in his 
resistance to this alternative. Much like Charles I two centuries prior conceding to his anti-
monarchical opponents the usage of the symbolically important term “Republique,”972 Grey could 
not keep himself from the sporadic concession that “representation” hinged on everyone voting in 
some approximation to equal electoral power. Hence true representative government sometimes appeared 
in his eyes to be “the strict principle of popular Representation,” and thus the excellence of the 
British Commons had to be considered a deviation from representation tout court.973 Whereas a 
Bagehot or Greg or Harris uniformly distanced democracy from representation conceptually, for 
Grey the boundary was more permeable.974 
Second, if Grey could rhapsodize about diversity within the Commons as well as anyone, he 
sang no paeans to diversity outside its walls. This was quite unusual: for Bagehot, for instance, 
prescriptions for a diverse Commons were continuous with a profoundly pluralistic social imaginary. 
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Where the editor of the Economist envisaged public opinion as multi-faceted, heterogeneous, and 
(therefore) the carrier of much wisdom, it appears that the Earl pictured it as a kind of cross 
between an older conception of a monolithic onrush of popular feeling and a Tocquevillian 
groupthink squeezing out minority opinions. In lieu of Bagehot-style reminiscences on the 
composite character of the national mind, Grey’s Parliamentary Government contains many mentions of 
the force exerted by “the feelings and passions of the numerical majority of the population,” 
cautions about “the sudden variations to which [the “people’s”] opinions and feelings are liable,” 
“popular caprice,” and the “prejudices of a popular Constituency.”975 “Popular opinion, or clamour 
(for they are not always easily distinguished)” was potent enough that “wise” thoughts often went 
unstated “from a fear of offending the prejudices of the day.”976 Under such a yoke, it was urgent to 
gain for some members, especially those of great talent and prudence, insulation from “the 
prevailing opinion of the day.”977 In conjunction with his weakness for a “democratic” definition of 
representation, his recurrence to a vision of public opinion as the howl of the people and an 
oppressive constraint on debate led to an image of a Commons that looked more detached from the 
nation than in the more intimate relationship depicted by Bagehot, or in those portions of Grey’s 
own volume which described the intercourse between Commons and society that gave rise to the 
latter’s great educative impact. 
To sum up: was Grey engineering deliberative diversity, or representing real societal 
diversity? Was, as in the traditional construction, the Commons reflecting diversity, or was it, in a 
reversal of the equation, generating diversity for its own epistemic needs? I don’t think even he 
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himself knew.978 
This uncertainty brings us back to an important, recurring message of this dissertation: that 
political theory is characterized by an indeterminacy and multiplicity of routes between, on the hand, 
first principles and fundamental commitments, and, on the other, institutions and practical 
recommendations. Grey did not have to make a clear decision about the normative foundations of 
his reforms because several paths could take him to his institutional destination. Grey’s problem 
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constituencies: in Inglis’s words, close boroughs were the means by which “many of those who…have constituted the 
chief ornaments of this House in the past and present age, have entered Parliament; many of whom, if this way had been 
closed, would never have entered these walls”; it was often noted that Pitt and Walpole had sat for close boroughs, and 
especially that after Burke lost election in Bristol as an incumbent for supporting free trade with Ireland he spent the 
remainder of his career sitting for a pocket borough. Another cited merit of the close boroughs was that they aided in 
the stability and quality of the ministry by allowing a seat for those appointed to a cabinet position. Grey subscribed to 
both of these positive valuations. Now, neither of these virtues had an obviously representative dimension, and the 
second one, a practical matter of the well-functioning of the executive, seems intractable to any representative gloss. 
However, it was possible to give an explanation of the value of the close borough in which representativeness featured. 
Harris – and even Stapleton, though in a less thoroughly theorized manner – saw the close boroughs as venues for the 
representation of the real social entities which were the nation’s intelligence and learning. Both Harris and Alison were 
clear about a further representative service provided by them: close boroughs, because they could be purchased by those 
who had risen to wealth or prominence at various posts throughout the Empire or be put in the hands of such men by 
the borough proprietor, offered to colonial and imperial interests an “unobtrusive but spacious channel which admitted 
their representatives to the British Parliament.” This line of thought allowed that these constituencies could be decried as 
a form of corruption when judged against a standard of purely competitive elections, but asserted that in practice they 
operated to ensure representativeness of the more intellectual reaches of the nation as well as its global face. While Grey 
did not, so far as I am aware, highlight the imperial inclusiveness of close boroughs (despite having served as Secretary 
for the Colonies), he did at times shine a representative light on their contribution: they were guarantees of the presence 
of “minority” opinions in the House even when “popular opinion is running strongly in one direction.” (In keeping with 
the theme of the first section of this chapter, he emphasized that this presence was demanded for the minority “even if it 
were clear that they were in the wrong.”) Grey’s reading of the positive place which close boroughs had once occupied 
in the ecology of the Commons thus hung midway between yearning for a time in which representation counted for less, 
in which the electoral system was more openly geared to the production of non-representative political goods, and 
celebrating a set of constituencies which, however anomalous they may have appeared in the light of institutional 
symmetry, in reality had enhanced the representative character of the House. We might crystallize this dividedness by 
saying that Grey did not make up his mind with regard to whether the close borough MPs constituted a kind of 
Coleridgean clerisy dropped into an otherwise representative body, or whether they stood for elements of the social-
intellectual fabric of the country in a way not fundamentally different from their counterparts of less “corrupt” 
constituencies. 
 See Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, chs. 7-9; Bagehot, “History of the Unreformed Parliament,” 301; Inglis, 
Parliamentary Reform, 34; Grey, Parliamentary Government, e.g. 215-6, 120-1; Harris, True Theory, 46-7; Stapleton, Suggestions, 
46; Alison, “The Reform Bill,” 15-6, 26-7; Coleridge, On the Constitution of Church and State (London: Hurst, Chance, and 
Co., 1830). 
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further reminds us that in investigating the thought of even highly reflective and intellectual 
politicians, one rarely finds clarity of principles at the bottom. 
The mirroring vision of deliberation and its treatment of the interaction between 
deliberation and other desiderata for the Commons was, all at once, its subtlest, most intricate, most 
sprawling, and most problematic aspect. A more straightforwardly depicted, though perhaps less 
convincing, value rounded out the normative side of their theory. 
 
4) Stability 
 Proponents of the variegated franchise attributed a fourth advantage to their model: stability. 
Their method of regulating the suffrage, they argued, could do more to assure the peace and 
tranquility of society than any other. 
The case they made for the stabilizing benefits of their system resembled their standpoint on 
its deliberative advantages in closely tracking arguments that were being made in the domains of 
toleration and freedom of discussion. The overlap between the defenses of representative and tolerant 
government was substantial; it is noteworthy that not one promoter of the variety of suffrages 
considered in this chapter was, as far as I have discovered, an opponent of the consolidation of the 
freedoms of the press and religious toleration that marked their century.979 
The stabilizing capacity of the variety of suffrages was anchored in an optimistic moral 
psychology similar to that described in part one as the psychological underpinning for the 
liberalization of the press. The confidence in the pacifying impact of parliamentary 
representativeness could therefore be described as the application to the sphere of representation of 
the psychology of “fair play” which was such an integral part of the philosophy of toleration in the 
nineteenth century. The variety of suffrages was, in this regard, perfectly continuous with the less 
                                                 
979 Alison, writing in the early 1830s, came the closest: although he stopped short of advocating repressive measures, he 
was deeply suspicious of a democratic-populist bias distorting the publishing market. 
 291 
 
metaphysical, more empirical versions of the pacific theory examined in the first half of this 
dissertation – a continuity which should not be surprising in light of the common Whig provenance 
of these sets of ideas.980 
Interestingly, in the mid-century period one of the most cogent articulations of the bearing 
of this psychology on the representative sphere came from W.R. Greg, who had a well-established 
reputation for personal pessimism.981 “There is a wide and indestructible difference,” he wrote, 
“between being not successful and being not heard – between being outvoted and being excluded – 
between being defeated after full deliberation in a legislative assembly and being denied a hearing 
and a seat in the assembly.”982 This difference was, Greg went on, not merely a normative principle 
on which philosophers dwelt for the sake of, say, determining whether a given government was 
legitimate. It was also an empirical law about the temperament of citizens under open parliamentary 
regimes. In most cases of discontent citizens’ “ground of complaint is, not that their candidates are 
outvoted in Parliament, but that they are not allowed to go there, – that their opinions are rejected, 
not after, but before, discussion”; the basic demand of ideological and interest groups was not to 
impose their wishes on society, but was rather the moderate, reasonable one that they be participants 
in the deliberation, that they be not “altogether overpowered, suppressed, and virtually non-existent 
because non-apparent.”983 Given that, in most citizens, the desire for inclusion in the arena of 
deliberation was more basic and powerful than the need to see one’s views triumph, a representative 
system that truthfully reflected the underlying social realities could be relied on to keep the peace in 
the diverse and conflictual societies of the modern world. 
                                                 
980 Both J.R. Pole and John Burrow noted en passant the presence of this view in Whig thought of the first third of the 
century; see Burrow, Whigs and Liberals, 44; Pole, Political Representation in England, 495. 
 
981 John Morley, “W.R. Greg: A Sketch,” 214-5. 
 
982 Greg, “Parliamentary Purification,” 622. 
 
983 Ibid., 622. 
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Greg was hardly alone in his certainty that being heard – the satisfaction with what we might 
term the receipt of deliberative consideration – trumped the desire for one’s group to capture political 
power or for policy to be dictated by one’s own priorities. Professions of faith in the pacific 
properties of representative (as opposed, in their lexicon, not to direct, but to class) government abound 
in the variety-of-suffrages literature. Bagehot wrote that the “uniformity set in 1832” had made the 
task of preserving “calm” in times of “popular excitement” more difficult by shutting off from the 
lower classes any means of “adequate expression” in the Commons.984 Creasy spoke of the truth, in 
accord with which he had crafted his own recommendation, that “men who, while unfranchised, are 
the noisy opponents of all establishments, will, when they receive the franchise, often become their 
steadiest and most zealous supporters”; a “prudent mind” would not risk letting any group grow 
“alienated” and “sullen” by its electoral exclusion.985 Where “an equal chance” was afforded to “both 
sides” of a dispute, Pochin held, then the decision arrived at was strengthened; “all ground of refusal 
to abide by” it would vanish when the losing side had only its failure to “convince” others of the 
“justice” of its cause to blame for its loss.986 This “reasonable” temperament obtained even among 
the working classes who, despite having been unjustly excluded from parliament, did “not ask for 
the whole” of the electoral power but only for a “share” consistent with keeping their views from 
going “unrepresented.”987 The “Reformer” gave a pithy condensation of this line of thought: 
according to his “settlement of the question of Reform” “every class and interest in the Country 
                                                 
984 Bagehot, “Lord Althorp and the Reform Act of 1832,” 224. 
 
985 Creasy, Text-Book, 55, 61. 
 
986 Pochin, Plan, 18-9. Pochin added a further stabilizing credential to his plan’s list of virtues, namely, that incorporating 
the urban working-class into the Commons would end the unrest caused by demagoguery. Demagogues, on Pochin’s 
telling, were able to stir up the people only by virtue of the latter’s being kept out of the political process: as soon as the 
lower classes possessed “a definite and tangible guarantee, that in all matters of legislation their interests shall not be 
overlooked, or their own view of disputed cases inadequately stated,” then the “floating suspicions mostly in the 
nebulous state lurking in the minds of some of them” which were “extremely useful to demagogues” would dissipate; 
ibid., 8. Macaulay shared this belief that inclusivity in representation was a key to ending demagoguery; see Joseph 
Hamburger, Macaulay and the Whig Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 38. 
 
987 Ibid., 7-8. 
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would be represented, and would combine and be equally interested in upholding the Constitution, 
because from the land-owner to the working man all would have a voice in the Councils of the 
nation.”988 
This dimension of the variety-of-suffrages framework corresponded to and encapsulated the 
progressive hopefulness of the Victorian period, the vision of political society as an open and 
cooperative enterprise. It was not an age prone to dwell in Hobbesian fashion on the dynamics of 
vainglory or unsociability. Instead, the variety-of-suffragists shared and built upon the contemporary 
sense that inclusion and the opportunity for expression were more basic human needs than 
dominion or supremacy. Whatever the advantages of a “liberalism of fear,” this was decidedly not 
the character of the liberalism examined in this dissertation. For these authors, liberal policies 
respecting religion, the press, and representation were what exempted the nation from fearfulness 
about its politics. 
Securing the country against the discontent that arose from being excluded from the 
Commons meant ruling out both oligarchic and democratic suffrages. The perils of the former were 
graphically illustrated by the downfall of the July Monarchy of France under Guizot in 1848. 
Although the Monarchy was a parliamentary regime that on many fronts pursued policies approved 
of by mainstream British liberals, to the variety-of-suffragist its highly restricted franchise founded 
on a unitary censitary requirement made the regime a kind of ticking time-bomb. Bagehot, for 
example, decried Guizot’s fidelity to this circumscribed, “bourgeois” franchise as “a great 
misfortune,” one that could not but have invited a revolutionary backlash from the innumerable 
groups and interests excluded.989 Similarly, democracy could be cast in a parallel way as an unstable 
because exclusive form of government. While the democratic electorate was not formally exclusive – 
                                                 
988 “Reformer,” View, 20. 
 
989 Bagehot, “M. Guizot,” in CW, vol. IV, 443. For similar sentiments from other figures, see Saunders, Democracy and the 
Vote, 77, 134. 
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this is, of course, what made it democratic – the forecast that “the views of all other classes” would 
“inevitably be swamped” due to the vast numbers of the working class conveyed a kind of practical 
exclusion as the result of uniform universal suffrage.990 These “swamped” groups would be every bit 
as restless and unsatisfied with their condition as the classes formally disenfranchised by the 
oligarchic state. “Democracy,” as Alison wrote, lacked stability due to “the fatal principle of 
uniformity in representation”: 
uniformity necessarily excludes a great proportion of the nation from the legislature. The 
electors, composed—or, what is the same thing, for the most part composed—of a certain 
class in society, cannot sympathise with other bodies; they are careless as to their complaints, 
indifferent to their welfare, swayed probably by an adverse interest ; and the inevitable 
consequence is, that the ejected classes become discontented, and public dissatisfaction goes 
on accumulating, till it terminates in a convulsion.991 
 
“Great inequality in the representation,” he continued, was the sole reliable preventative of such 
“catastrophe.”992 Democracy shared with oligarchy the fault of lacking surety against the neglect of 
integral components of society. 
 (This picture of the unstable-because-exclusive nature of democracy was, it ought to be said, 
not as widely shared as the corresponding picture of oligarchy. Indeed, as the reader will have noted, 
an opposite flaw – stagnation, deadness to new ideas and strong passions – was more often ascribed 
to democracy.993 Hence, depending on the angle from which the author approached democracy, 
different fears came to the fore: if one thought of democracy primarily as undeliberative, one was 
inclined to take alarm at its potential for stasis and immobility, whereas thinking of it as exclusive 
tended to produce alarm at its instability. The perception of democracy as being closed, without an 
                                                 
990 Pochin, Plan, 19. 
 
991 Alison, “The Reform Bill,” 15-6. And see Russell, History of the English Constitution, 180. 
 
992 Ibid., 16. 
 
993 On this count it is no coincidence that Tocqueville was a favorite author of the variety-of-suffragists: he had 
prognosticated that “great revolutions will become rare” in democratic epochs; see Democracy in America, vol. 2, part 3, ch. 
21. See also Seymour Drescher, “‘Why Great Revolutions Will Become Rare’: Tocqueville's Most Neglected Prognosis,” 
Journal of Modern History, vol. 64, no. 3 (1992), pp. 429-454. 
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“inlet” for the diversity that marked society,994 could forebode either civil disruptions if the author 
imagined these excluded elements as liable to bristle at their degradation, or a homogenizing, stale 
politics à la Tocqueville if one imagined them as valuable insights suppressed by the moral irresistibility 
of democratic majorities and the environment of uniformity.) 
 The differentiated suffrage was thus conceived as stabilizing for the same reason that it was 
thought to be just and deliberative: it realized a kind of equal opportunity for the different “classes, 
interests, and opinions” of which modern Britain was constituted. The effort to explain stability in 
this way could lead to some interesting and questionable façons de penser. For one, it led (as may 
already have been evident in the language of quotations throughout the chapter) to a tendency to 
personify the opinions, ideas, interests, and classes with which these authors were so preoccupied. In 
a manner that parallels the objection today to affirmative action programs or quota systems that they 
essentialize the groups intended to benefit from them, the Victorian theory of descriptive 
representation could seem to replace actual citizens with a hypostasized assemblage of impersonal 
categories. The political order risked upheaval if certain ideas were not given a parliamentary space of 
appearance; revolution would be courted if certain interests were not accorded the respect which they 
merited. At the end of the 1860s Charles Renouvier, the leading French Kantian and a devoted 
republican, divided theories of representation into those which (wrongly) involved the 
personification of ideas or other social “entities” and those which (rightly) operated on the view that 
systems of representation had no other objects than persons.995 The variety of suffrages, at least in 
many of its permutations, would have fallen on the wrong side of Renouvier’s classification. 
 A second presupposition – one less “ontological” but still questionable –was a potent 
                                                 
994 Alison, “The Reform Bill,” 25. 
 
995 “The right of being represented (se faire représenter) belongs, as do all possible rights, to men, and not to ideas, and 
every idea which does not have the force to cross the channel of the representation of persons…cannot aspire to a social 
role. Let it content itself then with the ordinary ways of propagating ideas”; Renouvier, Science de la morale, vol. 2, 248.  
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connection on the citizens’ part with the “representative like him,” the representatives who stood 
for or belonged to his group. To the Victorian descriptivist about representation, it was enough to 
ensure stability that all the relevant social-ideological groups be represented because every citizen 
could feel consulted and included in the legislative process through the strong tie that bound him to 
the representatives of the shared group-identity.996 This felt commonness of identity between the 
artisan and working-class representatives, or the dissenter and dissenting MPs, facilitated the 
acceptance by the nation of the policies that passed the Commons; even those segments of the 
population who had resisted a given law accepted it with grace once passed because they had been 
consulted (virtually) in the process by which the law was made. Hence, although parliamentary 
government in diverse societies was inconsistent with everyone being satisfied with the results of 
legislation, it was not inconsistent with a process that satisfied everyone. Because of the tight 
psychological link, the close “confidence,” which “might undoubtedly be presumed” to bind the 
“class of members” “within the walls of the House of Commons” with the corresponding group of 
citizens in the society at-large, a genuinely mirroring Commons “enhance[d] the value and authority” 
of the decisions made “to an incalculable extent.”997 Accuracy in reflecting society, in conjunction 
with the power of the bond felt by the citizen toward the members sharing the identity(ies) salient to 
him, guaranteed a kind of procedural satisfaction that could outweigh the unavoidable moments of 
                                                 
996 A similar thought appears in the comeback that “virtual representation” is making today – a virtual representation 
that dare not openly announce itself – as conceived by some deliberative democrats and political scientists; see e.g. the 
work of Jane Mansbridge. In multiple articles Mansbridge has stated that “advocates of particular political views who 
lose in one district...can hope to be represented by advocates of those views elected in another district”; see e.g. 
Mansbridge “What does a Representative Do?” 125; “The Many Faces of Representation,” working paper, Kennedy 
School of Government, 1998; “Rethinking Representation,” American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 4: 515-28. While 
she prefers the term “surrogate representation” and denies that she endorses virtual representation, what she is 
describing here is a revival of old-style virtual representation; compare her language with that of the Gladstonian defense 
of virtual representation in the 1860s as presented by Floyd Parsons, “Ignis Fatuus vs. Pons Asinorum: William Gladstone 
and Proportional Representation, 1867-1885,” Parliamentary History, vol. 21, no. 3 (2002): 374-85. Andrew Rehfeld 
similarly reads Mansbridge as returning to a traditional notion of virtual representation; Rehfeld, “Representation 
Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy,” American 
Political Science Review, vol. 103, no. 2 (2009): 214-30. 
 
997 Pochin, Plan, 18. 
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disappointment when one’s preferred policies lost. Being “virtually” present in the legislature 
through the participation of members associated with one’s sector of society, mirror theorists 
posited, was more important to the vast majority of citizens than substantively getting their way, 
even on quite bitter contests of principle.998  
To put this much of the burden of social stability on the shoulders of accurate descriptive 
parliamentary representation was an act of great hopefulness, a leap of faith all the more remarkable 
given that the assignment of such efficacy to political institutions was the article of the variety-of-
suffrages creed most out-of-step with the intellectual tenor of the time. The nineteenth century is 
typically credited with the realization of the limits of politics, with the discovery of “society,” “the 
economy,” “culture” as coequal or greater forces than the political system in shaping the course of 
human events. As Sidgwick wrote, summing up generations of thought before him: it was an 
“allusion [sic] that any form of government can ever give a complete security against civil war,” for 
this security “must rest on a moral rather than a political basis.”999 The variety-of-suffrages school, at 
least in its more enthusiastic moments, demurred from this analysis; getting politics right, which 
fundamentally collapsed into the problem of crafting a truly representative reform, was sufficient to 
keep away the specter of revolution.1000 
 Despite the oddity of these locutions and assumptions, the attempt by the variety-of-
suffragists to theorize the pacific advantages of their representative system is a testament to their 
                                                 
998 Stapleton, Suggestions, 47. On the basis of this moral psychology, variety-of-suffragists would thus have been perfectly 
capable of denying that their arrangements violated any rule against “invidious comparisons”; Estlund, Democratic 
Authority, 36, 168. As mentioned at ch. 3, note 559, engagement with the variety-of-suffrages school should provoke 
doubt about how solid the democratic foundations of epistemic democracy are. 
 
999 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 648. Sidgwick was here using “moral” in a broader sense than it has for us today.  
 
1000 See e.g. Mackintosh’s essentially electoral-parliamentary account of why England had not been susceptible to 
revolutionary turmoil: “Our ancient policy did not trust the preservation of order and liberty to those general principles 
of morality which, in all countries, influence the conduct of good citizens; it bound all classes, by ties of pride and 
attachment, to a system which bestowed important privileges on all. As every new class arose, it was fastened to the 
Government by these constitutional links. This policy left no class politically powerful, who did not visibly draw their 
power from the Constitution”; Mackintosh, “Parliamentary Reform,” 481. 
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continuing relevance. What they hoped and believed was, fundamentally, that the formula of diversity 
plus justice could outperform the older ideal of a homogeneous or unanimous society even on the issue of 
stability. Do we not still, in various ways and across various political domains, hope that this is so, 
and are we not still searching for explanations as to how this could be the case? 
 Although the claims of the differentiated franchise to enhance stability received wide assent, 
they were subjected to several lines of critical interrogation. One of these is of special concern to us, 
and can serve as a kind of bridge into the broader democratic response to this school of 
representation which is the subject of the following chapter. 
 The bitterest objectors to the stability component of the variety-of-suffrages outlook were 
not paternalists or authoritarians alleging that the ship of state could be steered safely only by wise 
captains or strong hands. Instead, they were democrats. To these latter, the plans surveyed in this 
chapter reified harmful divisions of class and rank and delivered the Commons over to a sectarian 
mindset that would exacerbate existing social tensions. Albert Venn Dicey, who, as will appear in the 
next chapter, was primarily exercised by fundamental philosophical problems with the variety of 
suffrages, nonetheless painted a lamentable picture of the fracturing impact which it had in practice. 
“Incalculable evils” he wrote, followed from the “tendency to intensify differences” which was 
inherent in these plans.1001 Instead of “members” who aimed at and deliberated upon the common 
good, “special representatives of a class” would conceive of their primary loyalty as being to that 
“something sacred” inhering in “classes,” “orders,” and “interests.”1002 The sociological perspective 
guiding the plans of differentiated suffrage would encourage MPs to see their mission as fidelity to 
                                                 
1001 Dicey, “The Balance of Classes,” Essays on Reform, 81. This yearning for a sense of national unity that would 
transcend the estrangement of classes was characteristic of the essays in this volume taken as a whole. For Gladstone’s 
similar turn away from “class representation” in this (his proto-democratic period, one might call it), see Saunders, 
Democracy and the Vote, 181-2; Maurice Cowling, 1867, 29. For a similar revulsion in the French context, see Rosanvallon, 
Le Peuple Introuvable, 90.  
 
1002 Dicey, “The Balance of Classes,” 79, 81. As a democratic pamphleteer put it, there ought not to be “representation 
of a class” but only “representation of the ‘people’ – that is to say all classes blended and, as it were, welded together”; 
“Political Euclid,” The Reform Problem: Its True Solution (London: Effingham Wilson, 1866), 27-8. 
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the group for which they stood rather than to the nation for which they made laws; “from their very 
position” they would feel it their duty to “display and intensify class feeling,” and consequently “the 
most fanatical, the most narrow” minds would be drawn to parliamentary politics.1003 The young 
Mill, before the shift in his political thought which Democracy in America would work, similarly 
bemoaned that representatives under this theory were reduced to “mere attorneys of certain small 
knots and confederacies of men” who would treat the legislature as a battlefield of “private 
interests.”1004 This was hardly a recipe for stability. Instead of a deliberative idyll in which the various 
sectors of society congregated to settle on a commonly acceptable course of action, the Commons 
would be something more like disputed terrain on which hostile, implacable adversaries fought. The 
rosy psychological premises to which these thinkers appealed may well have been true as a general 
matter, but the deleterious effects of their schemes rendered them inapplicable in the sphere of 
representation. 
Fears that the variegated electorate would in fact result not in national harmony but in more 
adversarial social relations could occasionally spill over into the ranks of mirroring theorists 
themselves. Greg, for instance, opposed projects for “assigning to the working classes a certain 
number of special representatives, to be chosen by them exclusively” because of the “unseemly and 
perilous antagonism” it would create when questions with a strong class-valence came up for 
debate.1005 The sectarianism of class-specific constituencies and the too-close identification of MPs 
with particular classes would “most perniciously aggravate, that disseverance and hostility of classes, 
                                                 
1003 Dicey, “The Balance of Classes,” 80. 
 
1004 Mill, “The Rationale of Representation,” 44. See also Dennis Thompson, John Stuart Mill and Representative Government, 
101. 
 
1005 Greg, “Representative Reform [1],” 474-5. Opposition to quotas often takes this form today; e.g. Lakeman, How 
Democracies Vote, 135-6; Rehfeld, Concept of Constituency, 230, 236. Insofar as similar attacks against quotas were marshalled 
in a systematic way, this was done by theorists of PR, for whom the variety-of-suffrages tradition as a whole was liable to 
these objections. There is some irony in PR authors having turned against it on this score, since in many other respects 
they were in agreement with the ideas in this section about the contributions of inclusive representation to civic stability. 
 300 
 
that separation of society into horizontal layers…which, of all the features and tendencies of the 
condition of England, is, perhaps, the most uncomfortable and menacing.”1006 In Greg’s anxiety 
about the corrosive impact that integrating more class-based elements into the electoral system 
might have, we encounter an interesting intellectual phenomenon: the convergence of opposite ends 
of the ideological spectrum. Of all the protagonists of the last two chapters, Greg was likely the one 
with the most thoroughly elitist sensibilities. And yet, in turning against all institutionalizations of the 
mirroring thesis more radical than his own, he made use of an argument dear to the Idealist 
branches of Victorian democratic thought that would gain traction late in the century: namely, that 
the health and stability of society depended on a shared moral purpose that transcended class 
affiliation.1007 
The champions of electoral variety did not have a satisfactory response to these criticisms; 
for the most part, this aspect of their clash with the democratic camp consisted of a kind of “we-say, 
they-say” exchange. Cole’s answer to the “objection” that his plan would “provoke” an “invidious” 
“contest of classes” was simply “a denial of the fact that any such consequences would ensue.”1008 
Neither side could convince the other of the accuracy of its prediction; indeed, it was far from clear 
what would count as decisive evidence that the pacific gains attributed to the feeling of being 
included and deliberatively considered were or were not offset by the destabilizing risks associated 
with heightened group-identification. Insofar as the contest between the prevailing mirror theory 
and its democratic critics revolved around the question of the sources of stability for representative 
government, this particular debate generated more heat than light. 
  
                                                 
1006 Ibid., 476. 
 
1007 See e.g. Richter, The Politics of Conscience. 
 
1008 Cole, Middle Classes, 66. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Democracy, Diversity, and Contestability: 
Democracy against the Variety of Suffrages 
 
 The previous chapters’ recovery of the sociological, variety-of-suffrages tradition of 
representation is important for political theory not only in its own right, as a sophisticated attempt 
to realize an ideal of descriptive representation under conditions of diversity and to provide a 
theoretical and institutional base for a “liberal” government that would avoid class-rule. Recovering 
this theory is also significant in an instrumental sense, for it enables us to come to a fuller 
understanding of democratic theory itself. Without recognizing how pervasive the theory of electoral 
diversity was and what potent appeal it came to have across the ideological spectrum, we are liable to 
overlook two crucial arguments for manhood (or at least widely extended) suffrage in this formative 
period for modern democratic theory. In addition to the array of other arguments in favor of 
democracy current in the period,1009 it was incumbent on mid- and late-Victorian advocates of a 
more democratic franchise to address this powerful alternative on its own terms, and this they 
tended to do in one of two ways. This chapter will examine these two strands of democratic 
argumentation. 
 
1) Diverse Democracy 
 In an age as obsessed with the theme of diversity as the Victorian era was – and as 
convinced of its epistemic benefits and the indispensable part it played in the progressiveness of 
societies – democrats had to show that parliamentary democracy was not inconsistent with diversity. 
This was, as we have seen, quite a tall order; one of the foundational, animating theses of the theory 
of the variety of suffrages was that electoral democracy would stifle diversity, that, by transferring 
                                                 
1009 Other prominent arguments in favor of democracy were, naturally, important in the era, especially those about the 
educational benefits of political participation and the deserving character of the working class.  
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the preponderance of electoral power to the working class and erecting the rule of “mere numbers,” 
it would prevent the translation of England’s social and ideological diversity into the House of 
Commons and thus lead to the atrophy of the national discussion that was responsible for the 
country’s progress. The differences in their specific institutional recommendations did not obscure 
from these authors the important fact that they shared an understanding not only of diversity’s 
inestimable advantages and of representation as a descriptive or mirroring concept, but also of the 
threat to these commitments posed by democracy. 
 Advocacy of the variety of suffrages rested, then, on two sets of claims: the first concerning 
the positive worth of a mirroring parliament and the deliberative-epistemic significance of diversity, 
and the second concerning the inconsistency of a democratic suffrage with the realization of the 
forgoing ideas. One important strain of Victorian democratic theory consisted of accepting the first 
set of claims while rejecting the second. The nexus of representative-deliberative-epistemic values 
that inspired the myriad sociologies and institutional concoctions sketched in the previous chapter 
were endorsed by these democrats as the correct ends for the designers of electoral-legislative 
structures. Their contribution to the advancement of the democratic cause lay in upholding a widely-
extended, uniform suffrage as an appropriate means for the achievement of these ends. They 
envisioned democracy, among its other qualities, as an electoral system which was welcoming and 
inclusive of new ideas, which gave space to the full range of different social agendas and ideologies. 
 To recast democracy in this mold meant dispelling the fear that a further extension of the 
suffrage would give parliament over to a monolithic clique of members who sprang from or 
appealed exclusively to the working classes and who would thereby crowd out the spokesmen of all 
but one set of ideas and interests. Such a state of affairs in the legislature would create a politics that 
was both tyrannical and undeliberative, or rather, it was the former because it was the latter: where 
parliamentary discussion was nonexistent due to the exclusion of contending viewpoints, policies 
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could be nothing other, Grey deplored, than the imposition of “a mere will.”1010 Deliberation meant, 
as we saw Inglis grandly pronounce in the previous chapter, a politics of reasons and not will, and it 
required opposition, debate, and difference, all of which were eschewed by despotic exercises of will, 
whether those of a single Napoleonic figure or an unchecked multitude that monopolized seats in 
the legislature.  
 In light of the powerful hold exercised by this condemnatory picture of democracy as the 
intolerant, absolutist regime of a specific class, democrats had to make the case that a fundamental 
premise of the antidemocratic argument from the value of diversity was false: namely, the premise 
that the working classes thought and acted as a unified body. Without this unity, the fact of the 
“overwhelming preponderance” of its “numbers” would be far less threatening to liberal ideals1011; it 
was only because they constituted, or could most often be expected to constitute, a consolidated 
ideological-political force that their entrance into the electoral arena would block the other streams 
of interests and opinion from the Commons and cause parliamentary politics to become 
unrepresentative. Any hope of reconciling to the democratic cause the influential liberal circles 
which adhered to programs of variegated suffrage would depend upon defeating this view of a 
crushing working-class homogeneity. Notwithstanding the exception of the alarm at the advance of 
socialistic ideas noted in the previous chapter, the debate over the ideological unity or dividedness of 
the working classes proceeded in a characteristically Victorian way in the sense that it was less 
interested in the content of working-class beliefs than in their distribution. Samuel Bailey, whom we saw 
in part one of this dissertation articulating one of the most sophisticated pre-Millian analyses of the 
diversity of opinions, could have recognized in these disputes about the suffrage much of his own 
                                                 
1010 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 181. Grey explicitly derived his thought on this subject from Guizot who, at least on 
this subject of the difference between “reason” and “will,” wielded as great an influence across the Channel as any 
homegrown British thinker. In this vein Grey went on to cite at length a crucial passage in which Guizot distinguished 
two concepts of the “majority”: “the idea of an opinion which is accredited, and that of a force which is preponderant”; 
François Guizot, History of Representative Government, 60. 
 
1011 Alison, “The Reform Bill,” 15. 
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sensibility. We might even say that this line of democratic argument was simply the application to 
the political life of the working class of Bailey’s dictum that “in any given state of knowledge or 
ignorance, it is much better that the error and ignorance should be of a multiform than a uniform 
character.”1012 
 The argument that the beliefs of the working classes reached this necessary threshold of 
mulitformity took two basic forms. The first was a simple empirical claim about the present 
distribution of working-class opinions. Democratic reformers were insistent that the image of the 
working classes as a monolithic mass that thought and moved in concert (often at the behest of 
demagogues) was merely a nightmare induced by fear of the unknown, a nightmare belied by the 
reality that the working classes were riven by disagreements on political topics. As the historian and 
Liberal-party publicist George C. Brodrick (about whom more will be said in the following section) 
wrote: “We speak of the working class for the sake of convenience, but in reality the working class is 
not a class at all in any political sense, but an unstratified and incoherent aggregate…[who] are 
perfectly incapable of being rallied under one banner.”1013 For Brodrick, the “working class” was a 
sensible term only when used to pick out a socioeconomic group; to treat it as denominating a single 
political or ideological integer was to indulge in an empirically-unfounded hypostasis. 
 The lesson that it was “idle to talk of unity among the working classes” featured even more 
prominently in the work of another figure closely linked to Brodrick: John Boyd Kinnear.1014 
Kinnear was a quite radical figure – an uncompromising individualist, supporter of women’s 
suffrage, and virulent critic of “privilege” – and he had a brief moment in parliament before being 
                                                 
1012 Bailey, The Pursuit of Truth and the Progress of Knowledge, 242. 
 
1013 Brodrick, “Household Suffrage and Parliamentary Government,” in Political Studies (London: C.K. Paul & Co., 1879), 
282. 
 
1014 Kinnear, Principles of Reform: Political and Legal (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1865), 19. 
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unseated by the future Liberal Prime Minister H.H. Asquith.1015 He was also, in contrast to much of 
mid-Victorian liberalism, distressed by the decline of concern for the “abstract rights of men in 
politics,” and he wished to re-inspire his compatriots with a notion of “the extension of the 
franchise” as a matter “of infinite value in itself alone.”1016 These high phrases notwithstanding, 
Kinnear devoted more of the chapter on the suffrage in his 1865 political treatise to the 
heterogeneity of working-class belief than to anything resembling a proof of a natural right to the 
vote. “All our fear” and “half the folly that is uttered on this topic” of working-class 
enfranchisement would dissipate, he assured his readers, if they acknowledged that “there is not a 
single question on which they are united and form ‘a class.’”1017 Like Brodrick he preferred to 
pluralize the name of the group he wanted added to the register: “it is not a ‘working class’ that is to 
be admitted: it is ‘the working classes’”; “there is no object or motive that can be suggested,” he 
went on, “which we shall not see at a glance would affect them all differently.”1018 Kinnear put the 
point with particular forcefulness, but the core idea of these passages attained the status of a sort of 
refrain in reform camps. Even the great Liberal MP John Bright, usually considered the archetype of 
the crusader for urban and manufacturing interests against the traditional landed elite rather than the 
sort of liberal moved by the discourses of diversity and deliberation, emphasized that “opinions 
differ just as much among [the working classes] as among the people above them.”1019 
As the quotation from Bright indicates, reformers attempted to draw on the political 
experience of the already enfranchised portions of the population to make their point that the 
                                                 
1015 On Kinnear, see Gordon F. Millar, “Kinnear, John Boyd (1828–1920),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/article/40269]. 
 
1016 Kinnear, Principles of Reform, 10-1. 
 
1017 Ibid., 16. 
 
1018 Ibid., 16, 19. 
 
1019 Quoted in Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, 124. Saunders is rare among historians in noting the presence of the 
question of ideological diversity within the working class during the Second Reform period. It is also noted briefly but 
interestingly by P.F. Clarke in “Electoral Sociology of Modern Britain,” History, vol. 57, no. 189 (1972), 35. 
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“horizons and planes of thought and sentiment” that characterized a particular class included a range 
of “differences” in “feelings, opinions, and traditions.”1020 Democrats hoped that even upper-class 
conservatives could be brought to acknowledge that the normal condition of economic classes was 
ideological heterogeneity, since a basic fact of parliamentary life was that it engaged members of the 
upper classes in policy debates and political conflicts with fellow members of their ranks. If this 
multiformity of belief and allegiance obtained in the classes already enfranchised, then surely, 
democrats judged, it was reasonable to attribute the same variations and disagreements to the 
working classes, even if these variations were less apparent among the lower orders due to their 
current marginalization in the political process: “on any question of the day, we shall find them 
holding as great a diversity of sentiment as their superiors in station”; “ nothing is more certain than 
that they have no intrinsic element of coherence, and will on every question be moved by the same 
infinite variety of motive and reason which influence the minds of those whom we call the 
‘upper’ or the ‘middle’ classes”1021 Applying to the currently excluded portion of his countrymen the 
postulate of the naturalness of diversity which has appeared at various points in this dissertation, 
Kinnear argued that one must expect diversity among them 
simply and necessarily because the working classes are composed of men, not of electric 
clocks, all worked by a central battery, and because each man among them thinks as much 
for himself as the average of those above them do, while they contain a full 
proportion of those who follow their own judgment in each separate question of the day 
with as positive confidence that their own particular reason is better than their neighbours’, 
as does the most independent or obstructive member of the House of Commons….[We 
must] try to remember that we really have not to deal with any huge vague image of some 
unknown and awful power, but only with a certain number of individuals who act and think 
under the same rules as ourselves.1022 
 
To presume unanimity among the lower orders was nothing less than to conflate a difference of 
                                                 
1020 Cracroft, “The Analysis of the House of Commons, or Indirect Representation,” in Essays on Reform, 169. 
 
1021 Kinnear, Principles of Reform, 16, 18. He continued, “There are Whigs among them and Tories,” before listing a long 
series of opposed allegiances and policies which he believed could be found among the lower class. According to Sir 
Llewellyn Woodward, this was an accurate depiction of working-class ideas; see Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1815-
1870, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 161. 
 
1022 Kinnear, Principles of Reform, 16-7. 
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socioeconomic status with a difference in human nature. 
To this breed of reformer, the existence of diverse opinions within the working class meant 
that the arrival of electoral democracy was wrongly conceived as the unleashing of the sort of 
unstoppable “moral and political force” which was believed to have been divined by Tocqueville.1023 
An extended and uniform suffrage was, instead, simply a mechanism for making the system of 
representation more “adequate” by including a “true representation of labour.”1024 Because the 
working class was as marked by diversity as any other class, further extensions of the suffrage would 
not inaugurate an age of “tyranny of the majority,” would not usher in an era in which “any one kind 
of legislative opinion,” maintained by the unified will of the multitude, held an iron grip on political 
power.1025 In Kinnear’s words, the upshot of this truth about workingmen’s opinions was that “the 
fear that there is a class…which would be supreme, and ‘swamp,’ as the phrase is, all the rest” was 
groundless.1026 
The important role which the postulate of the multifariousness of working-class opinion 
played in dissolving the apparent tension between the values enshrined in the mirroring-sociological 
theory and a democratic suffrage is well illustrated in the writing of the Christian socialist Frederick 
Denison Maurice. Among the central missions of his formidable activism were the education of 
working men in preparation for their enfranchisement and the promotion of working-class 
involvement in politics. But he retained as well a strong attachment to the deliberative ethos that 
inspired so much of the variety-of-suffrages theorizing. He decried, in a way remindful of Grey, the 
                                                 
1023 Seymour Drescher, Tocqueville and England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 220. 
 
1024 Cracroft, “The Reform Session of 1867,” in Essays, Political and Miscellaneous, vol. 1, 175. 
 
1025 Albert Venn Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century, 218. Interestingly, 
Dicey was making this point even after he had long grown quite disenchanted with democratic England as it moved 
further from his classical-liberal preferences. Much more will be said about Dicey in the following section of this 
chapter. 
 Among modern writers, Jeremy Waldron has levelled a similar argument against fears of majority tyranny; see 
Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 115, no. 6 (2006), esp. 1398. 
 
1026 Ibid., 15. 
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elevation of the “will of the majority” above any “standard of truth,” and he expressed fear at what 
he thought were the potentially deleterious moral consequences of “the slavish reverence for 
numbers” and the “talk about the ‘will of the majority’” which he heard being trumpeted by some 
segments of the democratic movement.1027 Nevertheless, even while laborers still suffered, in his 
eyes, from a very imperfect state of education, he scoffed at the dreadful forebodings of a “general 
suffrage” turning the Commons into a monolithic, despotic arm of the working class, and he did so 
in no small part due to his conviction that the diversity within the working class would prevent it 
from “swamp[ing] all the other classes in the country.”1028 How did he know that this salutary 
division prevailed in the working class? Because, if the most numerous class really were so tightly 
bound ideologically as to have one will, it would not need to wait to be “admit[ted] to vote” before 
imposing it.1029 No set of political arrangements could guarantee society against the dangers of a 
“mere multitude” united by a single political mission, and it was consequently a waste of political 
ingenuity to continue engineering dikes for a flood which, if it came, could not be held back.1030 
Happily, due to the country’s deliberative, tolerant ethos this misfortune was unlikely to befall 
England, and the probability of its occurrence was in no way increased by widening the suffrage.1031 
                                                 
1027 Maurice, The Workman and the Franchise, 224, 211. 
 
1028 Ibid., 217. 
 
1029 Ibid., 217. 
 
1030 Ibid., 217. 
 
1031 T.H. Green founded his theory of democracy in moral and spiritual considerations beyond the bounds of this 
discussion, and, as he was broadly untroubled by the possibility of majority tyranny. Yet even he was eager all the same 
to cite the diversity within the previously excluded classes as a reason for confidence in the beneficial practical operation 
of the democratic system. If Green’s own appreciation of this fact was a relatively unphilosophical and opportunistic 
piece of his activism for reform, later Idealists weaved these observations about diversity within the demos into the 
fabric of their democratic metaphysics. Take, for instance, Bernard Bosanquet’s vision of democracy as a site for the 
playing-out of the Hegelian dialectic between the organic holism of society and the infinite differentiation of society’s 
“logical units” and “communities,” a system for harvesting the “whole compass of individuality which society contains.” 
This can, I would submit, be seen as the merging of German philosophical influences with the attempt to demonstrate 
the accord between democracy and the ideals of descriptiveness and diversity that we are now examining. 
If, judged against Mill and earlier vintages of Victorian liberalism, the Idealists of the century’s final decades 
seem remarkably insouciant about the possibility of the tyranny of the majority, this was in no small part because of the 
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For conservative opponents of a reduction in the property qualifications for the franchise, 
this particular talking-point was the most tiresome element of their adversaries’ propaganda; they 
voiced annoyance at how “much stress” was placed “on the fact that all the working class do not 
agree in politics.”1032 Lord Salisbury (at the time Viscount Cranborne) railed against this refrain as 
nothing better than “unsupported assertions”: “the first thing which the friends of this Bill tell us is, 
that the working class will not act politically en masse,” and therefore that worries about a permanent 
working-class “preponderance” were not justifiable grounds on which to limit the suffrage.1033 This 
issue was, Salisbury concurred, “the root of the matter,” but he dissented wholeheartedly from what 
he took to be the reformers’ naïve optimism on the matter; however “divided in opinion” the 
working class was on some ancillary questions, on “matters upon which their pecuniary interests are 
concerned” they exhibited “perfect party discipline” under the “exacting and despotic rule” of 
trades-union leaders.1034 Needless to say, democratic reformers, with the exception of some 
socialists, denied that there was greater uniformity (let alone a “rigorous obedience” to communistic 
dictates1035) in the working class on economic questions than on any others.1036 
                                                                                                                                                             
concerted efforts of mid-century democrats to portray the working class as a segment of society as permeated by 
disagreement as any other. This continuity should, perhaps, cause us to rethink the familiar assumption of a stark break 
between the Idealists and other traditions of nineteenth-century political thought. The descriptive ideal, the keystone of 
classical Whig theories of representation, could still be glimpsed beneath the Hegel-inspired jargon that prevailed at the 
fin de siècle.  
Bosanquet, “The Reality of the General Will,” in The British Idealists, 139; Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the 
State (London: Macmillan, 1899), 137. On Green’s theory of democracy, see e.g. Richter, The Politics of Conscience, esp. chs. 
3 and 8; Peter Nicholson, “Introduction,” to Green, CW, vol. 5; Tyler, Idealist Political Philosophy, 70-1. On Idealist 
unconcern about majority tyranny, see Richter, Politics of Conscience, 203, 256. On Bosanquet and pluralism, see Peter 
Nicholson, Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, 214-8. 
 
1032 George Robert Gleig, “The Reform Bill,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, vol. 99, no. 607 (May 1866), 666. He was 
quoting from a speech by the conservative politician Lord Stanley. Stanley was complaining here of the belaboring of 
this point by Gladstone, although, as we have seen, the complaint applied much more widely. 
 
1033 Salisbury, “The Reform Bill,” in Lord Salisbury on Politics, 210. 
 
1034 Ibid., 210. 
 
1035 Ibid., 212. See e.g. Kinnear, Principles of Reform, 18-9. 
 
1036 As Brougham said in reply to this prediction that the working classes would leverage their numerical advantage in a 
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 An appreciation of the centrality of the question of the extent of lower-class ideological 
diversity to debates about democratization enables us to notice a usually overlooked dimension of 
the persistent Victorian inquiry into the deference, or lack thereof, among the lower orders. The 
thesis of the English populace as a “deferential” one is normally, and indeed correctly, thought of as 
part of the debate over whether democratic rights could be harmonized with proper authority, 
whether it was “safe” to extend the franchise in the sense that the leadership of the country would 
not be seized by the unfit rabble.1037 Yet the reality which the concept of “deference” was intended 
to capture in this era was not a simple acquiescence to an unchallenged or time-honored caste of 
wise rulers. During an “age of transition” in which the authorities who received this deference were 
not themselves unified in outlook – as they had been, almost all Victorians believed, in the ages of 
“feudal lord and sovereign king”1038 – deference meant not the simple veneration of unquestioned 
powers but the reflection of a heterogeneous pattern of thought and interest each stripe of which 
had its own tenets and luminaries. It was in this light that George Cornewall Lewis could see 
political parties in the plural as channels through which intellectual excellence could attain a directing 
influence on government and public opinion, and that Brougham could have confidence that a 
basically democratic suffrage would operate consistently with accurate representation of the greater 
                                                                                                                                                             
democracy to expropriate the upper classes: this forecast “also assumes that there is to be a union of the working classes 
all over the country in order to return this majority. Then, if they are likely to combine for the purpose of indirectly 
effecting the confiscation of property, why do they not now combine for the purpose of seizing upon it directly? For 
assuredly they possess this power in every country, and yet in none is there any more alarm felt respecting such a 
measure, than there is an apprehension of the horses in the country combining to kick, or the oxen to gore men to 
death.” The young JS Mill conveyed the same message in a debating speech in favor of constitutional reform: “He 
asserts that the people are desirous of destroying property. I shall not enter into this question for I consider it to be 
irrelevant, but I cannot refrain from saying if the people desire to destroy property why do they not destroy it now? 
Have they not the physical power that they must always have?”’ This method of defusing alarm at measures of 
enfranchisement with the provocative remark that the lower classes could do as much damage without the suffrage as 
with it parallels Maurice’s thought previously analyzed. 
See Brougham, The British Constitution (London and Glasgow: Richard Griffin and Co., 1861), 95-6, 73, 91-2; 
Mill, Speech on the British Constitution [2], 19 May 1826, in CW, vol. 26, 380. 
 
1037 See e.g. Cowling, 1867, 58-9; Kent, Brains and Numbers, 46; David Moore, The Politics of Deference: A Study of the Mid-
Nineteenth-Century English Political System (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976), passim. 
 
1038 Hazlitt, “The French Revolution,” in Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 87. 
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sociological importance of the upper classes.1039 Because at least a critical mass of lower-class 
electors could be trusted to follow traditional political leaders, and because these leaders were 
divided among themselves, there was no threat, these reformers thought, of deliberation among 
contesting viewpoints being displaced by an unvarying slate of delegates from a unanimous class.1040 
 Taken too far, though, this defense of the democratization of the suffrage based on the 
multitude’s susceptibility to the “moral prestige” of “intelligence” or the legitimate “influence of 
property”1041 had some rather perverse consequences for the theory of democracy. If it showed that 
a regime more inclusive of the working class was “safe,” it also risked making its achievement seem 
far less urgent. For it eliminated one of the most powerful reasons for bringing the working classes 
into the electoral fold in the first place, namely, that they had their own distinctive “sentiments on 
public affairs,” that there were peculiar “notions, right and wrong, which are fermenting in the 
minds of the working classes,” the exclusion of which from the formal channels of politics would 
impoverish parliamentary discourse and undermine the assembly’s claims to representativeness.1042 
There remained, of course, plenty of reasons to endorse an augmentation of working-class electoral 
power without this one: the gains to stability of making the political process more inclusive; the 
moral and educational benefits of citizenship; the recognition of the deserving character of working-
class citizens, among others. But, in comparison with the argument for working-class inclusion 
                                                 
1039 Lewis, Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion, 149-50, 181; Brougham, British Constitution, 82, 74. Of the Whig 
architects of the First Reform Act, Brougham was the figure who came closest to endorsing a simple democratic 
franchise: he preferred the inclusive qualification of “a good plain education” to any property requirements, as well as 
roughly equal electoral districts and a uniform franchise applying to them all; ibid. 73, 95-6. 
 
1040 Kinnear was representative as usual in his thinking on this front. He wrote that, since the working classes were 
divided into patterns of belief similar to those in the already enfranchised strata, they would “when admitted to power, 
merely add to or turn the majority in each locality according to its particular circumstances, leaving us still governed by 
the prevailing sentiment in all classes, and distinguished into parties much the same as at present”; Principles of Reform, 16. 
 
1041 Leslie Stephen, “Value of Political Machinery,” 846; Francis Jeffrey and Henry Brougham, “Parliamentary Reform,” 
Edinburgh Review, vol. 17, no 34 (Feb. 1811), 264. 
 
1042 Bagehot, “Parliamentary Reform,” 196; Mill, Speech on the Representation of the People [2], 13 April 1866, in CW, 
vol. 28, 66. 
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based on their distinctive thoughts and perspectives, these other rationales were lacking in one 
respect: they had little to say about what the groups that were to be enfranchised contributed to 
politics. The arguments from recognition or from the educational advantages of political 
participation concerned the benefits reaped by the working classes from their inclusion, and the 
argument from stability, if inflected with a strong note of deference, could look like nothing more 
than the implementation of the cynical credo of the archduke of antidemocracy, the young Salisbury 
(then Lord Robert Cecil), that “the best form of Government…is one where the masses have little 
power, and seem to have a great deal.”1043 
 (The question of whether the right way to understand the incorporation of hitherto-excluded 
group was as conferring a benefit upon that group, or as improving the political life of the nation 
more broadly through that group’s unique contributions, was reprised in another reform movement, 
that for women’s suffrage. There was a split within the rationales given for female enfranchisement 
between, on the one hand, the family of views that saw this measure as done for the benefit of 
women – whether it was a right owed as a matter of justice or a boon to women’s welfare which the 
state was fortunate enough to be able to bestow – and, on the other, those which conceived of it 
principally as an enhancement of the epistemic capacities of the political system through the addition 
of women’s distinctive perspectives and ideas. This latter standpoint, which had always formed part 
of the movement’s argumentative arsenal, became especially prominent in the years before the First 
World War; it appeared, for instance, in two of the most important political texts of the period, L.T. 
Hobhouse’s Liberalism and Ramsay MacDonald’s Socialism and Government.1044) 
                                                 
1043 Salisbury (then Lord Cecil), “Theories of Parliamentary Reform,” 66. 
 
1044 See e.g. Hobhouse’s declaration that “the larger wrong done by the repression of women is not the loss to women 
themselves…but the impoverishment of the community as a whole, the loss of all the elements in the common stock 
which the free play of woman’s mind would contribute”; Liberalism, 54. MacDonald stated unequivocally that if “there is 
a case for the enfranchisement of women, it should consist in a proof that women’s experience is different from men’s.” 
His own proof that the “experience and mind” of women could make a distinctive, irreplaceable contribution to a 
“rational state policy” hinged on his belief that 1) the modern welfare state was increasingly “assuming the 
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 The democrat of deference, then, presents something of a conundrum, akin to that 
presented by a certain Whiggish or skeptical line on religious toleration, associated with figures like 
Macaulay in nineteenth-century England and Bayle or Voltaire during the Enlightenment. A 
democracy in which the working classes had nothing distinctive to say was like a toleration of 
infidels on the grounds that the ways in which they differed from the orthodox were of no practical 
significance.1045 In the same way that a dissenter or a Catholic might have accepted the policy of 
toleration while balking at the dismissive spirit in which it was granted, to the modern liberal-
democrat the attitude of the democrat of deference towards those whom he would enfranchise may 
sound objectionable. Relative to this kind of democrat, the twenty-first-century reader may have 
more sympathy with those authors from the previous chapter who, seeing the working classes as 
quite able and likely to dissent from the conclusions of their social superiors, paid them the tribute 
of trying to limit their power. After all, Bagehot’s motivation for seeking seats for the urban artisans 
was precisely that they had “peculiar sentiments” to “express,” that there existed such a discrete 
social-intellectual entity as the “views of the working classes.”1046 The democrat of deference 
counted the absence of distinctive working-class views as a point in favor of uniform universal 
                                                                                                                                                             
responsibilities of a family and becoming like a family in its spirit and action” and 2) women had special insight into and 
knowledge of family life; see MacDonald, Socialism and Government, vol. 1, 67-76. 
 
1045 Ursula Henriques dubs this the argument for toleration from the “mere irrelevance” of the beliefs in question; 
Henriques, Religious Toleration in England, 201. 
 See e.g. Macaulay, “Civil Disabilities of the Jews,” in Critical and Historical Essays, vol. 1, 296-7: “It is because 
men are not in the habit of considering what the end of government is, that Catholic disabilities and Jewish disabilities 
have been suffered to exist so long. We hear of essentially Protestant governments and essentially Christian 
governments, words which mean just as much as essentially Protestant cookery, or essentially Christian 
horsemanship….The points of difference between Christianity and Judaism have…no more to do with his fitness to be 
a magistrate, a legislator, or a minister of finance, than with his fitness to be a cobbler. Nobody has ever thought of 
compelling cobblers to make any declaration on the true faith of a Christian. Any man would rather have his shoes 
mended by a heretical cobbler than by a person who had subscribed all the thirty-nine articles, but had never handled an 
awl. Men act thus, not because they are indifferent to religion, but because they do not see what religion has to do with 
the mending of their shoes. Yet religion has as much to do with the mending of shoes as with the budget and the army 
estimates.” The exemplary extended Victorian statement of this view also comes from Macaulay in his essay “Gladstone 
on Church and State,” in Critical and Historical Essays, vol. 2, 430-503. 
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suffrage1047; the Whiggish, variety-of-suffrages sociologist perceived the singularity and originality of 
their thought as a reason both for including the working classes and for restraining their numerical 
predominance over other classes, for discovering the means whereby “the lower classes are to be 
admitted to a share of political power without absorbing the whole power.”1048 At the risk of stating 
the point in overly provocative fashion, we might say that the insistence on the extent of ideological 
division among the working class, when bound up too tightly with the assertion of continuity with 
the status quo distribution of beliefs among the already enfranchised strata of society, amounted to a 
liberal-pluralist version of the organic-hierarchical social philosophy of the Tory democrats. 
 To return to the main thread of this section: the argument about the current extent of 
heterogeneity among working-class beliefs and policy-preferences was a crucial element in the 
democratic response to the theory of the variegated suffrage, deflating the anxiety about the 
demographic advantage of the working classes leading to distortions of the Commons’s sociological 
accuracy and its inclusiveness of all the major streams of interest and opinion. This was not, 
however, the only form in which the thesis of the sufficient diversity of opinion among the working 
classes appeared. Unlike the preceding contention, this second form was not an empirical assertion 
about the present, but a predictive claim about the future distribution of opinions under a 
democratic franchise. This prediction was central to what is arguably the most important document 
of democratic theory from the mid-Victorian period, although it is sadly neglected in political theory 
today: the Essays on Reform of 1867, a collection of articles from a group of young scholars and 
professionals known as the “university liberals” which “not only favoured the extension of the 
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franchise but expressed sympathy with the ideal of democratic government.”1049 Among the 
contributors were Leslie Stephen, James Bryce, and A.V. Dicey before the days of their fame, as well 
as three other authors – Kinnear, Brodrick, and Cracroft – who have already appeared in this 
chapter. It was, for the political left of the decade, something of a showcase of rising stars. 
 This second, academic-liberal argument for the harmony of democracy with the priorities of 
the mirror theorists punted on the foregoing question of whether the working classes currently 
contained one or multiple viewpoints and agendas. Instead, it threw offered a forecast about the 
distribution of opinions among them once they were granted the suffrage. Dire prognoses of deliberative 
politics succumbing to a united lower-class ideology or the multitude’s blind submissiveness to 
demagogues were irrelevant, ran this line of argument, because one could not generalize from the 
condition of mass opinion under an exclusive franchise to its condition under a democratic one. 
Even if lower-class beliefs in the 1860s were homogeneous or (as some imagined) nonexistent, 
political participation could be trusted to produce the optimally diverse allocation of opinions. 
 This prediction was the offspring of the combination of two quintessential tenets of 
Victorian political thought. The first, which has been the object of much attention in this 
dissertation, was the idea that widespread ideological diversity was natural to modern, “civilized” 
societies like the England of their day; the second, touched on at several points in previous chapters 
(especially in ch. 4, section 3), was the deep faith in the educative power of political life. If the 
engagement with public affairs that followed receipt of the “public trust or duty” of the vote could 
be expected to call into play latent intellectual and moral faculties, to draw attention to an array of 
complex problems, to involve the mind in new and various modes of thought, it could accordingly 
be expected to increase diversity. Whatever unanimity existed among the working class up to the 
present time was thus best understood as an artifact of the intellectual dormancy which naturally 
                                                 
1049 Harvie, Lights of Liberalism, 11. The book’s analysis of the Essays and their authors remains illuminating and has not 
been superseded. The ethos of academic liberalism was treated in ch. 2 (1)(c). 
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attended political exclusion. Consequently it was wrong, as Leslie Stephen wrote in his installment 
for the Essays, to fear that democracy would unleash workingmen simply to impose their desires, for 
once they had the vote and sent their own members to parliament “they would have to discuss these 
questions before the whole nation, instead of fighting in the dark; the whole intelligence of the 
country would be brought to bear upon their claims and detect their unsoundness: the mere putting 
them into shape and discussing them would infallibly bring out the differences among the workmen 
themselves.”1050 The conservative-turned-popular reformer Lord Houghton was likewise confident 
that the same kinds of thoughtful divisions of political allegiance and principle that characterized the 
then-current political classes would come to exist among the working class: “diversities of thought” 
would emerge among working men once they were brought within the pale of parliamentary 
discussion – “in proportion as [the newly enfranchised citizens] are taught to argue” and “have 
learned to think on such subjects,” Houghton averred, “their inductions will be various, and their 
conclusions contradictory.”1051 “Great differences of opinion,” wrote R.H. Hutton, a close friend of 
Bagehot who nonetheless opposed him on the franchise question, were sure to be an important part 
of working-class politics.1052 In short, division, diversity, fragmentation, contestation – these 
phenomena were intrinsic to politics itself, rather than peculiar to any particular governmental forms 
or electoral arrangements. The deliberative political culture that was so valued by the exponents of 
the variegated suffrage was in no danger from democracy, for the nondemocratic electoral 
arrangements they lauded had never in fact been the cause of the enlightening interplay of different 
views that had saved England from the “monotony” and “uniformity” that afflicted the rest of the 
                                                 
1050 Leslie Stephen, “On the Choice of Representatives by Popular Constituencies,” in Essays on Reform, 122. 
 
1051 Richard Monckton Milnes, 1st Baron Houghton, “On the Admission of the Working Classes as Part of Our Social 
System; and Their Recognition for All Purposes as Part of the Nation” in Essays on Reform, 64. 
 
1052 Hutton, “The Political Character of the Working Classes,” in Essays on Reform, 43. 
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world.1053 
 The dynamic and future-oriented nature of this second strand of argument for diverse 
democracy flipped the script on the way of conceiving of the relationship between enfranchisement 
and the holding of opinions described in chapter four. Whereas Bagehot, Greg, and authors of their 
ilk set the possession of opinions (and sometimes even of distinctive opinions) as the baseline for 
being granted the suffrage, the academic liberals behind the Essays believed that enfranchisement 
was itself a mechanism for creating opinions – and diverse ones at that. The former wanted the 
suffrage to reflect and react to the contours of public opinion; the latter viewed the suffrage as a 
generator of opinions and an engine for their fragmentation. 
 Separable from but complementary of these arguments about the current and future 
distribution of beliefs in the working class was a depiction of the intellectual character of the 
working class which often appeared alongside the former arguments. In diametric opposition to the 
bleak views of lower-class benightedness, closed-mindedness, and intolerance analyzed earlier in this 
dissertation, democrats portrayed the working classes as open-minded and tolerant. Frederic 
Harrison, the leading Victorian positivist, thought the working classes were unique in “being without 
class prejudice” and being “open to conviction” by the best ideas, from whatever quarter they may 
have emerged.1054 Morley praised them for being “less hindered by fixed ideas than other classes,” 
and Hutton assured his readers that “no class is so tolerant of differences of opinion as they are.”1055 
From this perspective, the important issue was much less the distribution of opinions that prevailed 
or was going to prevail than it was the kind of people that workingmen were; even if a seemingly 
unquestioning unanimity endured for a time, this needed not be taken as indicative of stagnation or 
                                                 
1053 MacCunn, Ethics of Citizenship, 159. See also Macaulay, “History,” in Miscellaneous Writings of Lord Macaulay, vol. 1, 268-
9. 
 
1054 Harrison, Order and Progress, 147. 
 
1055 Morley, Fortnightly Review of July 1868, quoted in D.A. Hamer, John Morley: Liberal Intellectual in Politics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968), 84; Hutton, “The Political Character of the Working Classes,” 42. 
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majority tyranny. When new breakthroughs and dilemmas occurred and new information was 
brought to light, argued these democratic reformers, the appropriate fissures and contestations 
would arise and the full range of perspectives be canvassed, because these consequences followed 
from the character of the British demos.1056 Contra the likes of Maine, Lowe, and Bagehot, a political 
system in which the working class was the numerically predominant element would be no more (and 
probably less) inert and inhospitable to new ideas or diverse views than any preceding system. 
Because these encouraging truths about the working class gave the lie to the image of 
democracy as a system of class rule or majority tyranny, these democrats of diversity could lay claim 
to all of the pacific and stabilizing benefits that the variety-of-suffrages school ascribed to its version 
of inclusivity and representativeness. The dire ruminations of conservatives like Alison on the social-
political collapse that would follow the triumph of democracy and limit it to an “ephemeral 
duration” – the accusation that a system of electors, “composed…of a certain class of society” and 
“indifferent” to the “complaints” and “welfare” of “other bodies,” would bring about the 
“inevitable consequence…that the ejected classes become discontented, and public dissatisfaction 
goes on accumulating, till it terminates in a convulsion”1057 – were utterly misleading. Since all 
citizens could truly conceive of themselves as participating in and represented by a democratic 
government, since “the feelings and wishes” of the whole population would find adequate reflection 
in a democratic political structure, democracy would typify “not only stability” but “strength.”1058 A 
more democratic suffrage would shore up the political foundations of England, for “political 
representation is the soul of political safety.”1059 Houghton gave an eloquent articulation of the thesis 
                                                 
1056 As Acton put it, in a slightly different context: the “real working class is more receptive to ideas and principles” than 
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1057 Alison, “The Reform Bill,” 16. 
 
1058 Bryce, American Commonwealth, vol. 2, 275. 
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of democratic stability. No political innovation could serve better as “a security for the common 
support of the Law and Public Order” than the democratization of the franchise, which brought all 
“passions working in the popular mind” into “the free atmosphere of political debate”; democracy 
was unrivalled as “a security against the sudden and violent ebullitions of social discontent,” for it 
“afforded a legitimate safety-valve of political discussion [that] can hardly be overlooked.”1060 
“Democratic institutions” gave everyone a “share” of the political representation, making it possible 
that all citizens could “give their wishes a legitimate expression through [the Constitution’s] ancient 
organs.”1061 Democracy’s credentials for inclusivity and representativeness were matchless, and it was 
therefore the best bet for achieving a stable and peaceful future for Britain. 
 On every front, then, democracy was a better instrument for realizing the mirroring ideal and 
its attendant goods and values than the electoral engineering efforts of the variety-of-suffrages 
school. To subscribe to descriptiveness and mirroring was, in the eyes of these adherents of what we 
might call diverse democracy, to commit to democratic institutions, for the facts about the demos’s 
congeniality to diversity rendered groundless the long tradition of anxieties about its classist and 
unrepresentative nature. 
 Before leaving this section, a word on the afterlife of this cluster of diversity-friendly 
democratic arguments is in order. The last quarter of the century witnessed the increasing 
orientation of British politics around class antagonisms, the rise of a more spiritually-laden 
egalitarianism with the spread of Idealism, and the fading of the schemes of variegated suffrage into 
the past, and with these trends the stress on pluralism and disagreement within the working class 
subsided. Yet the legacy of this particular piece of democratic doctrine lasted beyond its mid-
Victorian heyday and demonstrated a surprising tenacity. Take, for example, the gloss which D.G. 
                                                 
1060 Houghton, “Admission of the Working Classes,” 51, 54, 52. 
 
1061 Bryce, “The Historical Aspect of Democracy,” in Essays on Reform, 273. 
 320 
 
Ritchie put on democracy. Briefly, this was that the nature of the political sphere was to be an arena 
in which different individuals and groups advanced different visions of and programs for their 
society, and that a democratic political sphere would not fail in this regard – rather, it would be 
superior, for it was the only completely inclusive regime, the only one which made space for every 
possible dissenting voice, which was open to every movement that might arise. Ritchie, as briefly 
alluded to in chapter two, was one of the first British theorists to attempt to derive the freedoms of 
the press and public discussion from the ideal of democracy itself; unsurprisingly, he did not expend 
so much theoretical energy for liberties which he expected to do no more than sit sterilely on the 
books. So long as “the right of freedom of speech and freedom of association” was respected, then 
“it is the very chief advantage of democracy over oligarchy that, while it establishes the power of the 
majority, it puts that majority potentially in the hands of those who have ideas and are able to make 
them spread.”1062 Democracy, properly understood, was the open system; it was, according to 
Harrison, the sole one which alone warranted the confidence that all new projects and ideas, which 
by definition originated with “minorities,” had a fair chance to “convert” the rest of society to “a 
reasoned concurrence” and to contend for the “real preponderance of the social force.”1063  
An even more direct instance of the power which this connection of a diverse demos with 
the possibility of democratic descriptive representation retained over later democratic thought 
occurs in an unlikely place: the socialist theory of Ramsay MacDonald, Britain’s first Labour Prime 
Minster. For MacDonald, as for all socialists, democracy was wrongly conceived in an “individualist” 
mode as an aggregation of personal preferences.1064 Surprisingly, however, he also claimed that it was 
equally misunderstood as the government of a class, for “no class, however enlightened, can then 
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represent the whole community.”1065 Democracy was, instead, founded on the fact that at a 
“particular stage of [a society’s] evolution” it became impossible to attain an “accurate representation 
of the State personality,” a “complete representation of experience in the State,” without relying 
upon universal suffrage.1066 In this epoch of complexity, differentiation, and multi-facetedness in 
social relations, only democracy could deliver the inclusiveness and descriptive accuracy in 
representation that could make the Commons an epistemically robust “deliberative assembly”:  
it is not the idea of equality which I see underlying the democratic franchise, but the 
recognition of the value to the State of the experience of the individual, or perhaps, to speak 
more accurately, of the section of the community to which an individual belongs. For it is 
not individuals but classes and descriptions of individuals that are admitted from time to 
time to the franchise.1067 
 
Democracy was, in short, the appropriate political response to the modern sociology of diverse 
opinion; it was, in contradiction to the theory of the variety of suffrages, the latter’s true institutional 
corollary. For the greatest socialist politician of the early twentieth century, the democratic suffrage 
was the fulfillment in the modern era of the traditional British promise of a “mirroring” Commons. 
 
2) Radical or Undescriptive Democracy 
 There was another pro-democratic line of argument in which diversity was a prominent 
player. This line was a more radical departure from the sociological-mirror framework than the 
foregoing. The clash between the proponents of the kind of democratic argument surveyed in the 
preceding section and the full-blown champions of the variety of suffrages from chapters four and 
five such as Bagehot, Grey, and Cole was basically a family squabble. Hence the former might be 
considered a Whiggish school of democrats: they shared the same ideal as their opponents – that is, 
Bagehot’s ideal of “true Liberalism” as “hav[ing] the largest number of really organic interests and 
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ideas meeting together in the representative assembly, to try each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses”1068 – but disputed the assessment that a democratic suffrage could not operate in 
accordance with this ideal. In this sense the difference between a Houghton and a Cole was one of 
species more than of genus; “diverse democrats” existed on the far end of a continuum that reached, 
at its other end, to the likes of Greg or Macaulay, who combined subscription to the ideals of 
diversity and sociological accuracy within the assembly with a belief that fidelity to these ideals 
meant a suffrage that privileged the middle-class. Democrats like Houghton were, at bottom, the 
inclusive wing of the broad descriptive tradition of representation that had undergone such varied 
institutional permutations and theoretical articulations since the days of its Whig inception. 
 One democratic response to the theory of the variegated suffrage was, then, to show that the 
values that animated the theory would be best served by abandoning the electoral-parliamentary 
institutions usually thought to instantiate them. Yet another, the one to which we turn now, was to 
dismiss the sociological claims that underlay this way of thinking as inappropriate to modern politics. 
This response was not always clearly distinguished by democratic publicists from the former, and 
could sometimes be found alongside the previous one – indeed, this appears dramatically in the 
Essays on Reform, where the essay by Houghton which we have been discussing was followed 
immediately in the next chapter by a quite distinct case for democracy from Albert Venn Dicey.1069 
While these two positions came together, of course, in their practical recommendation of a 
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democratic franchise, the reasons for their dissatisfaction with the alternative offered by theorists of 
the variety of suffrages differed fundamentally. 
 Dicey would wind up as “eminent” a Victorian as any who would be subjected to Lytton 
Strachey’s scorn, and would spend the latter decades of his life in disillusionment with his country’s 
democratic politics (especially its economic and imperial dimensions).1070 He would achieve fame as 
England’s greatest constitutional scholar, and his Law and Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century 
continues to exercise great influence on the historiography of the period. But in the mid-60s all that 
remained in the future, and Dicey was still zealously democratic, even in comparison to the crop of 
fellow reform-minded young intellectuals who contributed to the Essays.1071 
 One important prong of Dicey’s offensive against the mirror view, and the one which 
concerns us here, was in effect an internal critique. Dicey wanted to show that, even should one 
accept the accurate reflection of classes, interests, and opinions as the correct parliamentary ideal, 
assent to this ideal could not produce a satisfactory institutional settlement. To do this, he insistently 
pressed the point that we saw even the occasional Whig, such as Bagehot and Harris, concede in 
chapter four: namely, that the resolution of the sociological question – of what the condition of 
society and public opinion was in “the English nation here and now,” as Bagehot wrote1072 – was 
hardly a straightforward one. Answering this question was, the reader will recall, the first order of 
business for theorists of electoral variegation. After all, the variety of suffrages was not meant to be 
instituted at random, with, say, different voting rules and qualifications allocated by lottery across 
constituencies. Such a method of random allocation was unacceptable because there was no reason 
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to imagine that a haphazard distribution of voting privileges would produce an electoral result 
faithful to public opinion. Therefore, it was necessary that some definitive account of the makeup of 
public opinion – of which regions, which classes, which ideas contributed with what significance to 
the makeup of the national mind – precede the assignment of the various suffrages to the different 
constituencies. But any such account would itself be contestable – and not just contestable but, indeed, 
contested. As we have seen, even two thinkers such as Bagehot and Greg who not only bore a family 
resemblance in their political thought, but who actually belonged by marriage to the same family, 
disagreed about the relative importance of the various classes in England and the adequacy with 
which they were being represented. The very fact about the British social order with which Bagehot 
and so many of his like-minded contemporaries were preoccupied – that the public opinion which, 
by general consent, was the supreme authority of modern British politics was itself a split and multi-
faceted entity, an amalgam of many different streams of thought and interest – made arriving at any 
such conclusive account a rather fanciful conceit. 
 This was the core of Dicey’s objection to the so-called “principle of the English constitution, 
that Parliament should be a mirror.”1073 Much as the designer of a variety-of-suffrage scheme might 
be confident that his proposal had more “reality” in it than either the “sham” that was the “present 
system” or any contending scheme, much as he might be certain that his plan to divide the seats of 
the largest urban constituencies, and only those constituencies, evenly between the upper and 
working classes was “founded on reason and justice,”1074 the fact remained that quite other notions 
of what the composition of the Commons would have to be in order to qualify as a “reasonable and 
just” mirror were prevalent. Dicey had no patience for the idea that the exercise of “political reason” 
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alone could produce such a mirror,1075 and he directed at such pretensions his most withering prose: 
Advocates of class representation have expended immense ingenuity in devising schemes for 
effecting an hypothetical balance of power, and the complexity of these devices has given an 
appearance of philosophic profundity to the theory which makes such devices necessary; for 
it is difficult for any one to believe that an object which needs thought and ingenuity for its 
attainment may, after all, not be worth attaining. But calm observers, though willing to give 
all due weight to the objections which may be urged against the representation of numbers, 
may yet be inclined to suspect that thinkers who advocate the establishment of a balance of 
power, entertain views open to greater difficulties than are the theories which these thinkers 
assail.1076 
 
However confident those of Cole’s mold may have been that the picture of society which 
undergirded their prescriptions for reform was the right one, their schemes were nonetheless “open 
to a primary charge of utter impracticability” resulting from the absence of consensus about the 
“weight and importance” of the discrete elements of society.1077 Dicey dwelt at length on this theme: 
Their object is to give “due” weight to each interest, but no standard exists by which the 
“due” weight may be measured. Mr. Disraeli is honestly convinced that the landed interest 
has not its due share of power. Most other persons would think a diminution of the 
influence of the country gentlemen essential to the establishment of a fair constitutional 
balance; but there exists no test by which to decide between the correctness of Mr. Disraeli's 
views and the views of his opponents, unless principles be introduced which are fatal to the 
theory of the balance of power [of the various classes and interests].1078 
 
Dicey, who, like almost all liberals of his age, was bullish about the burgeoning social sciences, did 
not mean to suggest that there was no fact of the matter about the relative contributions of different 
“orders” of society to the nation’s social, intellectual, and economic life.1079 His point, part-political, 
part-epistemological, was that there was no uncontroversial criterion by which “persons of opposite 
views, such as Mr. Mill and Mr. Disraeli, could be brought to agree on the exact proportion of 
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influence which ought to be retained by the landed, commercial, and working classes.”1080 In the face 
of these disagreements, Dicey believed, any plan of reform which depended on its acceptance as the 
means of reflecting the truth about modern English society in all its diversity must be unsatisfactory. 
 Dicey had no affection for the “mirror” principle, and did not contemplate with regret the 
imminent passing which he expected for it. But even in his essay one gets a sense of a sort of 
romantic tragedy about the theory which he was assailing. While he lamented that the “principles” of 
his antagonists “tend in practice…to the establishment of a Plutocracy,” he did not think that the 
mirror theory was a cynical cloak for upper-class power-hunger, and he was in any case uninterested 
in such ad hominem arguments.1081 Instead, even this theory contained (to use the lingo of the era) a 
“partial truth.” This was the respect for diversity and the conviction that including it within 
Parliament was advantageous: “An argument of real force…is that the introduction into the 
legislative body of members belonging to different orders of the community would tend greatly to 
improve the character of the legislature. No candid critic can deny that there is some truth in this 
allegation.”1082 Proponents of the variety-of-suffrages/mirroring position observed, valued, attended 
to the diversity in their societies; they developed a serious theory of the epistemic and policymaking 
benefits which diversity produced; they were guided by a desire to do justice to the various elements 
of the polity. But they never squarely faced the objection that wide swathes of their countrymen 
might dispute their assessment of the shape of the “public.” Though they celebrated and sought to 
give expression to the true state of society and public opinion in all its diversity, they did not 
recognize the diversity of opinions that existed with respect to this state itself, and the theory to 
which they subscribed lacked the resources to address the contentions arising from this second-
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order diversity. 
 This was the deep difficulty, and the tragic aspect, of the variety-of-suffrages theory. That it 
was very responsive to the conditions of “modern diversity” gave it great appeal and normative 
power in an age absorbed with these themes, but this diversity to which it was so attentive would 
always render its prescriptions contestable and unsatisfying. Only a society that was divided and 
diverse would need such careful planning to do justice to all parties. But a divided society was 
precisely the kind of society in which it was least likely that agreement on the exact contours of these 
structures would be found. Whiggish theorists of representation assumed that unanimity could be 
found at this second-order level – at the level at which each theorist was painting his own picture of 
society – while first-order diversity persisted. The essence of Dicey’s critique was to expose the 
implausibility of this assumption. 
 Dicey added a further dimension to his critique: the temporal. In a manner that reminds the 
modern reader of Nozick’s argument that the exercise of liberty over time inevitably disrupts 
patterned theories of distributive justice,1083 Dicey allowed arguendo that somehow a consensus that 
bridged the social and ideological divides in Britain could be reached. A consensus of this sort, 
could, however, only be fleeting and was therefore of little permanent benefit: “such an agreement 
would be as worthless as it would be illusory; for in politics nothing is more certain than that it is 
impossible to predict how political and social forces will adjust themselves under a new 
Constitution.”1084 This mode of theorizing, which relied on imprinting a “stereotype” of the social-
intellectual order of society on the legislature, was utterly unbefitting of political thinkers who 
rejected static notions of society in favor of a (in Dicey’s eyes, true) developmental, evolutionary 
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perspective.1085 This was a powerful persuasive maneuver, since, as noted in earlier chapters, at least 
the more ardent Whigs among the champions of the variegated suffrage were committed to a deeply 
progressive social thought. Dicey delivered the coup de grâce with the claim that, had Whigs genuinely 
adhered to their mirror theory, their greatest legislative achievement, the First Reform Act, would 
have died on the vine: “Had it been deemed requisite to ascertain beforehand what would be the 
exact amount of weight given by the Reform Act to each section of society, Gatton and Old Sarum 
might still be sending up Members to Parliament.”1086 It was a fanciful piece of self-flattery on the 
part of Whigs to ascribe their success in 1832 to the country’s approval of the law as an instrument 
for creating a prospectively accurate image of society; rather, the country had embraced the Reform 
Act for more pedestrian reasons, because, in a time of crisis, it promised to expunge great and 
obvious evils. In short, Dicey was not only convinced that in modern, diverse, progressive nations, 
consensus on the image of society that was to be transplanted into the legislature was improbable; he 
was also convinced that even if one could suspend disbelief and conceive of this improbability being 
momentarily overcome, the consensus reached would shortly become outdated and, hence, an unfit 
basis for representative government.1087 
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discussions of descriptive representation was absent, although the resistance to “stereotyping the social” expressed here 
does come close. For instances in the modern literature, see e.g. Phillips, The Politics of Presence, 55, 106; Jane Mansbridge, 
“Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women?,” 638. Robert Paul Wolff’s argument that postwar 
American pluralism imprinted a “frozen” picture of society on political discourse is really no more than an expansion of 
Dicey’s concern beyond the electoral-parliamentary sphere; Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance,” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), 41-7. 
 
1086 Ibid., 77. Gatton and Old Sarum were two of the most notorious rotten boroughs of the unreformed parliament. 
 
1087 A temporal aspect entered into Dicey’s article in another way. In keeping with the historical bent of his inquiry into 
the success of toleration in England, Dicey could not refrain from injecting a remark on the broad sweep of British 
history. If the sociological premises on which a representative scheme for mirroring discrete elements was founded were, 
as a theoretical point, always contestable, they reached a heightened pitch of implausibility in modern society: “In a 
society such as that of the Middle Ages, where marked orders existed, representation by orders, with all its disadvantages, 
arose, as it were naturally, from the surrounding condition of civilization. In a society like that of modern England it is 
difficult to find the orders on which laboriously to build a scheme of class representation. Take, for example, a class 
frequently mentioned in political discussions, that of the £10 householders. What, after all, is the real community of view 
or interest, which binds the members of the class together? They are of different politics; they pursue different 
professions; they belong, in many cases, to different religious bodies. Looked at in one point of view, they may be called 
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Dicey’s essay was, by my estimation, the most pointed articulation of the thought that the 
prevailing theory of representation was doomed by the very diversity which it sought to represent 
accurately. But he was not alone in making this critique, even in the Essays.1088 His fellow Essayist 
George C. Brodrick made the same accusation in his own reform writings. “The relative importance 
of these mysterious aggregates [“classes” and “interests”] is ordinarily measured, not by reference to 
any independent standard, such as numbers, wealth, or intelligence, but by the weight which the 
individual writer may be disposed to attribute to each, having regard to what he considers should be 
the predominant influence in Parliament,” Brodrick had written in an 1859 essay.1089 He restated the 
charge in the first chapter of Essays on Reform, there invoking as well the temporal dimension stressed 
by Dicey:  
To know what is a just balance of classes, we must have determined beforehand what degree 
of weight each ought to possess in the State, and have solved most of the problems which it 
is the special function of a reformed Parliament to investigate. Not long ago, it was 
considered a fair distribution of legislative power that a few hundred noblemen should not 
only compose one estate of the realm co-ordinate with the Commons, but should also 
exercise, through relations and nominees, a preponderating influence in the popular branch 
of the Legislature….What appears to a landlord or employer “a just balance of classes,” may 
appear the very reverse to an impartial critic, as well as to a tenant or artizan, especially if it 
has been adjusted on the monstrous supposition that the more numerous a class is, the more 
jealously should it be excluded from the franchise.1090 
 
Brodrick was much readier than Dicey to expose “the self-interest” which, according to him, 
                                                                                                                                                             
a class; looked at in another, they are a disconnected mass of different small classes….Who can say where the upper 
class ends, or where the middle class begins?”; ibid., 81-2. While this historical angle was incidental to Dicey’s main 
critique, in linking the decline of a society of orders to the difficulties of modern political representation he offers a kind 
of preview of the late-twentieth-century revival of liberal theory in France; reflection on the meaning of the end of a 
society of orders is central to the projects of Marcel Gauchet, Claude Lefort, and Pierre Rosanvallon. 
 
1088 Not all of the fellow contributors to the Essays, though, were comfortable with Dicey’s critical line on the mirror 
theory. As was noted in the previous chapter, Bernard Cracroft was a true believer in the traditional mirror theory even 
as he supported Gladstone’s bill to reduce the suffrage in both counties and boroughs. Consequently, in writing about 
the lessons of the Essays as a whole he felt compelled to downplay the severity of Dicey’s attack in a way which 
dramatically distorted the latter’s message; Cracroft, “The Reform Session of 1867,” 162. 
 
1089 Brodrick, “The Principles of Parliamentary Reform,” in Political Studies, 146. 
 
1090 Brodrick, “The Utilitarian Argument against Reform,” in Essays on Reform, 7-8. 
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underlay the espousal of this theory of representation,1091 but like his co-contributor he recognized 
that the more fundamental theoretical problem was the inability to travel from the ideal of a truthful 
reflection of society to an incontrovertible sociology that could serve as a template for electoral 
regulations. All reform proposals that purported to “give to each [of the various elements of which 
the nation is composed] its proportionate weight and influence” and in consequence to actualize 
“that equipoise of conflicting forces which has come to be regarded as the capital problem of 
political dynamics” were guilty of “petitio principii.”1092 
Two Reform Acts later and in an England much closer to electoral democracy, the greatest 
philosopher of Dicey and Brodrick’s generation, Henry Sidgwick, would give their critical argument 
a central place in his own thinking about the suffrage. In the 1890s Sidgwick was certainly among 
the target audience for the revival (championed by Lecky) of the variety of suffrages, one of the 
dwindling contingent of thinkers who remained receptive to the general outlook of a mid-century 
Whig-liberal. Not only was he utterly resistant to admitting “any supposed ‘natural right’” to the 
vote,1093 but he also placed a high value on the epistemic advantages of diversity and retained the 
strong Millian fear of parliamentary tyranny of the majority under a democratic suffrage.1094 
Nevertheless he found the objection from contestability, indeterminacy, and second-order diversity 
insurmountable. Indeed, he generalized the Dicey-Brodrick critique, in a way that they had not 
                                                 
1091 Ibid., 7. 
 
1092 Brodrick, “The Principles of Parliamentary Reform,” 145, 147. 
 
1093 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 377. 
 
1094 “But good legislation is a result more likely to be attained in a representative assembly in which such class-interests 
are fairly balanced, as each class is more open to sound reason and impartial consideration of the common good where 
the interests of others are concerned. For this reason, as we have seen, a widely-extended suffrage involves a danger of a 
different kind: viz. that the ultimate interests of the whole community may be sacrificed to the real or apparent class-
interests of the numerical majority of the electors, either through ignorance or through selfishness and limitation of 
sympathy”; ibid., 389. 
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themselves done, to include all other forms of “electoral inequality,” such as plural voting.1095 Any 
political theory built upon the principle of “due” representation – of giving “due weight” in the 
legislature to each class or group, or to attributes like wealth or intelligence – suffered from its 
inexact and ineluctably controversial character: 
however fully we admit the general considerations above stated, any scheme for applying 
them must necessarily be to a great extent arbitrary: we have no means of determining, with 
any pretence to exactness, how much additional electoral power is due to wealth on 
account of the implication of social with private interests, or how much properly 
corresponds to any available evidence of probable superiority in political judgment.1096 
 
Such theories were doomed by what Sidgwick did not hesitate to call the “impossibility of a 
satisfactory criterion” for making the kinds of finely-tailored adjustments and gradations of the 
suffrage required for their realization.1097  
This lack of a criterion, this internal indeterminacy, had practical consequences. For instance, 
Sidgwick thought that schemes of representation based on such theories were liable, from the 
necessarily disputable and arbitrary-seeming quality of their prescriptions, to have a destabilizing 
impact: “any particular plan of electoral inequality will always present plausible grounds for agitation 
to modify the standards applied: while the interests of classes and parties will always supply strong 
                                                 
1095 Ibid., 391. Similarly, Leslie Stephen felt that the problem of indeterminacy was sufficient ground for the dismissal of 
plural voting: “Of course it is totally impossible to find any proportion whatever” by which to regulate assigning “to the 
wealthy, and exalted, and intellectual people votes to correspond to the force which they ought to have…What Rule of 
Three will answer this question: – If John Smith has one vote, how many should Mr. Mill have?”; Stephen, “Reform,” 
529. 
 Arguments for plural voting tended to, but did not always, appeal to considerations other than those of 
descriptive representativeness, such as the justice of giving greater influence to the educated or the greater stake in 
national prosperity of the propertied. But, as we saw in Harris’s comprehension of plural voting within a sociological 
framework in chapter three, it was perfectly possible to advocate plural voting as simply an alternate means to the locally 
variegated suffrage, or as one instrument among others, for realizing this strong notion of representativeness. (And it 
still is possible so to conceive it – even as committed a modern egalitarian as Charles Beitz is willing to entertain the use 
of methods of plural voting. For him they would serve the “compensatory” purpose of enabling a minority group to gain 
fairer representation; see Beitz, Political Equality, 157-8. In this as in other areas we are not as far from the undemocratic 
Victorians as we might suspect.) For another example of such a scheme, one analyzed at length by Mill, see James 
Lorimer’s Political Progress not Necessarily Democratic and Constitutionalism of the Future. For Mill on Lorimer, see “Recent 
Writers on Reform,” 352-8. 
 
1096 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 391. 
 
1097 Ibid., 392. 
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motives for such agitation.”1098 But it was also a theoretical defect; in current philosophical parlance, 
we might say that Sidgwick criticized such theories for not being action-guiding. The injunction to 
produce a mirror of society or a just balance of classes was valueless because it did not provide rules 
for selecting among the diverse lights in which these phenomena could be reasonably regarded. “In 
considering balance of interests, it must be borne in mind that it is impossible to divide society into 
classes which remain identical and equally distinct for all legislative purposes”: hence it was 
eminently disputable whether the central “conflict of interests” around which the composition of 
the Commons needed to be oriented was that between the “‘agricultural’ [as] opposed to the 
‘manufacturing’ interests,” or that “between manual labourers generally and their employers,” or 
perhaps that between “persons to whom fixed money-payments are due and the rest of the 
community.”1099 As “we pass from one proposed law to another,” Sidgwick observed, “the 
important lines of division are continually changing,” and one of the lessons he drew from this 
fluidity and many-sidedness of political subjects was the foolhardiness of any aspiration to devise in 
advance a set of electoral-parliamentary structures that would reflect the true state of society.1100 A 
mirroring Commons was, to Sidgwick, at base not much more than a myth. The normative 
foundation of parliamentary authority had to lie elsewhere than in its descriptive accuracy. 
 These authors articulated a powerful critique of the mirror-sociological theory of 
representation, but it should be noted that in comparison to this critical project their own defenses 
of the normative superiority of democracy look scanty and suggestive. Indeed, much as this trio 
shared the perception of a theoretical inadequacy underlying the variety-of-suffrages position, it 
cannot be said that they shared a theory of democracy. There are several reasons for this. Sidgwick, 
                                                 
1098 Ibid., 391. 
 
1099 Ibid., 391-2. 
 
1100 Ibid., 392. 
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for one, can only with a great deal of contortion be classified as a democratic theorist, for he 
believed that unqualified adherence to any specific form of government was incompatible with the 
“utilitarian point-of-view.”1101 The most that could be asserted was that while “the general arguments 
for a representative legislature lead prima facie to the inclusion of all sane adults,” in practice these 
reasons were defeasible by a host of factors.1102 This did not mean that there was not much to be 
said for democracy. It did accord with the values of fairness and non-arbitrariness, and thus was not 
liable to provoke “a sense of injustice” in those groups who were excluded or whose impact was 
deliberately constrained1103; democratic electorates, for all their faults, did a “tolerably satisfactory” 
job of electing competent officials1104; and nondemocratic schemes were riddled with theoretical 
dilemmas, the reasoning behind them consistently “less plausible” for a “modern state.”1105 Yet he 
was alarmed by many features of his country’s nascent democracy, such as the tightening grip of 
party, and he was “perfectly happy to have his political-theoretical efforts understood as an attempt 
to marry the virtues of democracy with those of aristocracy.”1106 Sidgwick’s impression that 
nondemocratic applications of the descriptive ideal would be on the losing end when faced with 
democratic objections did not translate into any great keenness for the gains of democracy in his 
lifetime. 
 With Dicey and Brodrick the case is different. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
reconstruct their complete thought about democracy. But it does behoove us to consider one piece 
                                                 
1101 Ibid., 379. This parallels exactly his and Fitzjames Stephen’s criticism (analyzed in chapter two) of the absolute 
conclusions of On Liberty for trespassing the “essential limits of the empirical utilitarian method”; Sidgwick, “Review of 
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” 293. 
 
1102 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 378. 
 
1103 Ibid., 374. 
 
1104 Ibid., 378. 
 
1105 Ibid., 379. 
 
1106 Ibid., 589-603; Bart Schultz, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 591). 
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of their thought, or, rather, one lacuna in their thought. This is that, unlike Sidgwick, they made an 
immediate and essentially unargued leap from the rejection of descriptive representation to the 
acceptance of democracy. Why did they simply assume that the demonstration of the difficulties of 
contestability and arbitrariness that afflicted schemes developed on the traditional mirroring ideal 
amounted to an argument for democracy?1107 After all, in purely theoretical terms a plan for 
appointing a monarch or an assembly via lottery would have been just as immune to the objections 
that they lodged against the programs of variegated suffrage. 
 My responses here will be somewhat speculative, since it is difficult to give a sure 
explanation for the absence of an argument. I think, however, that we can give a few tentative 
answers. First, in equating the rejection of the variety-of-suffrages framework with the embrace of 
democracy, Brodrick and Dicey were in effect taking up the debate where their opponents left it. 
Greg framed the reform issue as a choice between sociological schemes and the “universal suffrage, 
which all deprecate,” and Cole confronted England with the choice between a plan such as his own 
and “the condition of universal suffrage.”1108 If the terms of the public debate were already that 
democracy or a system of variegated suffrage were the only options available, then democrats did 
not need to take on the extra work of showing the correctness of this binary. 
 But there are two other, more substantive reasons for this feature of their thought. The first 
is that they seem to have sided with the social contract tradition rather than with Burke on the 
question of the politically primordial character of majority rule.1109 One can glimpse in Brodrick and 
                                                 
1107 Brodrick, like Dicey, would end his life much disillusioned with the march of British democracy, mostly due to the 
movement for Irish home rule; see Harvie, Lights of Liberalism, ch. 9. 
 
1108 Greg, “Representative Reform [1],” 507; Cole, The Middle Classes and the Borough Franchise, 73. 
 
1109 For Burke’s famous argument about the conventionality and unnaturalness of majority rule, see An Appeal from the 
New to the Old Whigs, in Burke, Further Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. Daniel Ritchie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1992), 164. For the contractarians on the foundational character of majority rule, see Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. Richard 
Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 7, §5 ; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), II §95-6. 
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(especially) Dicey the thought that democracy was simply the default mode of politics, and that 
rather than continue on with what they took to be an “utterly impracticable” series of attempts to 
bring the country into agreement on a “fair constitutional balance,” it was preferable to have 
recourse to the default option.1110 
 The second, and I think more important, reason for their treating it as self-evident that 
refutation of the descriptive ideal meant the triumph of democracy was that their attack on the 
variety-of-suffrages school was, in their minds, more than just a contest of one institutional vision 
against another. It was also something like a defense of the political sphere against encroachments 
on its terrain: 
To divide citizens, therefore, into classes, and to marshal them according to their 
comparative claims to power, simple as it seems, is to undertake the responsibility of 
deciding beforehand in what proportions the great political jury is to be packed, and thereby 
virtually to anticipate their verdict.1111 
 
Inherent in the accusation of arbitrariness was the worry that implementing one of this slew of 
mirroring schemes would prevent decisions about the nation’s trajectory from being made in a truly 
collective manner. However “captivated” many of his contemporaries were “by the idea of 
Parliament being a mirror of the nation,” that theory rested on the unacceptably apolitical 
“assumption that theorists can sketch out the future of the nation.”1112 Perhaps the best (though a 
somewhat anachronistic) way to put it is that, for Dicey and Brodrick, democracy was envisioned as 
a way of moving the scene of the action from the sociological to the political. The representative 
system was no longer to be thought of as an arena for addressing the questions, “What does society 
                                                 
1110 It is worth noting explicitly that, in contrast to much recent Anglophone democratic theory, Dicey and Brodrick 
were operating with a minimalist notion of democracy. For Dicey, democracy consisted of the acceptance of two simple 
premises: first, that the equal treatment of “persons,” rather than a weighing of classes, ought to be the building block of 
political representation; second, that, if “supremacy” has to reside somewhere for political life to exist, the least 
objectionable and controversial place to locate it was in the “majority.” 
 
1111 Brodrick, “Principles of Parliamentary Reform,” 146. 
 
1112 Dicey, “Balance of Classes,” 84. 
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look like? How do we weigh its various elements? What is the shape of public opinion?,” but rather 
as a set of structures that enabled citizens to come to an authoritative collective decision about what 
they as a nation wanted, about the direction in which the country should head. In championing 
democracy, they believed that they were championing a true political process against the 
deformations of politics that had prevailed in the recent history of Britain. 
 Before concluding this section, a final word ought to be said about this line of Victorian 
democratic theory. In the critiques of the mirror theory of representation by Dicey, Brodrick, and 
Sidgwick there is observable a phenomenon familiar in the history of political thought: if extremes 
did not quite meet here, they certainly approached one another. For both these democrats and the 
Tories who had opposed the First Reform Act shared a strong sense of the arbitrariness of projects 
to “reform” parliament without inaugurating “democracy.”1113 But while for democrats of the 
second half of the century this arbitrariness was a philosophical defect, a proof of the inadequacy of 
the underlying theory to provide a normative foundation for representative government, for Tories 
of the first half this arbitrariness was not so much a philosophical as a practical problem. The former 
group claimed that the incoherence and indeterminacy of the sociological ideal proved a democratic 
suffrage to be the only theoretically-sound basis on which a modern parliament could rest; the latter 
group predicted that, if the suffrage were treated not as a near-infallible and undesigned product of 
national history and tradition but as an object of policy which could be revised to suit discrepant 
political agendas and social viewpoints, then this change of political outlook would lead inevitably to 
democracy. A crucial plank of the anti-reform Tory platform was that “the Whigs were opening a 
door that could not be shut,” that “the least modicum of reform” would bring “ultimate democratic 
consequences” and “open the floodgates to democracy.”1114 Whigs denied any such unavoidably 
                                                 
1113 For more on the rhetoric of these plans, see Saunders, “Democracy,” 143, 151-2. 
 
1114 Pole, Political Representation in England, 498; Southgate, The Passing of the Whigs, 16. See also Gash, Politics in the Age of 
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democratic telos implicit in their policy of reform, and they did so, as we have seen, for a compelling 
reason: namely, because they denied any necessary connection, practical or conceptual, between 
representative government rightly understood as anchored in descriptive representativeness and the 
democratic franchise.  
This was one of the central axes of the Tory-Whig struggle leading up to 1832. Whigs argued 
that in amending the traditional electoral map to bring the Commons into accord with the recent 
preeminence of the middle class, they were engaged in an improvement of the representative 
dimension of the British Constitution in response to objective social facts about the disaccord 
between parliament and the public at-large. Tories replied that piercing the armor of the organic 
perfection of the Constitution would leave any non-democratic electoral arrangements constantly 
exposed to the charge of arbitrariness regarding the limits of the suffrage they erected, whatever they 
might be. In 1831 our prolific Tory Archibald Alison pronounced it fantastical of Reform Whigs to 
imagine that they could articulate “grounds of justice,” acceptable to those who would be left 
unenfranchised, for the boundaries of the suffrage which they intended to draw.1115 To the Tory 
mind, the resistance to reform measures guided by a descriptive ideal was not so much that they were, 
in the theoretical sense, arbitrary, but that they could not help but look arbitrary and thereby serve as 
“a stimulus to further agitation” that would put Britain “on the highway to universal suffrage.”1116 
From this perspective, the critiques of Dicey, Brodrick, and Sidgwick were the inevitable theoretical 
expressions of the psychology of discontent with the electoral system which Tories predicted would 
prevail, and prevail with good reason, in the aftermath of 1832. Hence the unreformed Tory was the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Peel, ch. 1. A classic statement of this view is Peel’s speech of 3 Mar. 1831, cited at ch. 3, note 507. 
 Tocqueville saw the issue in the same light: that tampering with suffrage rights would inevitably lead to 
electoral democracy was “one of the most invariable” of the “rules that govern societies”; Democracy in America, vol. 1, 64. 
And see above, ch. 3, note 616. 
 
1115 Alison, “The Reform Bill,” 43. 
 
1116 Aytoun, “Reform Measures,” 373. 
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ideological neighbor, and almost the ally, of a certain style of Victorian democrat, for they both 
resisted the endeavor to remake parliament in the hope of perfecting its sociological reflectiveness. 
 
Conclusion 
Chapters four and five of this dissertation revealed the power of the mirror theory of 
representation and its institutional complement, the variety of suffrages, directly by showing the 
amount of energy which went into their elaboration. This chapter reveals their appeal indirectly, but 
no less strongly. Advocates of democracy in the decades of the great debates which culminated in 
the expansions of the suffrage of 1867 and 1884 combatted not simply the self-interested ideologies 
of oligarchs or the traditionalist reverence for the ancient constitution transmitted across generations 
of Britons. Instead, they had to contend with a school of thought about representation whose liberal, 
representative, and deliberative credentials were formidable. In this setting, it was an urgent task for 
democrats to arrive at an understanding of the relationship between the widely-extended franchise 
which they preferred and the vision of representation which animated so much of the political 
philosophy and institutional design of the mid-Victorian period. 
 To the extent that Victorian democratic theory was forged against the variety-of-suffrages 
position, it faced the burden of overturning the widespread sense that this rival institutional scheme 
was the appropriate response to the social and ideological diversity which was such a preoccupation 
of the age. This effort involved taking one of the two paths surveyed above. The first path, followed 
by those who felt it imperative to prove that the values of diversity and deliberation were on their 
side, was to argue that a democratic suffrage was consistent with – or, on the stronger versions of 
the claim, that it was the only institutional arrangement capable of realizing – the ideal of descriptive 
representation. The second was to show that the diversity which characterized modern Britain 
rendered arbitrary any particular instantiation of this ideal, and therefore that a widely-extended 
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suffrage was the fairest mode of electoral regulation. 
 Thus two distinct paradigms of democratic theory arose in reaction to the variety-of-
suffrages model. One camp believed in democracy as an extension of the mirror theory which had 
inspired the theory of the variety of suffrages; the other viewed democracy as an alternative that was 
in fundamental conflict with the descriptive ideal. The former descended onto the terrain of 
sociology, and rested its case heavily on an empirical-causal analysis. The latter remained in the realm 
of theory, and indeed denied the relevance and normative desirability of bringing any sociological 
claims or criteria into the domain of political representation. 
 Interestingly, neither of these schools of Victorian democrats is well represented in 
contemporary democratic theory. While deliberative democracy has taken a more “institutional turn” 
of late,1117 today’s theoretical landscape still remains far from the first strand of Victorian democracy 
outlined in this chapter. The conviction of a Houghton or Kinnear that the justifiability of 
democracy rested on a fine-grained set of empirical hypotheses – about the distribution of beliefs, 
the attitudes of different demographics toward the promulgation of new ideas, the character of the 
British demos, the effect of political inclusion on the beliefs of citizens – is foreign to the practice of 
much democratic theory today. To state the issue differently: in the Victorian era a democratic 
suffrage was the endpoint of deliberative-democratic argument, which involved a great deal of what 
we would now call social-scientific legwork; whereas today a democratic suffrage is often simply an 
assumption of the theory. Only thoroughgoing epistemic democrats occupy a position parallel to that 
of the diverse democrats of this chapter’s first section. Just as epistemic democrats seek to justify 
democracy before an independent criterion of correctness, so our first group of Victorian democrats 
sought to vindicate the practical operation of democratic electoral institutions in light of norms of 
                                                 
1117 See e.g. the essays in Designing Deliberative Democracy, eds. Warren and Pearse; Dennis Thompson, “Deliberative 
Democratic Theory and Empirical Research, Annual Review of Political Science vol. 11 (2008): 497-520; Archon Fung, 
“Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences,” Journal of Poltiical Philosophy, 
vol. 11, no. 3 (2003): 338-367. 
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deliberation and representativeness that possessed a venerable nondemocratic lineage. In particular, 
deliberative democrats at the present moment frequently bypass what was the very onus of the 
argument for democracy in their Victorian forbears: namely, that universal suffrage in equal electoral 
districts could actually function in accordance with the standards of deliberation. 
 The second, anti-descriptivist camp of Victorian democrats would, I suspect, be even more 
marginal within contemporary democratic theory. As the current resurgence in descriptive 
representation indicates, a large swathe of political theory today does not share the Dicey-Sidgwick 
perspective that the commitment to democracy involves refraining from offering judgments about 
what the composition of the legislature – or other salient political institutions – should be; to put the 
point in nineteenth-century parlance, the intuitions about representation of many political theorists 
today are as much “Whig” as “democrat.” For although the characteristics which are thought salient 
from the standpoint of representation have shifted – we currently speak more of gender, racial, and 
ethnic categories than of class or “interest” as the focus of efforts to make politics more 
descriptively accurate – the structure of the thought is the same: that it is possible for the political 
thinker to give an account of the appropriate makeup of a legislature or similar body in isolation 
from the outcome of democratic elections. If the modern democratic theorist is comfortable 
stipulating that, say, the membership of Congress conform to her notion of a faithful reflection of 
society, the most radical branch of Victorian democracy was decidedly not. Indeed, to the Diceyan 
wing of the nineteenth-century democratic movement, this impulse was precisely what they thought 
they were resisting. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Diversity with Democracy? The Invention of Proportional Representation 
and the Tradition of Representative Government 
 
 In 1914, more than four decades after entering the parliamentary reform fray on behalf of a 
democratized suffrage and now indisputably England’s most venerable authority on the 
Constitution, Dicey wrote in unflattering terms of the condition of political thought in his lifetime: 
In no part of English history is the tardy development of new constitutional ideas more 
noteworthy or more paradoxical than during the whole Victorian era (1837 to 1901). It was 
an age full of intellectual activity and achievement…but it was an age which added little to 
the world’s scanty store of political or constitutional ideas.1118 
 
This appraisal was tendentious, to say the least, and stemmed more from the disillusionment with 
democracy and the Liberal party that dominated the last three decades of his life than from a 
disinterested survey of the history of ideas.1119 In light of the past two chapters, however, there 
might appear to be some truth to his claim: despite the many new theoretical developments to which 
they had been subject, neither the variety of suffrages vision – which was anchored in the long 
historical legacy of the British electoral system – nor the idea of a widely extended suffrage tout 
simplement – which after all had American, French, and even (depending on one’s view of the 
“ancient Constitution”) British antecedents – could easily meet Dicey’s curmudgeonly baseline of 
truly “original” ideas. 
 The trouble for Dicey was that, even within the confines of the new introduction he had 
                                                 
★ A word on terminology is needed at the outset of this chapter. In political science a contrast is typically drawn 
between PR and “first-past-the-post” systems. However, this latter term is not strictly apposite to the British case before 
the Third Reform Act of 1884 which established single-member districts as the rule (more on this later). For the most 
part what had historically obtained would be better called a “first-and-second-past-the-post” system, since most 
constituencies had dual-membership. These were also not, strictly speaking, “majoritarian” electoral arrangements, since 
the candidates did not need to reach a 50% vote threshold to be elected. The best term to designate the British system in 
contrast to the proportionalist alternatives discussed here is therefore the most generic one: “plurality-rule.” I will try to 
use this term throughout, though the others mentioned may slip in from time to time; what is important, though, is to 
bear in mind that the fundamental dichotomy in this chapter is that between PR and plurality-rule. 
 
1118 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, eighth edition (London: Macmillan, 1915), lix. 
 
1119 See e.g. Ian Christopher Fletcher, “‘This Zeal for Lawlessness’: A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, and the 
Challenge of Popular Politics,” Parliamentary History, vol. 16, no. 3 (1997): 309-29. 
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written for the eighth edition of his textbook on constitutional law, he ran up against a vision of 
representation and electoral structure that was, by any measure, a notable innovation of the 
Victorian era.1120 For in addition to the sociological-engineering efforts of the schemes for a variety 
of suffrages and the schools of democrats outlined in the preceding chapters, Victorian political 
theory featured a third school of thought on representation which was oriented around the values of 
diversity, deliberation, descriptive representation, and inclusiveness. This was the theory of personal 
or proportional representation developed by Thomas Hare. In support of and reaction against 
Hare’s work emerged the most sophisticated set of reflections on representation in the latter third of 
the nineteenth century. Hare’s theory, and the movement that emerged around it, are the subject of 
this chapter. 
 Dicey’s downplaying of the originality of PR was motivated in part by his opposition to it – 
proponents of the scheme like Mill were more likely to herald it as a “great discovery.”1121 Yet his 
failure to grant proper recognition of the place of PR in the history of British politics and political 
theory is indicative of larger trends that have continued to this day. Indeed, in British-centric 
scholarship PR has, oddly, been a victim of both its success and its failure. On the first front, the 
implementation of PR throughout Europe and beyond (a process which was already well underway 
when Dicey was writing1122) has made historians and political scientists less attuned to its British 
pedigree. On the second front, the failure of the movement for PR in Britain naturally inclines us to 
                                                 
1120 For Dicey’s analysis of proportional representation, see Law of the Constitution, lxvi-lxxiii. 
 
1121 Mill, Letter to Thomas Hare, 19 Dec. 1859, in CW, vol. 25, 653. 
 
1122 “By 1920 Britain was the only democratic country in Western Europe not to have adopted some form of PR”; Peter 
Hain, Proportional Misrepresentation (Hants: Wildwood House, 1986), 4. On the history of the adoption of PR, see e.g. 
Andrew Carstairs, A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980); Arend 
Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984). On the 
classification of PR systems across the globe, see Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-
Six Countries, second edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), ch. 8. 
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imagine that it left less of a mark on British political theory than in fact it did.1123 Yet PR was a major 
theme of mid- and especially late-nineteenth-century British politics and political theory, and an 
understanding of the development of the theory of representation and parliamentary government 
demands that the ideas animating the Victorian controversy about PR be taken seriously. 
 Given its status as at once the innovation of the Victorian era most consequential to the 
conduct of modern representative politics and an understudied aspect of the political theory of the 
time, there are naturally many possible topics to take up. My inquiry here will be limited in various 
ways. First, I try to steer clear of simply recapitulating dominant themes in the contemporary 
political science literature on comparative electoral systems. Second, while a great deal of 
institutional nuance will be required, this chapter does not consider the formidable technical minutae 
of PR such as the respective merits of the Hare, Droop, and Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas, nor does it 
enter into comparison of the many possible schemes of PR except where such comparison bears 
directly on our central themes.1124 Third, although it is of course difficult to draw a hard-and-fast line 
between party motivations and theoretical claims, I try to ignore simple partisan calculation about 
PR.1125 Fourth, and related to this last point, I am not giving a narrative history of the movement for 
                                                 
1123 Even rich and intellectually-informed histories of British politics in the mid- and late-Victorian periods often neglect 
PR entirely; see e.g. R.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936) or, more recently, Angus 
Hawkins’s excellent Victorian Political Culture, ‘Habits of Heart and Mind’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). And see 
Floyd Parsons’s remarks in the conclusion to his Thomas Hare and Political Representation, 186. 
We should note, though, that even within the UK this failure is far from complete. Beyond the use of the 
limited vote (the credentials of which as a form of PR will come up later in this chapter) in three-cornered constituencies 
from 1867-84, Northern Ireland has used the Single Transferable Vote at various periods and still uses it for some local 
elections as well as for elections to the European Parliament, and STV was utilized for university seats for the House of 
Commons from 1918-45; see Pippa Norris, “The Politics of Electoral Reform in Britain,” International Political Science 
Review, vol. 16, no. 1 (1995): 65-78. 
 
1124 For excellent analyses in this vein, see Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1958), esp. chs. 10-1, 18-20; Enid Lakeman, How Democracies Vote, esp. chs. 4-7; Michael Gallagher, 
“Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes, and Majorities,” British 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 22, no. 4 (1992): 469-96; Kenneth Benoit, “Which Electoral Formula Is the Most 
Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence,” Political Analysis, vol. 8, no. 4 (2000): 381-8. 
 
1125 As political fortunes ebbed and flowed and the tide of events changed, STV was adopted and in turn disavowed by 
different parties across the spectrum from motives of partisan calculation; see Jenifer Hart Proportional Representation: 
Critics of the British Electoral System 1820-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), passim. As with the variety of suffrages, 
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PR in Britain1126; instead, while I will highlight some significant dates and attend where necessary to 
intellectual shifts over time, this is a conceptual and theoretical analysis that treats PR over the mid- 
and late-Victorian period as a relatively integral body of thought in contention with the other ideals 
of representation that we have so far discussed. (On this last point it is worth noting that this 
chapter extends further chronologically than the previous two, running more or less through the 
first decade-and-a-half of the twentieth century.1127 With regard to PR, the Victorian era extends into 
the Edwardian one: there was, in my view, a fairly cohesive set of references and arguments from 
Hare’s major works until the First World War.1128) 
 The goal of this chapter is to consider the conceptual and institutional core of the Victorian 
theory of PR in light of the schools of thought on representation examined so far. In other words, it 
asks what kind of theory we should understand PR to be: an updated variant of an older, 
nondemocratic theory of mirroring; a subset of one of the democratic outlooks in the previous 
                                                                                                                                                             
PR was not the province of any one party. Unlike with the former, though, the question of whether PR was partisan in 
some direction or was neutral with respect to the distribution of parties itself (a question which is still with us today) was 
broached at a high theoretical level. 
 
1126 The historiography on the subject is far from extensive, but see Hart, Proportional Representation and Parsons, Thomas 
Hare and Political Representation. I have benefitted a great deal from both of these works. 
 
1127 The period around World War One was the high tide for PR’s chances in the United Kingdom. In 1914 the Home 
Rule Bill included the single transferable vote for the Irish Senate and for some seats in the Irish Commons, though 
implementation of the law was suspended due to the outbreak of the war; upon gaining its independence, however, 
Ireland instituted STV. And in 1917 the Speaker’s Conference on Electoral Reform recommended STV for around a 
third of the Commons, but the Representation of the People Act 1918, which established universal male suffrage and a 
measure of woman’s suffrage, established it only for the university seats. See Hart, Proportional Representation, 176; 
Clarence Hoag and George Hallett, Proportional Representation (New York: Macmillan, 1926), 253. 
 
1128 Chronologically, therefore, I am closer to Pippa Norris than to Floyd Parsons, as the former sees a “first wave” of 
PR-based reform roughly coextensive with what I have outlined here, whereas Parsons believes there is a quite sharp 
break after the collapse of the original Proportional Representation Society in 1888. See Norris, “The Politics of 
Electoral Reform,” 69-71; Parsons, Thomas Hare and Political Representation, ch. 6. 
 Interestingly, there is something of a time-lag between the seminal theoretical texts of Victorian PR and the 
peak power of PR as a political movement. This is evidenced in the judgment of political scientist Herman Finer, that it 
was from the late-1870s or early -80s that PR had “received continuous and organised advocacy,” even though in that 
time a “harmonious piece of political philosophy” on the topic was lacking; see Finer, Fabian Tract No. 211: The Case 
Against Proportional Representation (Westminster: Fabian Society, 1924), 3. As we will see, Finer certainly overstated the 
point – there were many theoretically rich treatments of PR, including some hefty tomes, during the period he indicated 
– but it is true that the height of PR agitation did not correspond with the appearance of the greatest texts on the 
subject, those of Hare and Mill, which had come earlier. 
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chapter; or a novel sui generis vision of representative institutions? This is, it should be said, only one 
direction from which PR can be approached, and I will analyze the multi-faceted debate surrounding 
the “moral” impact and practical consequences of PR in a companion chapter. 
 Before investigating the nuts-and-bolts of PR, it will be useful to familiarize ourselves with a 
few developments in institutional design that helped to lay the groundwork for Hare. 
 
1) The Pre-History of PR in Britain 
 1859 was a landmark year for John Stuart Mill. This was the year in which one of the final 
and most important “modifications” of his “practical political creed,” which had been in an evolving 
state for “many years,” fell into place.1129 It was the year of On Liberty’s appearance. It is also the year 
in which this chapter’s story truly begins, and for the same reason – it saw the publication of the first 
edition of Thomas Hare’s A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal.1130 
 With Hare’s book – and, even more, Mill’s enthusiastic advocacy of it once it had caught his 
eye – the debate on PR in Britain begins in earnest and takes on many of the characteristic features 
that it still maintains up to the present, such as the distinctive focus on the single transferable vote as 
the preferred proportionalist method.1131 Proportional representation, however, did not commence 
in the late 1850s, and, depending on how one classifies certain authors, glimmers of the theory of 
proportional representation had both an American and Continental history anterior to Hare.1132 
Indeed, not even the single transferable vote was original to Hare, although Hare was unaware of his 
                                                 
1129 Mill, Autobiography, 201. 
 
1130 This text was not his first elaboration of his scheme; in 1857 he had released two editions of a much shorter work, 
The Machinery of Representation (both at London: W. Maxwell). 
 
1131 STV has been called the “‘Anglo-Saxon’ method of securing proportional representation;” see e.g. Vernon 
Bogdanor, What Is Proportional Representation? (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1984), 76.  
 
1132 The first list system of PR was elaborated by the French Fourierist Victor Considérant; see e.g. Rosanvallon, Le peuple 
introuvable, ch. 4; Hart, Proportional Representation, ch. 1. The issue of how to categorize some of these early writings in the 
French context is touched on again below in note 1279. 
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antecedent at the time of formulating his scheme.1133 While we will leave the international dimension 
of PR’s development aside, there was also a pre-history of PR in Britain, and something of this 
needs to be known not only for historiographical but also for conceptual purposes. 
 Beyond a common set of norms based in inclusiveness and deliberation, the variety-of-
suffrages authors and the descriptivist democrats of our previous chapters were united by a 
particular vision of the relationship between the composition of the assembly and the constituency. 
While, as we saw, these figures could be remarkably imaginative with regard to the construction of 
constituencies, they remained tied to tradition in an important respect. This was that the accurate 
translation of social diversity which they sought was to emerge entirely from the interplay between 
constituencies. Diversity was transferred into the assembly because constituencies were unalike in 
relevant ways (suffrage rules, size, demographic distribution, ideological and socioeconomic factors). 
Thus, while what were essentially minority groups were able to place their spokesman in the 
Commons – the shipping interest, say, being represented via the borough of Whitby, or the Catholic 
interest via Arundel1134 – no minorities as such were represented.1135 Instead, minorities entered the 
assembly in virtue of constituting the majority at some point(s) on the electoral map; the variegated 
suffrage was therefore an exemplification of the practice of majority-minority districting elevated to 
a very high degree of sociological nuance and sophistication. What the variety-of-suffrages and 
descriptivist-democratic traditions lacked was an attempt to give representation to minorities as they 
                                                 
1133 Earlier in the decade, the Danish Minister of Finance Carl Christopher Georg Andrae had conceived a system of 
single transferable vote which was actually applied (though only briefly) for elections to the Danish Upper House; see 
e.g. Poul Andrae, Andrae and His Invention: The Proportional Representation Method, A Memorial Work, trans. Vaughn Meisling 
(Copenhagen, 1926); Salem Dutcher, Minority or Proportional Representation: Its Nature, Aims, History, Processes, and Practical 
Operation (New York: United States Publishing Company, 1872), 111. 
 
1134 Hawkins, Victorian Political Culture, 92; Parsons, “Ignis Fatuus vs. Pons Asinorum: William Gladstone and Proportional 
Representation, 1867-1885,” Parliamentary History, vol. 31, no. 3 (2002): 374-385, at 376. Arundel remained a proprietary 
borough of the Duke of Norfolk, head of the most powerful British Roman Catholic family, even after the First Reform 
Act. 
 
1135 As we will see in what follows, due to the multi-member nature of constituencies the situation was actually 
somewhat murkier and more complicated. 
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existed within the constituency. Put another way, to these writers the accurate reflection of society arose 
out of an assortment of discrete constituencies treated integrally; the diversity that obtained internal to 
the constituency was not a direct object of parliamentary inclusion. 
 While, as we will see later, it is a contested question whether PR should be understood as a 
form of “minority representation,”1136 before Hare’s innovations there had already appeared 
proposals under this label which had made the significant move of turning to the inside of the 
constituency, as it were, in the interest of securing the Commons’s fair reflection of diversity. 
The shift beyond or beneath the notion of the representative order as a simple concatenation 
of independent constituencies was facilitated by an important fact about the English electoral 
system, one which has been touched on intermittently heretofore but not homed in on at length: 
namely, that the English constituency had historically been a multi-member one, with two-member 
constituencies obtaining almost universally before 1832, at which point they were accompanied by a 
growth in three-member constituencies that held during the classical age of British mid-century 
parliamentarism. These constituencies had always been regulated on what is now known as the 
“block vote,” that is, each voter possessed one vote for each seat to be filled in his constituency (two 
in two-membered, three in three-membered, and so on).1137 The block vote has come to be regarded 
as the electoral system with the greatest potential for “distortion” in representation as conceived 
from the modern perspective on proportionality as each party receiving seats in the assembly in an 
exact ratio to the percentage of the overall vote that it received. (How this modern perspective 
                                                 
1136 Hare, for one, disavowed the label “minority representation”; see e.g. Hare, The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary 
and Municipal: A Treatise, third edition (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865), 19; “Individual 
Responsibility in Representative Government,” vol. 4, no. 21 (1886): 350-8, at 350. Interestingly, his Danish counterpart 
Andrae was also firmly opposed to this term; Andrae, Andrae and His Invention, 27, 111. 
 Unless otherwise noted, references to the Election of Representatives will be to the third edition; it is, in my 
opinion, the clearest and best-written of the four editions, and there is not much substantive change between it and the 
final edition. Parsons charts the modifications the text received over its several iterations in his monograph. 
 
1137 See e.g. Michael Steed, “The Evolution of the British Electoral System,” in Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform, ed. 
S.E. Finer (London: Anthony Wigram, 1975), 35-54, at 36. This predominance of dual membership had descended from 
the conventional mandate for counties to return two knights of the shire and boroughs to return two burgesses. The 
block vote is also commonly referred to as scrutin de liste, though this latter term was inconsistently applied by Victorians.  
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developed is, of course, one of the themes of this chapter.) The potential for distortion in this sense 
was increasingly recognized as the century wore on; typically for the English, however, this 
recognition owed much to their perception of the failures of this system on the Continent (esp. in 
Belgium, Switzerland, and naturally France),1138 as well as to a sense of the oddity that the principle of 
the block vote, if detached from the English system of a multiplicity of different districts suitably 
distributed to capture “the varied interests, opinions, and feelings of the entire community,” could 
yield outcomes that were strikingly unrepresentative by just about any measure, such as in a case 
where an entire country was defined as a single constituency and the contending parties were well-
organized enough to furnish tickets containing enough representatives to fill every seat which could 
be voted for wholesale.1139 Yet, for most of the century, these worries could be set aside as 
speculative and, indeed, irrelevant even from a theoretical point-of-view: the block vote in multi-
member districts did not conflict, even in principle, with the conventional view of the mirroring 
Commons, since the descriptive attributes of the system operated at the inter-constituency level; 
moreover, the variety-of-suffragist of the first two-thirds of the century was not especially concerned 
with parties as the object of descriptive attention, but rather with, as we have seen, some variation of 
“classes, interests, and opinions.” 
Taking minorities in a strictly electoral sense, then, there was nothing intrinsically minority-
friendly about the traditional British electoral system. Yet the multi-member character of these 
districts facilitated experimental thinking about the possibility of transmitting divisions internal to 
                                                 
1138 See e.g. Nassau Senior, “Lewis on Authority in Matters of Opinion,” Edinburgh Review, vol. 91, no. 184 (Apr. 1850): 
508-58, at 545; Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” The Nineteenth Century, vol. 16, no. 94 (Dec. 
1884): 935-64, at 943-6. See also Carstairs, Short History of Electoral Systems, 12, 50-2, 138-40. It was in reaction to the 
perceived distortive, monopolistic character of the block vote that the United States banned multi-member districts for 
congressional elections in 1842; see e.g. Joseph Colomer, “On the Origins of Electoral Systems and Political Parties: The 
Role of Elections in Multi-Member Dstricts,” Electoral Studies, vol. 26, no. 2 (2007): 262-273. 
 
1139 See e.g. Lewis, “Marshall on Minorities,” 227. Lewis used the thought-experiment of an assembly that was 
unanimously Protestant and composed entirely of members of one class (“landlords against tenants, capitalists against 
workmen”) to illustrate the strangeness of a national system in which scrutin de liste applied. 
 349 
 
the constituency into the Commons.1140 Two such proposals are of particular import, both for the 
historical trajectory of PR and for ascertaining wherein exactly the distinctiveness of PR lies.  
One of these – the later to be invented, but the less consequential for our purposes – is the 
cumulative vote. First systematically laid out a half-decade before Hare’s scheme by James Garth 
Marshall, a former Liberal MP, the cumulative vote was “a system of voting where each elector in a 
constituency having as many votes as there are representatives to be elected in his county or 
borough, and distributing his votes as he pleases, may at his option give one vote to each candidate, 
or accumulate the whole number of his votes in favour of one candidate.”1141 Marshall desired three-
member constituencies (although it is not clear if he settled on them simply for reasons of 
practicality; in any case he does not appear to have contemplated constituencies of more than four 
members1142); on his plan, the voter in a tri-cornered constituency could give his three votes in any 
(whole-number) portions which he desired, rather than being bound to give no more than one vote 
per candidate. The cumulative vote was centrally, therefore, a proposal to increase flexibility in the 
distribution of the traditional multiplicity of votes at the electors’ disposal; its mirroring aims, which 
                                                 
1140 Despite the increasingly firm conviction as the century passed of the anti-minoritarian impact of this system, it was 
possible to view the bare fact of multi-member districting, even with the block vote, as conducive to a kind of minority 
or descriptive representation, at least when certain conditions obtained (such as the absence of centralized, nationalized 
parties and the persistence of a kind of premodern political culture in which the return of members resulted largely from 
the negotiation of local rivalries and loyalties; see e.g. Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, ch. 9; Philip Salmon, “The English 
Reform Legislation,” in The History of Parliament, vol. 1: The House of Commons, 1820-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 374-412, at 383. In this vein it could also be argued that, though multiple membership en tant que 
tel had no special property of minority-inclusiveness, if one assigned the right number per constituency then any ill 
effects which the block vote might in theory possess would be avoided. It was this line of argument which the great 
economist Nassau Senior took up in favor of the extension of three-cornered constituencies as the bedrock of further 
reform, his thinking being that while local majorities were cohesive and organized enough to monopolize a double-
member district, they were not sufficiently so to prevent any minority of real significance from claiming that third 
member: only “a very weak or very negligent” minority would fail to “carry[] one” of the three members and thus 
“secur[e] a fair hearing”; Senior, “Lewis on Authority,” 546. Three-and-a-half decades on, the Liberal journalist and MP 
Edward Russell would offer a similar defense of the block vote, although, in deference to the growth of disciplined 
parties, he set the number of members per district which would be resistant to dominance by the party of the local 
majority at six; Russell, “The Electoral Future,” Contemporary Review, vol. 47, no. 2 (Feb. 1885): 250-65, 252-3. 
 
1141 Marshall, Minorities and Majorities: Their Relative Rights (London: James Ridgway, 1853), 13-4. 
 
1142 Ibid., 22, 29-36. 
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were central to Marshall’s project,1143 were achieved by the removal of a formal constraint on the 
elector.1144 With this greater freedom came another benefit, one which Marshall rightfully highlighted 
as a distinctive “practical advantage” of his plan over rival (broadly construed) “descriptive” reforms 
– namely, that it enabled the elector to express in a clear way the intensity and not merely the fact of 
his preference for a candidate.1145 The cumulative vote was not without supporters of some 
prominence, with the aforementioned Third Earl Grey and (for a short time) John Stuart Mill 
among them, and it was implemented in a few places, including in Illinois (from 1870-1980) and in 
South Africa (the latter due to Grey’s work as Colonial Secretary).1146 On the whole, however, it was 
not an especially impactful player at the level of parliamentary reform. 
The second, earlier but more influential proposal was the limited vote, by which the elector 
in a multi-member district was restricted to fewer votes than the number of representatives to be 
returned. Classically, in the British context, this meant assigning two votes per elector in three-
                                                 
1143 Ibid., 5-8. 
 
1144 It should be noted that the bare fact of possessing two votes but not being compelled to use them both already granted a 
greater measure of freedom to the elector than exists in single-member constituencies; the British elector had always 
been free to “plump” (that is, use only one of his two votes) for a candidate to whom he wanted to show a special 
degree of support; see e.g. Hawkins, Victorian Political Culture, 212. 
1145 Marshall, Minorities and Majorities, 13-4. It was this “expressive” value which, he claimed, made his scheme superior to 
the “single vote” (what is now normally known as the “single non-transferable vote,” or SNTV), by which an elector in a 
multi-member (or even a single national) constituency would be allotted only one vote; the latter was, he admitted, “the 
same…in giving a justly proportioned weight to the opinions both of minorities and of majorities”; ibid., 12-3. 
 This expressive, intensity-conveying value, it should be said, only obtains if voters display a wide range of 
behavior in distributing their votes; if, however, it becomes the norm for voters to give all of their votes to their first-
choice candidate, then this characteristic of the scheme vanishes and it becomes basically identical to the SNTV. It was 
on this ground that Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (better known as “Lewis Carroll”) rejected the cumulative vote: “The 
method of ‘cumulative voting’ will usually have no other effect than to increase the ‘specific gravity’ – so to speak—of a 
vote. Let each Elector have 4 votes, with permission to ‘lump’ them if he chooses, and in the end you will find most of 
the votes given in lumps of 4, and the result much the same as if each Elector had had one vote only. The conclusion is 
that the important point is to let each Elector give one vote only”; Dodgson, The Principles of Parliamentary Representation, in 
The Pamphlets of Lewis Carroll, Volume Three: The Political Pamphlets and Letters of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (New York: Lewis 
Carroll Society of North America, 2001), 27. 
 
1146 Grey, Parliamentary Government, 206-7; Coull, “The Third Earl Grey and Parliamentary Reform,” 14; John H. 
Humphreys, Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election (London: Methuen 1911), 69. Lecky favored the 
cumulative vote as a method by which hereditary peers would select representative peers as part of his plan to reform 
the Lords; Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. 1, 461. It was also used for school board elections in England for a time. It 
was also used for school board elections between 1870 and 1902 in England. 
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cornered constituencies, or occasionally three in four-member constituencies.1147 More significant in 
the history of the Commons than the cumulative vote, Lord John Russell in his failed 1854 reform 
bill pushed for its application in forty-six districts, and he supported the amendment which 
eventually was included in the Second Reform Act by which it was implemented in twelve three-
cornered constituencies and the City of London, which had four members.1148 This legislation was a 
landmark in the history of British electoral law, not only because it is the first (and, depending on 
one’s view of STV, only) instance of minority representation for parliamentary constituencies, but 
also because of the practical and ideological significance it had for the theory and design of 
representative institutions in the following decades. This legislation was widely credited with 
spurring the growth of modern party discipline, for the creation of the Liberal Association or 
“caucus” by the Liberals of Birmingham was a direct response to what they perceived as the bias 
against advanced liberalism of the limited vote measure; the Liberal party in Birmingham strove for 
tighter organization and direction of supporters’ votes in order not to lose the third seat to a Tory 
and divide the cities’ strength as a bastion of Liberalism.1149 In consequence, the limited vote – 
though it was only in operation for a decade-and-a-half, going extinct of necessity upon the 
implementation of single-member districting in the Third Reform Act – helped to shape the political 
climate surrounding the discussion of PR, both by in fact contributing to the rise of new party 
conditions and, probably even more importantly, by the force of the impression that “minority 
representation” entailed “the caucus and…the practical despotism of the new political associations 
                                                 
1147 The first proposal of the limited vote came from the Tory poet W.M. Praed during the debate on the First Reform 
Act, proposing it for the few three-member constituencies that were included in the bill; Hart, Proportional Representation, 
9-11; Humphreys, Proportional Representation, 62. 
 
1148 Humphreys, Proportional Representation, 64-5. 
 
1149 See e.g. Joseph Chamberlain, The Radical Programme, ed. D.A. Hamer (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1971), 6; Francis 
Schnadhorst, “The Caucus and Its Critics,” The Nineteenth Century, vol. 12, no. 65 (July 1882): 8-28, at 13, 20; Woodward, 
Age of Reform, 188. For a dissenting interpretation that minimizes the role of hostility to the limited vote in the origins of 
the Birmingham caucus, see Trygve Tholfsen, “The Origins of the Birmingham Caucus,” Historical Journal, vol. 11, no. 2. 
(1959): 161-84. 
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[that is, the party organizations].”1150 
For supporters of STV, there was a kind of cruel irony in the fact that the limited vote had 
such an influence on the course of debate about voting systems since it was, in their eyes, obviously 
inadequate; as two early-twentieth-century American propagandists for STV summed up the disgust 
which the more ardent proportionalists had for some time felt for this measure: “That the limited 
vote should have been adopted for a considerable number of uses…where true representation was 
desired, is a good example of men’s astonishing laziness in these matters of voting.”1151 These 
criticisms of the limited vote’s shortcomings from the perspective of “pure PR” were, however, 
somewhat wide of the mark, for they both over- and under-estimated the theoretical stakes of the 
nineteenth century’s first attempt to think about representation as involving not only the relations 
between but also within constituencies. On the one hand, the limited vote was never articulated as a 
comprehensive theory of representation; even in the most robust proposals for its use, such as 
Russell’s in 1854, it was applied as the exception rather than the rule. The limited vote was in this 
sense always an adjunct to the variety-of-suffrages vision of mirroring, a corrective to deal with the 
advent of larger districts for which more than the traditional two members were thought requisite. 
Since these districts, by virtue of their demographic makeup and greater populousness, were more 
heterogeneous than the traditional variegated constituencies which, in the history of British electoral 
theory, were closely identified with a specific interest or group rather than with multiple,1152 the 
limited vote could be seen as merely remedial, inserted for a particular set of difficult cases, to 
                                                 
1150 Charles Seymour, Electoral Reform in England and Wales: The Development and Operation of the Parliamentary Franchise: 1832-
1885 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915), 501. 
 
1151 Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation, 44. 
 
1152 Although he does not directly connect this up with the endorsement of the limited vote, David Moore provides an 
analysis of Russell’s shift later in his career to greater favorability toward heterogeneous districts; see Moore, Politics of 
Deference, 325-6, 381-2. 
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preserve the overall working of the variety-of-suffrages method of descriptive representation.1153 
Rather than a faltering, half-hearted step toward PR in the modern sense of proportional reflection of the 
aggregate of individual preferences, the limited vote was a mechanism for refining the accuracy of the kind 
of communitarian representation that the Whig weltanschauung had always prized in a way that better 
suited the newer, more cumbersome circumstances of large heterogeneous districts.1154 It was the 
variety-of-suffrages school pushed just to the point where it doubted the unimpeachable universality 
of its methods. It was not intended as a stepping-stone to a “one-man, one-vote” conception of the 
equality of the worth of each elector’s franchise.1155 
Indeed, although its mode of operation, by turning inside the constituency rather than 
balancing among them, was opposed to the method of variegated franchises and constituencies, the 
line was actually blurrier than might be imagined at first blush. Earlier we encountered variety-of-
suffrages schemes which incorporated class-specific constituencies; among these, let us take, for 
example, Cole’s. Cole, it will be recalled, wanted to divide many urban boroughs, giving one of the 
two members (two of the four in the case of the City of London), to the “Middle-Classes” and one 
to the lower classes. This method of class-based representation raises an interpretive question about 
how to categorize his scheme. Was the division of an existing territorial constituency on grounds of 
class the creation of a new constituency? or was it an exercise in restraining the number of votes in 
electors’ possession in a constituency that had retained its identity and integrality? For the most part, 
Cole presented his proposal as the former, and hence he belongs amongst the more creative 
                                                 
1153 Russell, English Government and Constitution, 240. 
 
1154 For reasons that parallel why the variety-of-suffrages vision necessarily presupposed a preliminary sociological phase, 
the limited vote could not be seen as a device of mirroring on its own. The random allocation of three-cornered 
constituencies would not produce a descriptively satisfactory depiction of the array of “classes, interests, and opinions” 
unless one posited implausibly that all of these objects of representation were encompassed in a relatively stable 2/3-1/3 
bifurcation of partisan allegiance. Therefore the limited vote had to be endorsed downstream of a sociologically-
grounded distribution of different constituencies and suffrages. 
 
1155 Although Marshall came closer than most; see e.g. Marshall, Minorities and Majorities, e.g., 14, 21. 
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adherents of the variety-of-suffrages school. But for the sake of shoring up his case, he was willing 
to consider it in the latter light as well, and he believed that even from this angle his reform was 
immune to objection: 
The plan of all the electors no longer voting for all the members of their borough cannot 
with consistency be objected to, as against principle, by anyone who was a member of Lord 
Aberdeen’s Government in 1854; for by the scheme of reform which Lord John Russell then 
introduced…it was proposed that in all cases where three members should be returnable by 
any county of borough, no elector should vote for more than two…1156 
 
The class-specificity, and consequent improved sociological accuracy, of Cole’s scheme was 
obviously amenable to classification as an installment in the long catalog of Old-Whig-through-
Bagehot literature on the descriptive Commons. But it was also liable to a different gloss, to wit, as 
an early entry into a newer line of thought about representation, one less certain of its relationship to 
the traditional parliamentary notions and practices. The blurriness of the status of Cole’s plan points 
to what will be a central theme of this chapter, namely, the difficulty of understanding where exactly 
the connections and disconnections between PR and the variety-of-suffrages view lay. 
 The way in which Cole sought to leverage the Whig ministry’s vogue for the minority vote 
complicates, moreover, the distance which the champions of pure PR often wanted to put between 
their proposals and such thoughtless half-measures as the minority vote. For if class-specificity 
through bifurcation of extant multi-member districts could be seen as an instance of the limited vote 
in which the limitation was to one vote per elector rather than the standard two, then Cole’s scheme 
was interpretable as a case not merely of the limited vote but of the “single vote” as well, and this 
fact showed, furthermore, that the “single vote” was simply a species of the larger genus that was 
the limited vote. The single vote in a multi-member district was the cornerstone of proportionalism 
in the nineteenth century (as, in general, it remains today) – and yet, depending on the lens through 
which one chose to view Cole’s contribution, here it was being advocated by an opponent of “Mr. 
                                                 
1156 Cole, Middle Classes, 66. 
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Hare” who self-consciously hewed to another vision of the electoral machinery underlying the 
representative Commons.1157 There were, of course, several dimensions on which Hare and Cole did 
not align – the transferability of the vote; the size of the constituency; and the voluntary or 
involuntary character of constituencies – and all of these could, depending on the author’s sensibility 
or the reformer’s objectives, carry great normative weight, as we will soon see. But however 
discrepant they might appear at first glance, Cole’s invocation of vocabulary of the limited vote, in 
which it appeared to be a cousin of both Bagehot and Hare, demonstrated that a bridge could be built 
over the space that separated longstanding British descriptivism from a system that was frequently 
cast as out of “conformity with good old English notions of representation.”1158 
 In contrast to these perceptions of the alienness of STV, proponents of both the limited and 
the cumulative vote sought to stress the continuity between their recommendations and the time-
honored practices of British parliamentarianism.1159 (It was rather easier for the latter to do so than 
the former, the confinement of votes below the number of seats being judged a more marked 
straying from constitutional precedent than the increase in flexibility of apportionment of one’s 
votes.1160) Their goals were the same as those depicted above in chapters 3-4, and were expressed in 
nearly identical language.1161 Yet not even as sanctimonious an admirer of the organic British 
constitution as Russell could pretend that minority representation was a straightforward extension of 
                                                 
1157 Ibid., 28. 
 
1158 Russell, English Government and Constitution, 239. 
 
1159 Marshall, for example, copiously cited Burke, Russell, Grey, and other weighty Whig authorities on the constitution. 
And he repeatedly played down the extent to which he was innovating: he was offering no more than a “simple change 
in the mode of voting”; his was not among the schemes which would be “opposed to our established habits and 
customs”; and so on. Marshall, Minorities and Majorities, 1, 4, 6, 13, 24. 
 
1160 See e.g. Mill, “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,” 330. 
 
1161 See e.g. Marshall on such values as stability, inclusivity, the right to be heard in the assembly, and the epistemic 
advantages of diversity; Minorities and Majorities, 8-9, 11, 17. 
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previous constitutional practice.1162 Before leaving these schemes behind, it behooves us to ask 
where exactly the discontinuity between them and their counterparts from chapter four lies. 
 Four areas of discontinuity are particularly noteworthy. These propositions are interrelated, 
and together they indicate the conceptual paths along which true PR would travel even farther. 
 The first is one on which we have dwelt already: the disruption of the integrality of the 
constituency. Minority representation violated, in Gladstone’s words 
the principle of Parliamentary representation [which] is, that we should recognize each 
constituency as being in itself an integer – as being in itself a community – and what we want 
in this House is to have the prevailing sense of the community. We do not want to have 
represented in miniature particular shades of opinion that may at the moment prevail in it, 
but the sense of the majority, which represents the whole community.1163 
 
Both the limited and the cumulative vote were premised on the rejection of any such univocal 
“sense” of the community, and therefore amounted to a movement away from focusing on the 
assemblage of constituencies and toward the voters themselves as the direct object of representation. 
 The second is a decline of faith in virtual representation. Minority representation schemes 
were mechanisms for getting more votes to count toward the placement of a candidate in office.1164 This 
decline could take on two valences. On the one hand, it could indicate the irreplaceability of a 
particular cluster of electors to the overall sociological satisfactoriness of the Commons; for these 
persons in particular there were no equivalents to be found elsewhere in the nation such that the fact 
that they specifically did not place a spokesman in the Commons would not impair its 
representativeness. Given their focus on the populous, especially urban districts which were most 
                                                 
1162 “If there were to be any deviation from our customary habits and rooted ideas on the subject of representation, I 
should like to see such a change as I once proposed, in order to obtain representatives of the minority in large and 
populous counties and towns”; Russell, English Government and Constitution, 240. 
 
1163 Gladstone, Speech of June 15, 1870, 147. 
 
1164 On “wasted votes” under first-past-the-post systems, see e.g. R.J. Johnston, “Seats, Votes, Redistricting, and the 
Allocation of Power in Electoral Systems,” in Choosing an Electoral System, 59-69. This motive was central to Greg’s 
support, noted above, for the cumulative vote; “Parliamentary Purification,” 622-3. And see Hart, Proportional 
Representation, 17. Greg was relatively rare in favoring the cumulative vote while not also simply writing off Hare as an 
impractical dreamer; see Rocks Ahead, 7-8. 
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likely to be granted more than two members, defenders of these schemes were in effect taking Mill’s 
side in the dispute (depicted in chapter three) between him and Bagehot over whether the educated 
classes in the major cities were not of too special a sociological significance to have their chances of 
direct inclusion in the Commons be left to the uncertain outcome of electoral contestation with the 
working classes of the boroughs. This was, to be sure, a statement of the practical limits of virtual 
representation rather than an objection to the principle of it. But if such limitations proliferated then 
the whole system of virtual representation would unravel1165; for virtual representation to have any 
purchase as an element in an operating system of representative government, the demographic 
“blocks” to be included must be relatively few in number and uncontroversial in their boundaries. 
Put differently, because virtual representation rests on a basis of cohesive, identifiable groups, too 
finely-grained a sociology, by multiplying these groups and producing confusion about who belongs 
to them, would undercut the workability of the sociology on which the system is grounded.1166 (It is 
perfectly conceivable, for example, to believe in the principle of virtual representation and yet to reject 
its tenability on the grounds that, in a given state of affairs, every citizen is so unique as to resist any 
accurate grouping.1167) In any case, what matters for now is that one source of the discomfort with 
virtual representation evinced by minority-representation proponents was that it ran up against the 
practical difficulty that certain indispensable groups might be left behind by the (predominantly 
territorial) network of constituencies without the possibility of any effective ersatz for them being 
supplied by this system itself. 
                                                 
1165 The inverse relationship between how fine-grained and discriminating a political sociology is and the plausibility of 
claims of virtual representation would also be important for PR’s attack on virtual representation, as we will see in 
section 2(a). 
 
1166 Dicey’s objections to the variety of suffrages apply here as well. 
 
1167 This is close to the evaluation of the “crisis of representation” in late-twentieth/early-twenty-first-century 
democracies as Pierre Rosanvallon understands it; see e.g. Greg Conti and Will Selinger, “The Other Side of 
Representation: The History and Theory of Representative Government in Pierre Rosanvallon,” Constellations: An 
International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory (forthcoming). 
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 On the other hand, the movement away from virtual representation – the desire for fewer 
votes to be “wasted,” for more electors to succeed in placing a representative of their choosing in 
the house – need not have stemmed from descriptive impulses. After all, it is easy to imagine an 
electoral system which, through judicious apportionment of constituencies and franchises, would 
achieve a high degree of descriptiveness while within each district the winning candidates were 
returned only by very small pluralities, thus wasting lots of votes.1168 Even while accepting the 
descriptive satisfactoriness of the system, one could still bemoan the waste of votes on other 
grounds, and could do so without having recourse to a “democratic” view that elections were 
devices for delivering the consent of every citizen without which government could not be 
legitimate.1169 Greg is, as usual, illustrative of the ideological possibilities available, since his thought 
on representation was such a hodgepodge of contemporary concerns. As noted earlier, Greg was 
mostly content with the Reformed Commons in its descriptive dimension, but he had a lower 
estimate of the intellectual virtues of MPs, and (like Mill) the cumulative vote seems to have been to 
him largely a way of getting men of greater “personal qualities” into the House.1170 In other words, 
what Greg objected to in the current “waste” of votes was that it contributed to an intellectually 
deficient assembly. 
 Although these perspectives were different, on both of them minority representation was 
cutting against the grain of thinking of representation as a “virtual” process and stepping toward the 
representation of “persons,” even if it was still a long way from a “democratic” adherence to the 
equal worth of each person’s vote. Simply thinking in terms of electoral majorities and minorities 
brought these authors closer to a “personal” view of representation, since – in contrast to “classes, 
                                                 
1168 Again, the reductio is instructive: some theorists favor lottery on descriptive grounds, and yet in a lottery there are of 
necessity zero “effective votes.” 
 
1169 As we will see in what follows, Harean PR did not have a straightforward relationship to this line of thought. 
 
1170 Mill, “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,” 330; see also Mill, Letter to Henry Samuel Chapman, 8 July 1858, in CW, 
vol. 15, 559. 
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interests, and opinions,” which were all construed as objects whose nature and value were 
irreducible to the verdict of simple “numbers” revealed at the poll – the units which make up 
electoral majorities and minorities can only be the electors as individuals.1171 Thus, while an 
attraction to minority representation was (as we have seen) far from an abandonment of the 
commitment that “classes and not numbers are what we seek to represent,”1172 the necessity inherent 
in minority-representation schemes of adopting the electoral outcome rather than an independent 
sociological criterion as the vantage point by which to assess the fairness of parliamentary 
representation marked a step toward an individualistic or democratic outlook on electoral structures. 
 A third implication, which is in fact a version of the preceding one, was that a citizen was 
only represented if one had voted for a winner; the non-voter and the enfranchised supporter of a 
losing candidate were equivalently ill-off from the standpoint of representedness. Two rejoinders 
were readily available in the period to this line of thought: (a) the orthodox theory of virtual 
representation of course held that the efficacy of one’s vote was immaterial to the question of one’s 
representedness because this question was to be answered by surveying the composition of the 
assembly to see if it contained spokesman for one’s social rung, economic interests, religious 
convictions, etc.; (b) the image of the integral constituency made represented-ness an attribute of 
belonging to an electoral community. These views were to some degree separable, though they 
tended to be held in tandem (as by Gladstone) and thereby to reinforce the impression of the 
manifold representativeness of the British arrangements; a citizen could be said to be represented by 
the members who shared his religion, his party, his occupation, as well as by the members elected 
for his locality, without having cast a vote for a single winner. But what was critical about the 
                                                 
1171 This is really just another way of rephrasing Bernard Manin’s point that in representative democracies “minorities” 
and “majorities” are constituted by the procedure of the vote and do not exist apart from it; see e.g. Manin, “Political 
Deliberation and the Adversarial Principle,” trans. Greg Conti, Daedalus, forthcoming. 
 
1172 Greg, “Representative Reform [2],” 269. 
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equation of representedness with voting for a successful candidate was less the position itself as thus 
stated than the moral charge behind it. After all, as noted above, even Bagehot had allowed that the 
sort of durable intra-constituency minority status that he expected for upper-class citizens in the 
boroughs to which he would grant universal suffrage was akin to “disfranchisement.” What 
separated the thoroughgoing variety-of-suffragist from the champion of minority or, even more, 
proportional representation was therefore less an analytic or conceptual dispute than a moral 
judgment. For Bagehot, the entirety of the matter of the adequacy of a system of representation was 
to be resolved at the level of the overall economy of descriptiveness and deliberativeness; the 
electoral fortunes of any particular cluster of individuals was as such a matter of moral indifference. 
And this indifference was brought under fire by all minority or proportional representation schemes. 
 The fourth and final point of difference between the conventional notions of descriptive 
representation and Marshall’s and Praed’s style of reform is subtler, more of a tendency than 
anything approaching an absolute break. Nevertheless it is as momentous as any of the preceding. 
This is the shift toward (a) parties as a primary object of representational concern and (b) the 
accuracy of the reflection of party strength as a leading metric for evaluating the quality of 
representation. While variety-of-suffragists were of course not indifferent to parties, in their work 
parties appeared more as practical devices that assisted in organizing political activity (especially 
within the confines of the legislature; this was a kind of vestigial Burkeanism) than as entities the 
accurate reflection of which itself formed part of the task of the representative machinery. With 
minority representation, on the contrary, party affiliation was, in a new sense, what the electoral 
regulations were hoping to get at: via minority representation “we might have a Liberal country 
gentleman sitting for Buckinghamshire, and a Conservative manufacturer for Manchester.”1173 It is not 
                                                 
1173 Russell, English Government and Constitution, 240, my italics. 
This shift is visible even within an author’s oeuvre: Russell, Greg, and Grey, for instance, tended to speak of 
classes and interests when they were operating in the variety-of-suffrages framework but to emphasize parties when they 
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that classes, interests, and other “objective” sociological categories fall out – they do not – but that 
parties now join them in a new position of prominence as a potential object of representation in themselves 
which they did not have on the variety-of-suffrages view. This increase in the attention given to 
parties and their entrance into the realm, so to speak, of primary objects to be reflected in the 
assembly would have profound ramifications, not least because of the ambiguity surrounding their 
standing relative to the aforementioned categories that constituted the traditional subject matter of 
the representative system. Were parties replacements for those earlier objects of representation? or 
were they merely means by which these were now organized? Were parties neutral, or perhaps even 
beneficial, to structuring the multifarious streams that made up public opinion? Or did they have a 
distorting effect on the representative process? These are dilemmas which ran through the whole of 
the literature on representation in the last third of the nineteenth century; for now, it behooves us to 
make an observation about what was involved in the more prominent role played by parties. 
 First, the turn to parties marked a prioritization of opinion. This was, again, not a decisive 
breach with the variety-of-suffrages school – at least not with its major strands – so much as a more 
explicit recognition of a logic contained within the latter. Chapter four showed that, with the 
exception of Harris’s sort of medieval organic functionalism, “classes, interests, groups, etc.” were 
ultimately meant to be tracked by the representative system because they could be expected to 
correspond to differences of perspective; this was what was meant by the ascription of an 
“ideational” or “cognitivist” component to the variety of suffrages.1174 However, for various reasons 
this privileging of opinion for the most part remained latent; hence writers like Bagehot’s fondness 
for indiscriminate jumbles of terms like “sentiments, wants, desires, needs, classes, interests, 
opinions, regions.” Yet with parties the case was different – they were not (though of course they 
                                                                                                                                                             
were in the rarer, minority-representation mode. 
 
1174 On this point Rosanvallon has written eloquently; Le peuple introuvable, ch. 4. 
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might be correlated with or interpreted as expressing) sociological facts. Rather, they existed only in 
the free assent of their members for the explicit purposes of winning elections and influencing 
legislative conduct, and therefore they could not be understood to exist except as rooted in opinion. 
To take parties seriously as the objects of representation was to accept that it was in the last 
accounting the ideas of the citizenry to which a parliamentary assembly was meant to be faithful, 
since parties were constituted solely by the allegiance of electors.1175 It is easy to underestimate the 
significance of this change, especially because the older sociological language persisted alongside the 
newer one of parties and opinions, but its importance is evident from the following: while the 
“working-classes” could be thought to exist independent of their members’ sense of belonging to it, 
a “working-class party” certainly could not. Consider the difference between the way in which 
Bagehot, through reflection on the state of society and public opinion, determined that in certain 
regions of the country “labour” had come to have distinct political sensibilities meriting inclusion in 
the Commons and went about engineering electoral structures to incorporate them, and the way that 
minority representation, later in the century, would think about electoral justice to the Labour party 
consisting in its possessing seats in accord with its national vote share. In this respect, even if it was 
very much undertheorized in these embryonic forms, the cumulative and limited vote both had 
deeply democratic ramifications insofar as they put a dent in the traditional Whig sociological 
apparatus.1176 
                                                 
1175 See e.g. Marshall’s preference for the compound “parties and opinions” to describe what it was his system would 
represent in improved fashion: “the fair and proportionate representation of the various political parties or opinions”; 
“the mechanism of the elective process should be such as to allow all parties and opinions to be fairly represented in the 
House of Commons”; “any party or opinion” should be enabled to secure “proportionate representation”; Minorities and 
Majorities, 5, 8, 12. More generally, while “interest and opinion” appear coupled together in Marshall’s text in a rather 
standard manner, “class” is seldom invoked. That he recognized opinion as the grounding element of his system also 
shines through in several places: “a justly proportioned weight to the opinions both of minorities and of majorities”; 
provision had to be made for including “sufficient diversity of opinion”; Minorities and Majorities, 13, 19 (my italics). 
 
1176 In this they resemble both the radical democrats of the previous chapter (almost all of whom opposed minority and 
proportional representation) and a later, mostly Continental school of radical democracy which embraced PR and which 
insisted on its anti-sociological character as a core dimension of democracy; see e.g. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law 
and State (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006), 298. 
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 Like the variety-of-suffrages paradigm, which was holding strong into the 1860s and beyond, 
the schemes we have examined so far in the chapter did not vanish upon the appearance of Hare’s 
proposals in the late 1850s; indeed, as noted above, the greatest legislative success of these pre-PR 
systems occurred with the inclusion of the limited vote as part of the Second Reform Act in 1867. 
But with the arrival of STV the standing of these schemes in public debate altered. While of course 
there were exceptions who continued to believe in the cumulative or limited vote as a first-best 
option, on the whole those who wanted to depart from the traditional model came to see these 
schemes as stepping stones to “Mr. Hare’s system of personal representation” which were in 
themselves simply “insignificant makeshift[s].”1177 Moreover, after 1867, with electoral democracy 
appearing increasingly imminent, public attention to STV grew. Two causes in particular provoked 
intense interest in STV in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. First, the Third Reform 
Act, which inaugurated single-member, equal districts, was understood to spell the demise of the 
variety of suffrages as a realistic option for reformers who desired “variety in the representation.”1178 
Consequently, with electoral variegation as previously interpreted off the table in the eyes of most 
authors and the earlier models of minority representation conceived as halfway houses on the way to 
a more “perfect” method,1179 late-Victorian generations looked more and more to STV as the most 
practically plausible and theoretically sound corrective to the danger of majority “swamping.” 
Second, the turmoil in Ireland and prospect of Irish Home Rule or independence generated fear that 
without PR the Protestant loyalists (who were a minority) might be rendered voiceless upon further 
expansion of the Irish franchise.1180  
                                                 
1177 Mill, Speech on the Reform Bill [8], 5 July 1867, in CW, vol. 28, 207. See also Henry Fawcett, The Leading Clauses of a 
New Reform Bill (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1860), 22. 
 
1178 Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” 935-7. 
 
1179 Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. 1, 267. 
 
1180 George Shaw-Lefevre, a critic of PR, admitted that Ireland was a great argumentative coup for his opponents; see 
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***** 
With this historical outline in place, it is time to turn to the institutional details of PR as they 
stood in the period. For our purposes, what needs to be presented is Hare’s version. There are 
almost infinite permutations of PR, as there are of electoral systems in general,1181 and the 
proliferation of schemes of PR had a detrimental impact on the fortunes of proportionalist reform 
in Britain.1182 Yet Hare’s program stood out from the rest as “that which has obtained more support 
in this country and the British Dominions than any of its rivals”1183; and beyond the numerousness 
and illustriousness of its supporters, it had an advantage in setting the terms of debate in Britain by 
virtue of being both the first to take the field and being perceived as a native growth. Other schemes 
of PR, consequently, did not dislodge the primacy of Hare’s scheme even as the years rolled on from 
its birth. This continuing priority was also due to the fact that the most active pressure group for PR, 
the Proportional Representation Society, sponsored Hare’s plan.1184 While Hare was amenable to 
changes in certain technical features of the scheme, such as the manner of calculating the quota, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
“The Representation of Minorities,” Contemporary Review, vol. 45 (May 1884), 714-33; at 727. See also J. Parker Smith, 
“Parliamentary Reform: Minority Representation,” Westminster Review, vol. 121, no. 241 (Jan. 1884), 163-75, at 165; Ted 
Bromund, “Uniting the Whole People: Proportional Representation in Great Britain, 1884-5, Reconsidered,” Historical 
Research, vol. 74, no. 183 (2001): 77-94, at 82. And see above, note 1127. 
 
1181 Bogdanor, What Is Proportional Representation?, 46; Reeve and Ware, Electoral Systems, 4, 6. 
 
1182 Hence the humorous complaint of a leading proportionalist a half-century after Hare’s debut: “There are said to be 
some 300 systems in existence, and the ingenuity of inventors shows no sign of exhaustion. The unkindest thing that a 
proportionalist can do is to invent a system; unfortunately the joys of paternity often outweigh the call of an ascetic 
devotion”; J. Fischer Williams, Proportional Representation and British Politics (London: John Murray, 1914), 30. See also, 
Jones, The Politics of Reform, 1884, 99-100. 
 
1183 Williams, Proportional Representation and British Politics, 30; Lakeman, How Democracies Vote, 111. And see note 1131 
above. 
 
1184 In the British context the single nontransferable vote, the party list system, and the method of “clubbing” in which 
the candidate disposes of his surplus as he sees fit, all had to be advanced self-consciously as alternatives to the single 
transferable vote; see respectively Percy Greg, “Redistribution: Right and Wrong Directions,” National Review, vol. 2, no. 
12 (Feb. 1884): 807-23, at 818-23; James Meredith, Proportional Representation in Ireland (Dublin: Edward Ponsonby, 1918), 
xiii-xiv; Dodgson, “Parliamentary Elections,” in Political Pamphlets of Lewis Carroll, 158-9. 
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while he could contemplate bending on some matters for the sake of political expediency,1185 its core 
elements remained stable. 
Despite his centrality to the debate, Hare’s own presentation of the scheme in The Election of 
Representatives was far from limpid, and this contributed to a widespread impression that PR was 
confused and unintelligible.1186 The Election of Representatives was a forbidding tract, unsuited to capture 
the attention of a wide audience. It was at once both a professional legislative document – it 
contained a bill in thirty-three clauses in painstaking legalese – and a rigorous, lengthy exposition of 
the normative ideals of representative government, and these dimensions were interspersed with one 
another. Furthermore, the institutional essentials of the proposal were laid out in conjunction with a 
truly stunning array of claims about the benefits that would flow from its enactment, and so the 
intrinsic difficulty of understanding the functioning of his novel arrangements was compounded by 
the fact that the institutional components tended to get lost within the expanse of moral and 
political claims made on its behalf. These facts about STV chez Hare are important (and they will 
structure much of our subsequent analysis) because they point to an important truth: that Hare 
believed himself to be elaborating not merely a plan of electoral reform but, even more, a theory of 
politics. 
In consequence, there developed during Hare’s lifetime a subgenre within the PR literature, 
namely “the clarification of Hare” pamphlet. To grasp the key pieces of Harean STV, let us use take 
one of these, composed by the great Liberal MP and economist Henry Fawcett,1187 as a kind of 
                                                 
1185 See the alterations made for the fourth edition to adjust the scheme to the Ballot Act of 1872 (London: Longmans, 
Green, Reader, & Dyer, 1874), 124-6. Like Mill, Hare had been opposed to the introduction of the ballot; see Election of 
Representatives, third edition, 139-45. 
 
1186 See e.g. the verdict of a writer very sympathetic to Hare’s scheme as the “most logical and satisfactory method”: “the 
principles of his scheme appear in so highly elaborated a form in his own writings, that his system is vaguely regarded by 
most people as a theory of incomprehensible complexity”; J. Parker Smith, University Representation (London: Pewtress & 
Co., 1883), 30-1. 
 
1187 On Fawcett’s life and thought, see the essays in The Blind Victorian: Henry Fawcett and British Liberalism, ed. Lawrence 
 366 
 
Aristotelian mean between the stripped-down clearness with which the scheme is laid out in 
contemporary political science1188 and the manner in which a Victorian would have encountered it. 
Fawcett broke Hare’s scheme down into seventeen propositions, the ones of greatest concern to us 
being the following: 
[4] Each elector votes by a voting-paper. He arranges any number of the names of the candidates 
who have presented themselves for any constituencies, in the order he is desirous they should be 
returned…. 
[8] The Registrar-General divides the number of voting-papers so returned to him by the 
whole number of members composing the House, and the quotient so obtained, called the 
“quota,” represents the number of electors entitled to have one representative.1189 
[9] The Registrar-General forms a list of all candidates whose names stand first on a number 
of voting-papers equal to or exceeding the “quota”… 
[10] The candidates on such list are returned to Parliament. 
[11] No candidate shall require for his return more than the “quota” of votes… 
[12] If a candidate’s name appears first in more than the “quota” of voting-papers which 
must be appropriated to his return shall be selected from those papers which respectively 
contain the fewest names…. 
[14] If the House is not completed by members returned under the preceding clauses, the 
Registrar-General makes a list of the candidates whose names appear either first or second in 
the remaining voting papers a number of times equal to or exceeding the “quota,” and the 
names appearing in the list are returned as members…. 
[16] If the number of members is still not made up, the Registrar-General proceeds in a 
similar way to make a similar list of those candidates whose names appear either first, 
second, third, &c. the requisite number of times in the remaining voting-papers, and the 
process is repeated until the House is completed.1190 
 
This was the institutional essence of Hare’s program. Today, Hare’s name is usually associated either 
with STV or proportional representation generally, or, more technically, with his formula for making 
up the quota. But it is crucial that we recognize that his plan was comprised of several parts which 
could be individually revised and collectively reconfigured to produce something different from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Goldman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
1188 One of the best is Michael Dummett, Principles of Electoral Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), ch. 11. 
 
1189 This formula for the quota (the “Hare quota,” or v/s) was typically abandoned in favor of the “Droop quota” 
(v/s+1) once it was devised in the late 1860s. (Here, v = total votes, s = number of seats to be filled.) The preference for the 
Droop over the Hare quota remains in modern systems of STV. 
 
1190 Henry Fawcett, “Mr. Hare’s Reform Bill Simplified and Explained” (Westminster: T. Brettel, 1860), 6-8. My italics. 
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whole which he envisioned and to which he gave the title “personal representation.”1191 In order to 
understand where Hareanism – and the other forms of PR which would develop in response to it – 
fit within the spectrum of representative institutions in the period, we need to disaggregate these 
elements and consider their significance one-by-one. 
 In light of the principal concerns of this dissertation, five institutional aspects of Harean 
personal representation warrant particular consideration: (a) its relationship to the extension of the 
suffrage; (b) the manner in which it constructed constituencies; (c) its opposition to territoriality in 
districting; (d) the object for which votes were to be cast are under it; (e) the mechanism for 
transferring votes to candidates lower on the elector’s preference ranking. The remainder of this 
chapter takes up each of these features in turn, guided throughout by the underlying question of 
how to situate Victorian PR with regard to the traditions of representation which we have already 
investigated. 
 
2) The Institutional and Conceptual Core of PR: A Story of Continuity and Discontinuity 
 
a) STV, the Suffrage, and the Value of the Vote 
 At different moments in his long campaign for Hare’s system, Mill could be found depicting 
it in (superficially at least) rather opposed ways. This was especially true with regard to the 
relationship between his favored scheme and the concept of democracy. Take for instance this pair 
of assessments of the link between them: 
No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without [Mr. Hare’s 
plan]. 
 
[Personal representation] is neither democratic nor aristocratic…1192 
 
                                                 
1191 Hare, Election of Representatives, xxxvi. 
 
1192 Mill, Considerations, 452; Speech on Personal Representation, 30 May 1867, in CW, vol. 28, 177. 
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Mill was speaking on somewhat different registers (and in different contexts) in the two cases above. 
Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of these statements is nonetheless revealing of a larger truth about 
the reception of PR in the Victorian era: to wit, that while Britons were convinced that PR had 
something essential to do with democracy, the nature of this connection was not clear and was 
interpreted in multiple ways. This difficulty was enhanced by the fact that – apart from Mill, whose 
own record on the matter was certainly equivocal – the earliest adopters of PR, including its 
progenitor Hare, were far from accepting that theirs was a democratic project in any straightforward 
sense. 
 We will, of course, not be able to adjudicate in its entirety the question of the democratic 
character of Victorian PR right now; instead, the hope is to develop a set of judgments about this 
issue over the course of the whole examination. But we have to begin by noting that “personal 
representation” as inaugurated by Hare was nondemocratic in the most straightforward sense of all: 
it did not include universal suffrage. In this way it looked more antagonistic to democratic principles 
than a proposal such as Harris’s, which eschewed democracy understood as uniform universal 
suffrage through the use of a variety of mechanisms to apportion the franchise in a manner that 
respected sociological differentiation, but which nonetheless provided for the enfranchisement of all 
male citizens. 
 There are two dimensions to the absence of universal suffrage as a part of their program, 
and they need to be carefully distinguished. These dimensions correspond to the distinction between 
STV as a method for translating votes into electoral outcomes and “personal representation” as a 
complete theory of representative politics, and even Hare himself struggled to keep them apart. 
First, sometimes universal suffrage appeared not to be included in Hare’s reform because no 
recommendation on the suffrage was. What was on offer was a voting system, a decision-rule, and as such 
PR was agnostic about the level of enfranchisement: “the suffrage is a matter so distinct from 
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electoral organisation, that the legislature should deal with the two things in separate Acts. Blending 
them together tends to confuse and embarrass the discussion of both”; “the system of 
representation in this work” did not bear, except in an incidental technical way, on “the subject of 
the suffrage.”1193 As even one of the most famous “friends of Democracy” within the PR ranks, 
Henry Fawcett, put it: “it will be perceived that this scheme has no particular connection with any 
opinion respecting a democratic extension or an aristocratic limitation of the suffrage….The plan is 
adaptable to every extent of the franchise.”1194 In these moments “the scheme” was treated as 
coextensive with STV, and from this vantage point the question of its preferability to the method of 
“local majorities” was orthogonal to the “question of the suffrage.”1195 It was a module which could 
be inserted into any set of representative structures, the “present system” as much as any other, 
without prompting any additional modifications.1196 
 These judgments of the independence of STV from the regulation of the suffrage were 
basically accurate. And yet the matter was a complicated one. This was because, as mentioned 
before, Hare’s “personal representation,” and the proportional representation movement which 
developed out of it, did not consist solely of STV. As a theorist of representation and not simply an 
innovator in vote-aggregation procedures, Hare had views about the level of enfranchisement. His 
                                                 
1193 Hare, Election of Representatives, 281, 258. For reasons having to do with the complicated way in which he wanted to 
amend the classification of local districts – a provision which was not essential to the scheme and was ignored by his 
followers – Hare did believe that inconveniences would result from his plan if the discrepancy between county and 
borough franchises was maintained; ibid., 258. The less technical side of his opposition to variety in the suffrage is dealt 
with below. 
 
1194 Fawcett, “Hare’s Bill Simplified,” 8. He went on to stress that this agnosticism applied not only to the level of 
enfranchisement but also to the weighting of voting power: “It would be entirely foreign to Mr. Hare’s scheme to 
express any opinion upon the question, whether or not intelligence and wealth should obtain a plurality of votes. Were 
this principle adopted, the scheme would be as well adapted to it as to any other”; ibid., 16. For Fawcett as belonging to 
the democratic ranks, see Shaw-Lefevre, “The Representation of Minorities,” 715; Leslie Stephen, Life of Henry Fawcett, 
third edition (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1886), 170-1. 
 
1195 Hare, Election of Representatives, 167; “Representation in Theory and Practice,” Fraser’s Magazine, vol. 61, no. 362 (Feb. 
1860), 188-204, at 201. 
 
1196 Fawcett, “Hare’s Bill Simplified,” 8. 
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sentiments on the matter were fuzzy, bearing out his verdict that the enfranchisement issue was “of 
far less [importance] than that of organization” of the voting mechanism.1197 But underneath this 
fuzziness about the nature of a “wisely-regulated franchise” consisted in there was a clear 
unfavorability to universal suffrage.1198 “The pecuniary standard adopted by the Reform Act” – by 
which he meant the £10 householder franchise in boroughs rather than the higher county valuation 
– “seems to afford no unreasonable criterion,” Hare wrote, and he was in this respect understood to 
be comfortable with the status quo.1199 Similarly, to take just one more example: Fawcett, whose 
democratic credentials were later considered unimpeachable, was not averse to property 
qualifications at the time that he took up PR.1200 
 Beyond this conservative strain, two aspects of Hare on the suffrage must be emphasized, 
for they both marked decisive divergences from the variety-of-suffrages paradigm. First, his deepest 
commitment on the suffrage issue – certainly deeper than his preference for any given threshold of 
enfranchisement – was to its uniformity. In direct opposition to Bagehot and his fellow travelers, Hare 
saw the steps toward standardization in suffrage rules that 1832 had taken as a trend to be 
completed rather than a course to be reversed; he looked on the difference between borough and 
county franchises as a preposterous anachronism.1201 In addressing the suffrage, what mattered to 
Hare was to speak “on behalf, – not of any particular qualification, – but of an equality of 
                                                 
1197 Hare, “Representation in Theory and Practice,” 201. 
 
1198 Hare, Election of Representatives, xxxviii. 
 
1199 Ibid., 267; Carstairs, Short History of Electoral Systems, 194.  In Denmark Andrae had also been content with the 
application of his plan in a system with restrictive censitary requirements; Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation, 
172. 
 
1200 Fawcett, Leading Clauses, 4. His requirements were somewhat more generous than Hare’s. 
 
1201 “It may be hoped, however, that when the subject is examined in all its bearings, every party will agree on the 
abolition of distinctions, which are unworthy of the age in which we live, and carry us back to the times of the Norman 
villeins or the Saxon thralls”; Hare, Election of Representatives, 258-9. 
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qualification.”1202 From the perspective of personal representation, variations in electoral 
requirements were not inheritances of the longstanding wisdom of British constitutionalism but 
were bare “anomalies” to be expurgated.1203 
 Hare’s contempt for what remained of franchise variegation under the reformed parliament 
was overdetermined, and it related to several facets of the theory (such as the critique of virtual 
representation) which will continue to be investigated. At the moment it suffices to say that Hare’s 
thought here resembled Grey’s impression, touched on in chapter three, that the old style of 
variegation was irreconcilable with a more modern, rationalized politics.1204 In addition, it partook as 
well of the anxiety, discussed in chapter 4(d), that the attempt to divvy people up into groups whose 
electoral rights would differ was corrosive of national solidarity.1205 If “equality” in the franchise was 
to be pursued, what next needs to be asked is on what basis this uniform standard was to be fixed. 
And on this front as well the divergence from the variety-of-suffragists, though subtler here, was 
again noteworthy. For Hare and Fawcett, the basis was straightforwardly capacitarian. Deciding on a 
baseline which would admit only the capable was a tricky task,1206 but it was nevertheless a political 
duty to apportion the franchise to “fitness,”1207 and their assent to the “reasonableness” of 
standardizing the suffrage at the level of the reformed borough was grounded in the belief that this 
threshold aligned with the demarcation between fitness and unfitness.  
Hare denied that requirements for the franchise along his lines would turn politics into the 
domain of a caste – he disavowed the desire for a “perpetual exclusion” of certain “classes and 
                                                 
1202 Ibid., 260. See also Fawcett, Leading Clauses, 4, 13. 
 
1203 Hare, Election of Representatives, 259. 
 
1204 Ibid., 266-7. 
 
1205 Ibid., 259. 
 
1206 It was “the business of our legislators to select…that which is the test or qualification best suited to our country, our 
age, and our social condition”; ibid., 265. 
 
1207 Hare, Election of Representatives, 263-6; Fawcett, Leading Clauses, 1, 11-5. 
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conditions,” “employment[s] or situation[s]” – and he was open to the establishment of “educational 
tests” as avenues to enfranchisement in addition to meeting the property qualifications.1208 But, as 
wide as he might wish to cast his notion of capacity,1209 Hare’s mode of delimiting the suffrage was 
the opposite of the variety-of-suffragist mode – and this difference amounted, from the variety-of-
suffragist point-of-view, to a decline in inclusivity. In their lingo, personal representation bordered 
on class-rule; to follow Hare’s prescriptions on the suffrage would be perilously close to accepting 
what Grey had described as a monopoly of the £10 householders. The reason that Hare and 
company claimed that it would avoid this fate will be dealt with at length in what follows: the 
combination of STV and very large constituencies would permit what diversity existed among the 
enfranchised stratum to make its way into the assembly. But a crucial point of difference remained. 
At least the more philosophical advocates of electoral variegation had, as we saw in chapter four, a 
justification for leaving portions of the population unfranchised that was descriptive in nature, namely, 
that they did not contribute to public opinion and that endowing them with voting power would 
therefore have a distortive effect on the representation. Hare’s criterion for enfranchisement, on the 
other hand, was not descriptive1210; it hinged not on sociological inquiry but on substantive notions 
of worthiness and ability. Fixing the bounds of the suffrage – uniformly, it bears repeating – was a 
mechanism not for mapping the contours of sociological reality but for selecting the fit among the 
citizenry. 
The gap between the variety-of-suffragist use of suffrage regulations as descriptivist tools 
                                                 
1208 Hare, Election of Representatives, 266-7. 
 
1209 “Ordinary industry and skill in his calling, and ordinary prudence and self-denial in his conduct” were to put the 
subject within the pale of the suffrage; ibid., 266. 
 
1210 At least, it was not obviously so, though the descriptive and capacitarian rationales were not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. If one interpreted capacity as incorruptibility and then sees this corruption as an obstacle to the reflection of a 
genuine public opinion, somewhat as Bagehot and Greg did, then capacitarian and descriptive goals could coincide. And 
yet, despite his ambition to end corruption (e.g. Election of Representatives, 84-8), Hare did not square the circle in this way 
or foreground the possible descriptive harms of corruption when setting the boundaries for the suffrage. Instead, he 
(and Fawcett in this period) was relying on a freestanding ideal of fitness. 
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and this capacity-grounded notion of the voting boundary is highlighted by Hare’s affection for 
Guizot. (Figures in the former school, you will recall, were more likely to repudiate him). Despite the 
mid-Victorian period having been a low ebb for his reputation, the doctrinaire statesman is cited 
with astonishing frequency in The Election of Representatives, including in direct support of the thesis of 
capacity as the ground of electoral participation.1211 Though proponents of Hare’s invention would, 
as we will cover, make much of its ability to do justice to diversity, the Guizotianism of personal 
representation in its original formulations meant that the diversity which it would translate into the 
Commons was different in scope from that which a Bagehot or a Mackintosh conceived of their 
schemes as capturing. To the latter, what the assembly needed to contain were the salient divisions 
in society; to the former, the differences existent within the rungs of the capable. Hare was less 
engaged in the sort of cartographic enterprise of mapping the nation onto parliament than in the 
development of a technique for improving the quality of electoral participation for “les capables.”1212  
This doctrinairisme on “the great question of the suffrage” had a further dimension.1213 While 
in liberal democracies today the fact that PR secures equality for each vote1214 is equivalent to securing 
equality for each voter, these two were not identical at the founding of personal representation. Indeed, 
while the former was repeatedly trumpeted as a great breakthrough of the scheme,1215 the latter was 
no part of it – as was made spectacularly clear by Mill’s coupling of STV with plural voting based on 
                                                 
1211 “Le gouvernement représentatif…examine quelle est la capacité nécessaire pour cet acte; il appelle ensuite les 
individus qui sont présumés posséder cette capacité, tons ceux-la, et ceux-la seuls”; ibid., 205. Guizot, History of 
Representative Government, 62. See also Hare’s very Guizotian clarification that, though he pursued uniformity or “equality” 
in the franchise, he disowned the doctrine of “an equality of every man with every other, which the common sense of 
makind has in all ages repelled”; Hare, Election of Representatives, 260. 
 
1212 Ibid., 205. 
 
1213 Ibid., 205. 
 
1214 That is, each vote represents the same fraction of a member through the construction of unanimous constituencies. 
This is the subject of the next subsection. 
 
1215 Ibid., 67, 108. 
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education.1216 Hare’s own version of personal representation was inconsistent with the then-current 
operation of a plurality of votes in parliamentary elections through the property-owner’s or 
university affiliate’s belonging to multiple constituencies, but this incompatibility was due not to 
normative but to technical factors.1217 On the many versions of STV which had a different 
instantiation of constituencies than Hare’s, it would have been perfectly possible for “the same 
individual” to possess “more than one vote” in the sociological manner of the “present franchise” 
by casting a vote in several districts.1218 Indeed, this would almost certainly have been the default had 
PR ever been passed, and legislation would have been required to repeal this kind of plural voting as 
a separate measure. Moreover, all forms of PR are easily conjoined with the graduation of voting 
power, as would be done, for example, in turn-of-the-century Belgium.1219 The question of plural 
voting was one which divided the pro-PR community itself; anti-plural-voting PR supporters were 
far from taking for granted the abolition of plural voting but instead felt compelled to argue against 
it.1220 It was noted earlier that Bagehot accused Mill’s reform plans of being inadequately 
empowering of the working class. Regardless of whether Bagehot’s appraisal was correct, it should at 
                                                 
1216 Mill, Considerations, 474-9. See Hare’s approving remarks of such a possibility; Election of Representatives, 123. And see 
the remarks from Fawcett on the consistency of personal representation with the status quo at note 1196 above. 
 
1217 Because he wanted the entire United Kingdom to form a single constituency, his own version of PR was by necessity 
incompatible with this more “descriptive” form of plural voting; Hare, Election of Representatives, 123. On this, see 
subsection (c). 
 
1218 Ibid., 123. 
 
1219 Humphreys, Proportional Representation, 173. Similarly, in England many supporters of PR beyond Mill (such as 
Holyoake and Salisbury) would support some form of graduated voting. 
Hare also seems to have supported graduated voting in principle, since he wanted graduation based on rates of 
taxation to be preserved in municipal governance. See Election of Representatives, 288-90; “Ideal of a Local Government for 
the Metropolis,” Macmillan’s Magazine, vol. 7, no. 42 (Apr. 1863): 441-7. 
 
1220 See e.g. Henry Vere Hobart, “Parliamentary Reform,” Macmillan’s Magazine, vol. 13, no. 75 (Jan. 1866): 259-72, at 
271-2; Dodgson, Principles of Parliamentary Representation, 195. Dodgson’s antagonism to plural voting is particularly notable 
both because it runs counter to what we might have expected given his Toryism but also because of his typically colorful 
prose: “This arrangement would no doubt be unwelcome to certain ‘pluralists’ who are now able to vote in several 
different Districts….But even if no remedy were found, the justice of allowing one Elector to vote as if he were, ‘like 
Cerberus, three gentlemen at once,’ seems so doubtful that the objection hardly deserves serious consideration.” 
Dodgson, who had been intended for the priesthood, was punning here on the ecclesiastical meaning of pluralism, the 
infamous practice of bishops holding multiple benefices. 
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least now be apparent that Bagehot was driving at a real and surprising feature of Victorian personal 
representation: namely, that for its most famous defenders the suffrage and the vote-aggregation 
mechanism did not derive from a single, integrated normative framework. The latter had a diversity-
inclusive, freedom-enhancing rationale; the former depended on judgments of “quality and of 
worth.”1221 
The non-democratic character of personal representation’s approach to the suffrage, 
especially in the 1850s-60s, complicates what might otherwise have been a rather straightforward 
story about the return of consent as a value in electoral-representative theory. The broad Whiggish 
consensus about representation examined earlier did not see elections as devices for delivering 
consent; they were, rather, means for producing a desired composition of the assembly and a set of 
attendant benefits. Now, it might be imagined that STV fit right in with a more democratic direction 
of British politics over the latter half of the nineteenth century. The narrative would run as follows: 
advocates and theorists of democracy began to dissent from the consequentialist ethos that had for 
so long predominated. Against this, they held up the consent of every citizen to the government 
which rules him as a precondition for political legitimacy. This demanding vision of legitimacy 
required not only universal suffrage, but also the opportunity to cast a meaningful vote such that 
each citizen had a representative of his choosing in the assembly, in order to compensate for the 
impossibility of his participating directly in the making of the laws. PR, on this account, was of value 
by respecting, insofar as was feasible, the right of the individual to live under laws to whose 
formation he had contributed.  
Something of this view would gain traction, particularly from the mid-1880s onward.1222 But 
                                                 
1221 Hare, Election of Representatives, 271. 
 
1222 See e.g. Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” 953; Williams, Proportional Representation and 
British Politics, 1, 29; Finer, The Case Against PR, 4. 
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to Hare and the bulk of his first generation of supporters this vision did not apply.1223 As will occupy 
us in the next subsection, at Hare’s stage the PR movement was devoted to ideas which look a great 
deal like consent as it operates in modern democratic theory – such as the goal of realizing 
representation by giving each voter an MP for whom they voted and of augmenting the freedom of 
choice. But PR in its inaugural phase, and for many of its supporters throughout the duration of our 
period, did not equate the goal of making each elector’s vote effective in securing a member with 
any absolute, egalitarian notion of consent. 
In sum, due to its approach to the suffrage the debut of Harean PR was not an episode in 
the march of democracy. Not only was it not proposed as a species of democracy or an avenue 
toward its fuller realization. Because it embraced uniformity but not universality in the franchise, it 
could also be regarded as not even the most inclusive nondemocratic representative arrangement on 
offer. Compare two texts from 1857, Hare’s Machinery of Representation and Harris’s True Theory: the 
latter recognized a “democratic” imperative of a sort – namely, the inherent right of every individual 
to have a say in the government – and therefore it extended the suffrage universally though 
differentially and unequally. The former officially admitted nothing that could really be denominated 
democratic within the Victorian framework on these issues. 
Despite the rather “conservative” preferences of Hare and much of his initial following 
concerning the suffrage, Victorian PR’s relationship was never one of absolute hostility to 
democracy. From its first appearance – and even more so during and after the making of the Second 
Reform Act – the attractiveness of Hare’s scheme had much to do with the prospect of democracy. The 
point needs to be posed in this general way because PR had the odd property of having been desired 
in light of the likelihood that democracy was on the horizon more than because it was embraced by democrats 
                                                 
1223 The French case differed in the way that one might have expected; the earliest figure in the Hexagon who can 
accurately be called a theorist of PR, the mathematician Joseph Diaz Gergonne, conceived of his plan in terms of 
consent and individual right; see Gergonne, “Arithmétique Politique. Sur les élections et le système représentatif,” 
Annales de Mathématiques, vol. 10 (1820), 281-8, at 282, 285. 
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themselves. While there was always a subset of self-described democrats who latched onto PR from 
a feeling of fidelity to their democratic affiliation, it was more common for those fearful or skeptical 
of democracy to turn to Hare as providing a way to make democracy more palatable if it had to 
arrive.1224 Precisely because STV is a procedure for distributing votes to candidates whoever is casting 
the former, it was always available to be promoted in the event that universal suffrage was passed. As a 
result, even if PR accompanied by Hare’s own desires on the limits of the franchise were less 
empowering of the working class than the variety-of-suffrages alternatives, Hare’s scheme was less 
hostile to democracy than they were. This was for the simple reason that the variety of suffrages was 
in its essence an attack on uniform suffrage, whereas Hare’s innovation was incorporable into any 
suffrage arrangement. From the beginning, therefore, STV was marketed to the reluctant democrat: 
“it is not only consistent with the most democratic suffrage, but, by greatly mitigating its dangers, 
would probably reconcile to it many who are now among its most strenuous opponents.”1225 In a 
Tocquevillian spirit, Hare admonished those whose “fear of democratic progress” led them to 
ignore solutions which could cohere with the “principles” of “every democrat.”1226 STV had the odd 
property that, while not by nature democratic any more than it was by nature oligarchic, it 
nevertheless had the power of making democracy less bad. 
The reasons for this judgment about PR’s ameliorating effect on democracy will be dealt 
with in due course. What must be addressed now is the accuracy of Hare’s and Fawcett’s impression 
that, while STV was of benefit to democracy, it was neutral with respect to how one evaluated 
universal suffrage. It is true, as we have seen, that endorsement of it was not dispositive of any 
                                                 
1224 As usual, Dicey was perspicuous in identifying a shift in outlook: “[PR] was once considered a check upon 
democracy; it is not supported as the best method for giving effect to the true will of the democracy”; Dicey, Law of the 
Constitution, lxxiii. 
 
1225 Fawcett, “Hare’s Bill Simplified,” 29-30.  
 
1226 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 51-2. And see Mill, Speech on Personal Representation, 186: “Those who are anxious 
for safeguards against the evils they expect from democracy should not neglect the safeguard which is to be found in the 
principles of democracy itself.” 
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attitude to the suffrage.1227 But it might still be the case that democratic implications of a sort were 
embedded in the conceptual apparatus of STV. This is, I think, a correct depiction: from several 
angles there was an elective affinity or ideological kinship between STV as a vote-aggregation 
mechanism and uniform universal suffrage as a franchise regulation. A number of interlocking 
features of Hare’s invention are especially significant from this point-of-view. 
To begin with: as with the cumulative and limited vote, the concern to avoid the wasting of 
votes expressed an a-sociological approach to representation that aligned Victorian PR with Dicey’s 
democratic perspective. Again, nothing intrinsic to a commitment to descriptivism tout court would 
dictate concern about the efficacy of votes in returning a member; to see “wasted votes” as a 
problem demanded that one (at least implicitly) adopt other criteria for judging representation. This 
was perfectly clear to Victorians from the fact that support for PR was not confined solely to those 
who perceived great descriptive inadequacies in the contemporary Commons. While we will see later 
that an emphasis on diversity and polyphony was characteristic of most PR advocacy, it was not 
necessary to it, as is highlighted by the fact that two of the greatest Victorian technicians of PR, 
Droop and Dodgson, both thought an assembly characterized solely by a bifurcation between 
Liberals and Conservatives could be in “correspondence” to “the state of opinion in the 
country.”1228 In seeking to render each vote “successful,” PR campaigners appealed in the first 
instance to a notion of what was owed to the elector rather than to a picture of the desirable composition 
of the assembly (although of course this latter was supposed to come with the former being 
satisfied). Where Dicey expressed his opposition to sociologically-based thinking about 
representation in terms of fairness and avoidance of stacking the deck in favor of certain political 
                                                 
1227 Even beyond the evidence provided here, this is intuitively clear when we consider that decisions about PR or 
plurality rule do not resolve the matter of the where the age of enfranchisement should be set. 
 
1228 Henry Richmond Droop, “On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods of Electing Representatives,” 
(LSE Selected Pamphlets, 1869), 18; Francine F. Abeles, “Introduction to ‘Proportional Representation’,” in Political 
Pamphlets of Lewis Carroll, 119. And see Duncan Black, “The Central Argument in Lewis Carroll’s ‘The Principles of 
Parliamentary Representation’,” Papers on Non-Market Decision Making, vol. 3, no. 1 (1967), 1-17, at 1. 
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options against others, for Hare and company the preferred terminology for articulating the 
rejection of these modes of thought was that of realizing representation.1229 To be given a vote and yet 
not to contribute to the securing of a member of one’s choosing was to be given a kind of sham-
right; meaningful political participation, in the context of representative government, entailed 
effective exercise of the vote. “Political justice” in the domain of “the greatest moral object that 
society is called upon to undertake – the formation of a legislative assembly” was to be judged by 
whether the right of the individual citizen was actualized and not by judgments of the degrees of 
inclusion and power garnered by different groups in the Commons.1230 There was no formal 
mechanism internal to STV for attaining “sociological” goals; STV was, instead, an advance in 
representation insofar as it more reliably delivered a good to the person, namely, that of “enabl[ing] 
every elector – with the exception of an ultimate fractional number – to participate in the choice of 
some representative.”1231 Hare believed that the unit at the basis of the representative system was not 
groups but persons, and in this belief he seemed to be in company with the most radical wing of 
Victorian democratic theory.1232 Indeed, in this light Hareans appeared simply to be upping the 
democratic ante on plurality-rule democrats: if both of these camps judged the justice of the 
electoral system in terms of what it promised to each person, then the former went beyond the 
                                                 
1229 He spoke of “making representation a reality” and converting “the fiction [of representation] into the reality”; 
described the claim that someone was represented by a member for whom he had not voted as “an untruth”; asked his 
readers “whether we are to proceed towards a system of representation, or towards something else – not representation, 
but a substitute for it”; see Hare, Election of Representatives, xxxiv-xxxv, 128; “Representation of Every Locality and 
Intelligence,” Fraser’s Magazine, vol. 61, no. 134 (Apr. 1860), 527-43, at 532. Similar phrases abound throughout his 
writings. 
 
1230 Hare, Election of Representatives, 61, 65. 
 
1231 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 16. 
 
1232 Russell gives a curious illustration of this alliance between Hare and radical democracy in back-projecting the label of 
“personal representation” coined by Hare onto the rather crude arguments for universal suffrage of eighteenth-century 
popular reformers and ultimately onto Locke; Russell, English Government and Constitution, 176-7. 
We should note that, as we will see immediately below, this was not an obviously correct reading of the 
situation; certainly Hare did not accept that simply democratizing the franchise would yield “personal representation,” 
and the younger Grey, for instance, was admirably clear that that “the principle of individual as opposed to community 
representation” was not resolvable into the conflict of universal versus restricted suffrage; see e.g. Grey, “Proportional 
versus Majority Representation,” 936. 
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latter, guaranteeing everyone not only a vote but also an MP. It was more complete democracy; 
“true democracy,” as Mill called it.1233 
The important point here, though, is that this “personalistic” rather than “sociological” 
orientation not only could be claimed to deliver more democracy if universal suffrage were adopted, 
but actually inclined one to accept universal suffrage from its very logic. Four forces in particular 
pushed in this direction. First, PR supporters offered a set of criticisms targeted at arbitrariness that 
not only resembled, but actually took to an even more fundamental level those lodged by the likes of 
Dicey and Brodrick. For Hareans now moved to include as objectionably arbitrary any territorial 
divisions. While for Dicey and other first-past-the-post democrats an electoral system was suitably 
non-arbitrary if it distributed the vote equally and uniformly, for Hare all systems of representation 
except his own depended on the drawing of “arbitrary line[s]” and the making of “arbitrary 
selections.” 1234 They all relied on sorting electors in a way that could be judged inconsistent with the 
“fair share” of some group based on an opposed perspective.1235 The trouble for an admirer of 
Guizot such as Hare was, however, was that if the “geographical division[s]” and “the parade of 
distinct interests and distinct objects in the country and the town” which grounded the current 
                                                 
1233 Mill, Considerations, ch. 7; Speech in the Westminster Election of 1865 [4], 8 July 1865, in CW, vol. 28. See also John 
Dalberg-Acton, 1st Baron Acton, “Sir Erskin May’s Democracy in Europe,” in The History of Freedom and Other Essays 
(London: Macmillan, 1907), 97-8. The essay was originally published in the Quarterly Review, Jan. 1878. 
 
1234 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 26, see also 30; “Mr. Hare’s System: A Grouping of Parliamentary Electors that 
Combines a Just and Equal Distribution of Seats and the Free Expression both of Individual and Public Opinion 
with the Smallest Degree of Disturbance from Corrupt Influences,” in Transactions of the National Association for the 
Promotion of Social Science, Manchester Meeting, 1866, ed. George Hastings (London: Faithfull and Head, 1866), 202-8, at 207-
8. See also Election of Representatives xii, 34-5, 41-2, 46-8, 63-5. See also Percy Greg, “Redistribution,” 816-7; Hobart, 
“Parliamentary Reform,” 267; Williams, The Reform of Political Representation (London: John Murray, 1918), 4 and 
Proportional Representation and British Politics, 15-6. 
 In the German-speaking context, Kelsen and Weber, both proponents of PR, would turn similar argument 
from arbitrariness and contestability against the vogue for “corporatist” modes of representation. See e.g. Kelsen, The 
Essence and Value of Democracy, trans. Brian Graf (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 63-5; Weber, “Suffrage and 
Democracy in Germany,” in Political Writings, eds. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 80-129, at 88-94. 
 
1235 Hare, “Just and Equal Distribution,” 207. 
 381 
 
arrangements were “arbitrary,” then the signs of “capacity” were no less so.1236 There was no clearer 
criterion for intelligence or fitness than there was for sociological accuracy.1237 To “select for 
admission to the franchise only the best of the unrepresented classes” was as arbitrary a mission as 
to secure “due balance of interests” in the assembly; no less controversial “criterion” was available 
to “ascertain…intellect” than to pursue traditional mirroring aspirations.1238 As the great scholar and 
activist in international affairs Goldsworthy Lowes-Dickinson wrote in his summation of a century’s 
worth of change in theories and institutions of representation: “the watchwords” of “competency” 
and “varied interests” were equally resistant to any “measurements” that could deliver “finality” and 
perpetually liable to be given “new definition” by “any individual or any party” which disagreed; the 
“limit of competence” was as “shifting” and indeterminable a guideline as the “adequate 
representation of varied interests.”1239 Given their hostility to basing the representative system on (as 
they saw it) faux-objective judgments about the districts to which electors ought to belong, it was not 
clear why this same hostility did not apply to the wish to restrict access to the vote to those alone 
who were judged “able” to exercise it well. Put differently: if it violated principles of fairness and 
non-arbitrariness to dictate to “people themselves who are affected” the boundaries of the 
constituencies in which their votes were to count, why did not it violate these same principles to set 
                                                 
1236 Hare, Election of Representatives, 60, 65. For similar castigations of all kinds of fixed, “involuntary” constituencies as 
arbitrary/undemocratic in the modern literature, see e.g. Reeve and Ware, Electoral Systems, 46-7; Phillips, Politics of 
Presence, 106; Pogge, “Self-Constituting Constituencies,” 43; Rehfeld, Concept of the Constituency, 149; Robert Sugden, “Free 
Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation,” American Political Science Review, vol. 78, no. 1 (1984), 31-43, 
at 32. 
 
1237 See e.g. Ramsay MacDonald, Socialism and Government, vol. 1, 56-62; Kinnear, Principles of Reform, 2-3. Interestingly, 
Dupont-White attacked the doctrinaires on precisely these grounds; the translator for Hare’s greatest supporter was, thus, 
attacking one of Hare’s foremost inspirations. See Dupont-White, “Introduction” to Le gouvernement représentatif, xlii. 
 
1238 J. Holland Rose, The Rise of Democracy, second edition (London: Blackie & Son, 1904), 172-3; Salisbury (then Lord 
Cecil), “Theories of Parliamentary Reform,” 54. 
 
1239 Lowes-Dickinson, The Development of Parliament during the Nineteenth Century (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1895), 58-60. 
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a portion of the population outside the boundaries of the electorate altogether?1240 
The second democratic implication of STV stemmed from its promise to ensure each elector 
a representative, to leave no voter unrepresented through the waste of his vote on an unreturned 
candidate. Since the thought here – to wit, that there was something deficient about each voter not 
having been able to designate his representative – had no obvious descriptive basis, it might instead 
seem to draw on an underlying picture of democracy as a privileged mode of politics. Representation 
on this view was not a sociological or mirroring procedure but a proxy for a direct-democratic action 
that was no longer feasible; it was a concession to the fact that assemblies of the whole people were 
no longer possible. As Droop put it in 1869 (when England’s institutions were still quite far from 
instantiating one-man, one-vote) in laying out the perspective on representation which would be 
guiding his evaluation of “some of the different methods of election by which representative 
assemblies may be formed”: 
In a modem state the recognised mode of ascertaining the opinions of the people is to 
convene a representative assembly. This representative assembly has superseded the general 
assembly of all the citizens which we read of in classical and medieval republics….Instead of 
the various questions of legislation and government being brought directly before the whole 
body of citizens to discuss and vote upon, a certain number of persons, fixed upon by some 
process of election, are. deputed to represent the people, and the decisions of this 
representative assembly are accepted as equivalent to decisions of the whole body of 
electors.1241 
 
It was in light of this view that the Commons was to be seen as the functional equivalent of 
an assembly of the nation in toto that Droop would endorse STV: STV, in providing the closest thing 
to giving “to every vote an equal value,” was thereby enabling the closest approximation to a full 
democratic assembly.1242 (Recall that the variety-of-suffrages school, by contrast, simply rejected any 
                                                 
1240 Hare, Election of Representatives, 49. 
 
1241 Droop, “Political and Social Effects,” 1. His other most important essay in electoral theory begins on a similar note; 
“On Methods of Electing Representatives,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London, vol. 44, no. 2 (June 1881), 141-202. 
And see Hare on the “republics of antiquity”; Machinery of Representation, 43. 
 
1242 Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” 936. 
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such equivalency as undesirable; the decisions of a deliberative, representative assembly were not 
expected to reproduce what “mere numbers” would have preferred.) If representation was a 
contrivance to allow for “self-government” in an age in which citizens no longer all gathered 
together in the square, then it was required that, if each citizen was not able to perform their 
functions in person, each could be shown to have authorized a member to act on their behalf.1243 
Only with complete representedness in this sense could “the government of the whole by the 
whole” be achieved.1244 Thus the relationship between (a) the ambition to deliver a representative to 
each elector and (b) the commitment to democracy was a two-way street. It was not only, as is 
usually imagined, that some of those who were antecedently wedded to democratic principles came 
to value PR as a fuller realization of them. Influence ran equally in the opposite direction: Hare’s 
desire to realize representation for his electors preceded his acceptance of universal suffrage, but it 
seemed to call upon an implicitly direct-democratic imaginary about what was due to citizens. 
 A third democratic ramification of Hare’s “personalism” about representation was its 
elevation of the principle of majority rule. This can seem paradoxical given the lineage of PR in 
“minority representation” schemes, and indeed the nomenclature surrounding PR remained 
complicated; despite its best efforts, in pre-World War One England (in contrast to the Continent) 
PR never completely succeeded in shedding the “minority representation” label.1245 The question of 
                                                 
1243 Self-government became a popular rallying cry of the PR side, especially as the decades wore on; see e.g. Hare, “The 
Reform Bill of the Future,” Fortnightly Review, vol. 23, no. 133 (Jan. 1878), 75-84, at 84; Leonard Courtney, “The 
Representation of Minorities,” The Nineteenth Century, vol. 6, no. 29 (July 1879), 141-56, at 143. 
 
1244 Robert Lytton, “Report by Mr. Lytton, Her Majesty’s Secretary of Legation, on the Election of Representatives for 
the Rigsraad,” printed in Personal Representation, Speech of John Stuart Mill, Esq., M.P., Delivered in the House of Commons May 
29, 1867, with an Appendix, second edition (London: Henderson, Rait, and Fenton, 1867), 17-42, at 19. See also Courtney, 
“Representation of Minorities,” 149. 
 
1245 Shaw-Lefevre, for one, mocked the turn toward “proportional representation” over “minority representation” as a 
pitiful attempt at rebranding; see “Representation of Minorities,” 721. The perception that PR was anti-majoritarian was 
quite durable, despite the best efforts of many of its proponents to dispel it, even among some of the more sophisticated 
commentators on the topic: see e.g. Kinnear, “Practical Considerations on the Representation of Minorities,” Fortnightly 
Review, vol. 4, no. 19 (Feb. 1866), 49-64, at 55; Fawcett, “Proportional representation, from the last speech of the Right 
Hon. Henry Fawcett, M.P., delivered to his constituents at Hackney, October 13, 1884,” (Earl Grey Pamphlets 
 384 
 
whether this label was appropriate will be answered in the next subsection. But regardless of the 
answer on its status as minority representation, from Hare on it was a major boast that PR alone could 
guarantee majority rule; indeed, the distinction between representation and rule or decision was one 
of the fundamental conceptual pieces of the PR architectonic.1246 An assembly that was returned by a 
concatenation of local pluralities could very well contradict the principle that “the majority of those 
who vote at each election shall rule” and result in “minority control of [the] assembly.”1247 Only if 
the whole electorate possessed a member could one be certain that 51% of the membership of the 
assembly translated into 51% of voter support; on the other hand a majority of members who 
themselves had been elected by pluralities within their constituencies would often stand for only “a 
minority of the whole” instead of a “numerical majority” of the electorate at-large.1248 Without PR, 
there was no security against the government of false majorities.1249 
 Because this lesson about the “truth” of legislative majorities under PR is standard within the 
modern study of electoral systems, it is important to stress just how striking a departure this was 
from other visions of representation. The variety-of-suffragist was of course utterly unimpressed by 
any appeals to majorities outside the House; what was of significance to him was sociological rather 
                                                                                                                                                             
Collection, 1884), 1. 
 
1246 See e.g. Hare, Election of Representatives, xxx-xxxi; Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” 936; 
Fawcett, Leading Clauses, 20; Carstairs, Short History of Electoral Systems, 138 (on Victor Considérant). 
 In this context, it is notable that Hare was loathe to speak of his scheme as a solution to majority tyranny; 
despite his having been influenced by Tocqueville, the phrase was absent from his major works and he was more likely 
to decry the “tyranny of minorities”; Hare, “A Note on Representative Government,” Fortnightly Review, vol. 18, no. 103 
(July 1875), 102-7, at 102. See also his “Just and Equal Distribution of Seats,” 207. 
 
1247 Edmond Beales, W.R. Cremer, G.J. Holyoake, Walter Morrison, R.A. Cooper, George Odger, James Acland, 
Thomas Hare, and George Howell, “Representative Reform: Report of the Committee Appointed by the Conference of 
Members of the Reform League, and Others, on Mr. Hare's scheme of representation, held 28th February, & 7th & 21st 
March, 1868” (London: Trübner & Co., 1868), 4; Droop, “On Methods of Electing Representatives,” 144-5. See also 
John Lubbock, Representation (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1890), 5-6, 64. 
 
1248 Mill, Considerations, 304. 
 
1249 As was discussed in section one with respect to the cumulative and limited vote, the majoritarian element in PR was 
also related to its asociological character; when “interests” or “communities” are not ingrained in the system, only the 
aggregation of individual votes (and thus the units of majority and minority) can be invoked to justify a decision. 
 385 
 
than numerical fairness and accuracy. But even the conventional democrat was not especially 
concerned with the problem of majoritarianism as the PR champion understood it, that is, as a 
matter of assuring correspondence between degrees of support for a policy inside and outside the 
assembly.1250 Instead, he was principally concerned with equality in access to a right (the franchise), 
rather than with the accuracy of parliament in registering the distribution of political preferences or 
conveying exact demographic quotients of consent to particular policies. What he desired was just 
that the members of the House be elected on a “one-man, one-vote” basis; that “intra-house” 
majorities be identical to “extra-house” ones was no substantive worry of his. Approval of electoral 
democracy was detachable from the deepening of commitment to majoritarianism that was intrinsic 
to PR’s interpretation of the goal that “the whole nation [be] fairly represented in Parliament.”1251 
The latter – which we might call parliamentary majoritarianism as distinct from parliamentary democracy 
tout court to indicate that it rested the legitimacy of parliamentary decisions not on the equal 
extension of voting rights but on the assurance that a majority vote in the Commons conveyed 
majority consent “in the country”1252 – was the peculiar province of PR. 
 This expansion of what majority rule required implanted a democratic momentum to the 
theory of personal representation that the suffrage conservatism of some of its founding figures 
could not squelch. If nothing but “the predominance of majorities” understood in this demanding 
fashion could confer legitimacy on the decisions of the Commons,1253 it was far from obvious on 
what legs the restriction of the franchise to the capable could stand. In Hare, as we have noted, no 
                                                 
1250 Another method for ensuring that parliamentary decisions did not stray from the wishes of the national majority was 
the referendum, the movement for which gained steam with the second generation of PR support. The comparison 
between the campaigns for PR and the referendum is instructive in many ways, and will make up part of the chapter on 
the moral and practical controversy over PR once completed. 
 
1251 Millicent Garrett Fawcett, “Proportional Representation,” Macmillan’s Magazine, vol. 22, no. 131 (Sept. 1870), 376-82, 
at 382. 
 
1252 Ibid., 382. 
 
1253 Courtney, “Political Machinery,” 89. 
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clear answer was supplied; it just was a bedrock principle for him that legislative decisions needed to 
carry the authorization of what one might call a true majority of the capable, the capable being 
coextensive with the electorate.1254 But this was hardly satisfactory. If it were troubling that a 
majority in the Commons should not correspond to a majority out-of-doors, even though members 
of the Commons were presumed to be more informed and intelligent than the latter,1255 it was not 
clear why the regress needed to stop here: why should not the majority of those with capacité be 
made to align in some way with the majority of the whole?1256 Hare does not seem to have been 
especially bothered by the apparent capriciousness of his halting the momentum of his 
majoritarianism where he did. But there is no doubt that personal representation’s message that “not 
only an arithmetical misstatement, but also a great political injustice, takes place” when “true” 
majorities were not secured led, in many minds, to the embrace of an ideal of “government of the 
whole by the whole.”1257 To value electoral majorities so dearly seemed, to many, inseparable from 
support for democratic suffrage. 
 The fourth and final way in which the aspirations inherent in the single transferable vote 
pointed beyond the immediate issue of vote-aggregation and toward a democratized suffrage was in 
the rejection of virtual representation. Section one of this chapter showed that the original plans of 
minority representation contained a critique of virtual representation. This critique, though, was 
                                                 
1254 Characteristically, he quoted Guizot here: “representative government…seeks the majority from amongst those who 
are capable” [cherche ensuite la majorité parmi les capables]. For Guizot, unlike for Hare, limiting participation in representative 
government to les capables was not simply an isolated argument but stemmed from his cardinal theoretical commitment, 
the principle of the “sovereignty of reason.” Despite the epistemic emphasis of much of Hare’s thought, he cannot really 
be said to have been in command of any such theory. See above, ch. 4, note 729. 
 
1255 See e.g. Hare, Election of Representatives, fourth edition, 367. Hare was as ardent an objector to delegation as any of the 
figures discussed in this dissertation. 
 
1256 A similar thought underlay one of the traditional arguments against the ballot – namely, that where limited as 
opposed to democratic suffrage prevailed, the publicity of the vote helped to ensure some correspondence between the 
wishes of electors and non-electors by allowing the latter to “influence” the former; see e.g. Southgate, Passing of the 
Whigs, 92; Clarke, “Electoral Sociology of Modern Britain,” 40. While Hare was a great opponent of the ballot, he did 
not accept this argument against it – nor, given his faith in capacité, ought he to have done. 
 
1257 Lytton, “Report on the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad,” 19. 
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more often practical in nature; it expressed an anxiety that certain identifiable groups in identifiable 
sorts of constituencies were underserved by the status quo and that this threatened the functioning 
of an otherwise healthy system. Thus one departed from the rule in order to preserve it; minority 
representation as instantiated in the limited or cumulative vote was remedial of a defect in a system 
of which virtual representation was a major element more than it was an attempt at replacement. 
With Hare and company, however, the critique was deeper, and it was intended to be more absolute. 
To the proponents of PR, virtual representation was inadmissible as an aspect of representative 
government. 
  Frequently the way in which the PR community articulated its opposition to virtual 
representation was to speak of it as a “lie”; it was akin to telling someone that he was virtually rich 
because another person to whom some sort of relationship with him could be drawn was wealthy.1258 
“Virtual representation” was “false in fact”; to speak of “virtual” as against “actual” representation 
was simply to confess that “we have not had representation” at all.1259 To illustrate why it ought to 
have been conceived as a falsehood instead of as simply a less direct manner of being represented, 
Hareans often invoked arguments that were essentially descriptive – that is, they made claims about 
the fallaciousness of virtualism that turned on what we might say were mistakes in the sociology of 
opinion. The literature on PR abounds with such observations as the following to demonstrate the 
untruth of the contention that the adherents of an interest or party that lost in one district were 
represented just as well by victories won by this interest or party in other districts:  
To tell the Liberals of Kent and Surrey that they are represented by the Liberal members for 
Scotland and Wales [is misleading]….Perhaps the one question about which Kentish farmers 
care most is the subject of extraordinary tithes….But the farmers of Kent cannot expect the 
Liberal members from Scotland to help them as regards extraordinary tithes. It is possible 
                                                 
1258 Demonstrating the continuing impact of Bentham on Victorian political culture, the label used to express the 
denigration of virtual representation was frequently “fiction.” (This was Hare’s term of choice, for one; see e.g. 
“Representation in Theory and Practice,” 199-200; Election of Representatives, xxxv, 8, 90.) See Bentham, Bentham’s Theory of 
Fictions, ed. C.K. Ogden (New York: Harcourt, 1932). 
 
1259 Percy Greg, “Redistribution,” 810; Hare, Election of Representatives, 128. 
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that they do not even know what extraordinary tithes are.1260 
 
The idea of the minority in one place being represented by the majority in another is 
certainly ingenious, but it overlooks the fact of there being any differences between 
members of the same political party. There are Liberals and Liberals, and it was probably no 
source of consolation to Mr. Mill’s supporters in Westminster that in Marylebone Mr. 
Harvey Lewis had been returned….It may perhaps be replied that the English Catholics 
[who returned no members] had no reason to be dissatisfied [since many Irish Catholics 
were turned]….but it is extremely unlikely that Catholics in Ireland exactly coincide, even in 
questions bearing on their faith, with the opinions of Irish Catholics.1261 
 
A run of bad luck in one part of the country is not adequately balanced by a run of good 
luck for the same party in another part. If Scotch Unionists are under-represented, they are 
not fully compensated by English Unionists being over-represented.1262 
 
Rather mundane testimonials like these abounded in order to drive home the distortions which the 
“false assumption” that a losing group could be “adequately compensated” by other electoral results 
introduced into the system and thus to prove the inconsistency of virtual representation with 
parliament’s standing as “a mirror of the nation.”1263 
On this logic, then, what undermined “the old and exploded” contention about being 
“virtually represented” was that it would inevitably involve drawing false equivalences between 
different sets of beliefs.1264 This was not a merely remedial or practical objection, such as that 
covered above; it was, rather, a principled objection insofar as it alleged that virtualism could not help 
but run together unlike sets of ideas and preferences.1265 But although it was a principled critique 
rather than one targeting a difficulty of implementation, it was still firmly lodged within the domain 
of the sociology of opinion – and this characteristic led it into theoretical difficulties regarding the 
degree of correspondence between the beliefs of constituents and MPs reminiscent of those 
                                                 
1260 Lubbock, Representation, 18-9. 
 
1261 MG Fawcett, “Proportional Representation,” 377, 379. 
 
1262 Meredith, Proportional Representation in Ireland, 11. 
 
1263 Meredith, Proportional Representation in Ireland, 11; Lubbock, Representation, 64. 
 
1264 Lubbock, Representation, 18. 
 
1265 It resembles in shape the modern worry that introducing descriptive criteria into representation is necessarily 
essentializing. 
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addressed earlier under the heading of Greg’s problem. 
The trouble was this: implicit in the “descriptive” line of this hard critique of virtualism was 
the identification of the status of being represented with a complete agreement of opinion with 
oneself and one’s representative.1266 Short of this unanimity, Sorites-style problems about where to 
draw the line between sufficient and insufficient agreement would arise that would open the door 
for virtual representations claims about the representativeness of current arrangements to reenter: 
who could say that the overlap between Liberals from Kent and Scotland, or between Catholics 
from England and Ireland, was not enough to make the “compensation” of one by the other 
defensible?1267 And yet, first, PR theorists were in no way ready to guarantee this unanimity, as is 
clear from their rejection of delegation.1268 This rejection was premised on the grounds both of the 
superiority in intellect and expertise of the MP and the incompatibility of deliberation with dictation 
from the constituency, but via both paths it contradicted the full identity of views that was necessary 
for a completely descriptive rebuttal of virtual representation. Second, because it was a sociological 
claim, it had to fit the facts, which were disputable. On the one hand, if there were not a great deal 
of ideological diversity, but the country was rather (as some thought, especially during those periods 
when a Liberal-Conservative duopoly looked sturdiest) naturally divided into two blocks of partisan 
allegiance, then PR seemed much less urgent and perhaps hardly an improvement at all upon the 
present system.1269 But there could not be too much diversity, lest even the members returned by 
                                                 
1266 This point about the degree of agreement with one’s representative is related in interesting ways to the anti-partyism 
of British PR, as can be glimpsed at Williams, Proportional Representation and British Politics, 18. 
 
1267 Hare, Election of Representatives, 10. For related thoughts in the modern literature, see Reeve and Ware, Electoral Systems, 
80; Phillips, Politics of Presence, 157. 
 
1268 The PR movement, which was fractured along several dimensions, was at one in rejecting delegation: see e.g. Mill, 
“Tocqueville on Democracy in America [1],” 74 and Considerations, 510-2; Moisei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the 
Organization of Political Parties trans. Frederick Clarke, two vols. (London: Macmillan, 1902), 606-7; Wordsworth 
Donisthorpe, Individualism: A System of Politics (London: Macmillan, 1889), 52. And see note 1255 above. 
 
1269 Gladstone, “Declining Efficiency,” 560, 567; Parsons, “Ignis Fatuus vs. Pons Asinorum,” 376-9; Finer, The Case Against 
PR, 13; Shaw-Lefevre, “Representation of Minorities,” passim; Dicey, Law of the Constitution lxviii-lxx. And see Hobart, 
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PR’s voluntary constituencies seem no more than the products of ill-fitting coalitions that lacked the 
degree of unity for which their member could be said to stand in some kind of descriptive 
relationship.1270 An immutable match between this sociology of opinion and PR in any of the 
versions in which it was promulgated was a thin reed on which to hang their advocacy. There was, in 
short, no airtight case for replacing virtual representation with PR on descriptive grounds alone.1271 
As a result, in the final accounting the critique of virtual representation had to hinge on the 
necessity of electoral authorization. It was possible to endorse STV solely for technical reasons, as a 
mechanism that better accomplished the mirroring goals that animated the variety of suffrages; those 
who did so were not especially exercised by the urgency of eliminating virtual representation, and 
their subscription to STV was therefore more circumstantial and pragmatic.1272 But from this vantage 
point it was not possible to make the adoption of STV itself a matter of justice; instead, one could only 
treat it as a means – and not an inarguably superior one – to the just ends of representation. But as 
we have observed, this position was not enough for Hare or for most of his successors: they did see 
their reforms as matters of justice because justice demanded that the myth of virtual representation 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Parliamentary Reform,” 265 for an excellent summary of how satisfaction with the plurality-rule status quo was tied to 
a perception of the naturalness of party dualism. 
 
1270 The trouble, in other words, was this: if “all great subjects” really were so “many sided” that, as on a standard 
caricature of On Liberty, there were as many shades of political opinion as there were citizens, the notion that even PR 
could be truly descriptive would collapse; see Hare, Machinery of Representation, 42. One version of this criticism was 
Frederic Harrison’s mockery of Hare. Harrison believed Hare had voiced “the reductio ad absurdum of representation” 
because of the difficulties involved in the latter’s assumption that “each Member of Parliament expresses…the dogmatic 
convictions of his particular constituency”; Order and Progress, 158. And see note 1167 above. 
 
1271 This is perfectly clear from the fact, on which we have already touched, that it was possible to see PR as the next 
stage in descriptive representation, one better adapted to electoral democracy – a technical successor to traditional 
variety-of-suffragism rather than a revolution in representation, so to speak. On this continuity-based framing, virtual 
representation was far from any kind of categorical wrong; it was just outdated. See e.g. Albert Grey, “Proportional 
versus Majority Representation,” 935-7; Percy Greg, “Redistribution,” 808. See also on this point, very suggestively, the 
use which Sir John Lubbock, arguably the leading light of STV in the 1880s made not only of Grey but also of Bagehot 
as authorities in his work; Lubbock, Representation, i, 71. 
 
1272 In addition to the authors in the previous footnote, see Salisbury’s verdict that there was no electoral system whose 
instantiation was itself a matter of justice and that all were simply to be judged by how well they contributed to the 
descriptive “end” of representation; Salisbury, “The Value of Redistribution: A Note on Electoral Statistics,” in Political 
Pamphlets of Lewis Carroll, 227-47, at 242, 230. The article was originally published in National Review, Oct. 1884. In light of 
this view, it is not surprising that Salisbury was never more than an occasional supporter of PR. 
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be expelled from the system, since this latter was just a cover for the fact that, not only those 
without the franchise, but even many “electors are not represented.”1273 The non-negotiable, justice-
demanding character of personal representation was a matter of ending this “disfranchisement” 
inherent in the plurality-rule system.1274  
Yet if it was an injustice to “disfranchise” by rendering a vote inefficacious through its 
having been cast for a failed candidate, it was hard to see why it was not a greater injustice to leave 
large swathes of the population altogether without the vote. Indeed, precisely because the advent of 
STV promised to erase all traces of virtual representation within the electorate, it made non-
possession of the suffrage itself stand out as a more glaring deprivation. On the old descriptivist 
model, there was a continuum of groups who were marginalized from the perspective of electoral 
efficacy – American colonists, residents of cities like Manchester before 1832, minorities within a 
specific constituency – who were nevertheless adequately spoken for in the Commons due to the 
variegation that marked the system as a whole. But given that personal representation dismissed all 
of this as a fiction, the limitations on the franchise which Hare and company continued to endorse 
gave their system a forbidding air of exclusivity. The opponents of democracy covered in chapters 3-
4, after all, defended their restrictions on the suffrage on the grounds that these improved the 
descriptiveness and inclusivity of the assembly. Hare’s proposal, however, was premised on denying 
that it was legitimate to pursue the goal of inclusivity by this means. Since inclusivity was a widely-
shared value of British parliamentarism, there was strong ideological pressure on Victorian thinkers 
who were attracted to PR to make their system more compatible with the ideal of the inclusive 
constitution in the only way available to them: by extending the franchise to all.1275 If personal 
                                                 
1273 Hare, Election of Representatives, 8; Mill, Speech on Personal Representation, 178. 
 
1274 E.g. Mill, “Recent Writers on Reform,” 357, 359, 364; Considerations, 448, 453. 
 
1275 For this reason it is not coincidental that many of the great figures in British PR – Mill, Hare, the Fawcetts, among 
others – were also strong supporters of the women’s suffrage movement. 
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representation’s attack on virtualism contained the judgment that “a government is not good which, 
as to numbers of its people…allows them no voice in the choice of their legislators,” 1276 then it is no 
surprise that only a minority of its adherents ultimately declined to cast their support as part of a 
larger project for electoral democracy.1277 
Personal representation’s hostility to virtual representation was so stark that it supplied an 
almost irresistible democratic impulse to the movement in spite of the reservations of some of its 
major figures. But how was this transcendence of virtualism to come about? The means by which 
personal representation would accomplish this was through a revolution in how constituencies 
would be constructed. This is the subject of the next subsection. 
 
b) The Voluntary Constituency 
 This subsection brings us to what is really the key institutional departure of personal 
representation: its reimagination of the nature of the constituency. As we have already begun to see, 
many issues are involved in the debate between PR and plurality-rule systems (and between the 
many variations of each), and STV as presented by Hare claimed to deliver improvements along 
several dimensions: to equalize the value of each vote; to eliminate the waste of votes; to make each 
elector the authorizer of a member of the assembly; to create a Commons that “registered [public 
opinion] with an accuracy resembling that of a thermometer.”1278 But the technical amendment that 
was to make all of these goods possible was the move to a new kind of constituency. In short, the 
most basic conceptual question underlying the STV mechanism was: what is a constituency? 
 The simplest way to characterize the revolution in the constituency which wrought by 
                                                 
1276 Hare, Election of Representatives, xxi. 
 
1277 E.g. Lubbock, Representation, 2. 
 
1278 Hare, Election of Representatives, 239. 
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Harean PR was that it changed constituencies from the settings in which discrete, pre-arranged 
blocks of citizens voted to groupings of voters fabricated by the distribution of votes itself. In other 
words, in a sense the main difference between Hare’s proposal and the status quo was temporal: from 
being settled before the election, constituencies were now to be constructed after the election by the 
action of the elector qua elector.1279 But this is only one way of construing the change that personal 
                                                 
1279 This is an opportune moment for a digression onto French soil. By far the most trenchant analyst of PR in 
nineteenth-century France is Pierre Rosanvallon. However, when we recognize that the nature of the constituency is 
truly what marks off PR from more long-established genres of descriptivism, we can see that he in fact misdates the 
origin of the French PR movement. For Rosanvallon, this begins with the moderate-liberal lawyer and assemblyman 
Pierre-François Flaugergues. Rosanvallon sees Flaugergues as the originator of PR because the latter not only had a 
commitment to mirroring and pluralism in the assembly, but also linked this commitment to the idea that while the 
assembly’s membership should be diverse, this diversity ought to stem from electoral divisions that were homogenous 
within themselves; And yet, because (as Rosanvallon himself notes) Flaugergues’s system was based on fixed, class-based 
constituencies anchored in an antecedent sociology that determined the “natural fissures” in society and the relation of 
these different groups to one another, Flaugergues is best likened to the class-specific segment of the variety-of-suffrages 
school. As has been a major theme throughout the whole second half of this dissertation, the attachment to mirroring 
was consistent with a variety of very different electoral arrangements and of different assumptions about the 
homogeneity of the groups being represented. Instead of as a founder of PR, then, it is more appropriate to see 
Flaugergues as a French variety-of-suffragist. (While this school was never popular in France, it was not nonexistent. As 
Will Selinger has shown, a few French Anglophiles of the early nineteenth century, such as Simonde de Sismondi and 
Auguste De Staël, rejected the revolutionary heritage of uniformity of suffrage.) Since Rosanvallon does not recognize 
the variety of suffrages as a separate tradition in the history of representation, however, it is difficult for him to approach 
Flaugergues’s astonishing pamphlet as anything but an imperfect adumbration of PR. 
 Rosanvallon’s analysis is still perspicuous, though, because Flaugergues did play a role in the inception of 
French PR, namely, as an inspiration for Gergonne. (On the latter, see above, note 1223.) This connection between the 
two Frenchmen is a strong piece of evidence for the continuity side of the story about the relationship of PR and older 
models of descriptive representation; Gergonne took himself to be pursuing the same end as Flaugergues and offering a 
mere, though, vital refinement of the means. 
 A few miscellaneous points about Flaugergues are worth mentioning in connection with the broader themes of 
this dissertation. First, he is further evidence of just how sophisticated the empirical phase of the design of variety-of-
suffrages institutions could be; paralleling the “Reformer” of chapter three who took into account the relative levels of 
political energy of the different classes in deciding on the regulation of the franchise, Flaugergues incorporated theses 
from political psychology into his distribution of seats. He believed that France was divided into upper, middle, and 
lower classes, and that each constituted a third of the nation rightly understood. However, in order to achieve the due 
equality of influence between “la grande propriété,” “la moyenne propriété,” and “la petite propriété,” it was necessary 
not to give each a third of the deputies but to assign them in the ratios of 2/9, 1/3, and 4/9, respectively. This 
“overrepresentation” of the “petits propriétaires” was required because of the social-psychological fact of deference, 
which he estimated would diminish the true electoral power of distinctly lower-class interests and views by something on 
the order of one-quarter of its natural weight. 
 Second, Flaugergues had an apparatus of argumentation for the epistemic virtues of parliamentary deliberation 
as sophisticated as that of his English counterparts, and he articulated a concept of public reason (“la raison publique”) 
that resonates in some ways with the concept as used today. Notably, however, he put the gains to stability of a National 
Assembly that balanced and included all classes at the top of the list of its virtues. This prioritization of the “principe 
d’harmonie sociale” comprehended in his vision of class representation reflects the sense of political turmoil and 
uncertainty during the Bourbon Restoration. 
 Finally, he gave an extraordinary account of deliberation that applied (how consciously is difficult to say) long-
established views from the philosophy of mind to the assembly. For Flaugergues, including diversity within the assembly 
was a matter of securing the assembly’s freedom. He treated the assembly as a corporate agent with a corporate 
consciousness (possessing an “ame générale”) that, depending on the condition of its “passions,” could be either “free” 
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representation made. Another way of putting the point is in terms of identity and affiliation. On all 
the other models of representation, the pre-arrangement of constituencies imparted to the elector an 
affiliation additional to the object of his vote. Beyond voting for candidate so-and-so, the elector 
was also a member of such-and-such geographical (or professional or class) constituency. Under 
personal representation, the elector was identifiable with nothing beyond his chosen candidate; there 
was no intermediary level of association between the voter and the candidate. With the erasure of 
established constituencies, Harean STV left only the voters themselves as the material of the 
electoral system, and this step of taking the electors solely as such as the be-all-and-end-all of political 
representation was truly unprecedented. 
 The abolition of fixed constituencies was the technical feature that lay behind the widespread 
depiction, usually meant negatively, of PR as “individualistic.”1280 The debate about the 
                                                                                                                                                             
or not. Securing diversity within the assembly became in his eyes a prerequisite not just for better decisions but for its 
making decisions at all, as opposed to simply being determined to act by passions in such a way that “the reason” could 
not be said to “have any hold.” Here is how he summed up the relationship between the assembly’s diversity, its 
deliberativeness, and its liberty: “Les assemblées composées d'hommes ayant des intérêts et des passions homogènes, ne 
sauraient donc être libres; elles sont enchaînées par la passion commune. Si de telles assemblées ne sont pas libres, elles 
ne valent rien comme assemblées délibérants. Il faut, pour que la raison ait quelque prise, qu’il y ait diversité d’intérêts et 
de passions.” In other words, freedom consisted in the capacity to stand back from the passions and desires and to 
reflect on them so that one’s choices came only after examination of all the courses available. In a collective body, this 
suspension of immediate desires could only result from the presence of several interests such that a “passion commune” 
could develop only after the exchange of views about the best way to proceed, rather than be present from the beginning 
simply as a result of the likeness of the members. This view of the sources of an assembly’s liberty closely resembles 
Locke’s account of the liberty “of intellectual beings” as the “power to suspend the prosecution of any desire” and 
instead “to examine, view, and judge, of the good or evil that we are going to do”; it transposes a view about the nature 
of free agency in a person to an assembly. It also contrasts with most discussions about the freedom of the legislature, 
which tend to focus on external conditions; if forces outside the assembly (the crown, public opinion) impacted its 
conduct, then it was unfree. What Flaugergues was concerned with, on the other hand, were the internal conditions of the 
chamber’s liberty. While I think that his analysis coheres with the theories of the Commons that we have been looking 
at, it is fair to say that the Frenchman differed from his British opposites in addressing this subject explicitly in terms of 
the internal sources of corporate liberty. 
See Rosanvallon, Le peuple introuvable, 139-42; Flaugergues, De la representation nationale et principes sur la matière des 
élections (Paris: Barrois l’aîné, 1820), e.g. 10-2, 15-7, 26-7, 63, 66-7, 75-6, 85-8; Selinger, Philosophers in Parliament: The Crises 
of Eighteenth-Century Constitutionalism and the Nineteenth-Century Liberal Parliamentary Tradition (Dissertation, Harvard 
University, 2015), 169-71; Gergonne, “Arithmétique Politique,” 282-3; Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(New York: Penguin, 1997), ed. Roger Woolhouse, II.xxi.47-53. 
 
1280 The criticism of the individualism of PR ran the gamut from traditional “Whiggish” interpreters of the representative 
system to more radical ideologies such as positivism; see e.g. Harrison, Order and Progress, 158; Leslie Stephen, “Value of 
Political Machinery,” 845; T.H. Green, “Lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy [1867],” in CW, vol. 5, 154; Kent, 
Brains and Numbers, 151. 
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appropriateness of applying this term was fierce and, most importantly, multilayered, even if these 
layers were seldom distinguished with precision by the participants. For three separate issues could 
be subsumed under this label: (a) the technical issue of how voters were to be grouped; (b) the units 
to which in practice PR sought to give representation; and (c) the broader sociopolitical 
consequences of implementing the system. The last question, which might more properly be 
described as the question of whether PR was individualizing or atomizing in its effects, belongs to a 
discussion of the “moral” side of the controversy; the second question will be treated in subsection 
(d). As for (a), on this score it undoubtedly warranted the label. Hare’s method of personal 
representation was individualistic in a strict sense; its machinery, its method, made use of no 
“corporate” elements. This was just what it meant to jettison the pre-arranged constituency. 
 These two novelties – the elimination of corporate elements and the construction of 
constituencies through rather than before the casting of votes – were aspects of the central innovation, 
the “voluntary” constituency.1281 That Hare considered this voluntariness to be the staple of personal 
representation was clear from his definition of the “opposite” of his system as one founded on 
“involuntariness” in drawing constituencies through, e.g. “geographical, local, and corporate 
divisions of electors.”1282 The substitution of involuntary for voluntary constituencies made possible 
a further change, namely, that constituencies would be unanimous rather than divided. The unanimity 
of constituencies is often thought of as the distinguishing mark of PR relative to first-past-the-post, 
and for good reason; many of the great gains which have been claimed for it from its inception 
through the present day – such as the end of the waste of votes and the exact replication of electoral 
opinion – are really artifacts of unanimity. And even as Hare saw it, the creation of these 
“unanimous constituencies” was the capstone of his proposal; the “principle of unanimity” in the 
                                                 
1281 Hare, Election of Representatives, esp. ch. 2. 
 
1282 Ibid., xl, 40-1. Andrae saw it in the same light; Andrae, Andrae and His Invention, 14. 
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return of members was the telos of the complex apparatus which he had devised.1283 But unanimity 
was the result of voluntariness; it was only because he had figured out a way to do without the 
assignment of voters to set districts that he could accomplish the goal of “unanimity of choice” of 
candidate.1284 In the slogan “voluntary unanimity,” the adjective was prior and fundamental, and the 
noun came downstream of it.1285 
 How did Hare and Victorian PR conceptualize their voluntarism about constituencies? Most 
generally, they conceived it as a system of individual liberty. Freedom is a dominant theme running 
through British literature on PR and, I would submit, is more basic to its normative architecture 
than mirroring; at the very least, its emphasis on this value was distinctive, and much of the moral 
and intellectual improvement which it promised was premised on the way that liberty affected 
electors.1286 Hare was especially emphatic about its libertarian credentials; indeed probably none of 
his successors ever reached his pitch of his enthusiasm for freedom, which led him to tinker with the 
nomenclature for his reform. “The system here proposed,” he wrote, might best be denominated 
“the system of individual independence” since its chief impact was to accomplish “liberation” and 
“freedom of action in representative institutions”; the “basis” and “condition” of all his work was 
“individual independence.”1287 His was the “free electoral system” built upon the “free action of 
                                                 
1283 Hare, Election of Representatives, vii, 28. 
 
1284 Ibid., 24. 
 
1285 Ibid., 195. 
 
1286 Both of the other traditions we have examined were in accord with the operation of the reformed system in paying 
little mind to electoral freedom; see e.g. Michael J. Turner, “Political Leadership and Political Parties, 1800-46,” in A 
Companion to Nineteenth-Century Britain, ed. Chris Williams (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 125-39, at 136. 
For this reason PR has tended to attract those thinkers who wish to prioritize freedom over equality as the 
primary value of democracy; see e.g. Ostrogorski, Democracy and Political Parties, vol. 2, 661, 702; Kelsen, Essence and Value 
of Democracy, 72, 97; Urbinati, Mill on Democracy, 78. Urbinati is wrong to proclaim Mill’s uniqueness in highlighting liberty 
as the great advantage of PR; although they do not dig into the historical context, Bogdanor and Lakeman are far more 
correct to see this electoral libertarianism as in keeping with “mid-Victorian liberalism”; What Is Proportional 
Representation?, 77; Lakeman, How Democracies Vote, 111. 
 
1287 Hare, Election of Representatives, vii, xxxvi, 140-2, 216-218, 169, 256.  See also Hare, “John Stuart Mill,” Westminster 
Review, vol. 45, no. 1 (Jan. 1874): 122-59, at 150: “Its fundamental principle is, in fact, a corollary of that of Individuality. 
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electors” as channeled into “free constituencies.”1288 These liberty-emphasizing names and slogans 
were more faithful than some of the others associated with “proportionalism” or “personalism” 
because his “cardinal idea” had been to “give to every voter this freedom”: “at the root of all real 
reform [lies] the question of the measure of individual power and liberty of action which shall be 
afforded to the electors.”1289 Later generations of Victorian proportionalists agreed: their goal was to 
inaugurate the era of the “free and independent elector,” to establish a “régime of liberty.”1290 So 
resounding was this libertarian strain among PR advocates that its opponents, such as the great 
Fabian activist and political scientist Graham Wallas, would turn it against them, mocking them for 
inflating the importance of the elector’s freedom out of all proportion to its practical significance in 
a way that resembles what I described earlier as the critique of Mill’s “fetishism” of diversity.1291 The 
nature of this attack confirms that Victorian STV was reckoned with in great part as a theory of the 
political liberty of the individual within the framework of representative government; it would stand 
or fall, it was widely perceived, based on whether its conceptual and predictive claims about liberty 
were sound. 
 As would be expected from a theory of electoral liberty, the freedom associated with STV 
centered on the conditions of choice. To this there were two dimensions. Unfortunately, while they 
were distinguished in the literature of the time, the terms applied to them were not very stable and 
could be confusing. Here are a couple of Hare’s attempts to categorize the two lines along which his 
scheme would enrich improve the conditions of choice. He would: (1) (a) “relieve every elector 
                                                                                                                                                             
It puts forward in a practical shape the necessity of freedom for individual action.” 
 
1288 Ibid., 108, 114-5. Similarly, Andrae offered the system of “free election” as the best name for his scheme, since its 
chief characteristic was that of “making election a free act”; Andrae, Andrae and His Invention, 34. 
 
1289 Hare, “Individual Responsibility,” 352; “Reform Bill of the Future,” 76. 
 
1290 Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” 954; Courtney, “Political Machinery,” 85. 
 
1291 See Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, ed. Sugwon Kang (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 232-
5. And see Wallas, “The American Analogy,” Independent Review, vol. 1, no. 3 (1901), 505-16: “Undoubtedly it makes the 
citizen more ‘free’….But is he more likely to be right?” 
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wholly from any extraneous control” and (b) “give him an unrestricted choice from among all his 
countrymen”; his plan could secure two desiderata, both (2) (a) “freedom of choice” and (b) “extent of 
choice.”1292 Hare judged in the end that the latter formulation was not adequate – and this was 
because he had a maximalist vision of liberty that considered that one was freer the wider one’s field 
of choice was; he denied that an unimpeded “Hobson’s choice” could be called free, at least in the 
electoral sphere.1293 But juxtaposing the two phrasings does highlight the dual nature of the freedom-
enhancing project intrinsic to the voluntary constituency as he understood it. The single transferable 
vote was meant both (a) to reduce the dependence of the efficacy of one’s vote on the electoral 
conduct of others and (b) to widen the range of candidates from whom electors could pick. 
To take the first dimension first: the primary work of an institution of electoral liberty was to 
secure non-interference. STV’s “first” object was “that the conduct of others, whatever it be, may in 
no respect interfere with [the elector’s] free exercise of his own political functions, and that he may 
be enabled to select the candidate in whom he has the most confidence, without regard to the 
sinister or other influences by which any portion of the constituency may be actuated.”1294 How did 
STV achieve this reduction of interference? It did this by lifting certain constraints which existed 
solely as a function of plurality-rule elections in fixed constituencies. These constraints stemmed 
from the fact that under the current system the success of a candidate was a matter not of his 
earning a certain proportion of the overall vote (the quota) but of his having beaten other candidates. 
Making the return of a candidate contingent on his beating other contenders caused two linked 
kinds of dependence. 
First, in the eyes of Hare and his disciples, the dominance of parties and the power of their 
                                                 
1292 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 34; Election of Representatives, 140. 
 
1293 Ibid., 140; Hare et al, “Representative Reform Report,” 17. 
 
1294 Hare, “Note,” 105. 
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“wire-pullers” over the nomination of candidates was tied to the plurality-rule territorial system. 
Once party-machines settled on a candidate for a district, they could pressure all other even slightly 
sympathetic citizens who wished to run to stay away from the race lest the even worse option put up 
by another party slip in on a divided vote.1295 And if a less popular figure or one less subordinate to 
party dictates had the fortitude to present himself anyway, voters in agreement with him would have 
to weigh their desire to cast their vote for the person they sincerely endorsed against the likelihood 
that doing so would redound to the benefit of those politicians who were farthest from him 
ideologically. Thus the voter was not free in the sense that, if he were to desire that his vote be 
efficacious, he could not simply vote his sincere preferences but would have to take into account 
strategic considerations such as electability.1296 A second point – which was to a degree implicit in 
the problem of having to vote based on electability – was that an aspiring MP’s fate was determined 
not just by the amount of support he inspired, but also the amount of dislike which he elicited. On 
the current arrangements an incumbent could have the same number of supporters as in a previous 
election, but yet could lose a reelection campaign because a small knot of residents, who perhaps 
had not even voted previously, had joined the ranks of an opponent solely to block him – and, it 
was typically thought, had done so only at the instigation of party wire-pullers.1297 In such conditions 
voters were dependent in the sense that the return of their preferred candidate was put at the mercy 
of the sentiments and actions of others who did not endorse him.1298 
                                                 
1295 E.g. Hare, Election of Representatives, 85-6. 
 
1296 It was characteristic of PR supporters to deplore strategic voting as immoral in its own right, as well as a distortion 
of the representative aims of an electoral system; e.g. Dodgson, A Method of Taking Votes on More Than Two Issues, in 
Political Pamphlets of Lewis Carroll, 46-58, at 56-7. 
 
1297 E.g. Williams, Proportional Representation and British Politics, 62; Edward Hugessen Knatchbull-Hugessen, 1st Baron 
Brabourne, “Redistribution of Political Power,” Macmillan’s Magazine, vol. 27, no. 157 (Nov. 1872), 67-76, at 73. 
Knatchbull-Hugessen, an important Liberal politician of 1860s-70s, was sympathetic to Hare but ultimately preferred an 
idiosyncratic form of the cumulative vote. 
 
1298 Intriguingly, this genre of dependence was also given the label “swamping”; e.g. Max Kyllman, “Mr. Hare’s System 
of Personal Representation,” LSE Selected Pamphlets (reprinted from the Examiner and Times, 2 Oct. 1866), 1. As Kyllman 
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 Calling this a system of “individual independence” or “personal liberty” was, strictly 
speaking, inaccurate; the promises of Hare and company notwithstanding, in a collective project like 
electing representatives, “a perfect freedom of action in choosing their representatives” could never 
in fact obtain at the level of individual voters and had to remain something more like a regulative 
ideal.1299 The efficacy of any individual vote was not quite independent, even if the cruder kinds of 
dependence in local plurality-rule arrangements had been eliminated. For all its individualism, “the 
liberation of individual electors from a compulsory union with others” (that is, the voluntary 
constituency) did not achieve the complete emancipation of the individual.1300 Instead, what it did 
was to guarantee the independence of all “particular groups of voters” equal to the quota in size.1301 
Every “quota of voters” could now be secure in placing their candidate regardless of any 
“manoeuvres” elsewhere in the electorate, since quotas were insulated from the shifts in preferences 
and tactics of voters who supported other candidates.1302 No set of voters could pool their combined 
strength to keep out a candidate with a quota of support behind him.  
In sum, the unit whose independence was guaranteed was the quota, not the individual. But 
since a representative body made up of a series of quota-earners did loosen constraints placed on 
voters under first-past-the-post systems by giving each voter a greater margin for efficacious action, 
the individualistic-libertarian tone in which personal representation was often presented did capture 
                                                                                                                                                             
made clear, the problem was also linked to the issue of corruption, since the little clutches of swing voters might have 
voted against a candidate because they were bribed to do so. This will be dealt with in the forthcoming chapter on PR’s 
moral benefits. 
 
1299 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 34. 
 
1300 Hare, Election of Representatives, 113. 
 
1301 Ibid., xiii. This difference is made apparent by a comparison of On Liberty with the Considerations. Whereas in the 
former Mill asserted that an injustice was committed if a “contrary opinion” held by “only one person” were silenced, in 
the latter it was “the influence of every mode of thinking which is shared by numbers” which he declared “ought to be felt in 
the legislature”; On Liberty, 229; Considerations, 507. The public sphere can be open to everyone, but even the freest 
legislature can only be open to every group. The legislature, by nature, cannot be as individualistic as the public sphere 
more generally. 
 
1302 Williams, Proportional Representation and British Politics, 73. 
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an important element of the change which it sought to effect. The most precise formula for the 
pledge to emancipate the voter from susceptibility to the control of other electoral forces was 
accordingly something like this: the independence of each quota in the sense that the return of its 
MP could not be defeated by how other voters acted,1303 combined with the removal of impediments 
to the elector’s power to “unite himself with [any] number of his fellow-countrymen” with whom he 
happened best to agree.1304 
 This impatience with the “embarrassing restrictions” obstructing the free disposal of the 
vote according to the voter’s genuine preferences from among available candidates was linked to the 
second side of the freedom promoted by Harean PR: the expansion of the range of choice.1305 Even 
though the two aspects were analytically distinct, in practice his reform decreased the constraints on 
the elector only insofar as it was accompanied by an increase in the number of seats (including, at 
the limit as in Hare’s own proposal, all the seats where the nation was treated as a single 
constituency) which his vote could contribute to filling and thus to a potentially tremendous slate of 
candidates from which to choose. Where, for instance, one’s vote could only “participate in” one or 
very few positions being filled,1306 the same dynamics which dictated party loyalty and rallying 
around the least bad option to avoid losing the seat for one’s “side” would recur no matter how the 
votes were counted up. Therefore, the liberty of the elector could not be judged independently of 
the expanse of choice which was offered him, and any structure that “prevents the electors of the 
                                                 
1303 “The representation of any section of political opinion” should depend solely on “the number of its supporters” and 
not on “the attitude taken toward it by other parties”; Humphreys, Proportional Representation, 86. Humphreys had in mind 
here the evils of the “second ballot” system even more than of straightforward plurality-rule elections; as two-round or 
“ballotage” arrangements gained ground on the Continent, British PR reformers came to denigrate them as a step 
backward even from single-member plurality-rule districts; see also Williams, Proportional Representation and British Politics, 
27. 
 
1304 Hare, Election of Representatives, 21. 
 
1305 Ibid., xxxvi. And see 140: “The system of individual independence offers him a freedom of choice, not only of the 
two or three, but probably of two or three thousand candidates.” 
 
1306 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 16. 
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kingdom from choosing any man whom they may consider the most fit to represent them” had to 
be rejected as “antagonistic to and subversive of their rights.”1307 Moreover, Hare believed that the 
field of candidates itself would expand as a result of the destruction of territorial districts, since 
candidates who were unlikely to triumph in any specific plurality-rule election might now present 
themselves in the hopes of reaching the quotient by collecting votes from what were then several 
separate constituencies.1308 Because parties would no longer have to worry about splitting the vote of 
their adherents, pressure to limit the number of candidates wearing their colors would vanish, and 
consequently a wider array of options not only outside the main parties but also within them could 
come forward.1309 In sum, the related “artificial restraints” of the vote being split up into numerous 
districts and the stranglehold of parties upon the selection of candidates were to give way to a 
“magnificent field of choice [which] would be open to the electors of the kingdom.”1310 Hence the 
voluntary constituency was conceived as a technical innovation behind an extension of liberty in the 
electoral realm that comprised (a) a measure of insularity from the attitudes and strategies of other 
electors (through the guarantee of a seat provided upon meeting the quota), (b) the unencumbered 
ability of the voter to enter into a union with other voters for any candidate, and (c) the broadening 
of the set of candidates. 
 The conception of liberty embedded in the voluntary constituency was not understood as an 
isolated construction for its peculiar sphere. Instead, it was seen as an extension to the electoral 
                                                 
1307 Hare, Election of Representatives, 100. 
 
1308 Ibid., 132-3. And see “Representation of Every Locality and Intelligence,” 529: “Our system thus gives to a few 
persons [party “wire-pullers”]…the power of practically limiting the competition to one or two candidates of each 
party….The obstacles which thus confer a monopoly upon two or three candidates, to the exclusion, in effect, of all the 
rest of their countrymen, are coupled with the electoral arrangement which confines every candidate to the votes of one 
particular constituency.” 
 
1309 E.g. Walter Baily, Proportional Representation in Large Constituencies (London: William Ridgway, 1872), 19-20; Smith, 
University Representation, 35-7. 
 
1310 Hare, Election of Representatives, 45, 133. 
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sphere of liberty as it existed in other areas of life.1311 Two façons de penser about liberty from other 
domains were particularly potent for Victorian PR. 
 The first was economic: it was the political equivalent of free trade. While PR did have 
support from economic “centrists,” interventionists, and socialists of various kinds, it is significant 
that many of the leading publicists for PR were free traders and that they took these two issues to be 
part of a common moral-political package.1312 Hare, in particular, was not only adamant in his 
support for free trade but eloquent about the connections which he saw between it and his design 
for representative reform.1313 
An age which has achieved the freedom of commercial intercourse in spite of the 
pretensions of local protection and monopoly, may not unreasonably hope to find advocates 
for the free interchange and communication, as well of political action as of political 
thought, against the far less plausible and more insolent claims of dominant inhabitants of 
arbitrarily selected and privileged boroughs and districts to a monopoly of the great right of 
national representation. 
 The purpose of this work is to show how practically small in form is the change that 
would suffice to liberate the elector from the bonds that now tie him to the other voters of 
the borough in which he happens to dwell, whereby his action is absolutely fettered to 
theirs…1314 
 
Similarly, Courtney drew on the language of the free trader’s credo of the “natural laws” of the 
                                                 
1311 Hence it was requisite for “men who profess to be advocates of general freedom” to subscribe to PR; Hare, 
“Representation of Every Locality and Intelligence,” 535. 
 
1312 Bromund, “Uniting the Whole People,” passim.  
The perceived elective affinity between the two topics inspired Marshall in his invention, and it did so in ways 
that were overtly continuous with the sorts of themes about opinions “finding their level” encountered in Bailey and 
others in part one: “As in the case of the introduction of Free Trade, many doubts were entertained by practical minds 
as to this or that difficulty in working it, but these were quickly dissipated by experience because the system we had 
adopted was founded on just natural laws – so in the case of the Cumulative Vote, the adoption of it will, I believe, be 
simply an advance to a natural and equitable mode of taking votes…we shall find that the natural laws which determine 
whether parties at any given time shall be large or small, extreme or moderate, will act at least was well, and there is every 
reason to think will act better and more freely under an equitable system of taking the votes, than under the present 
imperfect one”; Marshall, Minorities and Majorities, 23. 
 
1313 His first excursion into political debate caught the eye of the influential politician and champion of economic 
liberalism William Huskisson; Parsons, Thomas Hare and Political Representation, 10-17. 
 
1314 Hare, Election of Representatives, 21-2. See also “Just and Equal Distribution of Seats,” 204-5, and his animadversions 
against “monopoly” cited in note 1308. 
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market in casting PR as a “return to nature and freedom.”1315 The “so-called doctrine of free-trade,” 
Hare’s most famous apostle said, went hand-in-hand with the truth that “all restraint, qua restraint, is 
an evil.”1316 In parallel, PR was meant to eliminate the evil of restraint from the world of elections.1317  
Less polemically important, though still theoretically interesting, was another “economic” 
aspect to his theory of representation – one that was also tied to his Anglicized doctrinairisme. Guizot 
had characterized political representation as an extension of the economic division of labor. In 
choosing his representative the citizen “only did what is done virtually every day” in confiding a 
portion of his interests that he was unable to carry out himself to another person “capable of 
efficiently conducting them.”1318 Hare agreed that voting was not generically different from selecting 
a plumber or a banker. In “an advanced state of civilization” representation “is a matter of daily 
occurrence, and common necessity. It is the vicarious performance of duties which cannot be 
personally executed. It intervenes in commerce, in jurisprudence, in education, and in a thousand 
other forms.”1319 What is so interesting about Hare, however, is the argumentative end to which he 
put the identification of political representation and the division of labor. In the case of 
revolutionary and doctrinaire French liberalism, as well as in the work of other English thinkers who 
                                                 
1315 Courtney, “Representation of Minorities,” 152. 
 
1316 Mill, On Liberty, 293. 
 
1317 Hare’s and his disciples’ claiming of the mantle of having translated free trade into the world of elections would not 
go uncontested. As was briefly alluded to in ch.2, section 2(b)(ii), PR could equally be seen as “protectionist” insofar as it 
guaranteed ideas a seat in the assembly without their having to “compete” directly against other views to win a seat. This 
was a very important accusation, for it made up part of set of theses about how PR would lead to stagnation – precisely 
the fate which theorists of progress like Mill were trying to avoid. It will be a major element of the chapter on the moral 
effects of PR. 
 
1318 Guizot, History of Representative Government, 287. The thought went back originally to Sieyès. On the Abbé and his 
“economic” vision of representation, see Pasquale Pasquino, “Emmanuel Sieyès, Benjamin Constant et le 
‘Gouvernement des Modernes’,” Revue Frangaise de Science Politique, vol. 37, no. 2 (1987), 214-28; Richard Tuck, The 
Sleeping Sovereign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 172. Constant also operated in this frame; Fontana, 
“Introduction,” to Constant, Political Writings, 23. 
 
1319 Hare, Election of Representatives, xxxv-xxxvi. 
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too it up,1320 it was certainly not imagined that this view itself supplied an argument for one electoral 
system over others; rather, it was used to justify representation tout court against more direct-
democratic visions. For Hare, however, the observation of the contiguity between “the choice of 
parliamentary representatives” and the “select[ion of] persons to fill other fiduciary or vicarious 
offices” was not meant to ward off direct democracy1321 – the prestige of the mid-Victorian 
parliament was too great to take such alternatives seriously. Rather, its purpose for him was to show 
the need for the “very much larger field from which to choose” which was the principal “novelty of 
[his] proposal.”1322 To Hare, the logic of the connection with the division of labor was identical to 
that of the analogy with free trade more generally: namely, to abolish restrictions on electoral choice. 
If “the exercise of individual judgment and deliberation suffice[d]” for the enormous array of 
“circumstances [in which] people are compelled to place themselves and their interests in the hands 
of others,” then it should not stop with the selection of MPs1323; if the economic division of labor 
functioned because the individual was left to handle his own commercial affairs unencumbered by 
limitations on his judgments, the political division of labor would flourish for the same reason. Both 
of the economic inflections of his theory of representation had, then, the same end: to show that 
with PR the economic and political spheres would constitute a sort of seamless fabric of freedom. 
 A second important influence on the manner in which PR was understood as a “proposal 
for freedom” also had economic dimensions, although it was broader in its scope and would 
therefore be better described as social.1324 This was the thought that voluntary associations were the 
lifeblood of a free society. No less than Tocqueville, many Britons were struck by the vibrancy of 
                                                 
1320 See e.g. Brougham, The British Constitution, 62; Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 373-4. 
 
1321 Hare, Election of Representatives, xxxvi. 
 
1322 Hare, “Just and Equal Distribution of Seats,” 204. 
 
1323 Hare, Election of Representatives, xxxvi. 
 
1324 Courtney, “Representation of Minorities,” 152. 
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associational life in the free Anglophone world (unlike France under its tyrannical Loi Le Chapelier), 
and Hare seized on the respect for the “voluntary association” as both consequence and guarantor 
of liberty to depict what voting was like under personal representation.1325 His aim was for the 
electoral arena also to give “full scope” to the “voluntary and natural disposition to associate,” to 
“bring the disposition for voluntary association to the business of political life.”1326 “The power of 
voluntary association,” the faculty of “free action” to enter into a “society or partnership,” were now 
to be extended to elections.1327 Parliamentary representation should resemble civil society in the 
latitude of liberty it provided, and it was this resemblance, PR devotees believed, which the 
mechanism of the voluntary constituency provided. If it achieved this similarity, the colorful mosaic 
of associations and cooperative groups that characterized modern civil society would extend into 
politics. This is an important point: given the formal individualism and anti-sociological, anti-
corporatist method of the scheme, there was nothing else to represent but what emerged during the 
electoral process itself via voters “associat[ing] themselves voluntarily.”1328 Since “the vesting in 
every elector of a power to act…without any trammel created by the particular section of voters to 
which he is nominally annexed, is the keystone of parliamentary reform,” in a sense the only entities 
within the system were sets of “wills” unanimously agreed to join together for the purpose of being 
represented by the same candidate.1329 The voluntary association of electors was all that was left 
standing after Hare’s purge of all “corporate” elements of the representative system.1330 
 A final point should be made regarding the system of free election conceived as voluntarism 
                                                 
1325 Sugden, “Free Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation,” 32. 
 
1326 Hare, Election of Representatives, 47; Hare et al, “Representative Reform Report,” 6. 
 
1327 Hare, Election of Representatives, 33, 23. 
 
1328 Hare, “The Coming Steps in Representation,” Fortnightly Review, vol. 37, no. 218 (Feb. 1885), 216-22, at 221. 
 
1329 Hare, Election of Representatives, 38. 
 
1330 Like the assumption of the mantle of free trade, PR’s understanding of voluntary associations was also challenged, 
particularly with respect to its anti-party animus. Again, this challenge is slated for discussion in the “moral” chapter. 
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in constituency construction. This point has been implicit in the foregoing, but it is important 
enough in marking the contrast with the variety-of-suffrages school to merit explicit treatment and it 
moreover serves as a bridge to the themes which will close this subsection. This is that a complete 
system of voluntary constituencies cut out all forms of mediation between the total aggregate of 
voters and the collection of MPs. There were no intermediary levels of sorting – all of these were 
denounced as fetters on the voter. It followed from this unmediated, unstructured character of the 
electorate that PR was irreconcilable with all kinds of quotas, understanding this term very broadly. 
The quota was, in a manner of speaking, the instrument par excellence of the traditional descriptivist, 
and it can be seen as a factor in any electoral system that retains even a territorial component.1331 For 
a Bagehot or Paley or Mackintosh, the electoral system was really just an elaborate set of quotas. 
What Hare and his most uncompromising successors envisioned was the antithesis of this apparatus: 
it was the most thoroughgoing anti-quota scheme possible. In this regard it distinguished itself even 
from other forms of PR, such as the party list, where quotas (such as for women candidates) can be 
reinserted at the level of party. While a party list system preserves the voluntariness of 
constituencies, they introduce an element of indirectness – since the vote is for the party rather than 
the candidate, the party can be made the site for inscribing sociological determinations back onto the 
assembly. STV, however, has no layer at which such criteria could be imposed; the composition of 
the assembly that comes out of it is an unmodified product of the electors’ will. Victorian PR and 
the variety-of-suffrages were, consequently, at opposite ends of the spectrum when judged from this 
perspective: in the former, everything was constructed from the tally of votes; in the latter, all that 
the electors did was, in a manner of speaking, to choose the specific people who would fill the 
various slots pre-appointed to different segments of society. 
                                                 
1331 The US Constitution mandates that Ohio have two senators and sixteen congressmen in the same way that, say, an 
affirmative action program might mandate that a certain portion of the student body belong to specific demographic 
categories. 
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 Two important questions arise out of this analysis of the voluntary constituency concerning 
the genre of representation to which Victorian STV should be said to belong. Both of these have 
been dealt with partially and in a passing fashion, but it is worth answering them more directly now. 
 First, we are now in a position to answer the question of whether it was a form of minority 
representation. The title “minority representation” remained with it for a long time, although 
proportional representation, while still contested as a label, had mostly won out by the last couple 
decades of the nineteenth century. While many STV proponents would ultimately reject the name as 
“misleading,”1332 others remained content with it. This satisfaction with the name was sensible 
enough. Like the original minority representation schemes, it was opposed to the principle of 
“majority representation” by which only “local majorities” could gain representation and “due 
weight to the minority” within districts was denied; all supporters of PR acknowledged that they 
wished to end a system that “deprive[d] the minority…of any share of representation.”1333 The 
genius of PR was that it could give representation to what were minorities according to block-voting or 
single-member-district arrangements, and the older nomenclature captured this facet well. 
 Nevertheless, there were a number of reasons for the bulk of Hareans to repudiate the 
name,1334 the most important of which being that it was not technically accurate. Unlike the schemes 
in section one, no minorities as such were represented, and thus Hare was perfectly justified in 
asserting that his “method has no affinity with any which has been suggested for the mere 
representation of minorities.”1335 This justification stemmed from the fact that it was intrinsic to the 
                                                 
1332 Lubbock, Representation, 4. 
 
1333 Hare, Election of Representatives, 30, 3; Courtney, “The Seats Bill,” Fortnightly Review, vol. 37, no. 217 (Jan. 1885), 26-36, 
at 31. 
 
1334 Including, importantly, the strategic one that it led democrats and radicals to look on PR with mistrust as a 
contrivance of those who found the demos ignorant. The perception of an antimajoritarian impulse behind PR was 
widespread; see e.g. Stephen, Life of Fawcett, 170; Morley, “W.R. Greg,” 255; Kinnear, “Practical Considerations,” 55. 
 
1335 Hare, “Individual Responsibility,” 350. And see Humphreys, Proportional Representation, 62. 
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endeavor to “convert what are now only majorities into unanimous constituencies” that there be an 
end of the status of “minorities” as well.1336 With Hare’s version of STV there were neither 
minorities nor majorities but instead a collection of equal unanimities. In the fact that it did not give seats 
to minorities qua minorities it was aligned more with the variety of suffrages than with a Marshall-
style minority representation plan. For both the variety of suffrages and STV shared a curious 
characteristic, namely, that they strove to give a place to minorities in one sense1337 – understood 
sociologically, or as the remainder produced by alternate electoral systems – while also keeping 
minorities qua electoral phenomena out of the Commons: the former by incorporating a variegated 
set of electoral majorities, and the latter by doing away with involuntary constituencies altogether. 
 Second, there is the matter of PR’s descriptiveness. The question of whether PR is 
democratic – or at least, whether it was meant democratically by its originators – has received a fair 
bit of scholarly attention,1338 and we have already addressed it at length. Less well considered, are its 
descriptive credentials, perhaps because it is taken as self-evident that PR is a textbook example of 
descriptive representation.1339 The dissertation’s reconstruction of the broader spectrum of 
nineteenth-century thought on representation, however, makes this interpretation look less 
straightforward. 
 That “Parliament should be the mirror of the nation” was announced as a central goal by all 
                                                 
1336 Hare, Election of Representatives, vii. 
 
1337 See e.g. Bagehot’s statement that the two camps overlapped in this aim, as against the “doctrinaire radicals”; 
Bagehot, “Mr. Mill’s Address to the Electors of Westminster,” in CW, vol. 3, 544. 
 
1338 This is especially true with regard to the Mill literature, where it is contested whether Mill’s support of PR reveals his 
commitment to or fear of democracy. For the antidemocratic interpretation, see e.g. Alan Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 71-4; Paul Kern, “Universal Suffrage without Democracy: Thomas Hare and 
John Stuart Mill,” Review of Politics, vol. 34, no. 3 (1972), 306-22. For the democratic interpretation, Urbinati, Mill on 
Democracy, ch. 3. 
 
1339 E.g. Hanna Pitkin, Concept of Representation, 62-3. 
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PR theorists,1340 and, as we will see in what is to come, this goal was often attended by a conviction 
about the extent of diversity in their society that equaled and frequently exceeded that of the variety-
of-suffragist. But delivering an assembly of “genuinely representative character,”1341 as the great 
political theorist and sociologist L.T. Hobhouse put it in summation of a half-century’s worth of 
“liberal” arguments for PR, was a fundamentally different enterprise under STV than on the more 
longstanding currents of descriptivism. 
 For one thing, compared with the variety-of-suffrages approach mirroring was an indirect 
outcome of STV. On the former, the regulation of the electorate was directly guided by sociological 
premises; it achieved mirroring in that the scheme itself was based on a correct picture of the nation. 
On the latter, on the other hand, mirroring resulted indirectly from freedom; it was because free action 
was not impeded that personal representation would yield a “perfect representation” as reliable in its 
tracking of the nation as a “political thermometer, indicating sensitively the national pulse.”1342 With 
PR, inclusiveness and respect for diversity – “the representation of all minorities, and subsections of 
opinion”1343 – was an upshot of each vote counting equally in the return of a member under 
conditions of genuine liberty and expansiveness of choice; these virtues had become completely 
detached from the possession of a correct understanding of society and its salient fissures. 
 Another way of stating the difference is that the substance of Hare’s innovation, at the 
deepest level, was that it was a purely procedural mechanism of vote aggregation; it dispensed altogether with 
the sociological phase of the mirror theory as practiced by someone like Bagehot or Harris. While PR 
may yield outcomes of greater diversity and inclusiveness, welcoming into the assembly “varieties of 
                                                 
1340 MG Fawcett, “Proportional Representation,” 378. And see e.g. Hare, Election of Representatives, xxxiv, 12, 37, 134; 
Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” 937, 940; Lubbock, Representation, 2, 27, 50. 
 
1341 Hobhouse, Liberalism, 117. 
 
1342 Hare, “Individual Responsibility,” 353. 
 
1343 Fawcett, “Mr. Mill’s Treatise on Representative Government,” Macmillan’s Magazine, vol. 4, no. 20 (June 1861), 97-
102, at 101. 
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opinion and feeling,” “diversities of thought and sentiment,” which would otherwise have been left 
unspoken for,1344 it denied the possibility of actually mirroring some truth out there – it folded all the 
action into the electoral procedure. Objective facts about social-ideological conditions against which 
the assembly could be compared had no place. The independent criterion which had existed for 
Britain’s original descriptivism was gone under proportional representation.1345 
Although this might be pressing the point too far, the differences between PR and the 
descriptive ideal as it had been traditionally known in England raise the question of whether PR 
ought to be considered a form of descriptive representation at all. At the least, the recovery of the 
fact that Britain had a robust tradition of genuine descriptive representation which was well 
entrenched at the time of the advent of PR can, I think, help explain a puzzle which some acute 
political theorists and scientists have noted: namely that, despite being the “cradle of pluralism,” 
Britain is one of the few European nations never to have adopted PR.1346  
The mainstream reformer, it will be recalled, was convinced that one could know the truth 
about the state of the nation. In light of this conviction, there was no reason to turn the 
composition of the assembly over to a supposedly “neutral” and non-arbitrary mechanism that left 
everything to the free judgment of all voters treated equally. Harris, among others, avowed this anti-
proportionalist reasoning openly when he denied, against “some very enlightened and philosophical 
reformers,” that any form of minority or proportional representation was necessary because his use 
of a variety of mechanisms to apportion the franchise in a manner that respected sociological 
differentiation guaranteed that “the legitimate influence of the opinions and interests entertained by 
                                                 
1344 Hare, Election of Representatives, 16. 
 
1345 In its absence of an independent standard and reduction of mirroring to an electoral procedure, PR’s claims about 
mirroring resemble certain inadequate epistemic arguments for freedom of speech in which the truth is simply identified 
with whatever view is left standing at the end of a discussion; e.g. Schauer, Free Speech, 20-2. And see above ch. 4, note 
827. 
 
1346 Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy, 28. 
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such minority will, where those are of real value and deserving of representation, have been already 
provided for in the State.”1347 To Victorians like Harris already attached to the descriptive ideal and 
who saw it as a national heritage, it was far from self-evident that PR marked an advance in 
descriptiveness, or that it qualified as a descriptive system at all. 
Given this, it should not be surprising that various possible implementations of PR were 
criticized for betraying the descriptive ideal. We saw earlier that Bagehot tossed aside Mill’s support 
for PR with a broader suffrage supplemented by plural voting as insufficiently representative to the 
working class. Similarly, anyone who felt that the £10 household franchise in boroughs was 
exclusive of the working class would not find Hare’s wish to go to STV while settling on this line as 
a uniform basis for enfranchisement to be a satisfactory solution to the crisis of representation. 
Finally, PR under equal universal suffrage, as it was often discussed even from the inception of the 
scheme, need have had no particular appeal, for this would give the working class electoral power in 
proportion to its numbers – but this was, precisely, a fate which the Victorian descriptivist was 
attempting to avoid, since he was certain that, though the working classes might make up, say, 75% 
of the population, they were not 75% of the nation properly understood in its diversity; this vastly 
exceeded, as Greg put it, the “due share” of the “lower orders.”1348 Moreover, the common, 
“conservative” view that under uniform universal suffrage PR was the only route available to ensure 
some seats for the upper classes – that is, the embrace of PR in democracy in order to avoid an even 
more undescriptive outcome – should not be confused with the positive acceptance of democratic PR as 
furnishing a genuinely accurate mirror. To take up this latter stance of strong approbation one had 
to sign on to an individualist, aggregative understanding of society and public opinion that was 
                                                 
1347 Harris, True Theory, 39. 
 
1348 Greg, “Expected Reform Bill,” 251; “Representative Reform [1],} 476. Or, as he phrased it elsewhere, “they [the 
labouring classes] comprise nine-tenths of the numbers, but only a fraction and segment of the nation”; Greg, 
“Representative Reform [1],” 466. See also Leslie Stephen, “The Value of Political Machinery,” 851-2. And see 
Bromund, “Uniting the Whole People,” 92, for Salisbury’s agreement on this point. 
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anathema to many thinkers across the ideological spectrum.1349 And one had to give up on the 
thought that the composition of the assembly was ultimately answerable to any external, non-
electoral standard. 
In conclusion, PR had some claim to having squared the circle which perplexed the figures 
in chapters 3-5: it could preserve a measure of inclusivity and deliberativeness under a uniform, even 
democratic, suffrage while skirting the kinds of sociological judgments that led to charges of 
arbitrariness. But the cost of doing so was that it significantly narrowed the vision of what 
descriptive representation amounted to and what it could be said to achieve. 
If the descriptive credentials of Hare’s program could be cast in doubt, the other aspect of 
the voluntary constituency that has been stressed here – its non-arbitrary and freedom-enhancing 
character – had a firmer basis. But this relied not only on those facets of his project that we have 
already covered, but also on one that has remained in the background so far, even if has been 
implicitly present in the abolition of involuntary constituencies: namely, the abandonment of 
territoriality. 
 
c) The Transcendence of Territoriality 
 If Hare’s proposal was to enshrine complete freedom of choice and by this route to produce 
a legislature that was “a true epitome of the political opinions of society” and not merely of a few 
major “stereotyped expression[s] of political sentiment,”1350 it would have to do away with all 
territorial divisions, which limited the number of candidates for whom one could vote to those who 
presented themselves for one’s district and increased the remainder of voters who lacked their own 
chosen spokesman in the House. This is what his system did. While some of the outward forms of 
                                                 
1349 From the “far left,” so to speak, see e.g. Harrison, Order and Progress, passim. 
 
1350 Hare, Election of Representatives, 309, 39. 
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territorial representation would remain – candidates would still stand for a local district but voters 
could vote for any candidate regardless of this nominal affiliation1351 – Hare’s desire, in the words of 
one disciple, was the complete replacement of “rigid territorial districts” with “personal districts.”1352 
No tethering to territory remained; instead each MP would represent 1/658th of the voters without 
any compulsory geographical element entering the equation.1353 As part and parcel of the abolition of 
involuntary groupings of voters, the chief source of this grouping, the territorial, had to go. What 
one was left with could be thought about in two ways: as either a district-less electoral system, or as 
one huge multi-member district – in the case of Britain at the time, a 658-member district. 
 Fittingly for a Victorian, Hare’s proposal of a single, Kingdom-wide constituency and the 
perfect liberty it supplied had a historicist dimension. “All is now different,” he proclaimed in 1860, 
from the days in which limitations on communication and transportation bound people to act in 
tightly circumscribed localities; one only needed to observe the state’s successful operation of “the 
Post-Office, that vast contrivance” to know that the “present facilities of communication” were 
capable of uniting Britain in one great constituency.1354 The technological and demographic advances 
that made personal representation possible were, on Hare’s estimate, quite recent: the nineteenth 
century was the first one fit for electoral freedom. Therefore Hare’s judgment was not so much that 
the English government of the past was blameworthy for having had unfree institutions, but that it 
                                                 
1351 Ibid., e.g. xii-xiii. 
 
1352 Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” 954. 
 
1353 This was shared with Andrae: “the two systems have further in common the principle of giving voters full liberty to 
unite over the entire territory as in one electorate”; Andrae and His Invention, 35. 
The Netherlands and Israel today both have nationwide districts in this way, though they are list systems. 
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway also have nationwide districts at one level of a two-tiered list system. See Lijphardt, 
Patterns of Democracy, 139-40. 
 
1354 Hare, “Representation in Practice and in Theory,” 199; Election of Representatives, 27; Machinery of Representation, 16. 
Compare with ch. 3, note 689. 
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was wrong to continue the historical system in light of the potential for freedom in modern times.1355 
 (This historicizing lens applied to the aforementioned analogy to free trade as well. Hare, 
ardent free trader that he was, joined many of his contemporaries in seeing free trade less as an 
eternal verity than a principle suited for their advanced epoch. For example, he decried majority 
representation in one- and two-member districts as a “protection [that] has not any of the excuses 
which were sometimes urged for the prohibitions of trade.”1356 Protections on and regulation of 
trade may have looked sensible in earlier eras, but that did not derogate from the fact that freedom 
of trade had now become an article of justice. Likewise, however well this electoral patchwork had 
operated in the past, Victorian Britain was a society fit for freedom in the sense of dropping a 
territorial basis to its representation that could now be no more than a set of “artificial bands.”1357) 
 By and large, however, Hare was not followed in this plank of his platform. Widespread 
doubts about the practicability of his scheme often focused on the recommendation of the single 
constituency, and therefore this was, from the standpoint of its practical political chances, one of the 
                                                 
1355 “Let us consider what is really the character of the change proposed. Nothing more than an application, in the 
business of electing our representatives, of the readier and more perfect means of action which the conditions of our 
times afford in almost all the operations of life. The object is to give to every individual elector the most complete 
freedom and power of exercising his best judgment in considering the qualities and merits of those whom he would 
choose to rule over him”; Hare, “Reform Bill of the Future,” 79. Hare was not alone in locating his innovation within a 
historical account of the system of representation; see e.g. Hobart, “Parliamentary Reform,” 46. 
 
1356 Hare, “Representation of Every Locality and Intelligence,” 529. 
 
1357 Hare, Election of Representatives, 148. His most remarkable passage on this parallel ran as follows: “In early times no 
doubt it was impossible for the inhabitants of towns distant from one another, and with few roads or facilities of 
communication, to exercise their franchise otherwise than separately; and even at this day each locality must have its 
own centre of action. So it was with regard to commercial intercourse; when there were scarcely any means of 
transporting commodities from one town or country to another, there would be no desire for freedom of trade. That 
which was first a necessity became gradually to be thought a law of nature or a principle of political wisdom; but with 
facilities of interchange and of transport grew up new desires. Legislators, however, thought themselves wise enough to 
prescribe the rules of conduct, which should be productive of national wealth, and to prevent the industry of one place 
from interfering with that of another: they established protections and prohibitions of every kind. We know the history 
of the struggle which, within the last few years, has succeeded in emancipating the trade of the kingdom from these 
trammels. It is the progress of development overcoming the doctrine of repression. It opens to our consideration the 
improvements which may be made in social science by an equally free interchange of thought and effort in the 
composition of the representative bodies by whom the political arrangements of society are to be governed….To say 
that it is not necessary now, because in earlier times communication was difficult or impossible, would be as reasonable 
as to say that as free trade was not needed in the infancy of society, when each community depended on its own 
productions, it is therefore unnecessary now”; Hare, “Just and Equal Distribution of Seats,” 204-5. 
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most harmful pieces of his thought.1358 In response, PR supporters developed plans to carve Britain 
up into several large, multimember districts provoking too many serious cris de coeur,1359 and in the 
late 1860s even Hare relented to pressure to offer a version of his scheme which would avoid this 
fount of objections.1360 
 Importantly, though, this reinsertion of territoriality was not a mere return to the status quo. 
Instead, the role of territoriality in PR was altogether different than in previous systems: it was solely 
a practical necessity and not itself a positive instance of the descriptive principle.1361 This difference 
is made clearer by investigating the transformation of the British electoral system in the Third 
Reform Act, the debate around which was also one of the crests of support for STV. 
 With regard to expanding the suffrage, the Third Reform Act seems simply to follow in the 
wake of the Second. But in two respects it was more revolutionary. First, as we have noted, it 
standardized the suffrage between boroughs and counties and brought districts closer to the 
principle of equal population, thus delivering a severe blow to the variety-of-suffrages 
                                                 
1358 Judging the situation a half-century on, a campaigner for PR lamented this chapter in its history: “There was 
doubtless some excuse for the cry of impracticability when, in launching in 1857 his proposals for proportional 
representation, Thomas Hare suggested that the whole kingdom should form a single constituency. This suggestion 
raised a barrier of prejudice against all proposals for proportional representation, which only to-day is being broken 
down…”; Humphreys, Proportional Representation, 110. 
 
1359 For instance, Droop settled on 8-10-member districts; Dodgson wanted 6-member districts; Courtney thought 5-
members was a good norm (although he denied ever having given up on the feasibility of implementing “Hare’s system 
in its entirety”). Droop, “On Methods of Electing Representatives,” 184-7; Dodgson, Principles of Parliamentary 
Representation, 180; Courtney, “Seats Bill,” 35 and “Representation of Minorities,” 156. 
 
1360 Norris, “Politics of Electoral Reform,” 70. 
 
1361 Importantly, even if the reintroduction of geographical districts derived from fears about impracticability, once 
reintroduced they did present some of the old problems of arbitrariness. This was because most plans did not 
recommend dividing the country into a number of equal districts, but rather sought to follow the “familiar divisions of 
the country,” assigning to each however many members accorded with the population of the designated area with a 
minimum of three-members per constituency. So, for example, a large city might constitute a dozen-member 
constituency, while sparsely populated rural area might be made a three-member district, with all manner of gradations in 
between. There was good reason for this way of proceeding; as the following subsection explains, slicing the country 
into equal districts meant splitting up local communities and causing a rent in the fabric of political life. The difficulty, 
though, was that the project of “enlarging our electoral areas” without violating the natural divisions in the nation was 
not immune to the charge of being executed in an “arbitrary manner,” even if proportionalists were confident that they 
could meet this objection. See Humphreys, Proportional Representation, 110; Fawcett, Leading Clauses, 26, 32. 
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perspective.1362 Second, and most pertinent to our immediate purposes, it converted almost all 
constituencies into single-member districts.1363 PR reformers were leaders in the charge against this 
change,1364 and STV reached what was arguably its nineteenth-century peak in fighting, 
unsuccessfully, against the tightening of territorial constraints and the demise of multi-membership. 
 The clash between STV and first-past-the-post single-member districts raised several 
intriguing conceptual points. 
 The first was constitutionality. Just as university seats provided a foothold within Britain’s 
political heritage for the definition of constituencies on non-territorial grounds that could be then 
exploited by the more imaginative theorists of electoral variegation, the fact that multiple 
membership (even if this was predominantly dual) had historically been far more entrenched than 
single membership gave, to the eyes of some observers, the proportionalists’ desire for districts of 10 
or so MPs the patina of greater constitutionality than the move to near-exclusive single 
membership.1365 It was not prima facie obvious that it was correct to regard even Hare’s proposal of a 
single very numerous multi-member district, let alone the modestly-sized districts in other STV 
plans, as a greater conceptual departure from Britain’s customary electoral-representative practices 
than the course that would be followed in the Third Reform Act.1366 
 Second, and more significant theoretically, were the arguments that occurred under the 
rubric of “community” versus “personal” representation. Territory was less a freestanding principle 
                                                 
1362 On the extension and uniformization of the franchise in the Third Reform Act, see Michael Smith, “Parliamentary 
Reform and the Electorate,” in A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Britain, 156-73. 
 
1363 For the exact figures, see Hawkins, Victorian Political Culture, 323. 
 
1364 Courtney, for one, resigned from Gladstone’s cabinet over this component of the Act. 
 
1365 On “the great and decisive change” marked by the adoption of single membership, see e.g. Carstairs, Short History of 
Electoral Systems, 191; Philip Norton, The Constitution in Flux (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982), 228. 
 
1366 To this end it is noteworthy that Hare cited Burke frequently as part of a general strategy of establishing his scheme’s 
consistency with constitutional practice; see e.g. Election of Representatives, 1, 6, 18, 48-9. 
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than the means to realizing the accurate representation of “communities.”1367 In anti-proportionalist 
discourse there was an equivocal character to the notion of community – one the one hand, it 
sometimes simply referred to the locality which was supposed to be coextensive with the territorial 
district; on the other, it defined any group with a common interest or opinion, whether 
geographically linked or not, to which the territorial constituency could stand in a “virtual” 
relationship.1368 For the present, what is of most relevance is the former, locality-based electoral 
communitarianism.1369 
 From this standpoint, localities were organic communities whose cohesiveness and integrity 
would be broken by large multi-member districts or the single national constituency. This 
communitarian counter to PR comprehended a set of predictive claims about the negative 
consequences that would the replacement of electoral localism by an “abstraction of personal 
relations” among voters and between voters and their MPs,1370 and these cannot be dealt with here. 
What matters at this moment is their view that the discarding of the locally-based constituency 
distorted the goal toward which representation was aimed, namely, obtaining MPs who really stood 
                                                 
1367 In addition to the material in the variety-of-suffrages chapters, see also Moore, Politics of Deference, 232; Hawkins, 
Victorian Political Culture, 90-2, for somewhat different analyses that hit upon this point. 
1368 It is important to recognize that support for single-member districts, despite being acknowledged as a momentous 
turn in electoral policy even by its champions, did not have to involve conceding diversity to the STV crowd and 
emphasizing other virtues. Instead, it could be argued that “variety in representation will be sufficiently arrived at, and 
the minority of the whole fairly represented, without any artificial attempt to secure it.” 
 Indeed, one might contend that, if one is going to accept that some measure of diversity in the assembly is 
important, then FPP paradoxically places more faith in a certain kind of empirical claim about diversity than PR does: 
the former needs to assume a higher level of diversity at least on the territorial dimension. (“The [FPP] system assumes, 
not alone a great number of constituencies, but also a very great diversity and heterogeneity in the character of the 
constituencies.”) PR, however, can extract whatever diversity exists and bring it into the representative system, even if it 
is only trace amounts. 
See e.g. Shaw-Lefevre, “The Representation of Minorities,” 732; “The Crusade for Proportional 
Representation,” Fortnightly Review, vol. 37, no. 218 (Feb. 1885), 202-15, at 213; Meredith, Proportional Representation in 
Ireland, 10. See also Roberts, “Resisting Arithmocracy,” 382-3, 400-3; Abeles, “Introduction to ‘Proportional 
Representation’,” 124. 
 
1369 It is worth being explicit that the high valuation of “locality” was not the province of conservatism; Idealist 
democrats tended to stress it too; e.g. Tyler, Idealist Political Philosophy, 70. The expansion of the suffrage was not 
necessarily linked to a positive assessment of individualism in representation, as has been noted so far with respect to 
Harrison and certain of the “deliberative democrats.” 
 
1370 Kinnear, “Practical Considerations,” 61. 
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for the “sense” (to use Gladstone’s phrase) of a locality.1371 On this view, which has remained 
common in defenses of first-past-the-post systems1372, when voters are no longer bundled in the 
proper (local) manner, the tie between the MP and the community of interest incarnated in the 
locality for which he served would wilt. His selection, instead of being part of a working descriptive 
order, was meaningless because it was nothing but the product of a haphazard group of 
unconnected voters diffused over a vast space. This was what was meant by the widespread 
Victorian attack on PR as anti-local.1373 
 What is interesting about this line of objection is that it focused not just on the method of 
PR but also on its substantive effects on the composition of the Commons. Critics were arguing not 
just that it operated in on a non-local basis – PR supporters were, after all, more than happy to 
admit this – but that the result of this methodological alteration was that localities were not going to 
be represented as units any longer, that among the constellation of things for which MPs would 
stand local groups would cease to be among them. Was this attack accurate? 
 Both yes and no. PR’s transcendence of territoriality would have been of little consequence 
if it left the play of political forces under the status quo unaffected. In this vein, it was imagined that 
PR would weed out certain evils that attended local representation: a “parochial” spirit that 
encouraged candidates to appeal to “petty local jealousies and prejudices” rather than to issues 
                                                 
1371 It is important to recall in this context that among the more conventional, less imaginative descriptivist authors the 
representation of localities was linked to larger mirroring aims – that is, localities also doubled as bearers of “interests.” 
As a result, disturbing the pattern of “senses” of the localities meant throwing off the descriptive enterprise. This 
perception of introducing disturbance into the normal course of representation was expressed by alleging that 
“crotchets” would displace “really organic interests and opinions” in the Commons. This was a cogent line of objection, 
one complementary of the earlier characterization of PR as protectionism in that it also culminated in a forecast of 
stagnation. 
 
1372 E.g. Haim, Proportional Misrepresentation, passim. 
 
1373 Hare cited “that it is too complicated to be practical” and “that it is hostile to our local system” as the two most 
common complaints about his proposal; Election of Representatives, vii. 
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affecting “general interests” and appropriate to the “wider relations of national life,”1374 as well as the 
more mercenary forms of corruption that obtained only in local constituencies where relatively even 
competitors could try to swing the balance in their favor by bribing a few knots of voters.1375 It 
thereby promised an emancipation from the worst aspects of binding local constituencies. 
Moreover, much like the class-specific and guild-style reformers from earlier in this dissertation, it 
was essential to PR reformers’ brand of pluralism that mirroring the nation involved finding space 
for views and interests that were not easily “localizable,” and this presupposition was obviously 
inconsistent with any sort of monopolistically localistic stance on representation. 
 And yet PR reformers denied that their system’s large districts and its transfer to “personal” 
from “territorial” construction of constituencies was equivalent to the eradication of local units from 
parliamentary life. Perhaps surprisingly, they bitterly contested the claim that their intention was “to 
delocalize.”1376 The criticism, they argued, was based on a mistaken conflation of the elimination of 
the binding quality of territoriality with the foreclosure of local factors from entering into the 
assembly.1377 Harean PR was formally neutral with respect to local ties, as it was to all ties between 
citizens – this is what made it “personal” representation. But this neutrality in no way prevented 
“contiguity of place” from “assert[ing] its influence.”1378 In a way remindful of how champions for 
toleration would argue that if true religion really were so vital to personal well-being then it ought 
not to have to rely on the coercive force of the state to flourish, supporters of PR parried these 
criticisms by arguing that if local influences really were important then they should fare well under a 
                                                 
1374 Hare, Election of Representatives, 73; Knatchbull-Hugessen, “Redistribution of Political Power,” 73-5. See also e.g. 
Fawcett, Leading Clauses, 10, 24; Rose, Rise of Democracy, 163. 
 
1375 The crusade against corruption will be covered in the chapter on the moral side of PR. 
 
1376 Hare, Election of Representatives, xii. 
 
1377 As far as locality was concerned, all that his innovations had done was to make “geographical limits” no longer “the 
sole basis of political action and association”; ibid., 73 (my italics). 
 
1378 Ibid., 73. 
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liberty-enhancing system that gave “free play” to all “forces” in society.1379 Precisely because PR was 
an open system, it was open to local influences as well.1380 
 Hare, and especially his disciples who were most active during the debates over the Third 
Reform Act, did not stop here, however. Again, paralleling those devout proponents of toleration 
who claimed that liberty of belief was the most fertile soil for the growth of genuine religious feeling, 
promoters of STV claimed that their scheme was actually more hospitable to genuine local attachments 
than the territorially-based alternatives, especially single-member districts. The system of 
voluntariness, as Hare put it, was best at empowering the “wholesome influences of locality,” which 
would be “destroy[ed]” on any other arrangement.1381 This superiority was connected to the problem 
of trying to provide a mapping of the social in a progressive society which was discussed above. 
Whether one had a “democratic” theory in which equal numerical districts were the rule or a non-
aggregative descriptive picture in which constituencies were to be ordered according to common 
interests, if the electoral system had “a reliance on localities” it would “continually involve” 
redrawing boundaries to track social and demographic “changes.”1382 This constant tinkering1383 – 
                                                 
1379 Courtney, “Seats Bill,” 33. 
 
1380 “If people are so animated with a local feeling that they must vote for one man in their own neighbourhood, they 
would have perfect liberty to do so. You give them power to join with those who are allied with them in feeling and 
thought, instead of those who live next door; but you don’t force them to go afield, and wherever local wants demanded 
local representation they would be sure to secure it”; Courtney, “Representation of Minorities,” 153. 
 
1381 Hare, Election of Representatives, xii. In the proportionalists’ discrimination of wholesome from unwholesome effects of 
localism and desire to make room only for the former they resemble the architects of the First Reform Act on D.C. 
Moore’s controversial interpretation, who were aiming to purge “illegitimate” influences of property while protecting 
“legitimate” influences; Moore, Politics of Deference, esp. ch. 4. 
 
1382 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 25. 
 
1383 ““Any electoral division founded solely on a geographical or territorial basis…has constantly to be reconstructed”; 
Hare, Election of Representatives, 61. See also ibid., 8-9, 218, as well as his finest articulation of this point from the first 
edition of the book in 1859, a full quarter-century before the switch to single-member districts which galvanized much 
of this discussion: “In the mobile and susceptible condition of population and society at this day, it is impossible not to 
observe the purely speculative character of all conclusions founded upon what the permanent interests of the inhabitants 
of a particular district may be, – upon what they will themselves consider them to be, or upon what their majority may 
resolve. In a revision of our electoral system, all those who would found the Parliamentary strength of interests or 
classes upon the basis of constituencies formed for their support, should consider with what degree of safety they can 
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which was associated pejoratively with American and French democracy1384 – could not but result in 
splitting up communities in the midst of organic development. Conversely, the ceaseless rejiggering 
would lump together dissimilar communities such that certain groups wound up voiceless. Without 
such a “self-acting process” which would adapt of itself to “the changes necessarily incidental to the 
progress of time,” the integrity and individuality of distinct local communities would be ever under 
assault.1385 Hare, typically citing Burke, contrasted “a system of arbitrary divisions, constructed 
entirely for electoral purposes” and for which “there will not be wanting reasons for its 
reconstruction to-morrow” with true respect for locality, which was anchored in a desire not to 
interfere with “these political incorporations which grow out of the constantly operating causes by 
which all human associations, like material things, are dissolved and reorganized, [and] are found to 
have the deepest roots.”1386  
According to proportionalists, this harmful slicing up of the surface of the nation into 
artificial segments reached its apogee in the Third Reform Act’s move to single-member districts, 
which “involves the arbitrary division of natural communities” and in consequence “weaken[s] local 
life.”1387 “The first and most obvious evil” of that installment of reform “would be the utter 
extinction of that local representation which is so valuable an element of Parliamentary thought and 
of national life.”1388 The “living creature” that is a “communal existence,” an “organic constitutional 
being with ideas, traditions, interests of its own, with a collective thought and will,” a “real local 
existence and community” imbricated in “local institutions, corporations, municipal existence and 
                                                                                                                                                             
rely upon a body of electors within any certain area remaining permanently faithful to the principles by which they may 
be at present guided”; ibid., xxvii. 
 
1384 Seymour, Electoral Reform in England and Wales, 496; Percy Greg, “Redistribution,” 815. 
 
1385 Hobart, “Parliamentary Reform,” 264, 272. 
 
1386 Hare, Election of Representatives, 41-2. And see Fawcett, Leading Clauses, 26-7. 
 
1387 Lubbock, Representation, 8. 
 
1388 Percy Greg, “Redistribution,” 814. 
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government” – all were going to be “chopped” up into “inanimate machinery” by the “complete 
rupture” of 1884-5.1389 The defenders of the new organization of districts were not insensible to 
these complaints, as we have seen, and when it came time to draw the new districts the bureaucrats 
in charge of doing so were instructed to respect the different “pursuits of the people” and to “take 
note of variety [of interests] and in a rough manner keep like with like.”1390 But these instructions 
immediately raised problems of indeterminacy in deciding what counted as a “pursuit” and how to 
weigh certain kinds against others,1391 and moreover even if these questions could be settled 
satisfactorily in one instance this would do nothing to resolve the anticipated damage to local 
political life of subjecting districts to frequent reconstruction to keep up with societal progress. In 
trying to base the whole system of representation on a finely-drawn set of geographical limits, single-
member districts in fact undercut the organic, naturally developing localisms for which a 
parliamentary presence was rightfully due.1392 Locality was to be represented by the free assent of 
some portions of voters to its importance – indeed, only under conditions where compulsion had 
been ended and the “widest scope and inducement for local combination,” as for combination for 
any ends, been afforded, could it be said that genuine local representation obtained at all.1393 
                                                 
1389 Ibid., 814-5. And see John Heywood, who had great sympathy for Hare but ultimately preferred the SNTV due to 
objections with the “chancy” nature of distributing the surplus votes, on how single-member districts would 
paradoxically destroy true spokesman of important local interests” by “parochializ[ing] the representation” too much; 
Heywood, The Representation of Minorities: A Practical Plan (Bristol Selected Pamphlets, 1884), 3. 
 
1390 Report of the Boundary Commissioners for England and Wales, 1885. Part One: Counties [C.-4287] (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1885), 7; Jones, The Politics of Reform, 1884, 9. 
 
1391 On this point see Roberts, “Resisting Arithmocracy,” 398. 
 
1392 Again, drawing on the parallel with toleration, we might say that there was an argument here about the inefficacy of 
compulsion to produce the true local ties that it was desired to represent in the first place. See e.g. Hare’s statement that 
“the system which really destroys the wholesome influences of locality is that which has long been, and still seems to be, 
most in favour with popular reformers, – grouping some boroughs, disfranchising others, here severing cities and 
counties, and there adding a score of villages to some small borough. The component parts are rather repelled than 
attracted by such undesired combinations. It is proposed to amend this anomalous patchwork, and allow the country 
spontaneously and without any arbitrary rule, to recover its natural subdivisions…”; Election of Representatives, xii. 
 
1393 Ibid., xii. 
 The Hareans’ conviction of the counterproductiveness of using involuntary constituencies to achieve inclusion 
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 The PR reformer’s insistence on the continuing place of locality within his post-territorial 
representative system brings us to two further issues. First, what it meant practically that “a real 
living society” like “Manchester” would continue to figure in the Commons was that candidates who 
devoted themselves to these local interests or who expounded ideas native to the place would be 
returned1394; unlike in list systems, where parties with centralized platforms are the objects of the 
vote, in STV one voted for candidates who might prioritize local issues over the concerns of the 
national party. Second, MPs, as we have stressed repeatedly, were returned by constituencies which 
were constructed by otherwise unaffiliated individuals opting to support the same candidate; STV 
was, therefore, formally agnostic about sociology, including no referents to groups within it. But this 
formal agnosticism and individualism did not, obviously, restrain Hare and his ilk from invoking 
substantive sociological premises in explaining how their proposals would work. “Locality” was, 
after all, a corporate category like the “classes, interests, and opinions” compound that featured in 
the variety-of-suffrages literature. Their confidence that due, “wholesome” localism would endure in 
                                                                                                                                                             
for local attachments or specific interests had a further dimension. This was the observation that in the context of 
modern politics with its pluralistic and conflictual character any endeavor to erect electoral structures based on 
homogeneous groups would itself give way to divisions in the contest of different visions and ambitions: in 1832 “some 
constituencies were retained, framed or modified, upon the supposition that they would, in all circumstances, support 
what were conceived to be special interests….The idea of the constituency as the constituted exponent of an interest 
having been once received, excluded the idea of personal representation within that constituency, and therefore led to 
the consequence, – that if persons not governed by the prevailing interest found their way within the prescribed limits, it 
was necessary, in pursuit of the representation of interest, to exclude such intruders, as far as it could be done, from the 
electoral power. As the law, however, did not, and could not, adopt, as an electoral qualification, a test of fidelity to the 
special interest contemplated, it is not found possible to exclude from the constituency some who are guided by other 
motives, and form an antagonistic class. The electoral bodies which are regarded as the exponents of special interests are 
thus exposed to internal conflicts, which render their action more or less uncertain….The territorial condition must be 
one of two things, – a source of strife if it succeeds, – or a cause of weakness if it fails. It is deserving of the most 
profound consideration of all who desire to perpetuate any definite political principle, whether it is possible to insure it 
for a geographical ascendancy; and. Whether there are any means of promoting its maintenance so certain and lasting as 
would be found in a consistent adoption of the sole and simple principle of personal representation”; ibid., xxvi-xxviii. 
 Intriguingly, this same argument would be deployed by Weber as part of his bitter attack against the “politically 
infantile littérateurs” who advocated “electoral corporations” based on “‘organic’ structures” in society and the economy. 
These “misconceived projects” would fall prey to “the autonomous operation of political interests”: “when herded 
together in such electoral corporations, the supposed bearers of ‘professional solidarity’ would be set at one another’s 
throats by denunciations and boycotts” and an “attempt to compel them to unite…would be a purely mechanical 
compulsion which would put an end to their inner life.” The only way to have interests, occupations, or classes play a 
role in representative politics was, Weber concluded, to leave them to fight for adherents by “free recruitment,” “free, 
independent initiative.” See Weber, “Suffrage and Democracy in Germany,” 88-97. 
 
1394 Percy Greg, “Redistribution,” 814. 
 425 
 
a PR-chosen Commons, then, reopens the question of the relationship between their individualistic 
electoral method and their image of their society. How were these voluntary constituencies supposed 
to relate to social realities beyond the hustings? In other words, what were the objects which it was 
imagined would actually be represented under STV? 
 
d) The Objects of the Vote and of Representation 
 As with the other schools of representation, then, with the question of the objects of 
representation we have arrived on the terrain of sociology. Before tackling the social imaginary 
undergirding personal representation, though, we need to take a moment to reckon with an 
institutional facet which has been present in our discussion but not emphasized: that the object of the 
vote was a person, not a party. The way to the sociological issue is through this technical feature. 
 That Hare and the Victorian PR movement preferred that votes be cast for candidates was 
overdetermined. For one, there was the weight of constitutional history; Britain had not seen votes 
be cast for anything other than persons. There was also the fact that, unlike in Continental Europe 
where list systems flourished very quickly,1395 the British never seemed to really be able to conceive 
of parliamentary election as anything else than choosing the person who should occupy the seat in the 
Commons; this singleness of view about what a representative election could possibly be 
contributed to the near-universal hostility in Britain to indirect election,1396 which equally violated 
this notion that there was only one way to fill an assembly, in contrast to the continent where both 
indirect election and list systems had much greater purchase. There was, moreover, deep vexation 
with the perceived increase in partisanship spanning more or less the whole of the second half of the 
                                                 
1395 Hence it is importantly not an anachronism to say that Hare preferred candidates over parties as the object of the vote; 
Hare and all conscientious Victorian reformers were aware of the progress of list systems elsewhere; see e.g. Hare, 
“Minority Representation in Europe,” Journal of Social Science, vol. 3 (1871), 185-91. 
 
1396 See e.g. Brougham, The British Constitution, 61, 68-9; Mill, Considerations, ch. 9. 
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century and including many commentators who were not especially interested in the mechanics of 
reform.1397 Finally, making parties the object of the vote struck many as obviously violating the 
prized tenet of “the freedom of the elector.”1398 
 And yet, despite the tight hold exercised by STV, there had always been a countercurrent, if 
a weak one, of support for the list system. Interestingly, perhaps the most incisive of these criticisms 
– and the one to be taken as exemplary for our purposes – came from Ireland, a country which has 
retained STV to the present day. James Creed Meredith, an Irish Supreme Court Justice, literary 
figure, and translator of Kant, was one of the few within the British Isles to prefer list systems over 
STV. Meredith’s attack on STV as not “even theoretically the best system...[because] it rests on 
principles and assumptions that are entirely inapplicable to Parliamentary elections” was multi-
pronged, and other pieces of it will be addressed in the forthcoming chapter, in particular, the moral 
and practical reasons that informed his rejection of the anti-party thrust of PR theories of “English 
manufacture.”1399 For now what is significant is that he saw STV as inconsistent with “the ideal of 
representative government…to produce a ‘reduced map’ of the country in its political aspect.”1400 
The attribution of mirroring properties to it rested on “a certain self-deceit.”1401 It was “only 
nominally and contingently a system of proportional representation.”1402 
 Why did Meredith believe that STV, which is often taken as the example of “pure PR” by 
modern scholars, was in fact unrelated to proportionalist aspirations and failed the standard of 
                                                 
1397 See e.g. JF Stephen, “Parliamentary Government [1], 5-7; Froude, “Party Politics,” Fraser’s Magazine, vol. 10, no. 55 
(July 1874), 1-18. An array of different positions converged on the frustration with parties; see e.g. Hawkins, Victorian 
Political Culture, 315. 
 
1398 Lubbock, Representation, 61. 
 
1399 Meredith, Proportional Representation in Ireland, xiv, 5. 
 
1400 Ibid., 8-9. 
 
1401 Ibid., xii. 
 
1402 Ibid., 58. 
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representativeness in the election of assemblies? The reason, he argued, that STV was “not, properly 
speaking, a system of proportional representation at all” was that it formally “takes no notice of 
parties.”1403 Yet “what is representation which is proportional proportional to? Apparently to 
the true strength of parties.”1404 In a time of near-manhood suffrage and close to equal districts in 
which the creation of electoral rules to take account of classes and interests, the only entities which 
remained for electoral systems to mirror were parties. Consequently, when STV proponents argued 
that first-past-the-post arrangements were distortive, they could only do so by pointing to the 
departures in allocation of seats to parties from what they would have earned if parties were awarded 
seats according to their percentage of the vote share; as Meredith put it, “the party point-of-view is 
inevitable on any system of proportional representation.”1405 Since parties were, so to speak, the last 
standard left after all extra-electoral mirroring criteria had been sidelined, the list system alone was a 
rational choice for anyone who still valued the alignment between assembly and nation: “We see, 
therefore, that just as the fairness of the single transferable vote is ultimately tested by an appeal to 
the list principle, so in practice, whether a list system is explicitly adopted or not, it all comes down 
to a question of lists in the end. A list-system is plain and frank: the transferable vote is 
complicated and treacherous.”1406 Disciples of Hare were really pursuing something quite different 
from proportionality, since proportionality, as the course of the nineteenth century had revealed, 
could only mean proportionality with respect to parties. 
One argument which Meredith intimated but did not precisely articulate would have pressed 
his point about the non-proportionalism of STV even further. “[Hare’s] object,” he cited a Royal 
                                                 
1403 Ibid., 56. 
 
1404 Ibid., 56. 
 
1405 Ibid., 60. Meredith’s point is well supported by the argumentation of the Proportional Representation Society’s own 
journal, Representation, in the years around Meredith’s book. 
 
1406 Ibid., 78. 
 428 
 
Commission as saying, “was to secure the return to Parliament, not of the parties or interests, but of 
the persons most desired by the electorate as a whole.”1407 The return of the persons most desired, 
however, was not equivalent to the return of persons proportional to the desires of the electorate to be 
represented by them. The transfer of surplus votes was intended to make each MP the representative of 
an equal slice of the electorate, but to do this it had to contravene the inequalities in first-preference-
level support among candidates; Gladstone, for example, despite the fact that he might receive 30% 
of the first-place votes, received only 1/658 of the voting power in the Commons. Proportionality 
did not seem to enter into this equation. According to Meredith, STV was a way of divining who 
were the most preferred “men as men,” but this project was utterly unrelated to the goal of “primary 
importance” for twentieth-century “political elections,” which was to give to each party the exact 
strength within the assembly that its support in the nation warranted.1408 All that STV did was 
generate a list of the most desired politicians, and therefore vastly unfit for an era in which the basic 
political question was which party or coalition of parties ought to form the government. 
Note that this characterization of STV as an unproportional method of representation 
depended on the acceptance of parties as the sole units according to which the mirroring capacity of 
an electoral system was to be judged. To Meredith, it was so clear that the oft-cited mirroring or 
proportional qualities of the system did not in truth apply that he treated them as little more than a 
propaganda ploy for the reformers and saw the only basis of real support for it as lying in a notion 
                                                 
1407 Ibid., 56. 
 
1408 Ibid., 57. In practice, Meredith thought, the simple fact that STV’s focus on persons differed from a rightful 
concentration on parties actually understated the extent of the damage the system would do. He endorsed the Royal 
Commission’s disapproving assessment that the conjunction of reinstating geographical divisions and the effect of late 
preferences in returning members would actively lead to a distortion in the representation of parties: “The balance under 
the Transferable Vote is the net total of the balances obtained in a number of multi-member constituencies, and these 
balances depend upon late preferences. The apparent verdict of the country will, therefore, be determined by the least 
satisfactory criterion which the system provides, for a considerable number of voters will not exercise their later 
preferences at all, and of those who do many will be influenced by other than party motives”; ibid., 57. This assessment 
was part of a broader story about how STV fostered a fuzzy centrism in the national mind that led to intellectual-
political stagnation. 
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of the “freedom which it gives to the elector.”1409 If one did not share this view about the 
fundamental representative status of parties, however, it was not obvious why one needed to accept 
the Irish jurist’s conviction of the superior descriptiveness of list systems – and this would hold true 
independently of whether one agreed in toto with the Harean conception of freedom. In other words, 
Hare had reasons for making candidates rather than parties the centerpiece of his reform that were 
not merely reducible to a particular argument about what liberty consisted in but which themselves 
stemmed from sociological premises. Although Hare’s great innovation of voluntary constituencies 
formed out of quotas for candidates was formally asociological, his conviction of its beneficial 
character was attached to his understanding of his society. This does not mean, however, that 
Meredith’s skepticism was entirely off-base, for Hare’s recommendations outlived much of the 
sociology with which they were originally linked and which gave his claims about mirroring (as 
distinct from freedom alone) plausibility. 
Although he did not recognize it as such, the sociology underlying Hare’s entrance into the 
field of electoral reform consisted of two strands, and it is not clear how well the two cohered. The 
first is what Floyd Parsons has called his “premise of pluralism.”1410 The paragraph from the Election 
which best lays this out deserves quotation in full: 
A perfect representation is plainly inconsistent with the exclusion of minorities; but the subject 
of representation would be very inadequately conceived, if it were regarded as a mere 
question between majorities and minorities. The formation of electoral majorities and 
minorities is no more the natural means of arriving at political representation than it would 
be a natural result of any other association that it should be divided into two parties, one 
perpetually labouring to counteract the wishes of the other. The order and the occupations 
of mankind, — the distribution of population, and the supply of its necessities, are all 
provided for by physical and moral laws operating on the diversities of nature and of 
character which are found amongst men. These differences preserve the harmony and the 
vitality of social life. In political sentiment there is not less variety than in the other motives 
of human conduct, and abstractedly it would be no more likely that the political opinions of 
the electors of a borough should fall into two or three antagonistic divisions, than that they 
should be composed of twenty, fifty, or a hundred distinct views or conceptions. The 
                                                 
1409 Ibid., xv. 
 
1410 Parsons, Thomas Hare and Political Representation, 142. 
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dissimilarity would be much more probable than the similarity. Opinion and action in 
politics would be as various as opinion and action in other sciences, if there were not causes 
that enter into political bodies, and create a disturbed and unhealthy movement, provoking 
antagonistic divisions.1411 
 
In keeping with the general bent of his thought, this observation about the wide extent of political 
diversity was a historicized one: “the extension of knowledge and the progress of civilization open 
the door of inquiry, prompt activity of thought, encourage diversities of opinion, and thus lead the 
way to social improvement.”1412 Contemporary Britain had arrived at such a position in the march of 
progress that ideological diversity was now the norm.1413 
 A few points should be stressed about this first strand of Hare’s sociology. First, it was 
concerned with opinion; it was above all a sociology of political ideas, an intellectual sociology. PR 
was preferable because it was respectful of “the natural and unrestricted operation of the variety of 
opinions and sentiments existing among a free people”; it was in view of “the varieties of opinion and 
feeling” that his reform plan was required.1414 And the modern magnitude of ideological diversity was 
not just a sort of freestanding social fact, but was itself an expression of the deep epistemological 
truth that “many sided all great subjects are”1415 – a view which, notably, he had espoused years 
before On Liberty’s appearance and the beginning of his friendship with Mill.  
                                                 
1411 Hare, Election of Representatives, xxix-xxx. 
 
1412 Ibid., 10. This greater diversity in opinion in the contemporary world was linked with the fact that there were simply 
more opinion-holders than ever before. The spread of opinion was, indeed, to a large degree simply what progress meant: 
“The progress of education and knowledge, the habit of reading, and of free and broad discussion, have vastly increased 
the number of the people who are capable of forming opinions for themselves, and communicating with others of like 
sympathies”; Hare, “Just and Equal Distribution of Seats,” 203. 
 In giving diversity of opinion this modern accent he resembled, among others, Wilhelm von Humboldt, the 
author who gave On Liberty its epigraph; Humboldt judged “an infinitely richer and more satisfying moral and intellectual 
variety” to distinguish modern Europe from antiquity or the Middle Ages; Humboldt, The Sphere and Duties of Government, 
trans. Joseph Coulthard (London: John Chapman, 1844), 17. 
 
1413 As in the treatment of territoriality, this was thus another respect in which Hare was happy to affirm that “the 
traditional method of filling the House of Commons” was “suitable…in earlier times” but not now; Election of 
Representatives, 75. 
 
1414 Hare, “Individual Responsibility,” 358; Election of Representatives, 16. My italics. 
 
1415 Hare, The Machinery of Representation 42.  
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 Second: this notion of the diversity of opinion marked a divergence from the theory of 
electoral variegation. As noted above, opinion did have a kind of primacy on the variety-of-suffrages 
outlook, but Hare – at least this side of Hare – differed from the adherents to this school in their 
breathless awe at the extent of pluralism.1416 The perception of a vast domain of diversity in beliefs 
was another crucial reason why freedom was such an important value in PR but not in the variety of 
suffrages. Both schools upheld that “Parliament should be a deliberative assembly” and thus that all 
relevant points-of-view should be included.1417 For the variety-of-suffragist, though, this category of 
relevant points-of-view was roughly coextensive with and bounded by significant social cleavages, 
while for Hare they were potentially inexhaustible and therefore any constraint in the electoral 
system was likely to be prejudicial to some number among the great “diversities of thought and 
sentiment.”1418 The combination of the focus on opinion and the Millian epistemic conviction about 
the many different lights in which public questions might be approached effected what we might call 
a sort of internalization within the elector of Sidgwick’s point in the previous chapter about the different 
lines according to which the opinion of the body politic might be divided. In an open system 
electors would “look into and consider the reasons” behind “various appeals” which would reach 
their ears, and the “real representation” thereby produced in the assembly would constitute a mosaic 
of the “varieties of expression that have in modern times been called into existence.”1419 
 The third important point about this sociology of opinion was that, in its emphasis on the 
great scope of ideological fragmentation, it seemed to take a strong stand on the question which has 
cropped up throughout this dissertation of the connection between class and opinion: namely, 
                                                 
1416 “Infinite variety of character and temperament” was observable even among “opinions which approve themselves, 
and sympathies which are common to any considerable number of minds”; ibid., 26-7. 
 
1417 Lubbock, Representation, 64. 
 
1418 Hare, Election of Representatives, 16. 
 
1419 Hare, “Reform Bill of the Future,” 84; Election of Representatives, 128. 
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running counter to much of the variety-of-suffrages corpus, classes appeared here to be 
heterogeneous in opinion. An “endless variety of thought and intelligence” was inconsistent with the 
assumption that common class affiliation implied ideological agreement.1420 This postulate of the 
ideological polyvalence of classes fit awkwardly with a program of class representation,1421 and PR 
proponents could sound like Kinnear in their espousals that “working men were as much divided in 
opinion as other classes.”1422 As the overlap with Kinnear indicates, this anthem could indeed be 
sung so loudly that it seemed to undercut one of the justifications for preferring PR to simple 
territorial democracy; if no “swamping” from the lower class could be anticipated because of the 
infinite array of differences in society, then it also looked unlikely that there could be any majorities 
or large pluralities which could claim enough victories in separate districts to monopolize seats or 
otherwise render the Commons seriously less inclusive.1423 
 Given this thesis of the naturalness of an almost kaleidoscopic diversity of opinion, it might 
look as if Harean personal representation was a solution without a real problem to address; after all, 
the diverse democrats of the previous chapter were satisfied that a more humdrum degree of 
diversity could be adequately accommodated by universal suffrage under plurality-rule procedures. 
This thought is misleading. The truth is, rather, that the locus of the problem had simply been 
displaced from how it was situated by the variety-of-suffragist. It was not here the brute numbers of 
a majority social group – the working class, or Irish Catholics – that were the primary cause of alarm. 
Instead, parties were. Since on this view a great class could not be the enemy of the accurate 
                                                 
1420 Hare, “Representation of Every Locality and Intelligence,” 528. He went on to quote Ruskin’s Modern Education: 
“Among all men, whether of the higher or lower orders, the differences are eternal and irreconcilable between one 
individual and another.” 
 
1421 It was, for instance, a major reason why Gergonne found Flaugergues’s plan of class representation inadequate; 
Gergonne, “Arithmétique Politique,” 283. As we saw in chapter three, though, it was not decisive against it. 
 
1422 Leslie Stephen, Life of Fawcett, 215. Stephen was paraphrasing Fawcett here, not speaking in his own voice. 
 
1423 Ibid., 215. And see note 1368 above. 
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translation of opinions due to the fact that classes were not conceived as corresponding to ideology 
in a strong way, parties appeared as the main enemies of proportionalists. They – and their tendency 
to duopoly in plurality-rule arrangements1424 – were what created the defects of descriptiveness, 
compressing the domains of thought and sentiment that could make their way into an assembly that 
ought to have contained the full spectrum of shades of opinion in society. To Hare’s disciples, those 
who accepted the two-party dominance of first-past-the-post were committing the same sort of 
error that Mackintosh and the Whigs attributed to Benthamites – that is, that they had a wrong 
notion of the electoral procedures that would yield a representative regime because they 
underappreciated the extent of diversity in their society.1425 
While this was a compelling argument against the heritage of plurality-rule, it was less 
obvious that it dispensed with the challenge posed by list systems. Advocates of the latter did not 
tend to argue that their system necessitated that there be two parties in contention; on the contrary, 
it is a frequent claim that parties proliferate under them. Yet it did still count against the list 
alternative, and for two reasons. First, even if list systems were better able to integrate more than 
two parties than plurality rule was – if, say, they made room for the four or so parties which thrived 
briefly during the aftermath of the party disintegration caused by repeal of the Corn Laws,1426 the 
period of parliamentary governance on which Hare looked most fondly – it was improbable that 
even the party system under list could be as pluralistic and open as this sociology demanded. 
                                                 
1424 E.g. Droop, “Political and Social Effects,” passim; Goldwin Smith, “The Political Crisis in England,” in Essays on 
Questions of the Day, Political and Social, second edition (London, Macmillan, 1897), 103, 110-1; Hare, Election of 
Representatives, 10. 
The first-mentioned essay here has been called a landmark in electoral theory for containing the first 
articulation of Duverger’s Law; William Riker, “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of 
Political Science,” American Political Science Review, vol. 76, no. 4 (1982), 753-66. It seems to me, however, that Hare and 
other proportionalists had already been operating with it in mind. 
 
1425 See e.g. Droop’s allegation that one of the greatest obstacles to PR’s implementation was the “widespread belief that 
our English division into two parties…is not due to artificial causes” but to nature; Droop, “Political and Social 
Effects,” 25. And see note 1269 above. 
 
1426 Philip Salmon, “The House of Commons, 1801-1911,” in A Short History of Parliament: England, Great Britain, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland & Scotland, ed. Clyve Jones (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2009), 265. 
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Remember that the depiction of the contemporary state of opinion by Hare and his cohort was one 
made up of innumerable gradations, and not of a set of discrete blocks in in rivalry with one 
another. Second, as will be attended to in the “moral” discussion over the value of parties in the 
upcoming chapter, STV exponents objected not just to the fewness of parties but also to their 
rigidity. And yet the list system threatened, in their eyes, to put even more tools in the hands of wire-
pullers to enforce narrow, inflexible platforms and to suppress dissent and intercourse of ideas 
within the party.1427 
In addition to being a driver of the anti-party orientation of Victorian PR, one other aspect 
of this first sociological strand warrants attention. This is an ambiguity running through it 
concerning the kind of existence which ideological diversity had. Hare and other PR theorists 
insisted on the naturalness of extensive diversity, but it was less certain whether it was natural in the 
sense that (a) in a proper electoral system it would arise or that (b) it was already there in the modern 
world. In other words, was PR going to generate or promote the diversity of opinions, or would it 
merely translate it into the Commons. This was, quietly and probably not visibly to the Victorians 
themselves, a fissure separating different camps within PR on the question of how electoral politics 
related to the intellectual life of the nation more broadly. For the most part, Hare came down on the 
side of (b). In the quotes above, he treats the great array of political beliefs as a straightforward 
empirical fact, akin to what he considers the indubitable diversity in aesthetic tastes and life-projects; 
his surprising indifference to the Tocquevillian-Millian idioms of “conformity” and “majority 
                                                 
1427 E.g. Hare, “Minority Representation in Europe,” 188-9; Williams Proportional Representation and British Politics, 63; 
Humphreys Proportional Representation, 201-2. 
 This was particularly offensive to mainstream Victorian PR supporters who, especially before the Liberal crisis 
over Ireland but also even after, mostly identified themselves as some species of Liberal – it was a trope in the Victorian 
era that, while there was only one way to be a Conservative, there were many ways to be a Liberal, since Liberalism was 
the “party of Progress.” Consequently, it was argued that Liberals ought especially to cherish STV for its power of 
quelling the dynamic toward constriction and over-disciplining of party under either plurality-rule or list systems. See e.g. 
the testimonials of several leading minds of PR, including Hare, included in Why I Am a Liberal: Being Definitions and 
Personal Confessions of Faith by the Best Minds of the Liberal Party, ed. Andrew Reid (London: Cassell, 1885). And see Mill, 
Speech on W.E. Gladstone [1], 21 July 1866, in CW 28, 97; Gladstone, “Electoral Facts,” The Nineteenth Century, vol. 4, 
no. 21 (Nov. 1878), 961, 968; Lubbock, Representation, 25. 
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tyranny,” mentioned at note 1246, is further confirmation of this interpretation. Insofar as sociology 
was concerned, PR’s task was important but modest: to bring diversity into the parliamentary arena. 
 It is arguable that side (a) – the more intellectually-sociologically ambitious side – also crept 
into Hare, for there are some passages in which he writes as if PR would act on the distribution of 
opinions itself and not simply reflect it better.1428 Yet on balance it seems safest to say that Hare 
meant to stay on the more modest terrain. Other writers, on the other hand, were willing to make 
weightier claims about the stakes of PR. Courtney, for instance, saw PR as a matter of ensuring the 
possibility of the variety of opinion tout court; it promoted ideological pluralism by providing the 
atmosphere in which less popular opinions could live, so to speak: 
And what is the effect to be apprehended [from single-member districts with a two-party 
system], not only on the representation of the people in Parliament, but on the condition of 
political life among the people themselves? Those who are not ready with the shibboleth of 
party must stand aside. Reduced to inactivity, their sterile existence ends in death. The 
springs of vitality are staunched. Removed from the sphere of political energy the suffer, but 
the life of the country suffers with them….Variety of representation is wanted, not only that  
Parliament shall exhibit the competitive opinions of the nation, but also that opinion shall 
have everywhere the freedom and play of life.1429 
 
PR protected the realm of public opinion(s) from constriction and “death.” As he elaborated in 
another essay, it could accomplish this promotion of ideological diversity in virtue of a kind of 
cascading effect which the state of the parliamentary forum had on other arenas of thought; the 
“emancipation of political thought” would trigger a “move onwards” towards greater “liberty” in 
“literature,” “conversation,” and even “silent speculation.”1430 Such a “great thing” would it be for 
PR to “set the nation free, to liberate the action of each political function, to give the opportunity of 
vitality and power to every new birth of political thought” that Courtney was able to contemplate 
unafraid the further expansion of the suffrage; democracy with PR was not a frightening prospect 
                                                 
1428 See e.g. Hare, Machinery of Representation, 42. 
 
1429 Courtney, “Seats Bill,” 31. 
 
1430 Courtney, “Political Machinery,” 89. 
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for the champion of liberty and diversity.1431 Courtney had a grandiose vision by which PR would 
turn Britain into something approaching a utopia of unshackled thought and expression, and in 
consequence he was comfortable disregarding the dire predictions about popular government’s 
intolerance and inhospitality to new thought which Maine and his ilk would make over the last 
quarter of the century. 
 This dimension of Courtney’s thought – the celebration of PR’s potential to act on the 
creation and distribution of opinions in society – added a wrinkle to the already fraught issue of the 
descriptive status of PR. Typically, Courtney spoke of his aim as a “representative chamber [that] 
would be a trustworthy mirror of the mind of the nation.”1432 But in modern parlance, we might say 
that he ran into an “endogeneity” problem here – by his own admission, the electoral system was 
not independent of the “mind of the nation” that it mirrored. In truth, then, Courtney was posing 
the question of the desirability of PR not in the form, ought the electoral system to be an accurate mirror of 
the national mind?, but rather in the form, what kind of national mind ought we to want to be mirroring?. What 
Courtney desired was, at its most foundational level, a free national mind – the intellectual-
sociological impact of PR was to him its most treasured attribute. 
 Alongside this first sociological strand ran another throughout Hare’s work. This 
appreciation of the natural diversity of opinions and the endeavor to represent (and perhaps even 
generate) thought transcending the constraints of party was only one of the ways in which he related 
his scheme to a sociological image of the country. The other was a more traditional descriptivist 
preoccupation with classes and interests. “The sole and simple principle of personal representation,” 
when inserted into this matrix of sociological reasoning, seemed to differ from variety-of-suffrages 
                                                 
1431 Ibid., 89-90. 
 
1432 Ibid., 89. 
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schemes only in technique.1433 Rather than an exaltation of diversity and freedom of opinion in 
themselves or a move toward the subjectivization of politics,1434 its animating insights looked very 
similar to those of a Bagehot – hence the fact, which we have noted, that a kinship between the two 
sorts of plans and their authors was often perceived. Indeed, this kinship could exist within a single 
author: Lecky, who seems to have always regarded the variety of suffrages as the best combination 
of both traditional English principles and universal principles, championed “Hare’s system” in the 
1890s for “secur[ing] the representation of all considerable minorities. Under no other system would 
the representative chamber reflect so truly…the various classes, interests, and opinions of the nation.”1435 
On this view, PR theorists’ fondness for the terminology of “minorities” strikes one as a lexical 
rather than a substantive shift in the norms underlying the scheme: this is nicely exemplified in the 
writing of Wordsworth Donisthorpe,1436 who despite being an “individualist” treated the 
“representation of interests” and the “representation of minorities” as equivalent titles for a proper 
reform that would leave behind the “representation of areas.”1437 The more traditional 
characterization of the objects of representation which appeared in these later texts was authorized 
by the way in which Hare himself had written of the units of representation of his plan. The 
inclusion of especially “interests” and often still “classes” functioned in the Hare lexicon as the 
metric for determining the justness of a representative system; the transcendence of territory was 
sometimes lauded for giving a truer representation of classes than any preceding arrangements had 
                                                 
1433 Hare, Election of Representatives, xxviii. 
 
1434 Rosanvallon, Peuple introuvable, 130-47. 
 
1435 Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. 1, 269. My italics. 
 
1436 Donisthorpe was one of the truly amazing Victorian polymaths. A self-proclaimed “philosophical anarchist,” he 
wrote voluminously to apply Spencerian evolutionary-libertarian principles to many legal-political subjects. He was also a 
barrister, an important figure in the world of competitive chess, and the inventor of an early device for taking motion 
pictures. On Donisthorpe, see M.W. Taylor, “Donisthorpe, Wordsworth (1847-1914),” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004, [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/article/ 47851]. 
 
1437 Donisthorpe, Individualism, 53. This treatment of the terms as synonymous contrasted with the disjunction between 
the two drawn by Harris, discussed above. 
 438 
 
done.1438 In this light it should not be surprising that Mill himself flitted back-and-forth between the 
first position described here of preoccupation with the great diversity of opinions – it was in this 
register that he spoke of “every mode of thinking which is shared by numbers” as “entitled” to a 
legislative presence1439 – and this second one of a more conventional (he called it “conservative”) 
descriptivism according to which the “variegated character” of the assembly connoted the presence 
of “advocates” for all “interests” and “classes” as opposed to permitting the “most numerous class” 
simply to “swamp and politically annihilate all other members of the community.”1440 For Mill as for 
Hare PR served as both the parliamentary machinery for the intellectually, discursively freewheeling 
society of On Liberty in which even the most unpopular views received a hearing1441 and an electoral 
plan that respected and carried on “the good points of class representation.”1442 
 These two sociologies were not exactly logically incompatible, but there was a certain tension 
between them. This was due to the fact that endorsing class representation depended on the 
conviction that each class needed its own MPs, that due to the limits of “intelligence and 
imagination” only those belonging to the class in question could “understand” its “wants”: a good 
Commons must “take account of, the dispositions and circumstances of every class in the 
population. If any one class is dumb, the result is that Government is to that extent uninformed”; “a 
representative assembly of the Commons, without this element [of ‘persons able to view all 
                                                 
1438 It “permitt[ed] every class to associate as the views of its members may dictate, without restraint of any boundary or 
district, and free therefore from the assaults of any adverse bodies who may invade their territories, or seek to 
undermine or usurp their franchise”; Hare, Machinery of Representation, 35. And see Election of Representatives, e.g. 6, 54, 233. 
See also e.g. Fawcett, Leading Clauses, 32; Lytton, “Report on the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad,” 19. 
 
1439 Mill, Considerations, 507. 
 
1440 Mill, Speech on Personal Representation, 183; Considerations, 465; “Recent Writers on Reform,” 363. 
 
1441 See e.g. Mill, On Liberty, 229; Hare, Election of Representatives, 233. 
 
1442 Mill, Considerations, 465. 
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questions from their side’] is grossly defective.”1443 For MPs to be identified with particular interests 
or classes, however, there had to be a group coherence behind these labels, a perspective proper to 
“advanced artisans” or “agricultural laborers” or “educated professionals.” But this group coherence 
sat ill with the pronouncements which seemed to imply that similarity of socioeconomic position 
was not deterministic of political conviction. 
 Recognizing the pervasiveness of this classical sociological strand in PR discourse is 
significant because, if the underlying sociology resembled that of the variety of suffrages, then the 
advent of PR marked much more a technical than a substantive-normative change in representation. 
And this is precisely how Albert Grey, the Fourth Earl Grey, understood it. Grey clearly painted the 
lineage of PR as lying in the older pattern of inclusion of diverse groups. “So long as there was a 
wide difference between the borough and county franchise, and a great variety in the size of the 
constituencies, the principle of community representation, as opposed to the individual, secured to 
us the variety in the representation which the different interests of the country demanded.”1444 The 
trouble was that “as soon as we establish in every constituency the same uniform electorate, the 
representation of localities no longer supplies us with any security for variety of representation….We 
have hitherto secured this by the plan of variety of franchise and local representation.”1445 In 1884, 
though, with uniformity and an extensive suffrage about to be enacted, a different technique had to 
be adopted to pursue the same goal: “It by no means follows that because a particular method of 
election secured us a fairly representative House when we had a variety of franchise that it will do 
the same when we have a uniformity of franchise.”1446 In these circumstances of “uniform franchise 
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1444 Albert Grey, “Proportional versus Majority Representation,” 937. 
 
1445 Ibid., 937. 
 
1446 Ibid., 937. 
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over the whole kingdom,” a “good House of Commons approximately reflecting the different 
interests of the country” could only be secured by abandoning territorial, communitarian methods in 
favor of “individual” methods.1447 But it was still by the justice it did to “interests,” conceived much 
as his father and grandfather had done, that the machinery of representation was to be evaluated. 
Tethered to the traditional sociology of Britain in this fashion, Mill, Hare, Albert Grey, Lubbock, 
and others could argue that they were presenting the next step in a continuous evolution of the 
British electoral system, the phase suited for a period when “anomalies in the representation” were 
being “swept away.”1448 
 If PR were just the latest stage in the representation of classes, interests, localities, and 
groups of other sorts, then its formal individualism did not in fact need to be thought of as violating 
or distorting a true representation of society and public opinion considered in the mainstream 
communal way as a composite entity the building-blocks of which were more or less cohesive 
communities of interest and sentiment.1449 Thus as much as its “individualism” was cause for praise 
insofar as every other system set the individual voter in a “degrading subjection,” this unshackling of 
the individual was not tantamount to a positive assertion of an atomistic view of the public 
opinion.1450 PR granted freedom to the individual qua elector, but it did so with the knowledge that 
individuals were in fact associative creatures and that their selection of candidates would reflect 
                                                 
1447 Ibid., 937. 
 
1448 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 51. And see e.g. Bruce Kinzer, Ann Robson, and John Robson, A Moralist In and Out 
of Parliament: John Stuart Mill at Westminster 1865-1868 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 105-7; and the 
appendices to Lubbock, Representation, 67-75. 
 
1449 Although his focus is rather different than mine, Bromund notes the communitarian flavor of the political thought 
of 1880s PR activists; Bromund, “Uniting the Whole People,” 78, 82. 
 
1450 Hare, “Note,” 105. On the territorial front Hare put it this way: “by enabling every unanimous quotient of actual 
voters to elect a member in the national representation, we not only avoid any disfranchisement, and preserve the 
corporate action of all counties, cities, and boroughs, but permit any number of additional boroughs to be created and 
enfranchised, provoking amongst them all a generous rivalry in the manifestation of public spirit”; “Reform Bill of the 
Future,” 84. Or as he put it in a rare moment of succinctness: “individual independence consistent with local and 
territorial interests, but not è converso”; Election of Representatives, xliii. 
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group affiliations and influences. The communal nature of public opinion was indeed a 
presupposition of all of Hare’s work. This comes through in a weird passage in which he conceded 
that his system could look as if it instantiated an “anarchic” principle which would reduce the 
country “to a state of natural society” so long as one forgot the saving truth of “the natural tendency 
of association” by which men’s thoughts and feelings were shaped by “innumerable knots, linked 
and tied by the countless affinities and tastes which attract men to their fellows.”1451 “The system of 
individual independence” was therefore not an expression of an individualistic or atomistic social 
ontology. Instead Harean representation reflected an organicist or evolutionary (to use the terms 
loosely) conviction that the electoral system should foster the natural emergence and adaptation of 
different social groups, opinions, and identities in a progressive society where the “old unity” and 
“traditional relations” could not simply be imposed.1452 
 Before turning to the last piece of the Harean machinery, the transfer, it is worth making a 
final point about the sociological underpinnings of Hare’s theory. This is that noting the presence of 
quite traditional sociological categories in his thought helps to clarify an area in the secondary 
literature that is rife with confusion. It is often asserted that the early PR movement was “elitist.”1453 
                                                 
1451 Hare, Election of Representatives, 80-2. And see Williams’s assertion that the growing purchase of “collectivism” in social 
and political thought since Mill’s time was entirely consistent with support for PR; Reform, 5. 
 
1452 Ostrogorski, Democracy and Political Parties, vol. 1, 110. 
 
1453 Parsons and Alan Kahan have traced this “elitism” to the influence of Coleridge’s concept of the “clerisy.” In his 
most famous political work, Coleridge reconceived the national church as a “permanent learned class” (the clerisy) 
devoted to the maintenance of the highest standards of culture and learning. Hare’s aspirations to a Commons 
containing the elite of the nation have been supposed to be consciously Coleridgean ones. 
 This is misleading. While it seems likely that Hare was aware of Coleridge, there is no evidence that he saw his 
quest to improve parliamentary personnel as an effectuation of Coleridgean nostalgic, organicist conservatism. Indeed, 
the evidence points in the opposite direction. Hare made an epistolary confession to an American popularizer of his 
work that he had been “anxious to address every class of mind, and [had] therefore quoted largely from authors of 
various sympathies.” And yet despite his almost comically excessive penchant for quotation and his publicizing instinct 
to cast a wide net, neither of his tracts on PR references Coleridge. There is, so far as I know, only one mention of 
Coleridge in Hare’s publications, and that does not speak of the clerisy but merely of Coleridge’s vague hope that the 
government would develop its subjects’ faculties and permit them to better their condition. 
 Parsons notes the paucity of references to Coleridge but nonetheless contends that “the affinity between Hare 
and Coleridge was distinct.” This affinity is overstated. Coleridge argued for a permanently endowed, publicly supported 
class of educated minds, a class without legislative functions, appointed from above, in a relation to the public not of 
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There is truth in the claim, but it is too blunt to be illuminating. It is often asserted that the early PR 
movement was “elitist.” Three components of Harean reform might earn this label, although critics 
contentiously attempted to apply this label to the scheme in other ways. First is something on which 
we have already dwelt at length: the capacitarian cutoff for the suffrage which he endorsed. This is 
not what scholars have in mind when they call Victorian PR elitist, since it has received hardly any 
attention in relation to Hare’s thought. Second was a topic already noted and which must occupy us 
in the account of the moral consequences of PR: the prediction that through the wider range of 
choice and the reduction of dictation by parties the personnel of the Commons would be 
                                                                                                                                                             
accountability but of pedagogy and edification. His clerisy did not pass laws or debate bills; it was not a forum for the 
expression of the range of opinions and interests in society. Instead, it was a body of men set aside and subsidized by the 
nation for the sake of “producing and re-producing… preserving… continuing, and perfecting, the necessary sources 
and conditions of national civilization,” which in practice meant maintaining “universities, and the great schools of 
liberal learning” and putting a “parson” and a “school-master in every parish.” The concept of the clerisy was 
Coleridge’s way of building into the English constitution a protection for learning and the liberal pursuits, of ensuring 
that the pursuit of wealth and commerce, on the one hand, and the push by the lower classes for political power, on the 
other, would not crowd the “higher” values out of society altogether. 
 This is, it should be clear, notably different from what Hare had in mind in touting his reform for bringing the 
best and the brightest into the legislature. In Hare’s case, the elite in question is the elite as identified by the electorate. 
Moreover, it is directly accountable to the voters. Finally, they are elected to be legislators, not pedagogues or scholars, 
and to represent their constituency, not to be an emissary from the domains of scholarship or culture. Hare was putting 
together a legislative body that would include members of “personal standing, elevation of character, or integrity of 
purpose” in order that they might pursue the common good in all its many facets, not claiming that a hybrid of religious 
establishment and national system for liberal education had long been built into the country’s constitution. What 
Coleridge and Hare shared was the desire to preserve a voice for the “higher elements” of society in the coming 
democratic age. But beyond that generality – to which an enormous number of the authors surveyed in this dissertation 
would have assented – it does not seem that Hare understood his work as belonging to any Coleridgean tradition. 
 One thing that has appeared to lend support to the association of Hare’s “elitism” with Coleridge’s clerisy is 
that Mill championed both. This attempt to use Mill to substantiate the link between Hare and Coleridge runs into a 
major problem, however: as Reeves notes, Mill had rescinded his endorsement of a “clerisy” in 1847, a dozen years 
before he would encounter PR. Having jettisoned his optimism about endowed or leisured classes, he took up Hare not 
as a continuation of the “clerisy” concept, but as an alternative to it. Mill’s goals of protecting diversity and dissent from 
oppression by the majority and of providing for the political influence of people of wisdom and integrity were to be 
achieved not by special provisions to prop up leisure and learning or by a constitutional balance of classes, but by 
guaranteeing diversity and wisdom within a sovereign Commons. In other words, the Considerations on Representative 
Government is a Harean, rather than a Coleridgean, text. Coleridge’s clerisy was an elite set apart from the normal 
economic, social, ideological movement of the society; Hare’s and Mill’s enlightened and diverse parliamentary corps was 
an elite that emerged from and was in touch with this movement. 
See Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism, 71-74; Parsons, Thomas Hare and Political Representation, esp. ch. 2 and 
conclusion; Coleridge, On the Constitution of Church and State, 51-6; Simon Sterne, On Representative Government and Personal 
Representation (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1871), 11; Reeves, John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand, 117; Hare, 
“Representation in Practice and in Theory,” 192; Election of Representatives, 37, 233, 267; Machinery of Representation, 4-5, 51; 
Carstairs, Short History of Electoral Systems, 193-4; Lawrence Goldman, Science, Reform, and Politics in Victorian Britain: The 
Social Science Association 1857-1886 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 9. 
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improved.1454  
The third “elitist” facet, unlike the first two, pertained directly to the classical sociology on 
which we have been dwelling. This was that the educated upper classes, especially in the great urban 
districts, were the most important of the groups which STV would prevent from being swamped. 
Only “accidental circumstances which appear to be passing away” given the trend toward uniformity 
and expansion of the electorate had previously provided for the inclusion of any members “but 
those who are chosen by the lower classes of electors, and those who concur with or conform to 
them”; the major thing to be warded off was “the danger of excluding from their just share in 
representation the more educated and intelligent classes.”1455 Of the “so many classes” whose 
“alienation…from political life” looked to be on the horizon, it was the groups that made up “the 
wealthier and more instructed part of the nation” whose expulsion from parliament Hare and 
company were most determined to prevent.1456 
Given that the boast that STV would protect them was often attended with expressions of 
doubt about the intellectual preparedness of the working classes for political life,1457 a distrustful 
impression of PR as a device that was classist and countermajoritarian developed on the part of 
radical democrats. In addition, it is noteworthy that for this fear of working-class swamping in 
plurality-rule to have traction, an implicit return to some version of a belief in working-class 
ideological homogeneity or identity politics à la Bagehot was required. Against the first, extreme-
pluralist sociology, on the second, more traditional sociology class was again determining politics, at 
                                                 
1454 After Mill’s 1868 re-election defeat, he was the example often used to illustrate how great minds were prevented 
from entering the Commons by local majorities even though the “quota” of support for them would easily have been 
gathered in a larger district or national constituency. 
 
1455 Hare, Machinery of Representation, 2; Election of Representatives, xxxiv. 
 
1456 Courtney, “Political Machinery,” 84; Hobart, “Parliamentary Reform,” 269. 
 
1457 E.g. Hare, Machinery of Representation, 44-5. Interestingly, despite his own conservatism on the suffrage Hare denied 
that “because, from the present state of popular education, the majority is especially liable to error…it ought not to be 
entrusted with the franchise”; Machinery of Representation, 46. The under-education of the working class was an argument 
against its monopoly of the representation but not against its representation. 
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least in the lower rungs of society and at least when he turned to warning of the perils of not 
accepting his plan. But the most telling thing about this third “elitist” factor was how ordinary it 
was, how in keeping with the broad sweep of all sociologically-concerned theories of representation 
in the period. Viewed from this angle, PR schemes differed from variety-of-suffrages ones only as 
these latter did among one another, that is, in the number of seats they was expected to put at the 
disposal of the various classes and interests. Viewed in terms of comparative political sociologies, 
their elitism does not look especially pronounced. 
 Underneath the unconstrained vote for candidates, then, there lay a mix of novelties and 
longstanding preoccupations. It is a judgment call on which side the balance rested. In my opinion, it 
is ultimately the side of continuity that wins out, albeit narrowly. While some variety-of-suffragists 
(notably Bagehot) would object to the anti-party inflection of much PR propaganda, on the whole 
PR proponents’ efforts to restrain and temper parties were in broad accord with a traditional 
descriptivism whose lineage reached back to well before the birth of anything like the modern party 
and whose adherents, by and large, continued to hold a Burkean conception of party.1458 Similarly, 
the class- and interest-based sociology which Hareans invoked seems to have done slightly more 
justificatory work for reformers than the more capacious and intellectualized one. 
 
e) The Transfer 
 If the previous subsection ended on a note of traditionalism, pointing to the continuity 
between Victorian PR and longer-standing legacies of thought and practice, we now turn to what 
was indisputably an innovation: the transferable vote. There was no precedent in the British 
constitution for allowing the elector to list multiple preferences for a single vote and allocating the 
                                                 
1458 E.g. GC Lewis, A Dialogue on the Best Form of Government (London: Parker Son and Bourn, 1863), 41-2; Grey, 
Parliamentary Government, 47-8; Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism Illustrated, third edition (London: Austin & Co., 1871), 
21-2. 
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vote to the highest-ranked candidate to whose quotient it could still contribute.1459 
 The transferable vote was as controversial as any part of Hare’s plan, but most of the 
controversy that it provoked occurred on what I have called the “moral” front: the most pointed 
parts of the disagreement about the transfer concerned opposed evaluations of its political and 
intellectual ramifications. Perhaps because so few of the writers whom we have been discussing here 
were anything like pure philosophers, or perhaps because discussion of the descriptive properties of 
plans was typically focused on the issues of suffrage and constituency-construction, conceptual 
discussion of the descriptive value of the transfer was surprisingly scarce. From the late-1860s on 
there was, to be sure, much technical debate about the relative merits of different methods of 
calculating the quota, and this had a quasi-descriptive dimension. But as to the big-picture question 
of whether the transfer brought the Commons to more closely approximate a mirror of society, few 
thinkers addressed it directly. Consequently I will have to stray a bit further from the source material 
than I have done elsewhere in this dissertation. It should be said, though, that the fact of the under-
theorization of this aspect of the transfer is itself a compelling datum: it reveals how far from the 
mainstream British parliamentary tradition the transfer seemed to Hare’s contemporaries – in 
comparison to his challenging of the predominantly territorial basis of the representation, for 
instance. For many Victorians, including not only anti-democratic descriptivists but also anti-
proportionalist democrats, the transfer pushed beyond the limits of their toleration for inventiveness 
and divergence from the historical constitution. 
 The final question about the conceptual apparatus of Victorian PR and its place relative to 
the other traditions is, what was the descriptive value of the transfer? was it primarily a “descriptive” device, or did 
it serve other purposes and stem from other grounds? 
 On this front, as on others, the answer is not straightforward. Let us begin with the 
                                                 
1459 The first Englishman to think of a transfer mechanism was Thomas Wright Hill, but he did not publish his 
researches and they were unknown in his home country until after Hare; Hart, Proportional Representation, 6-8. 
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affirmative side. 
 The cardinal way in which the transfer could be said to function as a descriptive device was 
in its encouragement of electors to vote their true preferences. This was in keeping with what has 
emerged as a core Harean principle, that of mirroring-through-freedom. Just as the transcendence of 
territoriality provided a more accurate gauge of opinion than did local districts by expanding the 
field of choice, and just as the vote for persons rather than for parties removed constraints on the 
candidates among whom voters could choose, the transfer increased electoral freedom by making it 
possible for citizens to cast their votes for their favored candidates even if their return was uncertain 
without fear that the votes would be wasted.1460 STV rendered it unnecessary to vote for the least-
bad option out of concern for electability, and it therefore liberated the citizen to rank-order 
candidates in the way that best expressed their own beliefs and priorities, to “act upon his 
conclusion in all earnestness and sincerity.”1461 As a result a Harean parliament would be marked by 
inclusiveness of a wider range of beliefs and a diminishment of the constriction and “stereotyping” 
of belief that party-dominance encouraged.1462 The transfer was a tool of emancipation, and this was 
emancipation in service of the revelation of the truth about the state of beliefs and preferences in 
society. 
 In contributing to the augmentation of electoral liberty the transfer had a claim, then, to 
descriptive credentials. On the other hand, a commitment to descriptivism, even within a 
proportionalist framework, certainly did not demand that one support the transferable vote. For two 
linked sets of reasons, the norm of mirroring – even in the wholly procedural, less robust sense of 
properly translating voter preferences – was hardly determinative of acceptance of the transfer. 
                                                 
1460 E.g. Hare, Election of Representatives, vii-viii, 121-2. 
 
1461 Ibid., 144. 
 
1462 E.g. Hare, “Just Expression” 203 and “Reform Bill of the Future” 77; Ostrogorski, Democracy and Political Parties, vol. 
2, conclusion; Humphreys, Proportional Representation, 45, 55, 210-3. 
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There were both (1) descriptivist objections to the transfer and (2) programmatic alternatives that 
seemed to satisfy this version of mirroring equally well. 
 To begin with (1): the transfer counts lower-ranked preferences equally with higher-ranked 
ones. Later preferences are only turned to if the above-listed candidate(s) have already attained the 
quota. But if brought into play, the tenth-listed choice is worth a full vote just as much as the top-
listed one. 
 This aspect of Hare’s transfer provoked hostility for being distortionary or anti-descriptive. 
We might call this the “intellectual misconceptions” critique of STV.1463 According to this line of 
objection, the single transferable vote was founded on a political-psychological or –epistemological 
error: namely, that it ignored the truth that the great bulk of citizens had only a quite limited stock of 
genuine beliefs and opinions. To ask them to do more than choose their most preferred candidate 
was to plunge too deep and to introduce votes that, because they were such “late preferences,” had 
no “value” as bearers of opinion.1464 To require of the elector that he “arrange in order more names 
than there is time during the election to turn for him into real persons” was to introduce noise into 
the representative system, so to speak, for the “ordinary citizen” simply lacked the capacity or the 
resources “to acquire a really clear conception of the personality” of very many candidates or of the 
“causes which they all advocate.”1465 Nor was the problem simply that late preferences were not the 
bearers of real convictions.1466 It was also that, even if the voter really did have an ample supply of 
genuine opinions, he could not approach the sixth spot on his list in the same spirit as he 
                                                 
1463 Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, 232. 
 
1464 Meredith, Proportional Representation in Ireland, 70, 19. 
 
1465 Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, 238 and “The American Analogy,” 512. 
 
1466 E.g. Dodgson, “Parliamentary Elections,” 159, among many others. 
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approached the first, since the odds of its actually serving as an effective vote were smaller.1467 It was 
simply untrue that, in the real world, a late preference was worth as much as a first preference, and 
yet STV depended on the pretense that they were “equal.”1468 In consequence it delivered a 
legislature that was not a true likeness of public opinion. 
 Two points about the intellectualist fallacy criticism merit being highlighted. First, it 
resembled arguments from the variety-of-suffragists; it reinjected an element of “objectivity” in 
evaluating the condition of society and public opinion back into the theory of representation. For 
the likes of Wallas and Meredith, the rejection of STV was based on the belief that it did not accord 
with the relevant facts out there, and this was precisely the same reasoning on which variety-of-suffragists 
and deliberative democrats founded the support for their schemes. Similarly, this objection operated 
on the same logic as the argument by which a Bagehot or a Greg had excluded certain groups from 
the franchise altogether; it was the opinion-holding criterion transplanted from the sociological to the 
psychological/epistemological domain.1469 It applied the idea that only genuine opinions should 
participate in the electoral system within the individual rather than across society. 
 Second, there was a divergence in the predictions about the practical outcome resultant from 
STV’s falsification of public opinion. To go into detail depicting them would trespass on the more 
sustained discussion that can be offered in the upcoming chapter on the practical and moral 
controversies over PR; at this juncture all that is pertinent is to note that the accusation about STV’s 
deficiencies in representativeness were linked to harms in the function of the legislature. Two main 
                                                 
1467 Meredith offered a couple different formulations of the point: “Under the single transferable vote system he has only 
one vote, and for which candidate that vote may count is a matter of speculation on contingencies which it is difficult to 
estimate. As the contingency becomes more and more remote, the elector becomes more and more reckless”; “Under 
the single transferable vote system there is every inducement to vote for a crank, and he generally manages to amass a 
considerable number of late preferences. For most of us are cranks when probed as deep as a ninth or tenth preference”; 
Proportional Representation in Ireland, 65, 71. 
 
1468 Ibid., 70. 
 
1469 See ch. 4, section 2. 
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streams of concern emerged. One (which included the likes of Meredith, and has its descendants 
today) thought that the inclusion of late preferences would privilege a kind of fuzzy centrism, since 
apart from a few statesmen of principle most of the figures of whom the average elector would be 
aware would be agreeable but bland celebrity-style types with nondescript platforms that could 
appeal in a shallow way to a wide swathe of people. The other – to which numerous notable authors 
from Bagehot through Wallas belonged1470 – believed that the result of voters’ inability to consider 
multiple candidates was that they would rely on party “tickets” to make out their ranking of 
candidates. This would increase the hegemony and rigidity of the great national parties and mean 
that in practice if not in theory STV was not much different from the dreaded list system. 
 It should be noted that Hare was not without an answer to these forecasts of the ills that 
accrued downstream of voters’ limitations of intellect and belief. Again, to avoid encroaching on the 
subject matter of the next chapter, it suffices merely to say that Hare conceded the great deficiencies 
of actual voters but predicted that once his scheme was in action it would bring about a great deal of 
improvement for the elector. Unsurprisingly, this was not a convincing rejoinder to those who were 
already suspicious of PR.1471 Nevertheless, even if one accepted Hare’s optimism about the political-
intellectual perfectibility of voters and was therefore unmoved by the charge that the transfer created 
a distorted picture of the state of political opinion, it was still not obvious that (2) the transfer was 
the right instrument for advancing the legislature’s mirroring capacity. Consider two alternatives to 
the transfer by the voter which were not liable to criticisms of the style of Meredith’s and Wallas’s but 
which were consistent with the other dimensions of Hare’s plan covered so far. Neither has been 
                                                 
1470 Wallas is often credited with having inaugurated an era of greater psychological and sociological realism in political 
science, but on the subject of representation his insights were really quite derivative of Bagehot and were familiar 
Victorian thoughts. For the conventional wisdom about Wallas’s originality, see e.g. the assessments cited in Sugwon 
Kang, “Introduction: Graham Wallas and Liberal Democracy,” in Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, v-xxix. 
 
1471 See e.g. Wallas, “The American Analogy,” 513: “A ‘Baconian’ democrat would try to found his electoral system, not 
on any conception of what the voter ought to be, but upon as exact an estimate as he can form of what the voter is, and 
can in the near future become.” 
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widely implemented, but comparison with them is illustrative. Importantly, both of them were listed 
as “proportional systems” in Hoag and Hallet’s Proportional Representation of 1926, which doubled as 
one of the great early American textbooks on electoral systems and a work of advocacy for STV.1472 
 The first, which Hoag and Hallett named the “schedule system,” replaced the voter-
designated transfer with a candidate-designated one.1473 It was sometimes stipulated that before the 
election the candidate would publish a list of the other candidates to which his surplus of votes 
would be given, but this was not an essential provision; some proponents were happy simply to 
leave the transfer to the candidate without any binding declaration of how he would use it. For this 
reason I prefer to call it the candidate-chosen transfer, to highlight the real point of opposition with 
STV – that what Hare and company wanted done by the voter was now to be done by the politician 
who received the votes. This plan was actually endorsed by several prominent Victorian writers on 
representation, including Dodgson, the English barrister Walter Baily, and the Irish barrister 
Archibald Dobbs.1474 
 The second was what Hoag and Hallett dubbed the “proxy system.”1475 On this plan there is 
no transfer whatsoever; instead a threshold of votes is established for election to the assembly, and 
then the voting power of each member is weighted according to the number of votes received 
beyond the threshold. Thus in deciding on a bill the vote of a Gladstone might be worth, say, fifty 
times more than the vote of an obscure backbencher and twice as much as a respected Cabinet-level 
statesman. This proposal does not seem to have been championed by any eminent Victorians, but it 
                                                 
1472 Although both were American academics, Hoag and Hallett were very well-versed in English theory and institutions. 
 
1473 Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation, 53-6. 
 
1474 Dodgson called this the “clubbing method,” which he took to be the “chief novelty” of his “‘Proportional 
Representation’ scheme. He was wrong to think it novel, however, since both Baily and Dobbs had beaten him to it. See 
Abeles “Introduction to ‘Proportional Representation’,” 116, 119; Dodgson, Principles of Parliamentary Representation, 192-4; 
Baily, A Scheme for Proportional Representation (London: W. Ridgway, 1869); Dobbs, General Representation, On a Complete 
Readjustment and Modification of Mr. Hare’s Plan (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1871). 
 
1475 Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation, 57-9. 
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does resonate with the Carylylean countercurrent in English political culture which wanted to 
unshackle and foster strong leaders in a way that parliamentarism historically had not. In light of this 
affinity and its potential to massively empower a few very popular politicians, we might call this the 
Caesarist assembly. 
 The presentation of these two alternatives, scanty as it is, is enough to suggest the crucial 
point: namely, that Hare’s version of the transfer was far from an obvious device to include if 
mirroring alone (or even mirroring plus the minimization of wasted votes) were the goal of reform. 
It is unclear why the accurate reflection of first-preferences realized by weighting voting power 
according to vote share or transferring at the candidate’s discretion suffered any deficit of mirroring in 
comparison to the employment of the medley of higher and lesser preferences demanded by the 
transfer to secure equal quotas. Earlier it was shown, in connection to claims such as Courtney’s that 
PR would liberate thought and increase multiplicity of opinion, that what was posed as a matter of 
whether parliament would or would not be a mirror of the nation was actually better understood as a 
question of what kind of nation one wanted parliament to be mirroring. Similarly, evaluating the 
transfer on the baseline of accurately reflecting preferences could only be indeterminate; one could 
not travel solely from this norm to the institution of STV. It was, at the least, arguable that the 
Caesarist or candidate-chosen assembly was more faithful to the salient facts of parliamentary life 
and to the way in which opinions about parliament were actually formed.1476 
                                                 
1476 Dobbs, for instance, was emphatic that his switch to candidate-designated transfers was a remedy not just for the 
“practical difficulty” associated with voter-designated transfers but was also an improvement in terms of the assembly’s 
representativeness: “Each candidate can have only one seat in the House, and one vote in divisions of the House, but 
even now votes in the division list are of very different weight in the public estimation, though of equal voting power. A 
statesman of high character, by whatever constituency he may be elected, though it were the smallest and least 
important, has necessarily more weight and influence in the great council of the nation than an insignificant person, 
though he should sit for the largest borough or county in the realm. High character, intellect, statesmanlike power and 
ability, together with the political influence which ought to and generally does accompany them, must under all 
conceivable circumstances have their weight; the plan, as modified, herein, makes evident the general popularity of each 
statesman, and enables him to gauge it for himself at each election, just as the changing height of the mercury in a 
barometer shows the varying weight and ebb and flow of the atmosphere, or as the fluctuating quotations on the Stock 
Exchange are a sure indication of the rising or falling credit of States or Companies, and the shifting to and fro of 
investments”; Dobbs, General Representation, 1, 16-7. 
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 If the superiority of the single transferable vote could not be proven by appeal to the value 
of representativeness alone, it had to be preferred, ultimately, on another ground. And this was, I 
think, the conviction that these alternatives would undercut the possibility of the kind of assembly that 
Hare, STV advocates, and indeed a broad consensus among thinkers about representation wanted. 
Such an assembly had to be numerous to include many shades of opinion and interest such that a 
working division of epistemic labor might form; it had to avoid being given over to a monopoly of 
any social group or all-powerful figure such that “will” might silence reason; it had to possess a 
margin of independence from party dictates and from temporary shifts in desire at the local level; it 
had to empower candidates to follow their consciences, to change their minds, to debate in good 
faith. What Hare’s version of the transfer could do better than these other “proportionalist” 
arrangements, the Victorian PR reformer believed, was deliver a true “deliberative body,” make the 
Commons a “place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even 
passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other interests and opinions, can 
compel them to listen, and either comply, or state clearly why they do not.”1477 Even in the 1910s, 
when the luster of the deliberative Commons had waned, it was still a core element of the STV creed 
that “duties of discussion” were preeminent in parliament and that the “common will” which its 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Even the young Bagehot, in one of his most contrarian moods, defended the Imperial practice of Louis 
Napoleon specifying his candidates before elections to the National Assembly with arguments that could justify the 
Caesarist or candidate-chosen parliament: “Nor do I concur with those who censure the President for “recommending” 
avowedly the candidates he approves. It is a part of the great question, How is universal suffrage to be worked 
successfully in such a country as France? The peasant proprietors have but one political idea, that they wish the Prince to 
govern them;—they wish to vote for the candidate most acceptable to him, and they wish nothing else. Why is he wrong 
in telling them which candidate that is?”; Bagehot, “Letters on the French Coup d’État of 1851,” 81. 
 A final example: Dodgson maintained in a similar spirit that the “clubbing” or “candidate-chosen” technique 
just accorded better with what it was actually like to want someone to represent you in parliament than the voter 
supplying a rank-ordered list did: “somebody shall decide how to use the surplus votes. But who? …Surely the Electors 
would not have so much confidence [in anyone] as in the man himself [for whom he voted]. And to him I would refer the 
question, who is to have the surplus-votes. The Elector should be made to understand that, in giving his vote to A, he 
gives it him as an absolute property to treat as he will – either by using it to secure his own return, or to help another 
candidate of whom he approves, or (if there be none such in the field) by leaving it unused. If he cannot trust the man, 
for whom he votes, so far as to believe that he will use the vote for the best, how comes it that he can trust him so far as 
to wish to return him as Member?”; Dodgson, “Parliamentary Elections,” 158-9. 
 
1477 Mill, “Recent Writers on Reform,” 358; Considerations, 424, 433. And see e.g. Lubbock, Representation, 64; Courtney, 
“Representation of Minorities,” 153, “Political Machinery,” 81-2. 
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legislation was meant to embody required that every section of “the opinion of the community” be 
given “consideration” within it.1478 As with the variety-of-suffragist or the diverse democrat, the 
nineteenth-century proportionalist was guided not by an isolated ideal of representativeness, but by 
this ideal as it was shaped by a theory of deliberation and commitment to a certain image of the 
Commons. 
 And it was because it conflicted with this broader image, and not because it was 
undescriptive or unrepresentative per se, that the PR community rejected these other 
proportionalisms. The candidate-chosen transfer was liable to the objection that it would further 
tighten the grip of parties, thus compromising the prospects for true deliberation in the assembly.1479 
The proxy system was even worse: in taking the unprecedented step of abandoning the “very old 
tradition” of “the equality of members in a representative body,”1480 it threatened to implant 
something resembling plebiscitary, autocratic government within hollowed-out liberal representative 
structures. These lesser-known schemes were not failures of mirroring from the PR viewpoint, since 
they could not be said in any obvious way translate the preferences of the electorate into the 
composition of the assembly incorrectly. But this did not mean that they were not deeply anathema to 
Victorian PR. It was just that the source of the distaste for them lay elsewhere: namely, in the 
anticipation that they would produce the wrong kind of assembly. STV was, then, far from a neutral 
“report” of what was “out there,” even if it eradicated certain forms of arbitrariness. Like the 
variety-of-suffragist, albeit to a different degree, Hare and company were engineering the machinery 
                                                 
1478 Williams, Proportional Representation and British Politics, 19. 
 
1479 See e.g. Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation, 56; John Chapman, “Politics, Sociology, Voyages, and Travels,” 
Westminster Review, vol. 41, no. 2 (Apr. 1872), 519-38, at 525. The fact that Meredith, that great trumpeter of list over STV 
judged Dobbs’s scheme a “considerable improvement” over Hare’s further supports the impression that it seemed to 
contemporaries to be more on the list side of the PR spectrum; Meredith, Proportional Representation in Ireland, 45. 
Interestingly, Dodgson was sensitive to this objection and in fact turned it back on the STV camp. He was among the 
large and influential group, mentioned above, that alleged that STV would in practice degenerate into competition 
between rival lists and increase the strength and rigidity of parties; Dodgson, “Parliamentary Elections,” 158. 
 
1480 Hoag and Hallet, Proportional Representation, 58. 
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of representation not just to mirror society, but to ensure the existence of a certain sort of assembly. 
 Rather unexpectedly, then, this subsection closes on a note similar to the previous one. The 
most singular aspect of Hare’s reinvention of representation in fact manifested his basic agreement 
with the historic parliamentary model. Above all else Hare was a devotee of something very close to 
the “Whig” ideal of the Commons which held the floor from Burke to Bagehot: a Commons at once 
stabilizing, educative, inclusive, uncorrupt, enlightened, diverse, and deliberative. His aim was to 
permit the assembly to continue to meet these criteria even after the utility of “the traditional 
method of filling the House of Commons” had ceased; he sought traditional ends by the only means 
he thought adequate to them, namely, nontraditional ones.1481 
 This conclusion fits the basic arc of nineteenth-century political thought. PR was essentially 
a product of a transitional age in the perception of representative government. As touched on 
before, the mid-century was the zenith of prestige for parliamentarism, but as the decades rolled on 
it became increasingly common to depict a crisis of parliamentary government, with the “mother of 
Parliaments” suffering from “declining respect.”1482 As with his anxieties about the tightening grip of 
centralized partisanship, which anticipated by a decade or so the main chorus of complaints about 
party government replacing parliamentary government, Hare was among the earlier voices to fret 
about the “diminution of that respect with which the House of Commons is now regarded.”1483 
When many of his peers still believed that the electoral-parliamentary system was functioning 
healthily if not perfectly, he was already viewing his mission as restorative.1484 Consequently in the 
                                                 
1481 Hare, Election of Representatives, 75. 
 
1482 Lubbock, “Proportional Representation,” reprinted in Political Pamphlets of Lewis Carroll, 140-4, at 144 (originally 
published in the Daily News, 15 May 1884); Lecky, Introduction to Democracy and Liberty, vii. 
 
1483 Hare, Election of Representatives, 102. 
 
1484 In this regard Hare was in a position parallel to that of his friend Mill on the liberty of thought: the bleakness of 
Hare’s assessment of then-current parliamentary politics struck many of his contemporaries as exaggerated in the same 
way that Mill’s cries against his society’s despotic conformity did; see ch. 2, section 2(b)(i). 
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early decades PR came under fire for being based in an alarmist, inaccurate diagnosis of the status 
quo: critics charged that he was offering a cure worse than the disease, that in trying to fix 
parliament he was jeopardizing something that was not broken in the first place. Later, as the 
century drew to a close, faith in parliamentary government crumbled. In this dourer climate PR 
proponents stood out for their unshaken devotion to the old ideal. Instead of contending that the 
PR camp was unduly critical, opponents now argued that their fidelity to the classical model of the 
Commons was quixotic; PR, they charged, was ill-equipped to revive a flagging parliamentarianism. 
Throughout the political and intellectual shifts of a half-century, Hareans remained devoted to an 
interpretation of what parliamentary politics involved. 
***** 
Conceptually and institutionally, proportional representation, like all “inventions” in politics, 
was a mix of old and new. It was also a medley of both variety-of-suffragist and democratic elements 
– and, within the latter school, of both the radical- and the deliberative-democratic strands – 
blending them in such a way that it is impossible to depict it as simply a new version of an old song. 
And yet it incorporate many of the standard melodies. It combined familiar themes from across the 
spectrum of authors examined in the previous three chapters – Diceyan, Kinnearean, Pochinian, 
Bagehotian moments – in ways that were not obviously internally coherent or mutually reinforcing, 
and furthermore it added a layer of norms and techniques peculiar to itself, such as electoral 
freedom and the transfer. It was neither solely democratic nor anti-democratic, neither an entire 
prolongation nor an overturning of the vision of the theory of electoral variegation. Perhaps the one 
qualifier that indisputably applies to it, though, is “Victorian”: it addressed itself to the full breadth 
of the theory and practice of representation in the world from which it emerged. 
It was Victorian in one final way as well – its failure to end the controversy over 
representation. There was wide (albeit not uncontested) assent to the general proposition that the 
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Commons should mirror the nation. The attempt to interpret and implement this ideal, however, 
gave rise to as much diversity as there was in the pluralistic society whose faithful reflection they 
sought to carry into the assembly. In 1866, still within a decade of Hare’s invention, Henry Vere 
Hobart began a plea for STV by lamenting the great “diversity of meaning” among the proposals for 
getting the country “duly represented in Parliament.”1485 Almost a half-century later, in much altered 
electoral-representative circumstances, Ramsay MacDonald observed in the course of an essay 
hostile to proportionalism that “a century of discussion has not yet settled in practice” the question 
of representation.1486 Not even “the great political doctrine of modern times” was equal to the task 
of resolving what was, in my view, the richest and widest-ranging debate about representation that 
has ever been seen.1487 
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